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Military Concepts and Philosophy
By Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U. S. Navy (Retired). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965. 339 pages. $9.00.
REVIEWED BY
Captain Ralph E. Williams, SC,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
(Captain Williams has served on the staff of the Naval War College and in the Strategic Plans Division and General Planning Group of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He was also special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Aide and Administrative Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.)
It is refreshing to find a calm and reasoned approach to the central theory of conflict as a phenomenon in human affairs. Such a book is Military Concepts and Philosphy, by the eminent military logistician, Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U. S. Navy (Retired).
There is nothing about this book that indicates that it is likely to become as popular as “Dr. Strangelove” or Seven Days in May. There are no good guys, no bad guys, no panaceas
A cruiser showing the flag on a distant station with her captain able to make and execute state policy 10,000 miles from Washington? Not in this day and age. In his latest book, Admiral Eccles puts this change in military concepts in proper prospective.
or package deals, no plots or conspiracies, no glamorous weaponry, no exotic gadgets. It is a book about ideas, mostly other people’s ideas, which the author patiently and skillfully assembles into the central theme of his work: the urgent need for re-thinking, re-defining, and re-organizing old concepts into meaningful relationships with modern politics and technology. In turn, he presents these ideas, with his own commentary, as they apply in today’s milieu to the realities of human conflict, strategy, logistics, tactics, organization, command, and decision process.
Admiral Eccles characteristically starts his works with great attention to the semantics of the realities under discussion. Military Concepts is no exception, and with good reason- The combination of polemics and “press- agentry,” that have become the standard software for every weapon that comes along, has vitiated just about every good military term in current use until the serious scholar is forced to define his terms at the outset within the limited context of what he is trying to say-
What Admiral Eccles is trying to say is that
have changed since the day when a lP s captain could make and execute state th°alcy 10,000 miles away from Washington;
at the speed and power of modern weapons C(fVe brought the civilian authority into the stntei °1 military operations, and there to a 'V that there is a place for the studies and int& ^CS t^1C <!^hiz Kids” alongside the Co Ult’ve judgment of the experienced military mtnander; that the options available to a de -10n are controlled not by what strategy sires, but by what logistics affords; that the ex ** *s to Prov^e the nation and its chc>CUt'Ve hierarchy with the freedom to ■ °Se anci to move among a wide range of
ernatives.
..... ^Caders of Admiral Eccles’ previous books
Perational Naval Logistics (1950) and Logis- t^.S ln the National Defense (1959)—will recog- e some familiar landmarks: the logistic Wball; the spectrum of conflict; the holy ^ nity °f strategy, logistics, and tactics. Each, ^ovvever, is treated in a different context from at ln which it formerly appeared, and each s to the clarity and meaning of the chapter 'Yphich it is used
j he chapter on the subsidiary concepts of sn . ence and communications deserves l Ccial mention for calling out the potential Ce *7 hnplicit in the increasing degree of fu r.zat>on and automation of these two C(,ncti°ns, which are to command what the ra^ nervous system is to the human body.
reliar JHatic
mares to those whose experience with tely simpler systems, has given them reason to believe that the initials EDPM
e very thought of our heavy and increasing nee for military decisions upon auto- r Ic Processes which can produce results no pj* than the data fed into them, or the ni ^larns controlling them, is enough to give
, O t“tlrnep \ktnco avnai’ian/'O uri tVl 'nfini
good
for Every Damned Problem Magnified, j? ae illustrative quotations which Admiral p . es uses extensively to underscore the quUjts l'e makes are carefully selected for the He ■ ltlCS readcr interest and appropriate- Ss to the subject. They add much to the
richness and variety of an already excellent treatise on the elusive abstractions with which today’s leaders, both civilian and military, must somehow deal.
The Politics of the Budgetary Process
By Aaron Wildavsky. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1965. 216 pages. Illustrated. $4.00
($2.50, paper).
REVIEWED BY
Rear Admiral John K. Leydon,
U. S. Navy '
(Admiral Leydon is Chief of Naval Research.)
