To date, we have neglected the brief Soviet campaign against the Japanese in Manchuria and the Northwestern Pacific waged in the closing weeks of World War II. Soviet propagandists claim undue credit for the entry of the Soviet Union into the war as a factor in the Japanese decision to surrender, and play down the role of the atomic bomb and the entire prior course of the War in the Pacific. Moreover, they have gone so far as to claim that their amphibious operation in taking Shimushu, northernmost of the Kurile Islands, compares favorably with the Iwo Jima operation or the taking of Okinawa! Such claims at least add another reason to look at the Soviet record.
The Soviet Far Eastern campaign is not only the most recent combat in which the Soviet armed forces have directly participated; it also is their one example of long planned offensive operations (those of 1942- 1945 in Europe having been generated in the course of a wider war as elements of a strategic counteroffensive). Finally, after a decade of dispensing with a marine corps, the Soviets have now re-established a modest marine force, with probably one brigade of “naval infantry” (as well as coastal defense artillery) in each of the four fleet areas: the Northern fleet, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific fleet.
At 0001 on 9 August 1945, immediately after presentation to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow of a formal declaration of war, Soviet land operations against Manchuria were launched. In ten days, three Army Groups with 80 Soviet divisions swept over large areas of Manchuria, although before the military decision can be said to have been reached, the general Japanese surrender interposed. Without reviewing that campaign in detail, we can turn directly to the naval and landing operations involved.
Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, formerly Chief of the General Staff, was named Commander in Chief of the Soviet forces in the Far East. Admiral Ivan S. Yumashev, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was coequal to three Army Group commanders whose forces were deployed to the east, west, and north of Manchuria. The head of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, also set up personal shop in the anomalous over-the-shoulder position of “naval co-ordinator” with Marshal Vasilevsky’s headquarters (as did Chief Air Marshal Alexander A. Novikov for the air forces). However, all naval forces involved, including the “naval infantry” (marines), were under Admiral Yumashev’s command. (The only exception was the Amur Flotilla, an inland river force under the appropriate army group command, which we shall discuss briefly later.)
The Pacific Fleet was given the following initial missions: (1) to disrupt Japanese maritime communications in the Sea of Japan; (2) to prevent Japanese naval use of the northern Korean ports; and (3) to assist the Army in preventing any Japanese landings in the Soviet Union. Later, it was given the additional—and, in retrospect, its primary—mission: to take by assault Japanese ports in northern Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the northern Kurile Islands.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet at that time was composed of two Kirov-class cruisers, one destroyer leader, ten destroyers, 19 destroyer escorts, 49 subchasers, 78 submarines, and 204 motor torpedo boats. Pacific Fleet Aviation, commanded by Lieutenant General of Aviation Peter N. Lemeshko, had 1,549 land- based fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and light bomber aircraft. Most of the fleet was based at Vladivostok, but a Northern Pacific Flotilla was based in part at Sovetskaya Gavan on the west coast of the Tatar Straits, and in part at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. The opposing Japanese naval and air forces were insignificant: one old light cruiser, one destroyer, 45 small patrol and mine warfare craft, and 170 aircraft—most of which were in the northern districts of the Japanese home islands and were kept there.
North Korea. Before dawn on 9 August, Soviet naval aircraft began operations with torpedo and attack bomber strikes on Yuki (Unggi) and Rashin (Najin), just over the Korean border. On 9 and 10 August, 504 sorties were flown against those two ports (a typical raid comprising 20 to 30 attack or light bombers, with a similar number of fighters flying cover). They claimed a destroyer at Rashin (there were none there), 19 transports, and 3 tankers. During the night of 9-10 August, two groups of torpedo boats left Poset for raids on Rashin and Seisin (Chongjin), where they claimed to have sunk 11 Japanese transports. (Unofficial and possibly incomplete Japanese records show a total of three transports lost off North Korea.)
At 1910 on 11 August, an assault landing was made at Yuki from a force composed of two frigates, two escorts, one trawler, and eight torpedo boats. Following the standard Soviet practice, Rear Admiral N. S. Ivanovsky, the senior naval officer, was “commander of the landing operation”; Major Markin, Commander of the 75th Naval Infantry Battalion, was “commander of the assault landing force.” First ashore were 171 submachine gunners of the 390th Independent SMG Battalion and some of the 140th Reconnaissance Detachment from the fleet staff, taken by torpedo boats into the port itself. Major Markin learned from men of the first wave that the Japanese garrison had left the night before, but he decided to proceed with the battalion landing in order to establish a position across the line of retreat of Japanese forces further north engaged in defense against attacking Soviet army forces. The very light resistance was quickly overcome. At 1820 on 12 August, after having been held up for some hours due to fog, the 75th Battalion of the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade landed at the docks of the Naval Base at Yuki. By that time, advance units of the 303rd Rifle Division of the 25th Army, advancing overland, reached Yuki and continued south toward Rashin.
