Comment and Discussion

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the

erosion of their command.

Engineering Duty Officers: be Dwindling Muster”

pages 46-54, December 1965 Proceedings)

Commander John D. Alden, U. S. Navy . etired)—Mr. Peck has done a great service finally bringing the scandalous neglect of ^e Engineering Duty corps into the open. ^yen while the Proceedings was going to ^Press, the two senior ED officers in the Navy, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Bureau of ' nips, submitted simultaneous requests for re­crement, rather than continue to preside over

The decline of the EDO is well docu­mented, but almost completely unknown out- j^fie specialized circles. Board after board ^as examined the problem and stated the |*^rgent need for increased technical expertise; ,°^ard after board has been followed by ac- ^p°n aimed at reducing the numbers, respon­sibility, and influence of the technical special- ^lsts in the Navy. Having served through 15 > ^ears of almost uninterrupted decline of the Hb corps I can aeree wholeheartedly with

Mr. Peck.

However, there are a few things, which he ¹⁽! not say, probably because he did not "'ant to lengthen the article unduly. One is a jb'nrd on the obstacles which have existed ^r°m the beginning to discourage line officers rorn entering the engineering duty specialty. . become an EDO, one has to go through a "gorous selection procedure followed by a enianding postgraduate course. The net ^efiect of this is to limit candidates for engi­neering duty to about the top third (in terms academic standing and professional fitness) each year group or class. The EDO must deliberately accept a career in which pro­motion has been wilfully made slower than in me general line, and in which the highest

rank achievable is two full grades lower than in the unrestricted line. Despite the rigorous selection, the EDO knows that he will be subjected to the same attrition as the un­restricted line officer every time he comes up for promotion. In this way the Navy, by administrative decision, insists on bleeding off a high percentage of its top technical talent.

To all this is added the indignity, written into law at the insistence' of unrestricted general line officers, that an EDO cannot exercise command at sea, even under emer­gency or casualty conditions. No matter how senior or experienced, as long as he is afloat he must yield command precedence to the greenest reservist or limited duty officer. Such outstanding officers as the new Chief of the Bureau of Ships, who came into the ED corps after rising through the unrestricted line to command of a submarine in combat, become, the instant they accept the 1400 designator, legally unqualified to handle a ship or even take charge of a motor launch en route to the liberty pier.

Mr. Peck lists a number of key billets which are going unfilled for lack of ED officers. What he does not mention are the hundreds of positions which have been abol­ished from organizational rosters since 1950 in an effort to reduce the requirements for engineering duty officers. These cuts in­clude key positions in the management of the naval shipyards—the industrial relations offi­cer, industrial engineering officer, shop superintendent, electronics officer, ordnance officer, and comptroller. All of these posts were formerly filled by experienced ED officers, but have since been turned over to civilians, the Supply Corps, or simply elimi­nated. Many of the functions have, through combining positions and double billeting, been added to the duties of the remaining, al-

ready overburdened, members of “the dwin­dling muster.” In the Bureau of Ships, as well, new duties and increased responsibilities have been imposed on the constantly decreas­ing nucleus of dedicated personnel. The fantastically small number who have held the line in key areas, as in the nuclear-powered submarine construction program, for exam­ple, would be unthinkable in industry or in a military organization such as the Air Force. I have figures only as far back as 1958, but note the following reduction in ED billets authorized (without regard to whether or not they were filled) in typical activities:

EDOs Authorized                                 1958  1964

Norfolk Naval Shipyard                         35       22

Mare Island Naval Shipyard                   34       24

Bureau of Ships (Headquarters)             197    176

The mistreatment of technical specialists has not been limited to ED officers. Indeed, by virtue of having had a bureau chief to stand up for them, they narrowly escaped the fate of the Aeronautical Engineering Duty group, which was abolished on the recom­mendation of the Franke Board of 1959, and the warrant officer program, which was all but scuttled in 1960-1961. Both groups had to be “reinvented” within a few years.

Although the Franke Board recommenda­tion to abolish the EDO designation was thwarted, time has indicated that this was only in the sense that a lingering demise by professional starvation was substituted in place of sudden death. As Mr. Peck so clearly shows, the group has been steadily whittled down and eroded away over the years. Finally, all the technical bureaus were down­graded and placed firmly under the thumb of a revamped Chief of Naval Material, who need not be a technical specialist. Even such technical recommendations as receive his blessing are increasingly subject to overruling, negation, or delay by layer after layer of non-technically qualified “review authorities” in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Department of Defense.

