The early 1950s witnessed the construction by the United States of a collective security system that blankets nearly the whole of the non-Communist Far East. A chain of alliances was forged, running in an arc along the perimeter of Asia, extending in the North from Japan and Korea, through Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines, to Australia and New Zealand in the South. The alliance system, almost single-handedly the creation of John Foster Dulles, was directed principally at the threat of overt military aggression—a threat vivid in the minds of all at the time as a result of the Korean War.
We live today, in another decade, with the same treaty structure as the basis for U. S. defense relationships with the nations of the Far East. As we approach the 1970s, it is worthwhile to ask ourselves both whether the threat which these treaties were designed to meet remains the same and whether the collective security system which they created, a product of the 1950s, is adequate to the challenges of the future.
Our defense treaties in the Far East grew out of a variety of circumstances and were negotiated against quite differing backgrounds. The ANZUS Treaty, between the United States, New Zealand, and Australia and our bilateral defense treaties with the Philippines and Japan were signed in 1951 as an integral part of the Japanese peace settlement. ANZUS was, in a sense, the price which the United States paid for Australia’s and New Zealand’s adherence to the Japanese Peace Treaty. In 1950 and 1951, so shortly after the end of World War II, the Australians and New Zealanders were by no means assured that Japan would not again be a threat to their security. This feeling was undoubtedly shared by the Philippines which had suffered severely the effects of Japanese aggression—although with respect to the Philippines there was in addition an existing relationship of interdependence and a community of interest with the United States of which the Mutual Defense Treaty was merely a further expression. These treaties, then, were not specifically directed against Communist aggression and were in fact viewed at the time more as being insurance against Japan.
The Security Treaty with Japan, which was negotiated at the same time, was part of the U. S. effort to move Japan out of the postwar occupation period into a firm alliance with the West and on terms that would avoid Japan’s becoming a vacuum of power into which the nearby forces of Soviet and Chinese Communism could move. In 1947, Japan had adopted, with encouragement from the United States, a Constitution in which Japan forever renounced war and the threat or use of force and pledged never to maintain land, sea, and air forces. In these circumstances, the United States, in the 1951 Security Treaty, in effect assumed the responsibility for the external defense of Japan. By 1960, our relationship with Japan had changed radically, although the Japanese constitutional prohibitions remained unaltered; and a new treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security was concluded that reflected the renewed strength and vigor of Japan and the new partnership characterized by equality and mutuality.
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization— SEATO—is an alliance among Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Under a Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, SEATO’s protective umbrella has been extended to Laos, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam, although none of these states is a party to the Treaty or a member of the alliance. SEATO grew out of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the resulting settlement of the Indochina question in the Geneva Accords of 1954. The United States had refused to become a party to the 1954 Geneva Accords. Among other reasons, we did not believe that those agreements provided a satisfactory basis upon which the newly independent Indochinese states of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam could resist Communist encroachments. Secretary Dulles conceived of SEATO as providing the necessary bulwark against this threat in the Southeast Asia area. One unique aspect of SEATO, as a Pacific alliance, is that it is directed against the threat of subversion in the area as well as against aggression by means of open armed attack—a feature which is found in only one other United States defense treaty, the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (The Rio Treaty), from which SEATO borrowed the concept.
Our remaining two defense treaties in the Far East, those with the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, grew out of specific threats to those countries. The Korean Treaty was signed on 1 October 1953, shortly after the Armistice Agreement ending the conflict in Korea had been concluded. The threat of renewed aggression in Korea was very much in the minds of both parties at that time.
The signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China on 2 December 1954, followed by three months the opening of heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy and other offshore islands by the Chinese Communists. Oddly, the defense commitments contained in Articles V and VI of that Treaty do not extend to the offshore islands but are confined, with respect to the Republic of China, to Taiwan and the Pescadores. It is also noteworthy, in connection with the U. S.- China Mutual Defense Treaty, that in a separate exchange of notes, Secretary of State Dulles and the Chinese Foreign Minister agreed that while the Republic of China possessed the inherent right of self-defense, “in view of the obligations of the two parties under the said Treaty [of Mutual Defense] and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas [Taiwan and the Pescadores or the offshore islands] by either of the parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense.”