Rashin had been subjected to 418 air sorties from 9 to 11 August. At 0900 on 12 August, the first wave of a landing force arrived—68 men of the 140th Reconnaissance Detachment, and 95 submachine gunners from the 354th Independent Naval Infantry Battalion. Captain of the First Rank E. E. Poltavsky commanded the landing operation; Marine Major Svishchev led the assault landing force. It took three hours for this small force to land, but there were no Japanese units in the port. A few prisoners and civilians said, however, that a Japanese regiment was dug in nearby, and the 354th landed under enemy artillery fire. A perimeter defense was set up. The next morning the main landing force arrived, the 358th Independent Naval Infantry Battalion (617 men), with six light artillery pieces (45-mm. and 76-mm. guns). By 18 August, the Rashin area was cleared, at a cost of seven Russians killed and 37 wounded, as against Japanese casualties of 277 killed, and 292 captured. (In addition, three ships of the landing force, and later six other vessels, struck mines allegedly laid earlier by American aircraft—116 non- contact mines were cleared in August alone.) The same day that Rashin was secured, units of the 25th Army advancing overland reached the city.
Seisin (Chongjin) was the next target. Following the initial landing at Rashin, it was decided to land at Chongjin on 15 August. The Military Council of the Pacific Feet later decided to advance the schedule, to use fast naval vessels for the landing, and to land directly in the port, as at Yuki and Rashin. The council believed that one submachine- gun company and one reconnaissance detachment would suffice, though a marine battalion was available if necessary. Chongjin had been subjected to constant air reconnaissance and bombing since 9 August. On 11 August, the first men boarded ship; the initial landing came at 1338 on 13 August, an armed reconnaissance party with the SMG company of the 390th Independent Naval Infantry Battalion (181 men) and again the 140th Reconnaissance Detachment. They came under artillery fire on entering the port, but landed and took the port area without opposition. Very soon, however, they faced a strong Japanese counterattack. Admiral Yumashev himself was on the command vessel, the destroyer Voikov, and personally assumed command.
Colonel A. Denisin, Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, commanded the first wave assault force. Even so, the command vessel was unclear on the course of the operations, and for reinforcement to deal with the counterattack called only the standby next wave—one company of the 62nd Independent Machinegun Battalion (80 men), who only then left Poset on board eight motor torpedo boats. They landed at 1830, but were much too few to help. A wounded survivor of a decimated platoon of the first wave conveyed the misleading impression that the whole first wave had been annihilated; actually, Colonel Denisin and most of his men were dug in, but under heavy pressure.
At 0455 on 14 August, the 355th Independent Naval Infantry Battalion (710 men) landed, and were told to take the city. They soon located the survivors of the first wave, and the combined force moved forward. Losses to the first wave had been heavy; for example, of the 181-man SMG company, only 39 were left; 25 volunteers from sailors of the landing vessels were armed and sent in as sub- machinegun replacements.
The Japanese, under Lieutenant General S. Nishiwaki, had brought up reinforcements for their 4,000 man garrison from Ranan (Nanam), including an armored train which gave the assault force considerable trouble. The Japanese even managed weak air attacks against the Soviets, but the Soviets maintained and used their air superiority. In all, the Soviets had 182 bombers and 73 fighters of naval aviation earmarked to support the operation. The Japanese had only 19 fighter aircraft and ten attack bombers available.
By this time it was clear that the initial and subsequent Soviet calculations on strength of the opposition had been much too sanguine. At 0045 on 14 August, the main marine force of the Pacific Fleet, the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade, began embarking at Vladivostok. Captain of the First Rank A. F. Studenichni- kov commanded the landing force of six escorts, ten landing ships, four transports, and three trawlers. This force proceeded through heavy fog in three sections, in single column. Its passage was uneventful, but subject to some scares. When it was already at sea, Pacific Fleet communications intelligence reported “new large Japanese formations” of unknown character, and independently a Soviet submarine south of Chongjin reported a Japanese battleship and four destroyers. (There was no battleship there, but whatever this force was, it moved south to Wonsan.) Pacific Fleet Headquarters was rather jittery over the fate of its whole marine force, sent out in a single column, and dispatched two submarines and a single available Catalina patrol plane to scout the area. On 15 August, there was in fact a small and unsuccessful Japanese attempt to attack the force by air.
At 0215 on 15 August, the task force entered Chongjin port. By this time, the marine battalion and other units there had been pushed back to a strip 300-400 meters wide. Enemy artillery was shooting up the docks, but the landing was made there anyway, according to the orders (and, of course, there was really no choice, given the tactical situation and the nature of the ships). The 13th Brigade, 5,000 men under the command of Major General V. P. Trushin, succeeded slowly in pushing back the defending Japanese force. Later that morning, Lieutenant General of the Shore Service S. I. Kabanov arrived and assumed command of the landing force. The battle continued vigorously through the 15th and 16th.