In the Department of Defense and the armed services the level of engineering authority has been pushed lower and lower in the organizational structure, despite repeated lip service to the expanding need for technical competence. As industry well knows, engi­neering judgment cannot be expected to pre­vail when the voice of the engineer is muffled, his advice ignored, and his authority to make or influence decisions is diluted to the verge of impotence.

In only one point do I take issue with Mr. Peck. He states that the Navy has “un­wittingly” allowed its engineering duty ranks to dwindle. The record shows that the shrinkage has been deliberate and has been done despite the protests of responsible tech­nical authorities.

If the old organization is indeed beyond salvage, it will surely have to be “reinvented.” For the good of the Navy, someone had better start trying to reinvent it soon.

Whatever Became of the Mine?

Lieutenant Commander James A. Meach- ^amj U. S. Navy (Mine Countermeasures Offi- ^ceri Mine Force, Atlantic Fleet)—It does not seem too many years ago that the United ' ^tates—particularly the naval community— ^{Was U}P in arms about mine warfare. After a "'holly unpleasant experience at Wonsan, we promised ourselves not to be caught again Without adequate countermeasures forces, and Pioceeded to build a truly formidable fleet °f minesweepers. More interesting—and more unportant—this effort contained considerable momentum, and the minesweeping forces and Petr equipment have been modernized and ^u Pda ted in a reasonable and commendable Way. But what of the mine?

It is a stepchild. The mine has fallen into disuse. The Navy does not think in terms of [Pines. The Navy thinks of countermeasures because many of us can remember a day When minesweeping was the Navy’s number °ne problem. But lost opportunities are not ^s° apparent, and mines are not much thought about today. There are several explanations I°^r the disinterest. First, the mine suffers from secrecy in design, in capability, in Production, and in stockpiling. Part of this ^secrecy is planned. Since the sea mine never really becomes obsolete as do some other Weapons, the need to safeguard the capability °f the weapon over great periods of time °Pposes the equally important requirement for wide support of the program both in and °^ut of the Navy. For example, the whole World knows that we want and need more effective aircraft, missiles, and torpedoes, and the industrial community responds with al­most fantastic ideas for improvement. The ^s[lent mine program enjoys no such competi­tion for its favors. In effect, we must feret out a contractor who is willing to produce at our direction. We are thus confined to a relatively small community and, I fear, in many cases t° a community with little imagination. To a yery real degree the same condition prevails ^lr> the Navy, where many senior officers and Policy-makers are unaware of the real capabil- *ty and flexibility of the sea mine. To a great ^extent, this is due to the unfortunate titles ^line Force, Atlantic Fleet, and Mine Force, Pacific Fleet. These titles were surely meant for two admirals who would take care of the peripheral business of mine warfare, and no one else need concern himself greatly.

For a goodly number of years, strategic deterrent and the “big bang” were the corner­stones of our national strategy, and the mine, however admirable a weapon of conventional (or unconventional) warfare, is hardly a reasonable response to a nuclear attack. To­day it appears that we have at least partially recovered from our nuclear intoxication, and realize that there are and will be wars of a lesser scale.

Other reasons for the demise of the mine, in no particular order or priority, include: the obvious disadvantage of having mines in a piece of ocean that we might want to go through in the near future; our national character, which is curiously antipathetic to such things as shots in the back, “sneak” attacks, and sea mines; the understandable preference of submariners for torpedoes and aviators for bombs and rockets; and the plain unavailability of mines and mine assembly personnel.

The mine does not have a place in every naval endeavor, but in some circumstances, it is the very best weapon. Yet it is generally overlooked in the search for answers.

The remedy for this neglect is simple. We must think about mines and uihat they can do for us. The advantages of the mine are many; they can be laid from almost any craft, provided that there are a few people that can handle them properly. Mines are weapons that wait; once placed, they do their job without further inputs, and the delivery agent is free to go about other affairs. In a sense this is eating one’s cake and still having it.