This brief book contains just about everything that most persons concerned with or interested in the federal budgetary process should know. Although the author states in his preface that military budgeting, which he calls a special problem, is not treated in detail, his disclaimer has no validity. Every aspect of budgeting of which he writes has its counterpart in the military budgetary spectrum from formulation to execution.
This is not a technical book; it does not deal with the jungle aspect of budgeting. Rather, it treats in an almost clairvoyant way, how and why things happen as they do and, more importantly, it goes beneath the surface to analyze the uncertainties and variables that plague budgeteers and drive out of their wits non-budgeteers who must serve in supporting roles in the process.
The style is cogent; practically every sentence contains a well-rounded, well-expressed thought and these separate thoughts flow together to form a pleasing pattern of understanding throughout.
The book is based upon a wide range of interviews with key figures in the budgetary process from the bureau level up through the hierarchy to the Congress and its various staffs. It also stems from a thorough review of the record of appropriations hearings of 25 different government agencies that have taken place over a 15-year period.
Excerpts from these hearings give the book spice, for they have been chosen both to illustrate the points being made and to portray the atmosphere which surrounds the Congressional committee hearing process.
The chapter titles themselves give a clear indication of the author’s success in making pleasant reading of what could be a deadly dull subject. He covers one aspect of his subject under the heading “Deciding How Much to Ask For” and follows it with “Deciding How Much to Spend.”
The complicated subject of how to get public support for an agency’s budget is lumped under the one word: “Clientele.” The author is the most adept when he treats the intangibles of relationships with Congressional committees, their members, and their staffs. They, too, have their difficulties, and he shows how they react to various approaches. More important, the sheer complexity of the budgetary process is shown to cause the Congress to resort to certain patterns of approach and behavior that are often found to be irrational, unreasonable, and irresponsible by government officials. These same officials come to the conclusion that “there must be a better way.”
Here is where the author clearly comes into his own, discussing the reforms which have been proposed over the years since 1940. He shows how the high purposes of reforms have been literally impossible to fulfill. He bluntly points out that the search for unrealizable goals indicates “serious weaknesses in prevailing conceptions of the budget.” Since the budgetary process is but an expression of the political system, the author clearly states that there is no sense in making drastic changes in budgeting without also altering the distribution of influence.
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Regular and Associate Members may save by ordering books of other publishers through the Naval Institute. A discount of 10 per cent is allowed on such books (except on foreign and government publications, and on books on which publishers do not give a discount). Allow reasonable time for orders to be cleared and books to be delivered directly to you by publishers. Address the Book Department, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland.
Although the author modestly thinks of his book as neither totally comprehensive nor definitive, and in typical research tradition calls it only a point of departure, such is not the case. It is a well-rounded work which, as its jacket states, provides at long last a wise and penetrating political analysis.
The Bombing Offensive Against Germany
By Noble Frankland. London: Farber and Farber, 1965. 122 pages. 18 shillings.
REVIEWED BY
Rear Admiral Frederick L. Ashworth, U. S. Navy
(Admiral Ashworth supervised and co-ordinated field tests of the first atomic bomb experiments, flew on the atomic bomb attack on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, and took part in the atomic bomb tests at Bikini in 1946. He has served in positions related to atomic energy and nuclear weapons in Washington and was executive officer ofi the first carrier squadron to fly nuclear-armed aircraft. He is presently serving as Deputy Chiefi of Staff, Joint Staff, U. S. European Command.)
It is probably safe to say that no strategy of World War II has provided more grist for the mill of military controversy than has that of strategic bombing. Certainly no strategy of World War II had greater influence on the subsequent structure and organization of the military establishment of the United States. The creation of the separate U. S. Air Force, the development of the theory of massive retaliation and deterrence, and to some degree the whole matter of unification, may be traced directly to the emergence of the strategic air offensive concept of the big bombers.