Only at 0625 on 16 August did the third echelon force arrive and begin to unload the brigade’s artillery—in all, only 34 45- and 76- mm. guns, three 76-mm. SP guns, and 12 120- mm. mortars. (Mine warnings were issued to this convoy en route, but three vessels hit mines.) At about that same time, a special supplement of seven T-26 light tanks was loaded at Vladivostok. Meanwhile, the 10th (Naval) Air Division had been providing Pe-2 light bomber sorties—135 on 16 August. On the 16th they managed to knock out the armored train which the Japanese had brought in on the 14th. On the same day they shot down a single Zero, their first Japanese air kill (the Japanese had been able only to mount sporadic single sorties).
Ships of the landing force provided relatively ineffective fire support. The Soviets ran into considerable difficulties in fire control; the most effective means proved to be semaphore signals shore-to-ship. To co-ordinate air strikes, an air force liaison unit had gone in with the second wave.
On the afternoon of 16 August, Chongjin port and city were finally cleared. Soviet losses are not known; Japanese losses—mostly as prisoners—totaled over 3,000. That night, units of the 25th Army reached the city overland in their drive south, and on the 18th they went on to take Ranan. On 19 August, the 335th Infantry Division was brought in on six transports and landed.
On 18 August, the Pacific Fleet issued orders to cease hostilities except where the Japanese continued resistance. At that point, it was decided to land forces quickly at Odaejin and Wonson (Gensan) in order to prevent the Japanese from evacuating their forces from Korea to the home islands. These operations were conducted by the newly formed “Southern Defense Region” under Lieutenant General Kabanov. A submachine gun company and the 77th Battalion of the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade (600 men) left Chongjin and landed at Odaejin at 0800 on 18 August. The garrison* had left that morning, and there was no opposition.
On 20 August, General Kabanov received orders to occupy Wonsan, and dispatched a marine battalion and other units totalling about 2,000 men. The Japanese garrison of 5,000 men, and other units in the Wonsan area including an air force unit with 50 aircraft, totaled some 6,300 men, and the port was fortified (with 280-mm. gun defenses). The landing force arrived and disembarked without opposition at 0930 on 21 August. However, the Japanese commanders (Rear Admiral Hori and Colonel Tado) declined to surrender their arms until they received orders from higher command. They knew that the Kwantung Army had ordered its subordinate units to surrender, but they had no orders through their line of command. (Ironically, neither the Japanese nor the Soviet officers realized that in fact the Japanese 17th Army—to which these forces belonged—had in fact been placed under the Kwantung Army on 10 August.) The Soviets, heavily outnumbered, reported to Pacific Fleet Headquarters, and were told by Vice Admiral V. A. Frolov, Chief of Staff, to take up defense of the port and to tell the Japanese that any attack would bring the full power of the Soviet air force. The Japanese surrendered the next day without further incident.
On 24 August, the Russians air-landed a force at Pyongyang, and the next day the 25th Army reached Wonsan. All Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel surrendered to Soviet forces within a few days. (U. S. forces landed in South Korea on 8 September.)
In looking back over the Soviet amphibious landings in northern Korea, one is struck by the fact that follow-through echelons did not put to sea until prior ones had successfully landed, often causing considerable delays and gaps in reinforcement. The only instance of serious opposition—Chongjin—might have ended quite differently. As it was, the long delays in reinforcement showed a vulnerability which was not critically serious only because of the proximity to the Soviet marine base at Vladivostok. The Japanese had planned to let the Soviets land their force and then destroy them—and would have succeeded if the Soviets had not had the marine brigade (the existence of which the Japanese were unaware) . Even then, the brigade had no artillery until a full day after it landed, and the modest allotment of seven light tanks arrived only two days later. The error was partially in planning, partially in assessing the situation after the first wave had landed, and partly due to limitations in equipment.
One may question the need to have undertaken the Korean landings in view of the rapid advance of the Soviet 25th Army overland; the concept, however, was sound. Similarly, the decisions by the Soviets to land at Odaejin and Wonsan after the Japanese surrender served a clear political purpose, and were successful.
Sakhalin. At the beginning of the campaign, Soviet forces on northern Sakhalin, and Kamchatka, were ordered to assume defensive positions. In view of the initial successes of the campaign in Manchuria, Marshal Vasilevsky’s command decided to proceed with an offensive to take southern Sakhalin; if the opposition in Manchuria had been stiffer, that decision would not have been made. Thus, on 10 August, the Second Far Eastern Front ordered the North Pacific Flotilla, to initiate offensive operations in Sakhalin on 11 August and to clear the island by 25 August.
Southern Sakhalin (called Karafuto by the Japanese) had been under Japanese rule since 1905; the northern half of the island had been temporarily occupied by the Japanese from 1918 to 1925, when they had reluctantly withdrawn. Neither side had major military forces on the island, but both had fortified their respective territories. The island is long (about 900 km. or 560 miles) and narrow; it was about evenly divided between the two countries.