Mines are absolute and non-discrimina­tory. Consequently, a minefield can some­times be advertised to good effect. No one in his right mind would tell an enemy or potential enemy “stay out of thus-and-such place, for I have a submarine lurking there,” but an impersonal minefield is another thing. In an extreme case, one could even shed alligator tears: “We put those mines in be­cause we weren’t sure of your intentions. We’re sorry.” But the field is still there and only the hardiest of mariners would challenge it. It can be activated and sterilized at times known only to the layers.

Despite talk of a "balanced fleet,” there are today no sur­face minelayers in the active U. S. Fleet. What mines are planted—for training and de­fensive operations—are sown by aircraft, submarines, and various ships fitted with jury- rigged mine facilities, such as the tug Salirtan (ATF-161) shown here with Mark 6 practice mines.

Mines are cheap; if we are called upon to blockade something or someplace, a mine­field generally costs less than even the fuel for a blockading force (to say nothing of the amortization costs).

This list could be continued at some length. The point is that mines have characteristics possessed by no other weapon. These may be of great value in foreseeable situations as well as in certain circumstances which may not be anticipated.

There are certain preparations we should make in addition to thinking, although that is probably the most important. First, we must face up to this business of delivery agents. It is easy to fall into the circular trap of failing to use, improve, and ultimately to procure mines because of lack of delivery agents, and then to turn about and fail to provide for delivery agents because the mines are not available in the configurations or quantity desired. Unhappily, we may now be part way into this trap.

For operations short of a “major war,” we have delivery agents now. Commanders at all levels and in all forces can plan and work with mines to sec what mines can do for them; the forces which can deliver mines should do so routinely for training, even though the direct benefits to them may not be apparent. We need to enlarge some missions to include mining.

It is ironic that the mine forces today are among the least able to deliver mines. The mine forces are in reality countermeasures forces, and few ships are as poorly adapted to carrying mines as is the minesweeper.

It is probable that we need some full-time minelayers. A nuclear-powered submarine minelayer or two, cruising secretly or simply loaded and available on short notice, would be of immense value under some circum­stances, even if we cannot justify such ships in terms of targets destroyed in a hypothetical situation. Perhaps the installation of tracks for moored mines on a certain number of sur­face ships is worthwhile. Contrary to popular belief, a field of moored mines spiced liberally with sweep gear obstructors is one of the black beasts of mine countermeasures today. These mines are highly reliable, require little advance preparation, and can be laid in great depths. Depth taking is automatic, hence detailed loading plans are not re­quired.

Somehow, we must all have all kinds of

Pages 26-36, September 1965,

and

fective.

naval gunfire support must have the

f^ines readily available so we can get at them °ⁿ short notice if they are needed. This is more difficult than it sounds, but is unques­tionably within our capacity. The mine is a good weapon of opportunity, but it is normally not considered because by the time *t is available the opportunity to use it is gone.

Finally, we must not hesitate to use mines ^Vvhen we need them. A minefield or a mined ^{aiea ca}n be sterilized at a preset time with ^{a Ve}ry high reliability. To make sure, we sweep it afterwards. There is some risk, but ¹¹ is small.

It seems clear that we have been caught ^UP in the trap of pushing what “sells.” This is a vast and complex, but deadly serious usiness, and can easily result in failure to 0->tain what is really needed in the long run.

torpedoes can sink more ships than mines in f hypothetical situation, shall we therefore ,^lave no mines, but only torpedoes? We must ,^{K Ver}y careful with such trade-off decisions.

submit that there will be uses for the mine ^ tch we cannot foresee. The mine’s unique futures demand we keep it in our bag, always 'cady for use. We must practice with it, plan '^V1th it, and use it when we need its services.

7 he Gun Gap and How to Close It”

(See,

P^age 112, January 1966 Proceedings)

Commander Robert J. Alexander, U. S. •Navy i

am in general agreement with the ' ^eas Put forth by Colonel Heinl, but differ la^arpl^y him on the need for 1:25,000 §^e scale maps for naval gunfire support. ^or purposes of clarity in this discussion, ^rnaps refer to land features and charts refer to Haiine navigational information. To be ef­

^Sa,rie map as the land forces—a map with Pi'ecise topographic information not carried °ⁿ normal charts. The problem is, therefore, military mapping problem as opposed to a naval charting problem.

he need for 1:25,000 scale maps for ulery and shore bombardment purposes as been given extensive study, within both ^e FJ. S. armed forces and NATO. It was the j. ^anim°us conclusion of all concerned that • -h000, although a desirable scale for ¹ _^ry use, imposes such a logistic burden ^at it is not an operationally feasible scale.

