As the Vietnam conflict accelerates into its third year since the Tonkin Gulf torpedo boat attacks, the question of final resolution becomes increasingly vital. Will we have general war? Will the Viet Cong melt away into jungle and swamp to return and fight another day—or decade? Or will peace talks materialize and result in a negotiated settlement as did the Korean conflict 13 years ago?
There is much in the present politico-military situation in Vietnam which suggests an armistice as the logical outcome. The apparent unwillingness of the United States to resort to strategic warfare and weapons appears to be matched by that of the Soviet Union. Such action is beyond the current capabilities of Communist China.
The cautious expansion of the level of conflict by the United States, plus our repeated entreaties for peace talks, indicate the greatest reluctance to force the enemy into a position where “the golden bridge” of negotiation is not open to him. The long Communist record of pragmatic realism makes it seem highly unlikely that Hanoi will simply abandon its many positions of strength in the face of military defeat without accepting peace negotiations. Thus, if our increasing military pressure prevails, we may logically anticipate an armistice arising from negotiations with a Communist foe.
It is in this sense that we may look to the Korean Armistice as a valuable source of guidance. The Korean Armistice clearly evidences many weaknesses which are traceable to failures in the negotiating process. Some of these failures, in turn, were due to poorly defined objectives, or lack of unanimity among U.N. representatives. A careful examination of the strong and weak points of the Armistice Agreement, with an explanation of their genesis, will lead to certain conclusions concerning how related matters might better be treated in Vietnam.
First, what is an armistice? From a legal standpoint there is very little which is formal or foreordained. International Law establishes only a rough framework within which agreement must be reached. Three points are critical in the framing of a traditional armistice. These are: determination of the duration of the agreement and specification of the conditions warranting resumption of hostilities; a list of prohibited acts; and, delineation of the geographic scope within which the provisions of the armistice apply. Modern practice, as evidenced by both the Korean Armistice Agreement and the Geneva Agreements of 1954 concerning Indochina, looks to the creation of neutral supervisory authorities to enforce the observance of an armistice. There is no provision of either conventional or customary law which requires such supervisory bodies. It is entirely fair to say that the final form and content of an armistice is more a reflection of the relative strength of the parties than it is of International Law. Force of arms, preparation, determination, and negotiating skill are all important elements which decide the degree to which one side may impose its will upon the other in an armistice agreement.
In Korea, we fared very well on the issues of duration and geographic scope. The armistice was to “remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.” It has! Despite frequent major and minor breaches of almost every provision of the Agreement, it remains an important aid in the maintenance of an uneasy peace in Korea.
The Agreement was particularly successful in establishing the geographic scope of the Armistice. The carefully defined, marked, and patrolled geographic boundary established between the opposing forces has prevented any possibility of the inadvertent resumption of hostilities. Only by a major, overt, and obviously premeditated attack can one side pose a significant military threat to the other side. The elimination of the temptation to engage in ambiguous, nibbling encroachment, with its attendant risk of gradual escalation into a state of general hostilities, is certainly the prime virtue of the Korean Armistice Agreement.
These two strong features of the Agreement were accepted by the Communist side at a time when the U.N. delegation, led by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, was at the peak of its effectiveness. A brief review of the history of the negotiations explains this fact. Truce talks first opened on 10 July 1951 at Kaesong, Korea. Both the time and the place were dictated by the Communists. They exercised full military control in Kaesong and exploited this fact to humiliate both U.N. delegates and representatives of the Free World’s press. The despicable treatment accorded our senior officers at Kaesong was intended to place them in the role of defeated supplicants who had come to beg for mercy from the victors. Admiral Joy’s description of this in his book How Communists Negotiate is a chilling reminder of the importance of the physical and procedural aspects of the negotiating process. He also stresses the importance of developing an objective agenda before opening talks, noting persistent Communist attempts to dictate an agenda which contained many provisions favorable to their side.
Recognizing our error in commencing the talks without proper preparation and under highly unfavorable conditions, talks were broken off in August and remained recessed at U.N. insistence until 25 October 1951 when they reopened at Panmunjom under acceptable conditions. Furthermore, U.N. military pressure during the long recess helped to persuade the Communists to renew the negotiations in a spirit much more conducive to early agreements. Almost immediate acceptance of the basic U.N. proposals concerning duration and geographic scope resulted.
In return for acceptance of the U.N. proposals, the Communists pushed hard for a de facto cease fire in November 1951. General Matthew B. Ridgway, the U.N. Commander, strongly opposed such an agreement:
To accept a de facto cease fire would jeopardize the United Nations military position and military negotiations in Korea. A de facto cessation of hostilities prior to reaching agreement on armistice terms would enable the enemy to augment his ground and air strength in close proximity to the battle line. The security of United Nations Command forces would thereby be seriously compromised. With a de facto cease fire the enemy could prolong indefinitely discussions on other agenda items.
