Programs of economic and military assistance have been conducted by the United States since World War II to help maintain Free World security and stability and to help counter the mounting threat of world Communism.
Over the past 15 years, the value of military assistance as a tool of national security has been amply demonstrated. Military assistance has proven to be instrumental in checking Communist aggression in key trouble spots around the world, in preserving domestic order, and in promoting the modernization and economic development of newly emerging nations. It has strengthened our allies and advanced the influence of the United States generally throughout the non- Communist world.
Nevertheless, this military assistance stands today at a major turning point—a dangerous crossroads. Either such assistance must meet the changing requirements of our times or face the Congressional ax.
Military assistance funds authorized by Congress for FY 1965, were one-third lower than the average level of expenditures for military assistance over the past five years— and nearly 50 per cent below the amount recommended to meet current U. S. military needs around the globe.
Despite the fact that the calls for military assistance are increasing, the Senate authorization bill for the new fiscal year provides for only a two-year extension of the program as now constituted, and a re-evaluation of it at the end of that time. While these provisions were not accepted by the House in Joint Committee, the conferees of both houses of Congress urged the President to undertake a review of the entire aid program, with a view to directing it more effectively toward resolving problems of the world’s developing countries.
Plainly, Congress wants a dynamic aid program, not a routine subsidy; it wants to avoid public criticism of administrative procedures; and it wants better justification— and results—from the dollars spent.
In any review of the military assistance program, four areas command our attention today. First, on the rim of Asia in the Far East, military assistance requirements are rising and can be expected to continue to rise, at least for the duration of the struggle in Vietnam and the trouble in Laos To strengthen Free World resistance in this part of the world, additional requirements for Thailand can also be anticipated. And other Southeast Asian countries certainly will require assurances of U. S. assistance against the rising threat of the Communist Chinese, in the years to come.
Second, in the Middle East, that troubled realm that stretches from Tunisia to Burma, the countries which lie directly under the threat of Soviet military power now need and will continue to need our assistance to hold the frontiers of the Free World. But, ever more forcefully, we must insist that these countries participate in their own defense and shoulder the cost of the arms burden. Of concern, however, is U. S. control over MAP- supplied equipment to ensure that it is used in defense against Communist aggression rather than in border clashes with neighbors, as occurred during the recent India-Pakistan conflict.
Third, in Latin America, military assistance requirements may also rise as the United States urges OAS members to participate in regional and international peacekeeping activities. The current Dominican Republic stability operations will show the desirability of modifying the U. S. claim to primary responsibility for hemispheric defense, and in helping to support elite forces for mutual security.
Fourth, in Africa, internal security problems and the need to protect and expand U. S. influence will inevitably create increased requirements for military aid to the dark continent.
How can the United States recognize these world-wide security responsibilities, maintain its important politico-military relationships, encourage economic self-sufficiency within its alliances, and operate within current or reduced military assistance budget levels?
The key to future military assistance may lie in re-orienting the program from one of military assistance to one of military co-operation, for the burdens of freedom and the responsibility for world peace must be shouldered by all Free World nations. Pure grants or give-aways must be replaced by joint efforts and fair shares.
Re-orientation of military assistance to military co-operation involves much more than changing the letterhead on the stationery. Four steps are essential:
First, an intensified Military Assistance Sales Program must be undertaken. A stepped-up program can reduce the total cost of military assistance to the nation and still preserve and extend U. S. military influence consistent with U. S. national objectives, while offsetting the foreign exchange costs of maintaining the U. S. military position abroad. Greater sales efforts can also help us achieve such benefits as: standardization of equipment; joint acceptance of strategic and tactical concepts and doctrine through the use of common hardware; augmentation of allied military forces complementary to our own; and interchange- ability in material, services, and logistic facilities with the nations involved.
To make the sales program a successful one, foreign customer preference for U. S. material can be generated by hawking the material’s technical superiority and convenient price, including credit assistance, availability, and follow-up support through U. S. logistic systems.
By selling military material to meet force and equipment goals, we preserve and extend U. S. politico-military influence and help meet our economic goals at the same time.