In this regard, four times as many 1:25,000 scale maps are required for an operation as 1:50,000 maps. When we consider that an Army or Marine division normally requires 1,500 copies of each large scale sheet plus an equal amount in reserve, it is apparent that the map stockage and logistic problems will be considerable. In addition, map production facilities, such as the Naval Oceanographic Office and Army Map Service, are already working at full capacity to meet requirements of new weapon systems.

With less than one-tenth of the world ade­quately mapped at the 1:50,000 scale, it would be a mistake to expend funds and car­tographic effort on mapping at the 1:25,000 scale, especially when the scale imposes logistic handicaps without giving any marked benefit in accuracy.

With modern technology, one can now obtain far greater accuracy by using a com­puter carried in a truck or van than by manually plotting, as was done during the Korean War and World War II. Further­more, the accuracy that could be obtained from a 1:25,000 scale map, even under the most favorable circumstances, has always been highly overrated.

The inherent error in the best 1:25,000 map is +20 feet. An improperly sharpened pencil, or changes in humidity, perspiration, and other factors affecting the stretch of the paper, can increase the plotting error to as much as +100 feet. This is certainly not fire control accuracy.

However, the breakthrough came in the mid-1950s, when advances in aerial photog­raphy and other mapping techniques made it possible to produce 1:50,000 scale maps with the same detail and accuracy as were formerly found in the old 1:25,000 scale. It was only when sufficient accuracy was at­tainable in the 1:50,000 scale that the United

ENTER THE FORUM

Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.

nnum

LOGISTICS

By Vice Admiral G. C. Dyer, USN (Ret.)

A basic text in logistics written for the naval officer seeking knowledge in this critical field. Emphasizes applied logistics within the Navy, describes joint, national, and international logistics planning. List Price $7.50 Member's Price $6.00

States and other NATO nations abandoned the 1:25,000 as an essential scale. We can see, therefore, that the problem was thoroughly studied and was not swept under the carpet as stated by Colonel Heinl.

The whole problem of maps and charts for our operating forces brings us to a point which deserves further elaboration. A map or chart is very different from other logistic items such as guns, trucks, or C rations. A gun, for example, can be used anywhere in the world, but a map is useful only on the plot of real estate that it portrays. Simi­larly, trucks and beans can be shifted from theater to theater, but maps are good only for specific areas.

This means that if a cartographer is to provide our forces with the maps needed for an operation, he must be told in quite some detail where the operation will occur, how it is expected to develop, and what map coverage will be required. As a mapping specialist, I have been singularly unsuccessful in getting this type of information from operational planners.

What they forget is that maps and charts take a long time to produce and cost a lot of money. As an example, a survey ship can chart about 50 miles of coast a year. Be­fore the ship can start work, diplomatic clearances must be obtained and aerial photography flown. In addition, it takes a minimum of one year for the Naval Oceano­graphic Office to smooth plot the data and publish the chart after the survey has been completed.

For a rough estimate, one can say that it takes four years from the time a planner says he wants a new chart until he gets it. This assumes, of course, that the chart is for an area accessible to our ships and has a high enough priority to warrant diverting ships, aircraft, and map production from other priority work. Further, each chart will cost more than one million dollars and will take more than 1,000 man-years of sup­port and cartographic time to produce.

In view of limited funds and extremely limited cartographic resources, it is essential that we program our mapping effort as effectively as possible. This will require very detailed planning and close co-ordination between operational planners and map producers now so we will be ready in war.

"The Biological/Chemical Warfare Challenge”

(Seepages44-51, September 1965,

and pages 117-118, December 1965 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander C. D. Johnson, U. S. Navy—Captain Saunders’ article was excellent. However, there is one incident, that appears to be inaccurately reported. The SS Francis L. Lee was reported to have been subjected to an exercise aerosol attack shortly after World War I, and after the expenditure of 50,000 man-hours in un­successful attempts to decontaminate her, was sunk.