Those of us who have been involved with these events and who have studied historically their evolution will find this brief, readable book a worthwhile addition to the lore acquired either first-hand or by study. As the story unfolds it will leave these readers with the thought that “this is where I came in.” The casual reader will find it a fascinating history of the emergence of the theory of strategic air offensive as it originated in Great Britain prior to World War I, its faltering struggle and near failure in the early days of World War II, and its ultimate victory after air superiority was achieved over Germany by the introduction of the P-51 Mustang fighter. All will find much food for thought in the
author’s analysis of the strategic air offensive from the point of view of its inefficiency, the extent to which its strategy was in sympathy °r in conflict with the grand strategy of the war, and whether or not it was morally legitimate.
Naval officers will find interesting the author’s thesis that the idea of strategic bombing had its roots in naval history. Naval blockade has the characteristic of bringing direct Pressure to bear upon the heartland of the enemy, and it has the advantage of being effective without regard to the military superiority against which it might be pitted. However, due to the circumstances in which Great Britain found itself in World War II, the Royal Navy was not being used as it had been in the past to exert in itself direct and decisive Pressure against the heart of the enemy. For this purpose something else had to be found. With its roots in naval history, it is not surprising that the first ventures into strategic bombing on the British side were made by the Royal Navy in World War I. It was the germ of the doctrine which in the next 25 years developed into the strategic air offensive of World War II in Europe.
There follows in this book a candid discussion of the early failures of the bombing offensive, the technical deficiencies and tactical limitations which forced the R.A.F. Bomber Command to carry out night bombing raids and to attack centers of cities in area bombing, and the nearly disastrous attempts by the U. S. Army Air Force to continue the offensive by day. In the words of the author:
Something had to be done to make good the practice of day bombing. The only thing which could be done was to get high performance fighters into action against the Germans to mount a bomber and fighter offensive. The German fighter force in being had to be driven out of the sky. After October 1943. the Americans turned their powerful attention to this problem and, marvelous to relate, the possibility of a solution was provided by December. This solution consisted of the P-51 Mustang. . . .
In the closing section of his book, entitled “In Retrospect,” the author reviews the air offensive against Germany through the eyes of the historian 20 years after the fact. While !t may be argued that disagreement as to target systems to be attacked diluted the effort and thus tended to reduce the effectiveness of the offensive, he concludes that in the final analysis the outcome depended upon the achievement of command of the air. In the author’s words: “The whole belief that the bomber was revolutionary in the sense that it was not subject to the classical doctrines of war was misguided. In a sentence, the preference, whether conscious or otherwise, for the teachings of Douhet over those of Mahan was disastrous.” This, of course, will have a familiar ring to any naval officer who has studied strategic bombing in any depth at all.
The discussion of the morality of the strategic offensive raises the usual arguments of the ends desired and the means to be used. As might be expected, the points made justifying or condemning are general, and properly, I believe, inconclusive. They do, however, throw light on some of the decisions made— the destruction of Dresden, for example.
FAHEY’S EIGHTH EDITION
THE SHIPS
AND
AIRCRAFT
OF THE
U S. FLEET
Compiled and Edited by James C. Fahey
An up-to-date listing by name and type of over 2,000 ships and 120 aircraft and missiles. Over 400 illustrations. 64 pages. Paperbound. List Price $3.50 Member’s Price $2.80 A U. S. Naval Institute Publication
Noble Frankland, a navigator in Bomber Command during the war and co-author of the official, four-volume The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945 (1961), has contributed little new to the analysis of the strategy of the bombing air offensive. He has, however, written an excellent book that is not only entertaining in style, but worthwhile for anyone who indulges himself in thinking about the “bomber controversy”—and that includes nearly all of us.
The Battle of Dienbienphu
By Jules Roy. New York: Harper & Row,
1965. 344 pages. Illustrated. $6.95.
This single battle more than any other has come to personify the struggle against Communism in the Far East since World War II. The battle has even more significance for Americans today, because it ended an eight- year conflict which was frighteningly akin to the war now being fought by the United States in South Vietnam.
