Sweden’s Charles XII began the Great Nordic War (1700-1721) when he was but 18 years old. After a successful attack on Denmark, which concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Travendal, he next defeated the Russians under Peter (later the Great) at Narva but failed to exploit this victory.
For almost a hundred years, Sweden had dominated the Baltic with a strong Navy which had prevented all attacks on the homeland and supported the well-trained Swedish armies in the conquest of vast areas on the opposite shores. In this way, a country of less than a million inhabitants exerted a significant influence on the history of Central Europe.
In contrast to his predecessors, Charles XII did not understand sea power. Whilst he fought the King of Saxony and Poland (probably for personal reasons), he allowed Peter to regain access to the Baltic in the Gulf of Finland and to found St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) with the naval base of Cronstadt. Although it was no more than 50 miles distant from the nearest Swedish base at Viborg, Charles did not attack here when he reopened the war against Peter, but marched deep into southern Russia, overextending his communications and overstraining his forces, as Napoleon and Hitler did many years later. As a consequence, he suffered a shattering defeat at Poltava in the Ukraine and lost his entire army. Escaping into Turkey, he succeeded in inducing the Sultan to attack and defeat the Russians. However, the two countries soon made peace and Charles was forced to leave Turkey. He rode across Europe back to Stralsund in Pomerania, where he arrived late in 1714.
During his absence, most of the Swedish possessions south of the Baltic had been lost, only part of Pomerania was still in Swedish hands. Although Charles had no more than 17,000 men, he attacked several Prussian outposts west of the Oder river early in 1715. Prussia mobilized and concluded treaties with Saxony, Poland, Russia, and Denmark, with the aim to drive the Swedes from German soil. Stralsund, their well fortified main base, had been beleaguered several times, but taken only once, in 1678, by Friedrich Wilhelm, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, who landed an army on the island of Rügen and cut Stralsund off from the sea.
(Albrecht von Wallenstein, the Emperor’s general in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) —nominated “General of the Baltic and Oceanic Seas”—in vain had sworn that he would take Stralsund “if it were forged to the sky with iron chains.” The beginnings of his fleet were destroyed by the Swedes, however, and Stralsund, supplied from the sea, could not be taken by his army.)
After lively diplomatic activity, the Allies agreed quickly on the following plan of operations against Rügen:
The Prussians and Saxons were to advance on Stralsund from the southeast, the Danes from the southwest.
Any attempts of Swedish forces to break through were to be prevented under any circumstances.
Stralsund was to be cut off from the sea and taken.
The respect for Charles XII as a resourceful and bold general was considerable. Nevertheless, the land campaign could be expected to develop without undue difficulties, for the Allied forces numbered around 60,000 men. At the beginning of July 1715, the main armies began their march into Swedish- occupied Pomerania. After two weeks of slow, but well co-ordinated operations, commanded by the king of Prussia, they joined hands before Stralsund. At the same time, the Danes invested the small port of Wismar. The roads proved too bad for the siege trains. The methodical attack on the outer fortifications of Stralsund had to be postponed until the heavy guns could be transported by water.
The naval operations were far more intricate. It was necessary to win sea power in the central Baltic, at least temporarily, in order to convoy a special shallow draught squadron to the fortified entrances of the Greifswalder Bodden, a diminutive enclosed sea, held by a squadron of small Swedish ships. Simultaneously, a large transport fleet had to be collected and escorted to Greifswald after the special squadron had forced its way into the Bodden and put the Swedish ships out of action. Then, the troops and the horses were to be carried in merchant ships to Rügen and put ashore by means of ships’ and fishermen’s boats.
Of the three Allies, only the Danes had a navy. It consisted of 24 ships-of-the-line (four of them given as “repairable” in the carefully kept lists) with 50 to 90 guns, 60 on an average. Mostly 24-pounders, a few 36-pounders, 21 frigates, a few with 18-pounders, the others with 12-pounders or smaller calibers, ten brigs, ten two-masted special craft with one large mortar each, six heavily gunned flat boats specially built for shallow water.