The heart of all of these treaties is contained in the commitment which each party undertakes to assist the other in the case of an armed attack against it. The formula which expresses this commitment is unusually uniform throughout all of our Pacific defense treaties. It is known as the Monroe Doctrine formula, adapted from the language used by President James Monroe to announce in 1823 that any extension of the European system to the American hemisphere would be considered by the United States as dangerous to our peace and safety. This formula was arrived at only after a most extensive constitutional debate in the United States over the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them till; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith . . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Article 11 states that the provisions of the treaty shall be carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The problem that arose in the U. S. Senate with this language was essentially a constitutional one. The checks and balances of the American constitutional system in the political field extend as well into the military and defense fields. Congress has the power “to declare war” and to raise and support armies. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and the Chief Executive of the United States, and is responsible for the conduct of the country’s foreign relations. The Senate was afraid that, through Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Executive Branch of the Government was attempting to usurp the authority of the Legislative Branch in this sphere by giving the President power to involve this country in warfare in Europe without the approval of Congress.
The problem can be traced back to the Constitutional Convention. The first draft of the Constitution gave the Congress the power “to make war.” Objections were raised to this formulation on the ground that Congress would be slow “to make” war. James Madison, among others, moved to substitute “to declare” for “to make,” leaving to the President alone the power, for example, to repel sudden attack against the United States. This substitution was adopted.
Would the language of the North Atlantic Treaty ultimately give the President the same powers to act alone in the event of an armed attack against, say, Norway, as if that attack had occurred on New York City? In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate was assured that the language of Article 5 in no way derogated from the constitutional powers of the Congress and that the President would act under the Treaty only in accordance with normal constitutional processes.
In order to avoid this kind of problem in our Pacific defense treaties, Secretary Dulles developed the so-called Monroe Doctrine formula. Under that formula, the parties know that an armed attack against any of them within the treaty area would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the others and agree that in the event of such an attack each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. This formula is found in all six of our Pacific defense treaties.
The constitutional issue just touched upon played a part in a different context under our treaty with the Republic of China. In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought advance Congressional concurrence in the use of U. S. armed force to protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and the offshore islands. The result was the so-called Formosa Resolution, a Joint Resolution of the Congress. That Resolution, referring to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deemed necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack as well as “such related possessions and territories of that area now in friendly hands” (i.e., the offshore islands).
More recently, President Lyndon Johnson sought Congressional support for his use of armed force abroad. After the North Vietnamese PT boat attacks against U. S. naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August 1964, the Congress adopted a Joint Resolution approving and supporting the President’s determination to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against U. S. forces and to prevent further aggression and declaring that
consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps including the use of armed force, to assist any member or Protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in the defense of its freedom.
In both of these cases—Formosa and Vietnam—even in the absence of a Joint Resolution of Congress, the President probably could have acted on the basis of his own constitutional authority alone to use American armed forces abroad (just as President Harry S. Truman did in Korea). But for political reasons as much as constitutional reasons, Congressional support was important.
There is also an interesting sidelight on the constitutional question in connection with our Philippine Defense Treaty. In a joint public statement issued by President Eisenhower and Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia on 20 June 1958, President Eisenhower made clear that “any armed attack against the Philippines would involve an attack against U. S. forces stationed there and against the United States and would instantly be repelled.” Again, in 1959, in the course of negotiations between the United States and the Philippines to revise our 1947 Military Bases Agreement, the United States reaffirmed the policy set forth in that Joint Communique and in an earlier statement of 7 September 1954, made by Secretary of State Dulles which said in part, “as between our nations, it is no legal fiction to say that an attack on one is an attack on both. It is a reality that an attack on the Philippines is an attack also on the United States.” A similar reaffirmation of this interpretation of our Mutual Defense Treaty was made publicly in June 1960 by President Eisenhower when he visited the Philippines. Thus, our defense commitment to the Philippines, stated in the Mutual Defense Treaty in “Monroe Doctrine” terms, has been interpreted in the very language of the NATO Treaty that gave rise to the whole constitutional issue which was supposed to have been resolved by the Monroe Doctrine formula.
It may be useful at this point to turn our attention to a particular alliance, SEATO, in order to illustrate some of the practical problems that arise under our Pacific defense treaties.
Article IV of the SEATO Treaty which contains the substantive defense commitments of the parties is divided essentially into two parts. Paragraph 1 provides that each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties, or against certain designated states which are not parties (Republic of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) would endanger its own peace and safety and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Paragraph 2 of Article IV states that if in the opinion of any of the parties, the inviolability or integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area or of any designated state is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which shall be taken for the common defense.