The author, a French Air Force officer who resigned in 1953 “in order not to participate in a war which he considered unjust and idiotic,” has given us two distinct studies:
The first half of the book describes the political and military situations which led to the disaster at Dienbienphu; the second half tells of the fantastic battle itself—in reality an airborne operation ranking with the German invasion of Crete, with the same high casualty rate, but with a very different ending.
Of particular value is the material gained in the author’s interviews with North Vietnamese officials and soldiers. —staff.
Challenge for the Pacific
By Robert Leckie. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1965. 372 pages. Illustrated. $5.95.
REVIEWED BY
Major General R. E. Cushman, Jr.,
U. S. Marine Corps
(General Cushman served as an infantry battalion commander during World War II, seeing combat on Bougainville, Guam, and Iwo Jima. Twice a Director on the Naval Institute's Board of Control, he is now Commanding General. Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California.)
This excellent book is the first volume in the publisher’s Crossroads of World History series and as such casts the battle of Guadalcanal as a decisive point in World War II. It is the purpose of the author to demonstrate that Guadalcanal was truly the turning point of the entire Pacific war, before which the Japanese were on the offensive, but after which the United States had seized the initiative and never again relinquished the attack.
But this is no dry, philosophical analysis of the elements which might determine the significance of one engagement versus another. It is an exciting story written in a crackling style which gives us a far ranging account of this battle from all levels of command.
The background of high-level policy decisions in Washington and Honolulu are sketched in; the decisions of the field commanders are amply stated as they are made during the course of this campaign. And, to give this story its real flesh and blood and air of excitement, the actual combat is described from the point of view of the enlisted Marine
Book Reviews 119
firing his machinegun—which was the actual viewpoint of author Leckie in 1942.
In describing the events, the author employs the effective device of interpolating the Personal experiences of participants on both sides. This method attests to the thoroughness of his research of both U. S. and Japanese accounts and records.
The author also describes, in convincing fashion, how the determined bravery of one roan can often stem a disaster—as when he tells vividly how a single machine gunnei managed to close a critical gap in the Marine lines during the battle of Bloody Ridge, preventing a further and disastrous penetration from reinforcing an opening made previously in the American lines. If the Japanese could have poured through this hole, and reinforced their initial success, the outcome of the battle for Guadalcanal might have been different. In the same vein, the sightings reported by one submarine, one scout plane, or one coast Watcher are shown to have played a decisive role in a part of the over-all struggle.
A battle is determined by the interplay of opposite forces whose commanders are in every case only partly informed. Too many accounts treat battle as though it were a chess game, with the entire battlefield and opposing forces laid out in full view. The author does not make this mistake and describes clearly the opposing plans, the respective commanders’ doubts and fears, and the effects of the “fog of war.” It makes fascinating reading.
No book is perfect and this one has two faults. There should have been additional maps to describe more clearly some of the troop movements and, particularly, some o the rather confusing naval battles which are so vividly described and which played an impoi - tant part in the campaign. There is also a tendency in the book to condemn decisions made by the naval command solely on the basis of the adverse influence on Marine combat at Guadalcanal without examining all of the far ranging factors which might have led to those decisions. This is a natural reaction by anyone who has to stay and be shot at while others leave the scene; however, more exhaustive analysis should be made before the accused is found guilty.
But these are minor complaints and although an ego here or there might be bruised, the over-all impact of the book is excellent. It well proves the point that Guadalcanal was a turning point in the battle for the Pacific and therefore a decisive battle in U. S. history. Written in an exciting style, it is highly recommended for the professional library of the naval and military officer.
Professional Reading
Compiled by Robert M. Langdon
An Annotated Bibliography of the United States Marine Corps in the Second World War
Michael 0’ Quinlivan and Jack B. Hilliard. Washington, D. C.: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1965. 42 pp. (paper) Gratis while available.
The Attack Submarine, A Study in Strategy
Robert E. Kuenne. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965. 215 pp. $4.50.