Regrettably, General Ridgway’s penetrating analysis of the Communist strategy was not reflected in his concurrent order of 12 November to the Eighth Army. General James A. Van Fleet was ordered to cease offensive operations in Korea and begin an active defense of the Eighth Army’s front. This surrender of the military initiative to the Communist forces led to growing initiative and intransigence on the part of their negotiators.
When Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Chief U.N. Delegate, and General Matthew B. Ridgway, U.N. Commander, arrived at Kaesong, Korea, on 10 July 1951 to commence truce talks, the Free World was unaware that the Communists did not intend to "negotiate” on any terms but their own.
From this point on, critical decisions went very poorly for the United Nations. Vital U.N. proposals concerning arms control measures; the membership functions, and authority of the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; reporting requirements; limitations on airfield development; and provisions for aerial observation were all rejected or emasculated.
We tamely accepted ineffective, imprecise Communist counterproposals which greatly weakened the Armistice Agreement as a peacekeeping measure. The failure to prohibit the rehabilitation of airfields in North Korea guaranteed that a major shift in the military balance would occur as soon as U.N. air operations ceased. Limitations on the number of ports of entry subject to inspection by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) Inspection Teams as well as Communist inspired restrictions on the freedom and authority of the Inspection Teams insured the opportunity for illegal reinforcement and re-equipment of Communist forces in North Korea.
Similarly, the failure of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and NNSC to contribute significantly to the maintenance of peace in Korea may be attributed to weakness at the bargaining table resulting from the premature relaxation of military pressure on the enemy. The MAC is now a debating team with no real authority to redress any violation of the Armistice. The NNSC is almost totally devoted to ceremonial functions, exercising no control whatsoever over the opposing sides anywhere in Korea.
Every Communist-sponsored compromise foredoomed these agencies to impotence. As a result, the real sanctions against the resumption of hostilities in Korea today are huge, heavily armed, expensive military forces maintained there by both sides, not the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement.
Negotiations finally collapsed completely in October 1952 on the issue of voluntary repatriation for prisoners of war. Just as General Ridgway had warned months before, the absence of military pressure gave the Communists freedom to “prolong indefinitely discussions on other . . . items.” On this one simple, relatively unimportant point the conclusion of an Armistice was delayed 17 months. The United States alone suffered more than 24,000 casualties while this one issue was resolved. It is difficult to believe that vigorous prosecution of favorable military conditions enjoyed by the U.N. in November 1951 would not have produced much earlier agreement on this point. It is a fact that the Communist side almost immediately communicated its willingness to reach a final settlement very shortly after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles “leaked” the word to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India that the United States would expand the war unless satisfactory progress was made soon in peace negotiations. Even the threat of significant military pressure seems to have produced willingness to reach an agreement in 1953.
Even more illuminating is the fact that on this one issue the U.N. representatives returned to the well prepared, detailed, and determined negotiating tactics adopted immediately after the Kaesong debacle. After the Communists offered a vague and ambiguous eight-point proposal for effecting the exchange of prisoners, the United Nations countered with a precise 26-point proposal which left no room for later dispute. A Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was established. Unlike the weak supervisory bodies previously created, this one was given a strong independent Executive Agent (India). The Executive Agent was authorized to employ its own armed troops in the execution of the POW exchange. Backed by its own power, free of crippling restrictions, not bound by the need for unanimity as were the other supervisory agents, the NNRC effected an orderly exchange of prisoners despite significant difficulties generated by both parties to the exchange.
Thus, the pattern emerges. The Korean Armistice Agreement is still strong and viable on those issues which were well planned and fought for vigorously by the United Nations. It is weak, or openly repudiated by both sides, in those features which were determined during a period when the United Nations allowed an overpowering desire for an early peace to blind us to the realities of dealing with an unscrupulous enemy. Careless compromise, unenforceable prohibitions, and ineffective agencies were all accepted by the United Nations after surrendering the military initiative to the Communist side. We pay a heavy price for these shortcomings every year in order to maintain peace in Korea.
How may we improve on these results in Vietnam? A number of actions seem obvious. First, start preparing for negotiations now! Plan the conduct of armistice negotiations just as military campaigns are planned. An Armistice Planning Group should be established immediately. Appropriate military and civilian members with good, tough minds and a high degree of physical stamina should be selected. Given authoritative policy guidance from the highest levels of government concerning the exact political objectives to be satisfied by a cease-fire agreement, the members should work out detailed proposals for a military settlement to achieve these objectives. Such proposals should be tested in moot truce talks against “devil’s advocates” in order to analyze probable enemy counter proposals and to strengthen the arguments and negotiating techniques of our own members. The most effective members of the Planning Group should be selected for duty with the truce talk delegation.