The Francis L. Lee was constructed during World War II by the Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard in Baltimore, Maryland. Early in 1946 she was loaded at Hamburg with a cargo of 5,000 tons of German bombs filled with toxic materials, predominantly mustard. Some of the bombs were designed as fire (Flam) bombs and were of light steel con­struction with a longitudinal weld. It was

liquid

mustard that caused the gross con­

tions

recommenced on 5 August 1946.

these bomb cases which were filled to |^;aPacity (leaving no expansion room) with

tamination of the Francis L. Lee.

After crossing the Atlantic, unloading °Perations were begun at Mobile, Alabama, "t July 1946, These operations were halted ^ ^several of the bomb cases ruptured due ⁰ andling and the internal pressure build-up °m the increased ambient temperature. It '^Vas then decided to tow the Francis L. Lee J^{1 a} point in the Chesapeake Bay off the gcwood Arsenal for further unloading and ^ec°ntamination by Army crews under the control and guidance of technically trained Personnel from Edgewood. Unloading opera­he exact amount of toxic materials spread n oughout the ship is unknown. One estimate *'1 icated that holds two, three, four, and five ^Us parts of the engine room, shaft alley, and ^Ia‘ⁿ sumps contained 1,000 gallons of |ⁿustard and 10,000 gallons of mustard con- ^aminated water. In addition, hold dunnage, ^anding mats, and some 200 tons of rock and ^Sand ballast were heavily contaminated. An stiniated 51,000 man-hours, 26,000 pounds

₀           chloride of lime, 1,500 pounds of caustic j° ^a’ ^and 2,200 gallons of DANC solution a

' c°ntaminate—were used during the Edge- °°d unloading and cleanup. Direct costs ^,^{cre 4}0,000 dollars with indirect costs prob- ^y *^{n exce}ss of that amount. The ship

₁           ^as dually delivered to the Maritime Com- Ussion with a certificate of decontamination ⁿ 16 October, three months after her arrival ⁿ ^e United States.

s an epilogue, further contamination was ^IS<:overed in two hitherto unknown bilge ^Partments during shipyard work in Balti- _T°'e ^shortly after she had cleared Edgewood.

• !^s. ^rcsulted in mustard burns to three

ian yard workmen and another 170 man- _c°urs of effort before the Francis L. Lee was ^usidercd clear of contamination. To the j . this writer’s knowledge, the ship ^ncd the Maritime Administration reserve ^CCt *ⁿ Wilmington, North Carolina, in the inter of 1946-1947 and remained there until ^^Was sold in early 1965.

‘ ev eral conclusions can be drawn from this ^e*Perience:

It Would be difficult, if not impossible, for

an enemy to contaminate a ship by tactical means to the extent the Francis L. Lee was contaminated.

•       Gross contamination of a ship could be achieved by subversive or accidental means or through battle damage.

•       Once gross contamination with a per­sistent material has been achieved, decon­tamination would be expensive, hazardous, and time consuming, even under non-tactical conditions.

•       Compartmentation of a warship would tend to localize contamination. However, common drainage systems, wiring trunks, etc., could readily eliminate this advantage by providing avenues for spreading, plus areas inaccessible to decontamination efforts.

"Assignment to New Construction”

(See pages 68-77, July 1965,

and page 113, November 1965 Proceedings)

Lieutenant William F. Schretzman, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired) (Chief Officer, SS American Chieftain)—As one of seven civilian officers on board the USS America (CVA-66) during her builder’s trials and preliminary acceptance trials, I could not help but chuckle over Lieutenant Buell’s warning about civilians such as we. His statement that a civilian crew has methods of operating a ship that appear to be in conflict with certain standard naval operating procedures is doubt­lessly, and of necessity, true.

He followed this warning with, “Despite its unorthodox ways, however, the civilian crew always seems to manage to get the ship out and back safely. This record can be a source of comfort during anxious moments underway.”

I do not know what “anxious moments” Lieutenant Buell experienced with his civilian trial crew, but I can say that in the case of the America she was operated by seven licensed master mariners experienced in all types of vessels from the SS United States through the most modern cargo liners in world service today. The shipyard crew on board was qualified, helpful, and performed its tasks efficiently and as ordered. During the trials the America was put through all of her tests safely, without incident, and in full compliance with the applicable laws applying to her at the time, including International Rules of the Road as well as Inland and Pilot

Aboard thu VSS Monitor: I ilti'2

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Rules. Coast Guard emergency drills were complied with as well as required pre-sailing tests of equipment. I find it surprising that Lieutenant Buell finds these procedures “unorthodox”!