An economist analyses submarine warfare in World War II and looks to the submarine’s future.
The Birth of the Missile
Ernst Klee and Otto Merk. New York: Dutton, 1965. 126 pp. Illus. $6.95.
The “secrets of Peenemunde” with an introduction by Wernher von Braun; one author is controller of the Peenemunde archives, the other a West German journalist.
The British Fighter Since 1912
Peter Lewis. Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero, 1965. 400 Pp. Illus. $9.95.
History, dimensions, drawings of 350 aircraft of the R.A.F. and the 1914-1918 Royal Naval Air Service.
Castlereagh and Adams:
England and the United States, 1812-1823
Bradford Perkins. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1964. 364 pp. $7.95.
The third and final volume of the same author’s monumental diplomatic history surrounding the coming of the War of 1812 and the eventful postwar years leading to the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This volume’s predecessors were The First Rapprochement (1955) and Prologue to War (1961).
Catalog of Maps, Ships’ Papers and Logbooks
Mariners Museum. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1965. 505 pp. $45.00.
A master guide to a leading naval and maritime depository.
Chesapeake Circle
Robert H. Burgess. Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1965. 211 pp. Illus. $10.00.
A most useful historical account of the Bay’s commerce and sailing vessels.
A Chronology of the
United States Marine Corps, 1775-1934
Colonel William M. Miller, U. S. Marine Corps, and Major John H. Johnstone, U. S. Marine Corps. Washington, D. C.: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1965. 129 pp. (paper) Gratis.
A day-by-day account of the Marine Corps’ activities with source material cited for each entry and “conclusions” evaluating each period.
A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1935-1946 Carolyn A. Tyson. Washington, D. C.: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1965. 139 pp. (paper) Gratis.
[See above listing.]
The Corfu Incident of 192 3
James Barros. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 364 pp. $7.50.
A thorough coverage of the international episode which constituted Mussolini’s first encounter with the League of Nations.
The DC-3
Colonel Carroll V. Glints, U. S. Air Force, and Lieutenant Colonel Wendell F. Moseley, U. S. Air Force. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965. 203 pp. Illus. $4.95.
The story of the old reliable “Gooney Bird” which is still in use in its third decade and now seeing action as an attack plane in Vietnam.
Decisive Battles of World War II
H. A. Jacobson and J. Rohwer, editors and coauthors. New York: Putnam, 1965. 509 pp. $10.00.
A translation of one of the war’s best broad coverages written by several German military historians.
Discord and Collaboration
Arnold Wolfers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965. 283 pp. $2.25 (paper).
A distinguished American political scientist’s essays and lectures on contemporary international politics.
Forests and Sea Power
Robert Greenhalgh Albion. Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1965. 485 pp. $11.00.
A reprint of a major work which deals with the Royal Navy’s timber problem from 1652 to 1862; first published in 1926.
France, Germany, and the New Europe: 1945-1963
F. Roy Willis. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1965. 397 pp. $8.75.
A well-balanced analysis of the background, extent, meaning, and significance of Franco-German relations during the eventful post-war years.
Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow
Peter H. Merkl. New York: Oxford, 1965. 366 pp. $7.50.
A broad survey of German developments from the late 19th century to the present.
Guns
Dudley Pope. New York: Delacorte Press, 1965. 254 pp. Illus. $22.50.
A leading British naval historian’s pictorial account accompanied by authoritative text; from the invention of gunpowder into the 20th century.
The Honorable Conquerors
Walter J. Sheldon. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 336 pp. $6.95.
An account of both the military and personal relationships which occurred during the American occupation of Japan, 1945-1952.
Hostile Allies: FDR and Charles de Gaulle
Milton Viorst. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 280 pp. $6.95.
A highly partisan book which contains much information on this eventful phase of World War II diplomacy. The author is extremely critical of America’s failure to estimate de Gaulle’s true importance.