Now, in the first place, paragraph 1, which contains the obligation to “act,” applies only to “aggression by means of armed attack.” That situation is clearly distinguished in paragraph 2 from threats “other than by armed attack” in which case the obligation is merely one to “consult.” Lawyers have argued for ages as to the precise meaning of the terms “aggression” and “armed attack”; they will probably be arguing the same point for ages to come. But, for example in Vietnam, the problem is a very real and immediate one. “Aggression” and “armed attack” were fairly easily identified when, for example, German armies marched into Poland in 1939 and when North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel in the summer of 1950. But how should one view the clandestine and covert infiltration of armed personnel, political cadres and war materiel from North Vietnam into the Republic of Vietnam, combined with Hanoi’s support and direction of subversion in the South —is that “aggression by means of armed attack?” The U. S. government has concluded that it is and that such aggression gives rise to the right of collective self-defense recognized in the United Nations Charter and embodied in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
If there is aggression by means of armed attack—and that is a question which each party must determine for itself—the parties have an obligation to “act” to meet the common danger. But the treaty does not say what kind of action the parties must take. We can imagine a whole range of actions that a party could take. It might be a mere diplomatic protest, or the provision of economic or military assistance, or the actual utilization of military force. The treaty leaves to the parties themselves the decision as to what kind of action they will take, although presumably the action taken must be appropriate to the threat.
Whatever action is taken under paragraph 1 must be taken in accordance with the parties’ constitutional processes. If those constitutional processes, for example, require legislative approval before the executive branch of the government can take certain actions, and that legislative approval is not forthcoming, then those actions cannot be taken, and the party would not be in violation of its commitment under the treaty for not taking them.
These are some of the questions of interpretation that have arisen under all our Pacific defense treaties. There are others. For example, under the SEATO Treaty the question has arisen as to whether all the parties to the Treaty must unanimously agree to act under Article IV, paragraph 1, before there can be any action. Certainly, to be able to say that SEATO itself is acting, all the parties must concur or at least acquiesce in the action. At the same time, the United States, for its part, has taken the position, which I believe is supported by the language and history of the SEATO Treaty, that the commitment to act is also an individual obligation. Thus, a communique issued on 6 March 1962, by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand states that in the case of a Communist armed attack against Thailand “the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective.” We have, therefore, interpreted the multilateral SEATO Treaty in such a way that our defense commitments to Thailand are precisely the same as those which would exist in a separate, bilateral security treaty.
Another problem that has arisen results from a U. S. Understanding which was appended to the SEATO Treaty at the time of its signature and which is an integral part of the Treaty, binding on all the parties. In that Understanding, the United States stated that its obligation under Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty to act in the event of aggression by means of armed attack applies only to Communist aggression but not to other kinds of aggression. In the event of non-Communist aggression, the United States will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2. We thus have an anomalous position with respect to our obligations under the treaty and those of the other parties, for while the other parties are bound to act in the case of non-Communist aggression by means of armed attack, they cannot look to the United States to fulfill the same obligation. Pakistan, which is a SEATO member, believes that India poses a threat to its independence and that India is an aggressor. But, quite apart from the merits of Pakistan’s accusation, the United States, because of its Understanding, has no obligation to act under Article IV, paragraph 1, in this situation because aggression from India would not be Communist aggression.
Under SEATO, the parties, by a Protocol signed at the same time as the treaty itself, designated Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia as states to which SEATO protection would be extended. These Indochinese states were prohibited by the Geneva Accords of 1954 from joining military alliances. Yet, they were threatened by Communist aggression, and they wanted the protection which SEATO offered. So the formula of extending the SEATO umbrella over these states without their actually becoming parties to the Treaty was devised. The treaty contains a provision to the effect that no action on the territory of these designated states can be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.
Since 1954, two things have happened to affect the status of these so-called Protocol states under the SEATO Treaty. Cambodia has repeatedly taken the position that it does not any longer wish to have SEATO protection extended to it. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia in letters to the Secretary General of SEATO at the Ninth and Tenth SEATO Council Meetings in Manila and London respectively (1964 and 1965), requested that the Organization take formal action to remove its protection from Cambodia. The Organization has taken no such formal action, responding to Prince Sihanouk’s latest letter by pointing out that under the Treaty SEATO could take no action in Cambodia except at the request or with the consent of the Cambodian government. In the case of Laos, at the Geneva Conference of 1961-62 the Government of Laos submitted to the conference a Statement of Neutrality, which eventually formed part of the Geneva Agreements on Laos, containing a provision that Laos will not recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO. In response to that statement, the other thirteen participants at the conference (including four SEATO members, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Thailand) undertook in the Geneva Agreements to respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognize the protection of any alliance, including SEATO. This undertaking, while not legally necessary since SEATO could not act in Laos except at Laos’ request or with Laos’ consent, was politically essential to the successful conclusion of the Laos Agreements. Because not all members of SEATO were parties to the 1962 Geneva Agreements, these Agreements could not legally amend the SEATO Treaty; and Laos is still technically a designated state under that treaty.