It proved difficult to find the money and the men to commission the bulk of this fleet. About 40 per cent of the crews were Norwegians, 30 per cent North Germans.
With about 30 ships-of-the-line, the Swedish Navy was distinctly superior. In the spring of 1715, two fleets were commissioned, one of 19 ships-of-the-line, 12 frigates, 12 galleys and other shallow-draught vessels against Russia, another of five ships-of-the-line and two frigates for the western Baltic. Four more ships-of-the-line were to defend the fairways leading up to Stockholm, capital and naval base. The disposition of the Swedish fleets was evidently influenced by the Russian naval development. Peter the Great had started on a large shipbuilding program immediately after Poltava, his main fleet had reached a strength of 13 ships-of-the-line and ten frigates. In July 1714, a Russian galley fleet had defeated a numerically inferior Swedish force at Hango-Udd (in Russian, “Gangut”) in the Finnish skerries. That is why only a small Swedish squadron operated against Denmark. At first, its four ships-of-the-line (the fifth was not yet ready) under Rear Admiral Count Wachtmeister took up a watching position south of the Sound, not far from their own bases in southern Sweden, where they could retire if a superior Danish fleet appeared.
However, Charles XII overrode this sensible arrangement of his Admiralty by sending orders directly to Count Wachtmeister telling him to proceed westwards into the waters off Lübeck, to make prizes and “to fight.” Fight he did but on a lee shore against overwhelming odds, eight ships-of-the-line and a frigate under Rear Admiral Gabel, which the Danes sent after him when he started making prizes of their merchant ships. On 24 April 1715, after a battle near Fehmarn Island, in which the Swedes suffered heavily, they ran their ships aground just outside Kiel (the present German naval base). One only was burnt, the others could be refloated and were taken to Copenhagen. Some hundreds of the prisoners took service with the Danes, others were allowed to join the armed forces of Venice.
As a result of the bad strategy of Charles XII the two fleets were now equal. For various reasons it took both sides a long time to get them to sea. On 15 July, the Danes under Admiral Raben sailed from Copenhagen. He had 16 ships-of-the-line only, because some had to be left behind for lack of men. On the following day, north of Rügen, this fleet was joined by the special shallow-draught flotilla under Vice Admiral Sehestedt which was to be escorted down the east coast of Rügen. At night, they anchored. On 18 July, after a council of war, Sehestedt carried on whereas Raben turned back. He was afraid that he would be cut off by a superior Swedish force. Actually, the Swedish fleet, 21 ships-of-the- line under Admiral Sparre, had put to sea on 16 July, also destined for Rügen and also with a convoy, which carried mainly supplies, and some 10,000 muskets among other urgently needed material.
Raben’s best cruiser captain, Peter Wessel, later ennobled as Tordenskiold, sighted and reported the Swedish fleet on time. Although Sparre had the weather gage and intended to fight (his ships hoisted the “blood flag”) Raben succeeded in slipping away under a press of sail. The Danish Admiralty congratulated Raben upon the “habilite” with which he had conserved the fleet. Allied Headquarters (before Stralsund) were of a different opinion. According to the Prussian war diary, the two kings (Frederick IV of Denmark and Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia) felt grave apprehensions for Sehestedt’s flotilla which now seemed to be at the mercy of the Swedish fleet.
Sehestedt had nearly 30 vessels, none drawing more than eight feet, and three armed with 18-pounders. On 20 July, he tried to force his way into the Bodden via the East Deep (minimum depth about ten feet). He had to desist, however, because the wind was contrary and the fire from nine 24-pounders on Ruden Island too heavy. On the following day, the Swedish fleet appeared and found Sehestedt well prepared. He had anchored off the north end of Usedom Island as closely inshore as possible. With a draught of 24 feet at least, the Swedish battleships could not get into effective range (600 yards, with a highest range of 2,000 yards for 24-pounders). The Swedish frigates were repeatedly forced to retreat because they had 12-pounders only. Sehestedt asked his king for the intervention of the Danish main fleet, but added that he could hold out for several weeks even with Usedom in Swedish hands.