At the time of the Soviet declaration of war, the Japanese Fifth Area Army (garrisoning the Kuriles and Sakhalin) had on Sakhalin one division, the 88th Infantry, and one artillery regiment, together with a naval base at Otomari (Korsakov). There were 13 airfields in Southern Sakhalin—but no Japanese military aircraft. The only naval force was the 104th Squadron with six patrol craft. In all, the Japanese military forces totaled about 20,000 men. The three infantry regiments of the 88th Division were spread out: the 125th Regiment defending the Koton defense line near the border (which was 12 km. wide and 30 km. deep, with 17 reinforced concrete pillboxes and 335 artillery and machine gun nests and dugouts); the 25th Regiment, mostly at the west coast port city of Maoka (now Kholmsk) and to the south; and the 306th Regiment in the southern area around Otomari (now Korsakov) and Toyohara (now Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk).
Soviet forces available for the operation were superior on land, and completely dominated the sea and the air. In northern Sakhalin, Lieutenant General A. D’yakonov’s 56th Rifle Corps (subordinated to the 16th Army of the Second Far Eastern Front) was composed of the 79th Rifle Division, the 2nd and 5th Independent Rifle Brigades, the 214th Tank Brigade, the 673rd and 178th Independent Tank Battalions (in reserve), and five artillery and machine gun regiments. Supporting them was the 255th Composite Air Division with about 100 aircraft; the Japanese had no aircraft. The Soviets had 85 tanks; the Japanese none.
Soviet superiority was 3.7 to 1 in infantry companies, 10 to 1 in artillery, and 4.3 to 1 in machine guns. In addition, the organizationally independent North Pacific Flotilla had its naval and naval air units, two marine battalions (the 365th, and an unnumbered composite Naval Infantry Battalion), and later “seconded” to it for landings the 113th Rifle Brigade of the 16th Army on the Soviet mainland.
The Commander of the 16th Army (which was not engaged in Manchuria), Major General L. G. Cheremisov, took part of his staff to Sakhalin and took charge of the whole Sakhalin operation.
The 56th Corps at 2200 on 10 August received orders to prepare and launch an attack at 1000 on 11 August—only 12 hours later. The plan was to conduct the operation in three phases: (1) breakthrough the initial defense line (15 km. deep) during the period 11 to 15 August; (2) breakthrough the last defense line during 16 to 18 August, and conduct a landing at Esutoru, if the enemy was bringing up forces from the south; and (3) from 19 to 25 August, to sweep south (at 55 km. per day), with a landing at Maoka. The landing operations would be conducted by the North Pacific Flotilla; its chief mission was to seize the ports to prevent either reinforcement from Japan or withdrawal to Japan.
Heavy rainstorms prevented air operations on 9 and 10 August, and made the terrain nearly impassable. Bombing support by fleet aviation began the night of 10-11 August, but air support remained weak due to constant fog. At 0745 on 11 August, the 165th Regiment of the 79th Rifle Division led off the attack on a four-kilometer front (with 24 tanks and 70 artillery pieces per kilometer of front). Progress was slow against stiff resistance by the Japanese. For three days the Russians made little headway, and on the 14th the 179th Regiment of the 79th Division was cut off and surrounded by the Japanese.
On 14 August, the Commander of the North Pacific Flotilla, Vice Admiral V. A. Andreyev, proposed landing two battalions at Toro, located roughly one-quarter down the Japanese half of the island. Incredible though it may seem, the Flotilla Headquarters had no liaison with General Cheremisov’s staff on Sakhalin, and were not informed of the progress of operations on the island. His proposal met with approval of Pacific Fleet Headquarters, which urged speed. The Second Far East Front Headquarters at Vladivostok (to which General Cheremisov was responsible) also approved, but noted that since the proposed landing area was 200 kilometers from the 56th Corps, and the rest of the Japanese 88th Division was moving north, the enemy might be able to destroy a small landing force; hence, they advised, it might be wise to use a larger army unit. They also requested a landing be made at Maoka, about three-quarters the way down the Japanese territory. (It is not clear whether the Front Headquarters named Maoka as a counterproposal to a landing at Toro, or as a request for the earlier contingently planned landing in addition; Pacific Fleet interpreted it, at any rate, as the latter. Presumably the Front Commander wanted a landing at Maoka in order to tie down as much of the Japanese regiment in garrison there as possible.)
Specially arranged aerial reconnaissance on 12 and 13 August showed no Japanese defenses at Toro or nearby Esutoru. Two naval patrol craft also reconnoitered Esutoru on 12 and 13 August; Japanese, but no Soviet, sources say that a Soviet submarine also shelled Toro on 11 or 13 August. On the patrol reconnaissance on the 13th, the designated commander for the Toro assault force, Lieutenant Colonel Tavkhutdinov, Commander of the 365th Naval Infantry Battalion, was on board. The Japanese at Esutoru reported to their higher headquarters that they had repulsed an attempted landing by three or four Soviet landing ships, but there seems to be no reason to doubt the Soviet accounts which describe this action as merely a sea reconnaissance patrol. North Pacific Flotilla received its orders only 26 hours before the force had to embark.