Second, we should support specially selected elite international or regional peacekeeping forces. Military co-operation can be planned and organized to provide specific units on a country-by- country basis to make up a readily available force for multilateral peacekeeping when needed or called upon. By helping key allies to set up their peacekeeping forces to meet charter obligations, U. S. support of the United Nations, OAS, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and ANZUS, will also be extended.
All other grant-aid can be carefully planned for eventual phase-down by transferring the burden of support to the defense budgets of receiving countries, and by the commitment of U. S. forces against external aggression. Grant-aid would best be limited to material only, and in those amounts which the indigenous country can support. Our aim should be to make military assistance self-sustaining rather than self-perpetuating.
Third, we must support civic action and internal security programs in underdeveloped countries. Civic action is the utilization of foreign military and paramilitary forces in projects helpful to the local population in the fields of education, public works, agriculture, transportation, or other projects contributing to social and economic improvement.
Civic action, supported by MAP, can and should be designed to encourage and assist local forces in preventing or eliminating insurgencies inimical to U. S. interests. And this is best done by improving the relationship between local military forces and the local populace in a wide range of activities in which they work together, including road construction, village development, irrigation, school construction, rural health services, vocational training, and social welfare projects for youth opportunity and development.
Fourth, during overt aggression, we should provide for massive assistance through special appropriations. A sound security program in one area should not be jeopardized by transferring credits or reprogramming to meet unexpected critical emergencies elsewhere. Special appropriations such as were needed for Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo should be obtainable from reserve funds provided for forces operating in active theaters to avoid upsetting carefully-made plans and previous commitments.
These objectives of a military co-operation program aim at meeting, and are vital to, the long-term U. S. foreign policy goals of maintaining Free World integrity and freedom from Communism. To conform to changes in international relationships, they must be subject to periodic review and revision.
President Lyndon B. Johnson recently stated, “We will continue to support those nations who need help in resisting aggression.” His words echoed those of President Harry S. Truman who declared in a message to Congress almost 20 years ago:
I believe that it must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures—the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedom. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation.
These remarks, which heralded the Truman Doctrine, are generally thought of as marking the beginning of American foreign assistance. But foreign aid has a much longer history and dates back, in fact, to World War I, when the United States, long a debtor nation found itself called upon to bolster the efforts of the allies.
The United States loaned about 7 billion dollars in World War I before the Armistice, and 3.2 billion dollars in the postwar period. But foreign aid was then only vaguely regarded as an arm of U. S. foreign policy.
Major foreign policy issues began to develop in the 1930s in Asia and Europe as war clouds again gathered. Although there was no disposition on the part of the United States to enter the fighting as long as Great Britain held out against the Axis, the policy of bolstering British defenses in World War II was developed to forestall a complete Axis victory. A Lend-Lease program followed closely after a transfer of 50 destroyers to Great Britain, in exchange for base rights in British territory in the Western Hemisphere.
The United States soon became the arsenal of democracy as it expanded its own defense capabilities, while satisfying British defense needs, by lending or leasing material for the duration of the war. After Pearl Harbor, Lend-Lease accelerated, and the total value exceeded 48.5 billion dollars by the end of the war. Besides Great Britain, which received 32 billion dollars, Lend-Lease assistance was extended to 42 countries including two other principal recipients—the Soviet Union, which got 11 billion dollars and France, which received 3 billion dollars.
When the war ended, it quickly became evident that the Soviets wanted no further truck with capitalism. Russian recalcitrance at the United Nations, Communist-instigated civil war in Greece, pressure on Turkey to share control of the Dardanelles and surrender territory, and the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran confirmed that Soviet co-operation with the West was ending.
In 1948, a coup by Communist minority factions enveloped Czechoslovakia; the Russians tried to drive the Allies from Berlin by closing land and water access to that city; and the Red tide drove the Chinese Nationalists from the Chinese mainland. Later, the Communist bloc resorted to direct aggression in Korea.
The challenge in Germany was met by the Berlin airlift which supplied all food, coal, and other essentials to beleaguered Berliners for 11 months. The Korean challenge was met by United Nations’ action in which 16 nations sent troops to the aid of South Korea.