At first, he obtained water from the island; then, Swedish cavalry stopped that, and field artillery harassed his ships. He moved a mile to the north, out of their range, and had his cooks prepare the food with salt water. On 25 July, the Prussian war diary noted that Sehestedt’s flotilla was considered as lost, and that Stralsund could not be taken in this campaign. At the same time, however, the Prussian king took energetic steps to improve the situation. During the night of 30-31 July, 2,000 Prussian infantry-men and 800 cavalry crossed the Swine (the main arm of the Oder River) from Wollin to Usedom in fishing boats. After suffering heavy losses, the Swedish garrison of Usedom fled to the mainland. Sehestedt’s flotilla could be supplied with water, food, and ammunition again. According to the diary of a Saxon general, the two kings first celebrated this success rather abundantly and only then visited the flotilla.
Raben now received the strict royal order to attack the Swedish fleet. The Danish Admiralty admonished him to apply “conduite and seamanship” and to avoid too great risks. At the same time they found more crews for him. On 5 August, he put to sea with 21 ships- of-the-line (1,325 guns) and six frigates. On 8 August, he sighted the Swedish fleet (20 ships with 1,300 guns and six light vessels) at anchor about ten miles north of Sehestedt.
There was a good breeze from the northwest, both fleets formed line ahead on a northeasterly course. Fire was opened at 1 p.m. and kept up till in the evening the battle ended for lack of ammunition. Neither side had made any attempt at tactical maneuvers or to close in. Contrary to custom and order Wessel’s frigate had taken the place of a battleship which had been damaged and left the line temporarily.
The Danes fired 200 rounds per gun on the engaged side using up 133,000 cannon balls and 30,000 cwt. of powder. They had 127 dead and 485 injured, the Swedes 145 and 333. The Danes obtained approximately 3 per cent hits (Battle of Jutland: The British 2.7 per cent, the Germans 3.2 per cent). Neither side claimed to have won the battle. On the whole, the Swedish fleet seems to have suffered more. In any case, it went back to the naval base at Karlskrona and was not ready for sea again before end of September. Raben now anchored in sight of Sehestedt as proof of his strategical success.
Some of the shallow-draught vessels entered the Stettiner Haff, another diminutive enclosed sea, via the Swine, in order to destroy the Swedish ships there. These fought stubbornly and eventually succeeded in escaping through the Peene River past Wolgast (already in Prussian hands) to the Greifswalder Bodden. Now, supplies and especially the heavy siege guns could be transported by water from the Prussian arsenal at Stettin on the Oder River to Wolgast at least. To open the inland waterway to Greifswald, the Prussian king gave orders to storm the strong Swedish fortification at Peenemiinde (Mouth of the Peene). After a short bombardment, 1,065 Prussians and Saxons succeeded in overwhelming the defenses, with a loss of 608 killed and wounded. This operation made quite a stir because it was customary to reduce fortifications by slow methodical attack.
Sehestedt’s flotilla was reinforced by three Norwegian galleys and Hjaelperen, a kind of sailing monitor with 16 24-pounders, drawing only eight feet forward and seven aft. But Ruden island was too heavily fortified even for Hjaelperen, and the New Deep was selected for the attack. The Swedes had scuttled several ships there. Against adverse winds, fire from Swedish ships, and the hazards of navigation, it took Sehestedt from 16 to 25 September to work his way through. Once the Danes were inside the Bodden, the game was up for the lightly armed Swedish ships. Most of them found shelter in small ports on the Bodden where they were blockaded by the Danes. Sehestedt was promoted to (four- star) admiral “with full pay.”