Gli Incrociantori Italiani
Giorgio Giorgerini and Augusta Nani. Rome: Mini- stero Difesa-Marina, 1964. 700 pp Illus. Lire, 6,000.
An excellent study, in Italian, of cruiser development, with the emphasis on Italian cruisers from 1861 to 1964.
Industrial Research Laboratories of the U. S.
William W. Buchanan (Ed.). Washington, D. C.: Bowker, 1965. 746 pp. $25.00.
Full factual coverage of 5,000 industrial research and development facilities throughout the nation.
Introduction to Space Science
Wilmot N. Hess (Ed.). New York: Gordon and Breach, 1965. 919 pp. $10.00.
A broad and thorough coverage by several authorities.
Japan and Korea
James William Morley. New York: Walker, 1965. 152 pp. $4.50.
A sound history of the international relations involving these two nations
Lost Soldiers
George Armstrong Kelly. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965. 404
pp. $10.00.
A well-researched account devoted to the French Army and empire from the Indochina crisis of 1947 to the independence of Algeria in 1962.
Marine Archaeology
Joan du Plat Taylor (Ed.). New York: Crowell, 1966. 208 pp. Illus. $9.50.
The Librarian of the London Institute of Archaeology summarizes what has been recovered from the Mediterranean over the past 60 years.
Maritime Strategy,
A Study of Defense Problems
Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, C. B., Royal Navy. New York: Praeger, 1965. 210 pp. $6.75.
A reappraisal of maritime strategy calling for conventional naval forces as a major line of defense in the Cold War.
Military Manpower Policy:
A Bibliographic Survey
Harry Moskowitz and Jack Roberts. Washington, b. C.: Government Printing Office, 1965. 142 PP- $1.00 (paper).
The Missile Crisis
Ehe Abel. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966. 220 Pages. Illus. $4.95.
The Cuba affair of October 1962 as researched by the author, an American journalist radio commentator.
Munich: Peace For Our Time
Henri Nogueres. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
423 pp. $7.50.
A French historian and journalist traces pre-World War II background politics and agreements as far hack as the Austrian Anschluss of 1938.
The Naval Profession
Rear Admiral James F. Calvert, U. S. Navy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 196 pp. $5.50.
A candid and informative coverage by a recently Promoted flag officer and former A-sub skipper.
Neutral Ally: Norway’s Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War
Olav Riste. Oslo: Scandia Books, 1965. 295 pp. N.kr. 18.
A fresh, authentic view of Norway’s wartime status which demonstrates how Norway’s neutrality became increasingly precarious during World War I; provides background of Germany’s invasion of Norway in 1940.
Russia and History’s Turning Point
Aleksandr Fedorovich Kerensky. New York: Duell Sloan, 1965. 558 pp. $8.95.
The key figure in the Russian government of March- November 1917 tells of his own role.
Sailing Yacht Design
Robert G. Henry and Captain Richards T. Miller, U. S. Navy. Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1965. 139 pp. Illus. $5.00.
Two professional ship designers, drawn to yacht design as an avocation, discuss and tabulate comparative data on yacht types and specific well-known yachts. Contains a colloquy by other designers; also sail and accommodation plans of fiberglass yawls being built for the U. S. Naval Academy.
Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned
Dan Kurzman. New York: Putnam, 1965. 310 pp. $5.95.
One of the more provocative volumes on the Santo Domingo crisis of 1965; its author, a U. S. journalist, is critical of U. S. haste in intervention.
Professional Reading 123
A Soldier Speaks
Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (Ed.). New York: Praeger, 1965. 367 pp. Ulus. $6.95.
Many public papers and speeches of General of the Army MacArthur; introduction by Carlos P. Romulo; carries a limited amount of editorial comment.
The Steel Navy
James Dolby. London: Macdonald, 1965. 168 pp. Illus. 21s.
Second edition of a handbook listing British warships since 1860; contains basic dimensions and particulars and excellent silhouettes.
The Structure and Performance of the Aerospace Industry
Herman 0. Stekler. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1965. 223 pp. $6.50.