Countermeasures to Soviet aggression in the form of foreign aid fell exclusively on U. S. shoulders when the British, devastated by the war, terminated aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947.
President Truman’s response to the British plea, for the United States to prevent Greece and Turkey from falling under the Soviet yoke, became the first application of postwar foreign aid.
His pronouncement on extending aid remains a vital force in the world today. It still must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. The free peoples of the world still look to us for support in maintaining their freedom. If we falter in our leadership, we are even more likely now than ever to endanger the peace of the world.
Under the Greek-Turkish aid program, a total of 654 million dollars was spent in defense of freedom. Substantial aid was also given to Iran to enable this pivotal Middle East state to maintain its own security. Other aid went to the Chinese Nationalist government in a vain attempt to help stabilize the hold on the mainland, while the Philippines received a total of nearly 2 billion dollars for opposing the Communist-inspired Hukbalahap (HUK) attacks, as well as for reconstruction of their country.
The European Recovery Program—the Marshall Plan—responded to the economic crisis in Europe. As Western Europe approached an economic collapse, there were unmistakable signs of people turning to Communism, not because of ideological conviction but because of economic distress. The United States was the only country capable of retrieving Europe from the brink of post-World War II disaster.
The Marshall Plan operated from 1948 to 1951, and provided 12.5 billion dollars to participating nations. It succeeded in restoring and revitalizing the European economy, and it laid the basis for allied defenses under military assistance programs.
Continued vigilance on the Communist threat, on the part of the United States and its Free World allies was established through the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized the Director of Mutual Security in the Department of State to supervise over-all military, technical, and economic assistance activities. The Mutual Security Program, amended several times, remained in force for a decade before being replaced by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It included four basic components—military assistance, defense support, technical assistance, and the Development Loan Fund.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 completely revised underlying legislation that had governed the conduct of military and economic assistance. It was designed to give new vigor, purpose, and direction to the foreign aid program, and it provides for comprehensive programs of economic and military assistance to friendly foreign countries, as well as international organizations, while setting down administrative provisions for implementing this aid.
Under its provisions, Congress reaffirms that it is the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations. Congress also states its belief that the security of the United States is strengthened by assuring the security of other free and independent nations, and that this can best be done through measures for the common defense against internal and external aggression, including military assistance to these nations.
As a major tool of U. S. national security policy, military assistance must be co-ordinated effectively with parallel efforts in the fields of diplomacy, national defense, and economic aid.
Under terms of the prevailing Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Secretary of State, at the President’s direction, has responsibility “for the continuous supervision and general direction” of both economic and military assistance programs authorized by the Act. The Department of Defense exercises primary responsibility in the field of military assistance by determining military end-item requirements, integrating equipment procurement into Service programs, supervising the use of equipment in recipient countries, supervising the training of foreign military personnel, and establishing priorities for the procurement, delivery, and allocation of materiel.
Before a country can become eligible for military aid, the President must make a determination that the country is not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement. Restrictions have now been added which provide that no assistance shall be furnished to any country failing to take appropriate measures to prevent ships or aircraft under its registry from transferring any equipment, materiel or commodities to or from Cuba. Assistance is also suspended for countries that have nationalized, appropriated, or seized U. S. property without having made reasonable and prompt compensation of equivalent value.
Still another proviso stipulates that, commencing in FY 1966, aid be suspended to any foreign country which permits or fails to take adequate steps to prevent damage or destruction, by mob action, of U. S. property within its territory—until such time as the President deems it appropriate to resume aid. Military assistance is also suspended when a country or countries, such as India and Pakistan did in 1962 and 1965, use U. S.-furnished equipment for purposes other than defense.
The Military Assistance Program is drawn up each year on the basis of military requirements needed to meet long-term U. S. foreign policy and military objectives. In preparing the program—which is a job belonging essentially to the unified commands—strategic guidance is given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With this guidance, and supplementary instructions from the commanders of the unified commands, each Military Assistance Group advises the unified commanders in turn, as to the development of country plans and programs in the areas where they serve. The views of the Ambassador may also be offered to the unified commander and to the Department of State. The country-by-country assistance plans as well as the over-all program are then submitted to the Director of Military Assistance who co-ordinates the proposals with the State Department, Agency for International Development (AID), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The basic aim of the U. S. Navy in implementing its MAP responsibilities is to strengthen the collective sea power of the Free World by providing ships, aircraft, equipment, technical assistance and training to friendly naval forces.