The landing force left Sovetskaya Gavan and proceeded in heavy fog (visibility sometimes at only one-quarter cable length). The initial reconnaissance detachment, 141 marines, went ashore silently at 0517 on 16 August. By 0600 it had taken the port, against virtually no opposition. Only after this success did the main echelon, the 365th Naval Infantry Battalion, depart Sovetskaya Gavan, at 0640; it was then held up over an hour by heavy seas, and arrived at Toro at 0942. By 1010 the whole battalion (654 men) had landed, and the third echelon (the 2nd Battalion of the 113th Infantry Brigade—900 men) had left Sovetskaya Gavan. This force arrived and landed at 1722, and the rear sections of both battalions arrived the next morning. Toro was secured by 2000 on the 16th (although North Pacific Flotilla headquarters received no word from them that entire day).
Eighty aircraft, mostly IL-2s, were assigned to support the operation, and some air support was given, but several requests could not be met because of weather at the home air bases. There was moderate resistance between Toro and Esutoru. In addition to the units advancing from Toro, the 22nd Independent Machinegun Company was landed at Esutoru itself at 1010. Esutoru was taken, without opposition, by 1030 on 17 August.
On 19 August, Japan officially ceased hostilities. Nonetheless, it was decided to proceed with a landing at Maoka, which had been decided upon on the 15th for 20 August.
The landing force for Maoka left Sovetskaya Gavan at 0650 on 19 August, in a convoy commanded by Captain of the First Rank Leonov (who also had taken the Toro force in), with a destroyer escort, 16 minor warships and five transports. Colonel Zakharov, commander of the 113th Infantry Brigade, was in command of the 3,500 men of his brigade (minus the battalion at Toro, but plus a composite battalion of marines). The first wave (297 submachine gunners) landed in heavy fog at 0605 on the 20th. The landing was opposed, but by 1630 the town was cleared. The Japanese lost at least 200 killed, and 600 captured; Soviet casualties are not known. The third echelon of the force had gotten lost in the fog, and its ships had to find their way individually (at least one vessel was caught on the rocks, and the men on board swam ashore). On the same day, 20 August, the Koton defense line in the north was broken, and the Japanese began a rapid withdrawal southward with the 56th Rifle Corp in pursuit. The mission of all elements now was to prevent Japanese withdrawals to Hokkaido and to complete the occupation of the island as speedily as possible.
The 113th Rifle Brigade moved overland from Maoka to Futomata and on to Oto- mari. Eighty air-support sorties were flown. Meanwhile, the two marine battalions (and a third, new composite battalion formed from sailors only a few days earlier), 1,600 men in all, were re-embarked at Maoka to move on Otomari by sea. En route the next day, they were forced by stormy seas to seek haven in Honto (now Nevel’sk); finding no Japanese forces there and the civilians waving white flags, one marine company was landed and the rest of the force proceeded. On 25 August, the marines landed at Otomari just as the 113th Brigade arrived overland. At midday, advance elements of the 56th Rifle Corps arrived from the north. The 3,400-man Japanese garrison surrendered that day without resistance.
The campaign on Sakhalin was over; 18,320 Japanese prisoners were taken. They had held the northern defense line for nine days; no doubt the landings at Toro and Maoka contributed to the final Soviet success, and the move on Otomari in preventing withdrawals to Hokkaido, but it would be hard to consider the landing operations essential.
The absence of a North Pacific Flotilla liaison element at 16th Army Headquarters on Sakhalin required that all communications between the naval landing forces and the 56th Rifle Corps be conducted through Pacific Fleet and Second Far Eastern Front headquarters in Vladivostok. In contrast, the 255th Air Division headquarters remained with the 16th Army, and after 16 August both of these headquarters were located with 56th Corps.
It is not clear whether there was friction between Army and Navy elements in planning the Toro and Maoka operations. The Second Far Eastern Front comments on need for a larger army force (knowing Pacific Fleet had only one regular and one composite marine battalion available) suggest this. In any case, the Toro operation was commanded by the marine battalion commander, and the Maoka operation by the army brigade commander, but with the marine element first ashore. The naval performance was adequate, in admittedly bad weather conditions. Air support was not very effective, except for critical importance of aerial reconnaissance.
Prior to the operation, the main Koton defenses and Japanese deployments had not been located. The Northern Pacific Flotilla air photography of Esutoru and Maoka proved very valuable for the landings; the patrol craft reconnaissance contributed. On 18 August, two days before the landing, the submarine Shch-118 landed a special five-man reconnaissance team at Maoka; they were not discovered by the Japanese, but their mission aborted when their radio was lost in the surf. Special hydrographic teams landed with the first wave at both Toro and Maoka to determine conditions for later landing vessels. In all, reconnaissance was adequate, but left much to be desired.