Then again, perhaps I am on the wrong tack: perhaps the vessel to which Lieutenant Buell alludes had “bugs” which required her civilian crew to be a bit “unorthodox” in order to get her back to the yard safely.

Most civilian officers and crews are well aware of the complexities involved in operat­ing a naval vessel with regard to special sys­tems. But when it comes to sailing and sea­manship I can say that we, too, have been in business for a very long time and somewhat successfully at that.

"Naval Communicator—

Specialist or Subspecialist?”

(See pages 72-78, September 1965,

and pages 114-115, December 1965 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander William F. Fos­ter, U. S. Navy—It is true that the naval officer comes to the communications billet in a technical agency such as DCA at somewhat of a disadvantage with respect to the tech­nical details of long-haul communications over land-lines and submarine cables. How­ever, the other side of the coin is equally meaningful. The naval officer with wide fleet communications experience possesses an ability to look at the broad, over-all picture involved in joint actions in the communication field. Officers of other services with detailed communications knowledge of a technical nature are very often enmeshed in technical detail and lack the ready ability to sit back and view the over-all impact of an action divorced from the circuit control aspect. The background for independent action accrued by the naval officer with command experience places him in a good position in the “joint arena.”

While the naval officer may be at a dis­advantage with regard to the long-haul cir­cuits, he is an expert in dealing with the aspects of communication unique to the naval service and which have become an important part of joint command, control, and communications (single sideband voice, broadcast communications, ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship communications, etc.). This knowledge makes him a valuable part of the joint team.

From personal experience and observation, I conclude that the naval officer, by his rather unique training and experience, stands in good stead once conversant with the “give and take” of the joint arena. By and large, the capacity for independent thought which is nurtured by the naval service contributes to his ability in this area of endeavor. The career patterns recommended by Admiral Wadleigh will contribute to the viability of the communications subspecialist in competi­tion for selection to higher rank and assure the availability of his naval and “joint” capabilities in the senior ranks.

"Carrier Employment Since 1950”

(See pages 26-33, November 1964,

and pages 114-116, November 1965 Proceedings)

William R. Walsh—General Smith’s re­marks are not consistent with his thesis of objectively evaluating the performance of aircraft carriers; he underrates their role by misstatements of fact.

land

targets left that warranted the carrier

n                                                                     lv.1 L 11 let. L Well 1 ailU-U Lite

^c'et s attention. It also became increasingly j *^ai that the U. S. carrier forces which had ^{JCcn n}'issed at Pearl Harbor were the only ^Se'ious threat to Japan’s war aims. Conse­quently, the Japanese carrier force was em- P °yed against the U. S. carrier fleet and ^c ustroyed by it. Even at Midway, the decisive tuning point, the Japanese successfully at- acked the island installations while land- ^>a'^S(;d aircraft were singularly unsuccessful in attacking the Japanese naval forces.

1 he U. S. carrier forces were even more Successful against land targets. At no time, " ^my knowledge, did shore-based planes

to

def«

AI

exandria trying to re-equip her depleted

dmiral McDonald’s statement regarding ^e Performance of Japanese and American ^ca>ner success against land-based opposition seems quite factual when carefully examined.

earl Harbor was not the “only” successful •Japanese carrier strike against land installa- jons. The raid against Darwin, Australia, I'¹ ebruary 1942, support operations during ^e early Southwest Pacific drive, and the 'aids against Ceylon in April 1942, can scaicely be considered failures. Following ^lcse early victorious months of the Pacific |^va,> Japanese carrier strikes against land ^argets largely ceased. In fact there were few

^eat an attack by U. S. carrier-based air- p^r , ^ar>d this includes Atlantic as well as acific operations.

Unfortunately, the Royal Navy was less ^Successful in its carrier operations. Of six operational carriers in 1939 only one, the jJ. R°yal, could be considered a modern ship.

"tain’s failure before the war to develop "'liable carrier aircraft was a further handi­cap throughout the war. In spite of these "advantages, British carriers were largely Successful in their primary mission of assisting *c fleet in operations against Axis warships. ^e Taranto raid of November 1940 was a ⁿ°.^,a achievement.