During the naval and military operations for the mastery of the central Baltic and the enclosed seas Bodden and Haff energetic steps were taken to collect a large transport fleet. Prussia had agreed to contribute vessels for carrying 5,000 men, but actually furnished more than half of the total number of transports (181 of 337) and about two-thirds of the entire carrying capacity. The Prussian vessels came from at least 15 ports up to Konigsberg (at present Kaliningrad) in East Prussia. They sailed singly or in small convoys to the Swine and, after the Peene had been opened, to Greifswald. The Danish transport fleet, hired in Denmark, Norway, and Northwest Germany, also went to the Swine, in one large convoy, protected by Raben. All the transports were rather small because none drew more than ten feet. The Danes paid a fixed amount according to the size of the ship, the Prussians paid for the upkeep of the crews only on the grounds that they could not earn money anyhow as long as there were Swedish ships at sea. For rapid disembarking, at least 300 small barges and boats were collected from the vicinity of Greifswald. The transport fleet was ready there about the middle of October, rather late in the year. There were suggestions to postpone the “great enterprise” to the following year, but with great energy Friedrich Wilhelm I (who was 27 years old) saw to it that the preparations were continued. He was in supreme command, with Field Marshal Prince Leopold von Dessau commanding on land and Admiral Sehestedt on the water. Evidently, this arrangement worked well. In all the voluminous correspondence, official and private, there is not the slightest hint at any difficulties in the command set-up and the co-operation.
The landing force was composed as follows:
|
Battalions Infantry |
Squadrons Cavalry |
Danes |
10 |
18 |
Prussians |
10 |
15 |
Saxons |
4 |
2 |
|
— |
— |
|
24 |
35 |
In full strength, this would have been 14,000 men infantry and 6,000 horses. Actually, there took part 12,245 infantry (staff included), 4,974 cavalry, 26 guns, 26 ammunition wagons, and 5,183 horses. The whole force was formed into five brigades infantry and four brigades cavalry. These brigades were also the transport units. A naval officer was detailed to each as transport officer.
On 1 November, the embarkation was begun by putting water, provisions, and fodder aboard. There is no report on the details of embarking and disembarking, but in the considerable number of war diaries, log books, orders, and “press” reports available, enough facts are mentioned to give a fairly complete picture. According to the Prussian war diary, getting the troops on the ships took longer than expected. Now Greifswald is a small port which definitely had not room enough for over 300 transport vessels from five to 60 “last.” A “last” is the measure of carrying capacity used at that time. It may be compared with a net register ton but is somewhat larger and means room and buoyancy for at least 2.4 tons weight. On the Rügen operation, a ship of eight last carried 70 infantrymen, one of 15 last, 120 men. The artillery was put on 17 ships “from Stettin and Kolberg” (i.e. the largest ports), evidently of strong construction. The vessels for the horses had been specially prepared and were capable of transporting from ten to 60 horses each.
The cavalry started going on board on 3 November. From the fact that a gale interrupted this part of the preparations, it is evident that the horses had to be ferried over to the transports. Some reports mention specially designed flat-bottomed barges for carrying horses. An etching of a landing in 1712 in the same area shows a wooden pontoon at right angles to the beach with a ramp on the land- side and some small boats with oars and sails alongside the other end. Some mounted cavalrymen are on the ramp and on the pontoon which obviously could serve as a link between shore and ship or could be towed away.
On the night of 7 November, all the cavalry were safely loaded. How it was done with the horses is nowhere mentioned. It seems to have been taken for granted that the merchant sailors could handle cargoes and horses in a competent way whether with block and tackle or via ramps. In view of the rapid disembarkation, ramps are more probable for the horses. Hardly any seaway was to be expected, for the landing area was a shallow and well sheltered bay. Moreover, in the middle of November, the water of the Baltic is not much above freezing point, the nights are damp and cold. Letting the horses swim ashore would not have been very healthful for them.
The infantry went aboard in the following two days, the kings and generals on 10 November. On 11 November, a council of war was held in the Kronen, the Royal Danish yacht. Orders and a signal book, printed in Danish and German, were issued. In the afternoon, anchors were weighed, but the wind increased, and the fleet soon anchored again.