An analysis of the structure and performance of the aerospace industry, especially of the relationship between the government and the private firms.
Le Torpediniere Italiane
Paolo M. Pollina (Ed.). Rome: Ministero Difesa- Marina, 1964. 320 pp. Illus. Lire, 4,000.
The American full-rigged ship Aristides painting by Mr. Robert Salmon which appeared on the cover of the April 1965 Proceedings is now available in full color as a large- size print (26"X22") suitable for framing. List price $5.00 per print. Member’s price $U.OO per print.
Please use book order form on page 165
Prints Available
An excellent study of torpedo boats in the Italian Navy, 1881-1964, in text (Italian) and illustrations.
Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor: Germany During World War I
Robert B. Armeson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. 155 pp. Glds. 19.75.
This is a study of Germany’s domestic measures during World War I to back up the war effort; generally known as “The Hindenburg Program.”
2 5 Centuries of Sea Warfare
Jacques Mordal. New York: Potter, 1965. 428 pp. Illus. $7.50.
A broad coverage of a large subject area by a leading French naval historian.
The United States
and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis
Brice Harris, Jr. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964. 187 pp. $5.50.
An impressive, compact monograph based heavily on U. S. and Italian archives. The author maintains that Europe’s overriding fear cf war caused Mussolini’s gamble to succeed. He explains U. S. attitude as reflection of serious domestic problems.
United States Policy
and the Partition of Turkey
Laurence Evans. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965. 437 pp. $7.95.
A thorough, well-documented account of America’s role in this post-World War I situation; the U. S. Navy under Rear Admiral Mark Bristol played a ma jor role.
The War Against Japan, Volume IV
Major-General Stanley Woodburn Kirby. C. B., British Army. London: H. M. Stationery Office (U.S.A. distribution by the British Information Services, New York), 1965. 568 pp. Illus. $17.00.
This volume in the official British history is subtitled “The Reconquest of Burma.”
Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises
KennethS. Norris (Ed.). Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1966. 771 pp. $15.00.
A specialist’s survey of the most recent advances in cetacean research.
Year of the Tiger
Alvin Coox. Tokyo: Orient/West Press, 1964. 171 pp. $7.50.
A Far Eastern expert analyzes the eventful July 1937- July 1938 year as it unfolded in the Orient. Particular emphasis is devoted to the “China Incident” which may be called the immediate origin of World War II in the Pacific.
ARTICLES
"Admiralty Cable Ships”
K. R. Haigh in Journal of the Royal Naval Scientific Service, September 1965.
Historical survey.
"Arms Control
and the Developing Countries”
Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leirs in World Politics, October 1956.
Two MIT political scientists suggest regional arms control agreements as being feasible and practical.
"Changing International Law: Method and Objectives in the Era of the Soviet-Western Detente”
Edward McWhinney in American Journal of International Law, January 1965.
"A Miracle? Potsdam 1945 —Western Germany 1965”
Lord Robertson of Oakridge in International Affairs, July 1965.
The highly qualified former Sir Brian Robertson balances the debits and credits of the years of Allied— particularly British—occupation of Germany and concludes that the latter considerably outweigh the former.
"The Pursuit of Peace”
Eric Larrabee in Atlantic Monthly, November 1965.
A provocative discussion of the nature of war and peace and of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and guerrilla warfare with particular emphasis on the reasons a nation wages war. The author believes war is not the extension of political aims by another means, but involves, rather, a decision to abandon political aims for an entirely different kind of national objective.
"Skyhawk:
A Proud Past and a Promising Future”
J. S. Butz, Jr., in Air Force and Space Digest, November 1965.
A comprehensive look at the A4D/A-4 Skyhawk by the magazine’s technical editor; good background.
"Special Oceanographic Issue”
Signal, October 1965.
The journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association devotes the entire issue to 29 articles with the central theme of oceanography. Many of these articles, authoritative and broad in scope, pay particular attention to the role of giants in the industry, such as Litton, Lockheed, and Sperry.