As has been seen, each of our Pacific defense treaties grew out of different circumstances and, particularly from the point of view of our treaty partners, each was designed to serve different purposes, not all of which were necessarily consistent. Even today it would not be surprising to find that each of our allies in the Far East views its defense treaty with the United States in a different light and as serving different national purposes, domestic or foreign. From the U. S. point of view, then, what common purpose can we find in these treaties?
Broadly speaking, our Pacific defense alliances have two purposes—one, political/military, the other, legal. Politically and militarily, the whole thrust of the collective security system is directed against the threat of Communist aggression. And the threat, as seen in the early 1950s when this system was born, was that of conventional military invasion. The defense treaty stood as a firm warning to potential aggressors that they could not attack a member of the alliance with impunity, that in attacking our defense partners, they ran the risk of having to deal with the United States as well. In fact, our Pacific defense treaties have been notably successful in deterring overt aggression against our allies. It is noteworthy that the only case of direct armed attack in the Far East since the Pacific collective security system was established has been the Chinese attack in 1962 against India—a country outside this security network.
Of further political significance is the fact that the defense treaty serves the purpose of reassuring countries in the area that the United States is prepared to join with them in a collective effort to preserve their independence against aggression. This factor is one of the primary elements at stake in the present struggle in Vietnam. The measure of assurance which other countries have in our commitments depends to a great extent on our willingness and our ability to carry out our commitment to Vietnam; and the SEATO Treaty is one of the principal evidences of that commitment.
In the case of SEATO, and ANZUS, the treaty organization provides an important forum for the parties to discuss issues of common concern on a high level and on a frequent and regular basis. Additionally, the treaty organization provides a basis for joint military planning and exercises which have thus far proved to be very valuable in co-ordinating the defense efforts of the parties.
Our defense treaties in the Far East provide the legal basis for U. S. actions in that area of the world. From an international point of view, the defense treaties are collective self-defense arrangements under the United Nations Charter, and action which we take under those treaties would presumably be taken in the exercise of what Article 51 of the Charter calls the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.” From a domestic point of view, a mutual defense treaty is a document which has received the advice and consent of the U. S. Senate and which therefore represents a commitment, approved by at least two-thirds of the Senate under the Constitution, for U. S. defensive actions in the Far East.
For the foreseeable future, the central factor confronting U. S. defense strategy in Asia is Communist China. The problem we face throughout Asia is that of containing the influence of a hostile, belligerent China while at the same time trying to persuade the Chinese that their true interests lie in peaceful relations with their neighbors. One of our long- range objectives is to establish independent states in the area sufficiently strong and stable so that individually or collectively they can resist Chinese pressures.
In the short run, the United States must bear the major burden of containing the Chinese threat. That this is so, is obvious not only because of the comparative weakness of Asian states vis-d-vis China but also because of the attitude of our non-Asian allies. France, in particular, carried a major responsibility for the security of Asia in the early 1950s; its commitment was essential to the founding of SEATO. Even as late as 1962, France was given a special responsibility under the Geneva Agreements signed that year for preparing Laos to defend itself. But today it is clear that France has no intention of committing its military forces in Asia. It is difficult, at this juncture, to say precisely what France’s view of the future of SEATO, and its role in it, might be.
At the same time, there has been increasing concern in the United Kingdom that the British cannot indefinitely maintain the present scope of their military presence and commitments far from Europe, and this may eventually lead to a reduction of U. K. military commitments in Asia and elsewhere.
If, then, the future seems to point to even greater defense burdens for the United States, what instruments are available to us, what tools are best suited, to do this job in the 1970s? One instrument we have relied on thus far is the defense treaty. As we have seen, existing defense treaties contain commitments to defend most countries in the area against Communist armed attack or open aggression. Even in the absence of a formal treaty commitment, we can, of course, help countries that are victims of aggression at their request under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which recognizes the inherent right of collective self-defense. This may be a particularly important reserve right in Asia where many countries, such as India, are reluctant to enter into military ties with foreign countries and yet are faced by the threat of Chinese nuclear weapons. On 16 October 1964, when Communist China announced that it had conducted its first nuclear test, President Johnson issued a statement reaffirming existing U. S. defense commitments in Asia. He added,
Even if Communist China should eventually develop an effective nuclear capability, that capability would have no effect upon the readiness of the United States to respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression. The United States will also not be diverted from its efforts to help the nations of Asia to defend themselves and to advance the welfare of their people.
The President, two days later, in a nationwide address delivered from the White House emphasized again the readiness of the United States to meet this new threat. He said: “The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, they will have it.”