_o^ne Royal Navy did suffer grievous losses ^ Crete, though not as serious as General "uth’s tally—the two battleships were dam- ^aScd, not sunk. It should not be implied at this occurred because of a failure of Uaval aviation. During the period 20 May to P 'Une 1941, the only British carrier in the ^astern Mediterranean, the Formidable, was in

air group. To provide some relief for Crete, she raided the main enemy airbase at Scar- panto with eight aircraft, but was damaged during withdrawal. The carrier forces avail­able were completely insufficient for the task. Had a serious effort been made to establish fighter bases on Crete during the preceding months the story might have been different.

The Mediterranean was a difficult operat­ing theater for carriers, but the British continually entered it. During 1941 and 1942 their carriers repeatedly made trips from Gibraltar to ferry aircraft reinforce­ments to Malta and provide cover for Malta convoys. The British lost no carriers to air attack in these efforts in the Mediterranean. General Smith’s comment that the carriers in the June 1942 effort to supply Malta were “driven from the Mediterranean” is rather strong considering that another convoy with four carriers sailed from Gibraltar toward Malta in August 1942 when the situation vis-a-vis land-based air support was certainly no better then in June.

Returning to the Pacific theater, it cer­tainly seems an oversimplification to at­tribute Admiral Kurita’s withdrawal at Leyte Gulf to the availability of the Tacloban airstrip. A message that this field was avail­able for refueling carrier planes was known to Admiral Kurita and was one of many in­fluencing factors. His loss of heart would seem to be a result of the cumulative effect of three days of combat during which he had had his original flagship sunk from beneath him by a submarine and had endured heavy attacks from U. S. carrier-based aircraft. At the moment of decision his staff believed heavy U. S. naval units were closing and he was even then suffering from gallant destroyer and escort carrier plane attacks.

Nor is it correct to say that carrier forces did not attack until Japanese air power was subdued. The fast carrier forces repeatedly raided strong Japanese airbases in order to destroy or neutralize Japanese air power: Truk in February 1944, the Marianas before the batde of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, Formosa in October 1944, and Indochina in January 1945, are examples. Prior to the Okinawa invasion the carrier fleet raided the Tokyo area in February 1945 and the Kyushu airfields in March. Then the B-29s took over suppression activities while the Fleet sup­ported the assault on Okinawa. As the Okinawan campaign drew to a conclusion the Fleet returned to raid Japan during May and June and carried out strikes until the end of the war.

General Smith recognizes that the modern carrier is “an ideal instrument of national power.” I believe a closer examination of the record of achievement of carrier forces during World War II would increase his ap­preciation of their historical worth.

Stanley L. Falk (Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces)—General Smith’s comments on the subject of land-based vs. carrier-based aircraft include some very good points about the World War II experi­ence and about the dangers of oversimplifi­cation with which I agree. But I would like to point out some apparent errors in his remarks about the Leyte campaign.

While it is true that carrier aircraft were unable to remain over the Leyte beaches for long periods, it is also a fact that General Kenney’s land-based aircraft, especially the bombers, were unable to stage forward to the island as early as planned. Plans called for Army aircraft to begin reaching Leyte on A-plus-5 (25 October 1944), but the miserable condition of the captured airstrips and the high water table, marshy terrain, unstable soil, and continuous heavy rainfall at Leyte made it impossible to bring significant num­bers of planes into Leyte bases until the campaign was almost over. As a result, carrier aircraft had to fly cover and support missions for far longer than was originally intended.

It is also true that no carrier support was available from 24 to 26 October, but neither was there any land-based air support on those dates—nor could there have been. And while, as General Smith points out, Army aircraft did begin arriving on 27 October (A-plus-7), the condition of the fields and the state of the weather made it impossible for these planes to be based on Leyte in sizeable numbers for well over another month. They were unable to prevent the con­tinued large-scale arrival of Japanese rein­forcements on the island and for the most part could do little more than defend their airstrips against Japanese air attacks. In­deed, it was not until late November that Leyte-based American aircraft could fly their first direct support mission for the ground troops and they could mount no more than a dozen of these missions before the end of the year. Under the circumstances, had more carriers and carrier aircraft been available to assist the Sixth Army, the Leyte campaign might have ended far sooner.