The Kurile Islands. Only on 15 August did Marshal Vasilevsky direct the Second Far Eastern Front and Pacific Fleet to mount operations to occupy the northern Kurile Islands (Shimushu, Paramushiro, and One- kotan). There appears to have been some tangle in lines of command; not until the 18th did the headquarters of Pacific Fleet receive a copy of an order from Marshal Vasilevsky to General Purkayev, Commander of the Second Far Eastern Front, giving him the same mission they had received on the 15th. Thus, the Commander of the Petropavlovsk Naval Base, Captain of the First Rank D. G. Ponomarev, and the Commander of the Kamchatka Defense Region, Major General A. R. Gnechko, were ordered by Pacific Fleet Headquarters on 18 August to plan and undertake the operation “together with units of the Second Far Eastern Front.” But there were no appropriate or available units of that front except General Gnechko’s men and Pacific Fleet Headquarters had already on the 15th ordered Gnechko into action. General Gnechko had, on the 15th, been given nine hours to develop an operations plan, and only 29 hours until departure from port. The next day was spent frantically bringing together the army units spread about on Kamchatka in defensive positions, and most critical of all, commandeering and unloading commercial vessels of all kinds to use in the operation.
The Soviet forces did not command a large superiority over the Japanese on the northern islands. They had only 8,824 men against 8,480 Japanese on Shimushu; seven infantry battalions against six. In artillery they had 205 guns against 98 (but the Japanese were dug in), and 492 machine guns against 312. The Russians had 215 antitank guns and the Japanese none; but the Japanese had 60 tanks and the Russians none. The Soviet forces had 42 combat aircraft in support (the 128th Composite Air Division); the Japanese only seven aircraft (however, the heavy fog reduced considerably the advantage of Soviet air superiority). Neither side had any major warships, not counting two Soviet submarines. In fact, the Japanese had no naval forces at all available—only three motor torpedo boats in the whole of the Kuriles.
The Russian plans for the operation called for the main blow to be struck in the northeast corner of Shimushu, the northernmost and most strongly defended island. A small diversionary landing was planned on the southeast side. A second tactical landing on the southwest side of the island was contingent on success of the first. Finally, a landing on northern Paramushiro across the straits from Shimushu was planned in case of weak resistance on Shimushu. The objective was to take Shimushu, and above all its naval base at Kataoka, but it was decided that a landing at or near the fortified base was not feasible.
The main Soviet force was the 101st Rifle Division under Major General P. I. D’yakov. On the Japanese side, the 73rd Brigade of the 91st Infantry Division, the 11th Tank Regiment, and the 31 AAA Regiment were defending Shimushu, and the 74th Brigade (plus 11 tanks) defending Paramushiro. In all, there were 23,000 Japanese military men on these two islands, and over 60,000 in the whole of the 50 islands of the Kurile chain. There were six airfields on the northern islands, and three others in the south, but in all the Kuriles the Japanese had only the seven aircraft on Shimushu. The Soviets were aware of major Japanese dispositions, but Soviet advance reconnaissance and intelligence was rather incomplete.
Shimushu is only six and a half miles from the nearest point on Kamchatka, but 170 miles from Petropavlovsk, where the Soviet force debarked. The Japanese were not expecting a landing operation, knowing that the Soviets were relatively weak in ground strength in Kamchatka.
At 1400 on 17 August, 16 or 17 transports and 15 or 16 landing craft, escorted by two destroyer escorts and one submarine, left Petropavlovsk. General Gnechko was in over-all command, Captain Ponomarev was in charge of the landing operation, and General D’yakov commanded the assault force. In addition to two regiments of the 101st Rifle Division, the landing force had one composite naval infantry battalion (783 men), hastily formed from personnel of ships and the fleet’s shore establishment located at Petropavlovsk.
The first wave landed in dense fog at 0410 on 18 August, initially in complete surprise. However, one of the landing craft opened fire, and others joined in, hopelessly compromising surprise. The first wave (two companies of marines, a maritime border guard company, and a submachine gun company) got in, and some elements even got two kilometers inland before drawing fire. The premature firing had, however, alerted the Japanese, and the main initial landing echelon (the 138th Rifle Regiment) faced heavy artillery fire, as well as resistance on land. Two key hills changed hands three times in bitter fighting. The ship with the commander and staff of the first echelon was unable to get to shore, leaving those ashore leaderless. Captain Ponomarev sent a group of his own staff ashore to find out what was going on, but they lost their radio in the water. Only four 45-mm. guns had been landed. At 0725, the main force began landing under heavy fire, and the commander and staff failed again to get ashore. This regiment repeated the error of the first wave, continuing to fight for the tactical objective of the heights while failing to clear out the Japanese artillery batteries that were peppering the landing force. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Artyushin, commander of the second echelon (the 373rd Rifle Regiment), managed to get ashore and save the day.