The U. S. Navy’s MAP responsibilities involve participation and full support of all offices of the Department of the Navy. Overall direction is exercised by the Chief of Naval Operations through the DCNOs—Air, Logistics, and Plans and Policy.
The approved and funded program of the Secretary of Defense (ISA) is implemented by Bureaus, supply control points, and other interested offices within the Navy. Implementation uses the same resources and supply organizations that are used for Regular Navy activities, and procurement is integrated with Service procurement programs in accordance with policy guidance provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Logistics Negotiations (ILN).
The Chief of Naval Operations determines whether ships and Navy aircraft are to be supplied from reserve stocks or new procurement, and he issues specific directives to the pertinent Bureaus to implement the various parts of the program. The disposal of certain naval vessels, however, is prohibited without Congressional authorization, and the transfer or loan of such vessels to foreign nations requires a special act of Congress. In these cases, agreements are drawn up to cover the duration of the loan as well as title, replacement of equipment, appurtenances, consumables, fuel, etc., along with provisions for settlement of claims that may develop while the vessel is in the hands of the foreign country.
Sometimes, ships have been purchased outright. A total of 162 warships, amphibious, mine warfare, patrol, and auxiliary craft have been sold, in fact, out of a total of 2,415 ships and harbor craft that have been programmed for transfer to foreign nations between FY 1950 to FY 1963. In addition, a total of 19,404 aircraft have been committed for foreign delivery during the same period.
Argentina |
2 submarines 3 destroyers |
Korea |
1 destroyer 3 destroyer escorts |
Brazil |
8 submarines |
Netherlands |
2 submarines |
Canada |
1 submarine |
Portugal |
2 destroyer escorts |
Chile |
2 submarines 2 destroyers |
Pakistan |
1 submarine |
Colombia |
1 destroyer |
Spain |
1 submarine 5 destroyers |
Germany |
6 destroyers |
Nationalist China |
4 destroyers |
Greece |
3 submarines 6 destroyers |
Thailand |
1 destroyer escort |
Italy |
2 destroyers 1 submarine |
Turkey |
5 submarines |
Japan |
1 submarine 4 destroyers 2 destroyer escorts |
Submarines Destroyers Destroyer Escorts |
27 36 8 |
|
|
Total |
71 |
All loan agreements specify that the recipient country shall use the vessels solely to maintain its legitimate self-defense and to fulfill the policies of NATO, SEATO, CENTO and the Mutual Security Act or any other bilateral agreement that may apply. A total of 71 warships are currently on loan to foreign countries (21 May 1965) Table I.
The Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force have similar organizations and corresponding responsibilities in their military assistance programs.
By its nature, military assistance deals in military technology and hardware, but its purposes are rarely purely military. Like economic aid, it provides a flexible means of serving the national interest in a variety of ways. A political purpose is usually present and frequently a socio-economic one as well.
But even when the military motivation is dominant, the purpose of military assistance is neither uniform nor simple. At times, its main objective is to improve the capabilities for external or internal defense. At other times, we may wish to maintain elite or special forces to support United Nations or other international peacekeeping efforts. In still other situations, military assistance can be used to ensure the continued occupancy of military bases or facilities, to provide access to the recipient’s territory or air space, or to deny such access to a possible enemy.
The political impact of military assistance is general and unobtrusive, but it is more direct than usually realized. It creates a more favorable environment for American diplomacy by reinforcing and adding substance to an already present communality of interests between the United States and other nations. Ruling governments of recipient countries, meanwhile, are given specific support in terms of the American commitment, and close personal ties are created between American and foreign officers. As a result, the American position on most issues gets a sympathetic hearing, and conflicts that are contrary to American interests are significantly reduced.