Next, sufficient military pressure must be sustained to induce the enemy to make the first overtures for actual negotiations. There can be no question that our present level of military activity in Vietnam has been carefully controlled by U. S. policymakers with just this result in mind; and, that the control exercised in Vietnam is the most sophisticated, sensitive, effective political direction the U. S. military has ever received. A difficult political situation with global ramifications has been managed adroitly to date. If we continue to be resolute in our military policies we shall be in an excellent position to force the enemy into making the first concrete proposals for peace talks.
It is safe to predict that the first Communist gambit will be to hint at a willingness to talk if we stop bombing in North Vietnam. No such concession should be considered. One need only look at the results of the U. S. bombing moratorium in North Vietnam from 24 December 1965 to 31 January 1966 to see the danger of such action. Our “peace offensive” was regarded as a sign of weakness by the Communists who ridiculed and maligned our motives. At the same time they exploited the hiatus by repairing their roads and railways, doubling the infiltration rate of troops into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and expanding SAM antiaircraft defenses into new sectors of North Vietnam. While the “peace offensive” may have been necessary in the world community, and may have produced political gains there, the military costs are still being paid in Vietnam. Not one element of military pressure should be relaxed as a prelude to negotiations. Conclusion of an acceptable armistice should be the only signal for ceasing operations.
The enemy’s invitation to open peace talks should be accepted only under conditions entirely satisfactory to the United States and the RVN. Any proposal to conduct peace talks as an extension of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina must be rejected. Neither the United States nor the RVN ever accepted the Geneva Agreements because they represented the terms of an abject French surrender to Communist pressure, not a workable plan for peace in the area. Any attempt to revive these moribund documents can work only to the advantage of the Communists. A firm, agreed- upon agenda must exist before negotiations begin. The location of the talks must be open, neutral territory. All members of our delegations and press representatives must be accorded appropriate courtesies. In Admiral Joy’s words, “We must not negotiate merely because the enemy wants to do so . . . We must negotiate not merely from strength, but with strength.”
Our initial demands should be presented in carefully detailed drafts. As subsequent bargaining points, drafts should contain several proposals which are not essential to our interests but are known to be unacceptable to the Communists. Negotiators should be authorized to yield on these points only in return for concessions and agreements on issues which are critical to our side. Once presented, the demands must be repeated verbatim, day after day, unchanged and unchanging, until the opposition makes the first concrete offers of compromise. Our negotiators should refuse even to discuss vague or insignificant concessions. And, obviously, all demands should be reinforced with the maximum appropriate military pressure.
Finally, some recognition must be given to the fact that the geography and political subdivisions of Southeast Asia do not lend themselves to the creation of a neat, well defined Demilitarized Zone as in Korea. This fact certainly represents one of the great problems in devising effective means for peace keeping throughout the Indochina area. There is a critical requirement for a peace-keeping measure to take the place of the DMZ in Korea. A strong, neutral, independent supervisory agency, comparable to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, is suggested as one feasible solution. Such a body must be composed of true neutrals, not satellites of each side. The group must be afforded complete, unrestricted freedom of movement and the right to conduct thorough inspections on their own initiative at any point within all areas specified in the armistice agreement- The inspection units must be large and well armed so that they may not be inhibited in the performance of their duties except by the open, deliberate opposition of superior military force. Overt opposition would constitute an unambiguous threat to the peace, fully justifying the imposition of severe sanctions by the supervisory agency. Appropriate sanctions should be prescribed in the armistice agreement. The offended side would always have the option of resuming hostilities as the ultimate sanction.
The advantages of a strong neutral supervisory body are threefold. First, it could redress minor violations of an armistice promptly. Second, it would reduce greatly the danger of a resumption of hostilities due to a series of minor, ambiguous, threatening actions by one side. No claim is made that even the most aggressive supervisory authority could prevent the resumption of hostilities if one side openly breached the armistice in such gross fashion as to create an unacceptable threat to the other side. It is only argued that an effective, armed neutral agency can remove the aura of uncertainty from ambiguous situations, thus preventing the inadvertent and unintended resumption of hostilities. Third, a dynamic policing agency operating as a buffer between opposing forces might very well permit each side to reduce the number of nearby military units, thereby further reducing tension and the danger of serious incidents.
In this imperfect world, it may well be impossible to agree to grant this degree of authority and control to any neutral body. However, in the words of U Thant, Secretary- General of the United Nations,
“. . . when the situation is serious enough, Governments are prepared to waive certain attributes of national sovereignty in the interest of keeping the peace ...”
When one considers that the only other apparent alternative in Vietnam is to accept the expense and danger of a semi-permanent armed truce, just as we now do in Korea, it is possible to believe that the better choice may be made.
By its very nature, a limited war tends to end in a form of limited peace. Whether the degree of peace we achieve in Vietnam will satisfy the basic security requirements of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam will be a direct consequence of the military force, skill, knowledge, and determination we bring to bear against our enemies during the negotiation of a final armistice agreement. Now is the time to begin!