Meanwhile, several landing craft were sunk. Only in the afternoon did some attack aircraft get through the fog; rather than give direct support, they hit the naval base on the south of the island to impede reinforcement from Paramushiro. In all, the Soviet air force flew 94 sorties that day, of which 42 were light and attack bombers. All seven of the Japanese aircraft flew support, and two were shot down. By the end of the day, the main Soviet force was landed and held a perimeter of four kilometers front by five-six kilometers deep (in an island of over 100 square kilometers). The initial mission—to seize the whole island in one day—had proved impossible to carry out.
A renewed major attack planned for the 19th was held off in view of the Japanese capitulation and a letter from Lieutenant General Suiumi-Fusaki, Commander of the 91st Division and Japanese forces in the northern Kuriles, opening negotiations for surrender. On the 20th, a small Soviet task force was assembled from the landing force and sent around the island by sea to land at Kataoka naval base in the south. It was supposed to take on a Japanese navigator who was not, however, at the place the Russians understood that he would be, so it proceeded without him. Upon arrival at the port they were met with artillery fire, and were compelled to withdraw with casualties. On getting word of this action, the Soviet command resumed the offensive at 1300 on 20 August. New landings with the other two regiments in Kamchatka were planned, but on 23 August the 12,000 Japanese on Shimushu surrendered.
The remaining northern Kurile Islands surrendered without incident, as elements of the Soviet Kamchatka-Shimushu forces arrived by sea: Paramushiro on 24 August; Onekotan and Shiashkotan on the 25th; Matsuwa on the 25th and 26th; Shimushiru on the 27th; and Uruppu on the 28th and 29th. Other Soviet units from southern Sakhalin took the Japanese surrender at Itu- ruppu (Etorofu) on the 28th; Kunashiri on 1 and 2 September; and Shikotan on 5 September. In all, 63,840 prisoners were taken in the whole of the Kuriles.
The only combat action was the initial landing operation on Shimushu and the progress of that force from 18 to 23 August. The other planned and contingent operations on Shimushu and on other islands were never conducted. Opposition was stronger than expected, and several setbacks were encountered. In addition to the inadvertent loss of tactical surprise, Soviet military writers are divided over the question of whether artillery preparation from Kamchatka, begun several days before the landing, compromised surprise. In fact, the Japanese have since disclosed that they did not expect a landing. Some Soviet military men have also criticized the complicated system of variant plans and contingent landings, but the situation of Japanese piecemeal surrender would seem to justify some uncertainty on the resistance to be expected.
The most serious shortcoming of the operation was, as the Soviets now admit in their own military analyses, inadequate working out of communications, command, and combined operations. In addition, the suddenness of the decision to shift to an offensive required unloading transports and landing craft already loaded with other goods; in fact, in some cases there was not time to complete the job, and some ships carried irrelevant civilian cargo as dead ballast. Similarly, the closest Soviet air base, at Ozernoe on Kamchatka (90 kilometers from Shimushu) was not operational and could not be used.
All in all, the operation at Shimushu, while marked with a number of difficulties and failures, was reasonably successful. It is, however, hardly to be compared with the taking of Iwo Jima.
The Amur Flotilla in Manchuria. The final contribution of naval and amphibious forces to the Soviet Far Eastern campaign of 1945 was the support of the inland Amur “Red Banner Flotilla” to the Second Far Eastern Front in crossing the Amur and Ussuri, and riding up the Sungari, rivers. The Flotilla, under the command of Rear Admiral N. V. Antonov, had over 200 craft of various kinds, including eight monitors, 11 gunboats, and 52 armored cutters. Some of the gunboats had been built before World War I. (The Japanese had 29 river gunboats and monitors.)
The 45th Fighter Regiment flew air cover for the flotilla, and the 253rd Attack Regiment supported the 15th Army crossing the Amur and moving up the Sungari. (The Japanese had virtually no air power to counter the Soviet advance.)
The major axes of the Soviet attack on Manchuria were carried by Marshal Rodion Malinovsky’s Front on the west, and Marshal Kyril Meretskov’s on the east. General of the Army Maxim Purkayev’s Second Far Eastern Front held the north and northeastern frontiers along the Amur and lower Ussuri rivers. This Front had the missions of auxiliary offensive thrusts south from Blagoveshchensk and southwest from the Khabarovsk area, and defense along the rest of the frontier line. Even so, his powerful Front had three field armies: the 2nd Red Banner Combined Arms Army, the 15th Combined Arms Army; the 16th Combined Arms Army; the 5th Independent Infantry Corps; the Kamchatka Defense Group; the 10th Air Army; and a headquarters reserve. We have earlier discussed the only elements of the 16th Army to enter combat: the 56th Rifle Corps on Sakhalin, the 113th Rifle Brigade which was landed on that island, and the Kamchatka Defense Group, which mounted the attack on the northern Kuriles.