On 12 November at 6 a.m. the transport fleet eventually put to sea, well protected by Sehestedt’s flotilla which kept a close watch on all Swedish ships. It was two days after the full moon, and there was a good breeze from the west. Sehestedt planned to disembark by moonlight. When this was begun on 13 November at 3 a.m., the wind backed to the south-southeast and increased. A considerable confusion ensued, a boat was rammed and sank (the men saved, however), and Sehestedt called the operation off. For two days, the wind was too strong. When it abated and veered to the west again in the forenoon of 15 November, Sehestedt and Prince Leopold proposed to change the plans and to sail at once to Gross-Stresow in order to disembark there. The kings agreed. At 11 a.m. the cavalry brigades began to move, followed by the others at short intervals. At 11:45 the entire fleet was under way. At 2:30 p.m. the Kronen dropped anchor off Gross-Stresow.
The transports with a draught of less than five feet had orders to run aground. On the approach “the men were to be chased back to the helm,” as an order has it. All the warships and most of the transports seem to have anchored, however. At 3:30 p.m. the men of the first wave went into the shallow-draught means of disembarkation attached to each transport. They were of very differing types. One battalion (620 men) was taken ashore by a galley (220 men), two barges from the Oder river (160 men) and two galiots (240 men). Another battalion of 530 men was landed by one large barge (or pontoon) (182 men), three Oder barges (260 men), and six rowing boats (98 men). A third battalion was put ashore by 83 boats. To each battalion, a large cutter from one of the Danish ships-of-the-line was attached for towing and general assistance.
On the whole, the men were evidently expected to get on land not exactly dry-shod but with little difficulty and without getting very wet. Special care was taken to ensure that they kept their cartridges (which were not at all waterproof) high and dry.
Prince Leopold went ashore with the first wave in order to reconnoiter the situation personally, for he expected a Swedish counterattack. He was followed by some of the generals and by Colonel Wutchenau. The weather had turned fine and calm, no difficulties were encountered because according to all reports, everything had been planned with meticulous care. This paid off now. At 5:30 p.m. all the infantry were ashore, the guns followed. Disembarking the cavalry began at 10 p.m. when the moon had risen. After three hours, it was interrupted by a heavy Swedish attack.
A troop of Swedish cavalry had observed the landing and reported to Charles XII, who at once set out with 1,000 infantry men, 2,500 horse, and eight field guns. Owing to bad roads he had not been able to gain Gross-Stresow earlier. Prince Leopold had arranged his men in battle order, making good use of the terrain, and had put chevaux de frise, carried from Greifswald, in front. Charles XII concentrated his force against a narrow sector where unfortunately for him there were two rows of obstacles. His men were not able to penetrate them at the first attempt. They came under a heavy cross fire and were attacked in their left flank by cavalry. Charles XII was seriously wounded; his force lost 400 dead, 200 prisoners, and all the guns.
On 16 November, at 1 p.m., 23 hours after the first anchor had been dropped, the whole multinational force marched off in the direction of Stralsund. Two days after, Altefähr, its bridgehead on Rügen, surrendered. Stralsund held out, the Allies began the methodical attack. On 22 December, Charles XII left the town for Sweden and on 28 December, it capitulated. The campaign was ended, Sweden had—for the time being—lost her last possession south of the Baltic.
In the last 250 years, technical progress in warfare has been immense. And yet, that almost forgotten campaign of 1715 had problems which seem strangely modern to us. There was the decisive importance of being master of the sea. There was the dictator as we might call him, feared as a military leader who tried to use his sea forces like divisions on land and who did not know when to stop. There was the problem of rapidly disembarking troops with no sea experience whatsoever. Obviously, the military commanders willingly accepted the advice of the naval experts although these were inferior in rank and probably in social standing, too.
Last, but not least, there was an alliance of sovereign countries with differing interests. However, they had one common and dangerous enemy, who was a threat to each of them. Therefore, their leading men came together and worked closely together, far more in the spirit of their treaty than in the letter only. Much was done to foster mutual trust and confidence. In this way, the main problems of any alliance—inner cohesion and consistent action—were satisfactorily solved, and the common aim was reached.