We, therefore, have a sufficient framework within which to act in Asia under our defense treaties and under Article 51 of the U. N. Charter to meet overt aggression. This framework should be maintained to meet the overt threat.
In the foreseeable future, however, the Communist threat in Asia is likely to be mainly subversive rather than overt. “Wars of national liberation,” taking advantage of human misery and despair, of unpopular governments and dissatisfied peoples, seem to be the Communist pattern of action. Military alliances have not in the past been successful in preventing this new “subversive” aggression, and they do not seem likely to be an effective deterrent to this kind of threat in the years ahead. We can meet subversive threats with force where we have to, as in Vietnam, without having a defense treaty with the nation that is the victim of the aggression. But military force alone is not an effective and lasting deterrent to subversion. Economic, social, and political action is indispensable. Subversion—indeed, Communism —simply does not succeed in attacking healthy societies. It thrives amidst poverty, disease, ignorance, and injustice. These are the causes that need to be rooted out. In Latin America, a massive effort is being made to meet this challenge through the Alliance for Progress—an effort based on the principles of national self-help combined with mutual assistance through regional and collective cooperation. These principles are equally applicable in the Pacific and are a sound basis for U. S. policy in that part of the world. President Johnson’s proposal, in his famous 7 April 1965 speech at Johns Hopkins University, for a one-billion-dollar Southeast Asia development program was based on these fundamental concepts.
New instruments will have to be forged to promote the necessary self-help and mutual assistance efforts. The most promising of these instruments, it seems to me, are regional arrangements among the Pacific nations themselves. We should encourage the countries of Asia to move toward regional groupings. These should be primarily political and economic associations, not military or defense oriented. Political or economic groupings once established on a firm footing should gradually develop a regional security consciousness.
But it is not easy to envisage a Pan-Asian grouping at this time. It may be natural that in newly independent countries, whose national energies are turned to internal economic and social efforts, regional interests have a low priority. In addition, Asians remain largely divided among themselves. For example, Japan, whose power must be harnessed to an Asian regional arrangement if it is to be a meaningful counterbalance to Communist China, still suffers from a World War II legacy of mistrust on the part of many Asians. The Philippines, for example, which suffered tremendously at the hands of the Japanese in World War II, may not yet be ready to ally itself with Japan. The situation in Korea provides another relevant example: Korea has just recently normalized relations with Japan, and the two countries are not finding it easy to make the political and economic adjustments necessary to consummate their sensible and long overdue reconciliation.
Japan has its own peculiar internal problems as an aftermath of World War II. Is Japan ready to abandon its pacifist attitude? Is it politically feasible for Japan to move in the direction of defense ties in the Pacific area? Could any Japanese government which adopted such a policy survive politically?
A look at the Indian subcontinent illustrates another difficulty in achieving regional cohesiveness among Asian nations. There India and Pakistan each look at the other as the primary threat to its security. Even when India was forced to recognize the threat of China as a result of the 1962 invasion, its traditional policy of “nonalignment” was an embarrassing obstacle to mutual security arrangements designed for its defense. Yet it is difficult to conceive of stability and security in the subcontinent or in the Pacific area generally unless India and Pakistan join forces with each other and with other nations of the region.
Because of these and a variety of other similar factors present in the Asian scene, immediate efforts to develop regional co-operation probably have to be focused on small, carefully selective rather than ambitious, all-embracing combinations of Asian nations. In recent years ASA (Thailand, Philippines, and Malaysia) and Maphilindo (Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia) have appeared to offer potentially constructive efforts toward broader regional co-operation. Japan has evinced interest in improving its relations with Indonesia and in establishing better ties with Australia and New Zealand. These are encouraging trends and may lead to Japan’s assuming greater political and economic responsibility in the area, and to Japan’s establishing regional ties with other Asians who are not now ready fully to embrace the Japanese. A settlement of the Kashmir dispute might open the way to co-operative efforts by India and Pakistan for economic and social development of the subcontinent.
Asian regional arrangements, to be successful and lasting, must be primarily Asian products. The United States should encourage and support Asian efforts and be prepared to commit American power to back them as appropriate. Self-help—each Pacific nation taking effective internal economic, social and security measures—and mutual assistance— each Asian nation contributing to the others’ efforts, assisted as necessary by the United States—are the ingredients of a successful battle against aggressive subversion. For the fact is that the challenge in Asia is primarily political, economic, and social and only when there is a failure to meet that challenge does it become military. Then it may be too late. As President John F. Kennedy said in a message to Congress on 25 May, 1961, “Military pacts cannot help nations whose social injustice and economic chaos invite insurgency and penetration and subversion.”