Military assistance also facilitates the economic development and general progress of recipient countries. Often, forces supported by military assistance engage in economically- useful civic action programs. Some of the specific skills created by these programs have also proven helpful to discharged servicemen in later civilian life. Military assistance programs encourage a wider, more progressive attitude toward achieving higher standards of administrative and technological efficiency.
These various purposes may be expected to underlie military assistance, and to even grow in importance, in the years ahead. But emphasis on these programs is constantly shifting in response to the international situation. And the mood of Congress, as reflected in the latest rash of restrictions on the use of foreign aid by receiving countries, indicates possible reductions in program coverage. The interest of Congress in phasing-down the program in certain areas is also spelled out in the provisions of the Act which specify that no assistance shall be furnished to any economically-developed nation capable of sustaining its own defense burden and economic growth.
Finally, during consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, considerable discussion centered on a proposed Senate amendment calling for termination, by 30 June 1967, of the foreign aid program as now constituted, and asking a thorough review by a Planning Committee to determine the nature of any aid programs that might be continued after that date.
Although the Senate eventually withdrew this amendment, there was general agreement that there are many shortcomings in the foreign aid program which are basic, and which cannot be corrected merely by improvement in administrative procedures or quality of personnel. The Joint Senate- House Committee also said that so many changes have taken place on the international horizon since 1961 that a most careful, overall review of the fundamental thinking behind the foreign aid program is overdue. At the committee’s urging, President Johnson has established a General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs to evaluate their usefulness and make recommendations with regard to their future.
Several important developments on the world scene will influence future requirements for military assistance, and warrant examination:
• The changing nature of the Communist threat resulting from the Sino-Soviet split and the gradual loosening of Soviet controls over its Satellites;
• The economic resurgence of Western Europe and Japan and the recovery of national prestige and purpose in these areas;
• The molding of many nations, recently released from colonial empires, into regional groupings for both economic and military security purposes;
• The awakening of national aspirations in underdeveloped countries for human betterment and national progress;
• Rapid advances in military technology, including the increasing mobility of the U. S. armed forces, and;
• U. S. commitments to arms control agreements and United Nations disarmament agreements.
These trends, together with other factors we have examined, will surely influence the future course of our military assistance programs. We must face—and our friends must accept— the fact that U. S. military assistance is no longer what it once was. When World War II ended, we had gold in our coffers, surplus war materiel in our warehouses, and the need to help our allies forge a common defense against aggression. Now, our balance-of-payments deficit requires caution in allocating funds; surplus materiel is no longer available in quantity; pure military requirements are becoming limited to internal security, and politico-economic considerations are taking on greater importance.
It seems certain that military assistance will continue to be limited in the years ahead and must be re-shaped to meet its new challenges. In the future, international peacekeeping units in key countries will become cornerstones of our international relations. OAS countries currently participating in the Dominican Republic operation, for example, and others who guarantee forces when called upon for peacekeeping activities must be assured of our support.
Also, in the future, military assistance sales and co-operative agreements will assume greater importance. Increasing sales and decreasing grant-aid must be integrated in order to provide maximum political and economic benefits consistent with required military force levels.
And, finally underdeveloped countries lacking or weak in internal stability, and needing economic and moral bolstering, must continue to have the advantage of military assistance with its wide range of socio-economic as well as politico-military benefits.
Controversy will continue to prevail in countries where a government may not be able to provide for its security against external aggression. It would seem feasible for the U. S. military forces of the future with their increased mobility and new weapons, to indicate our nation’s interest, and disposition, to extend direct assistance when requested.
As the MAP transfer program continues to phase out “operational” assistance costs, grant-aid should be restricted to the equipment which a receiving country can maintain and operate through its own economic resources.
The Military Assistance Sales and Credit Program will serve the three-fold aim of strengthening the defense forces of the Free World by selling military equipment to meet force and equipment goals, preserving and extending U. S. military and political influence, and assisting in offsetting the costs of maintaining the U. S. military position abroad.
The achievements of military assistance in defense of U. S. national security policies and international peace have justified military assistance to foreign nations over the past 50 years. Sound planning in the area of military co-operation now in the light of changing world conditions will determine the status of military assistance in the future.