General Smith further states that Admiral Kurita turned back from his advance on Leyte Gulf because he feared an air attack from the Tacloban airfield. This fear was cer­tainly one factor in Admiral Kurita’s decision, but it was not the main one. His primary rea­sons for turning back were: (1) his conclusion that even if he could fight his way into Leyte Gulf (and this is still questionable), he could do little effective damage against what he estimated were by then only a few empty transports; and (2) his desire to attack an American task force that Philippine-based Japanese planes had erroneously reported to be maneuvering off northeastern Samar.

"Safe Bearing”

(See pages 143-144, November 1965 Proceedings)

Commander W. J. Ashton, U. S. Navy— The concept and use of a “safe bearing” vis-a-vis a “danger bearing” is an example of a forthright, intelligent approach to a problem in basic piloting.

The “groundings, bent propellers, and ulcers” mentioned by Admiral King attest that there is less than adequate “smartsman- ship” on station today. What can be done to improve the situation?

One immediate move is to ensure that the navigator is free to use all his senses and experienced judgment as he considers all available ship sensors to determine past and future ship movements. If in a small ship the executive officer is also the ship’s navigator let navigation be his sole task in piloting waters.

A consideration not yet fully appreciated by all seagoing officers is the fact that today’s antisubmarine ships are true “deep draft” ships. The large, hull-mounted sonar domes of the modernized World War II ships and the deep, bow-mounted domes of the latest ASVV

^ hey Sailed to the Flying Boat’s Future”

^ce P^ages 82-91, November 1965 Proceedings)

^s !ps require clear water of a depth formerly associated with cruisers, not destroyers. As a ^result, the destroyer has lost effective man­euverability. The use of single-screw propul- ^on systems accentuates the maneuverability I'ficulties in many new ASW ships. The estroyer and escort ships must have the ^sa,ue high level of technical navigational competence and experience we have tradi- honally associated with larger ships. The commanding officer needs all the help he can get as h_e maneuvers in close waters.

^ he press of other programs, accelerated movement into graduate school, and glamour ⁰ other activities all prevent immediate ^uPgiading of the experience level on small combatants. However, additional “smarts- manship” must be used to ensure the safety ^ar*d readiness of the wide roaming “small ^ao>^s- Safe navigation in the South China ^ea or in the Persian Gulf is a most de­^manding task.

Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned ^r°m the naval aviation safety program. The ^{a v}ent of heavy, fast, and unforgiving carrier ^a o'Craft in the 1950s demanded increased mtcrest in safety by all aviation personnel, ucreased emphasis on the position of ^SclUadron safety officer was assisted by special fcademic courses, backed up in the squadron •* widespread use of written material, charts, cm toons, and all the other elements of a P¹ ofessional sales campaign. The product was

^ety; the results were encouraging. In- ^Cl cased interest in safety brought about lower accident rates and a resultant increase in squadron readiness. Is it not unusual that *• ^Cre is no similar effort in effect to help the commanding officers of surface ships? Details ? execution would of necessity be different ut the results could be the same—increased ^,eadiness. The need for increased skill or ^smartsmanship exists in our ships now.

ed Stone—The destroyer MacDonough '351) _Was commissioned in 1935, and Us could not have participated in the rescue °Peration for the 1925 flight. The ship which Dobably took part in the operation was the ^c estroyer MacDonough (DD-331), which was commissioned in 1921 and stricken in 1930.

Ronald Beerens—A great many contro­versial articles and material in various books related to U. S. naval aviation have placed a great deal of emphasis on the flight of the NC-4 to Europe in the early 1920s and little has been devoted to the first “sailor” who flew in the opposite direction, to Hawaii. I am not referring to Commander Rodgers, who we know sailed his plane during the last leg of his venture, but to then-Lieutenant William V. Davis, Jr., U. S. Navy, now a retired vice admiral affiliated with the Doug­las Aircraft Corporation.

Admiral Davis flew as navigator of the air­craft named Woolaroc while on a 30-day leave of absence from the Navy. For this venture he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

The Woolaroc was one of nine aircraft taking part in the Dole Air Derby, sponsored by James D. Dole, who saw Charles A. Lind-