The main thrust of the Front was made by the 15th Army across the Amur at T’ung- chiang and up the Sungari toward Harbin. A secondary thrust across at Aigun toward Tsitsihar was made by the 2nd Army, and a small secondary advance by the 5th Corps at Tungan (Hsiangtan) and on toward Poli.
This Front faced the weakest Japanese defenses. The Japanese did not plan to defend the salient of northeastern Manchuria embraced by the thrusts of the 15th Army and 5th Corps. Apart from light border defenses, there was only one Japanese division, the 134th at Chiamussu. Further west, the 123rd Division was at Sunwu and the 135th Brigade at Erhchan, both facing Blagoveshchensk, and the 136th Brigade was at Nenching (but redeployed south to Tsitsihar), while the 149th Division redeployed from Tsitsihar to Harbin on 11 August, where it joined the 131st Brigade. Of these units, only the 134th and 123rd Divisions and 135th Brigade engaged in combat with the Russians. It should also be stressed that, like most of the once-vaunted Kwantung Army in Manchuria, these forces had serious deficiencies in weapons and training. None of these units was rated at more than 35 per cent effective by the Japanese. Most had been in existence only some months. To note but one particularly striking example of deficiencies, the 149th Infantry Division had not a single artillery piece.
On 9 August, initial crossings in the east were made and Fuyuan and Tungan taken. Heavy rains had complicated the Soviet task by making muddy pools of troop concentration places and swelling the river sufficiently that several crossing points had to be changed almost at the last minute. Nonetheless, apart from these successful seizures of Japanese river ports, against virtually no opposition, General Purkayev was able to determine that the Japanese had no major combat units within 15 kilometers of the river in that whole sector, and decided to cross the main force of the 15th Army over and assume the offensive. On the night of 9-10 August, 4,000 men of the 361st Rifle Division were ferried across to T’ungchiang, and on 11 August moved up the Sungari and hit Fuchin, where they encountered the Japanese 134th Infantry Division. By the 12th, the whole of the 361st and the 171st Tank Brigade were at Fuchin, but the battle was heavily contested for several days. General Purkayev had assumed personal command of the Sungari operation (despite his concurrent responsibility for the distant Sakhalin Island and Blagoveshchensk operations). While most of the 361st Rifle Division had proceeded overland after taking T’ungchiang, several battalions had been embarked again on vessels of the Amur Flotilla and landed at intermediate points and at Fuchin. Meanwhile, the 34th Rifle Division had come overland, against resistance, from Lopei to Fuchin. Only on 14 August was the Japanese 134th Division forced to withdraw to Chiamussu.
The 361st and 388th Rifle Divisions, the 171st Tank Brigade, and the Amur Flotilla, were given the mission of taking Chiamussu. On the 14th, a regiment of the 361st and a composite detachment of the 34th were transported by the flotilla to several intermediate points, but finding no enemy forces, they re-embarked and landed at Susutan—40 kilometers closer to Chiamussu—on the morning of 16 August. That night they began shelling that city, but learned from prisoners that the 134th Division had left for Fang- cheng on 13 August, leaving only a rearguard of 500 Kamikaze, and the Japanese- Manchukuoan Composite 7th Brigade had gone to Mingali. The Amur Flotilla Commander then decided to land another regiment of the 361st Division at Mingali, and it landed on 16 August and without resistance took the surrender of the 7th Brigade. On the afternoon of 16 August, the same regiment landed at Chiamussu and, with the rest of the 361st Division there, cleared the city.
On the night of 15-16 August, the 34th Division had sent word that it was in heavy combat south of Linkou, and Amur Flotilla units were sent to provide fire support. On the 16th, the Flotilla commander asked General Purkayev’s permission to move on Fang- cheng with the regiment of the 361st Division which he had on shipboard. He was told that the 34th Rifle Division was advancing from Taniunan, the 361st Division and 171st Tank Brigade from Chiamussu, and elements of the 5th Rifle Corps from Poli were all converging on Fangcheng, and to join them. The regiment landed north of Fangcheng just as the Flotilla learned of the Japanese surrender.
At 1000 hours on 18 August the Chief of Staff of the Japanese 134th Division informed the Soviet Flotilla leader of readiness to surrender. The 134th Division had, in fact, been out of communications with the Japanese First Area Army to which it was subordinate since 11 August.
On 21 and 22 August, the Flotilla landed the 394th Regiment at Harbin to take the Japanese surrender. Small Soviet units had already air-landed there on 19 August.
While the Sungari operation was proceeding, joined by 5th Rifle Corps elements overland after crossing the Ussuri, the other Soviet thrust was made south from Blagoveshchensk. The first crossing near Aigun was made the night of 9-10 August, following artillery preparatory fire. The first wave was composed of 222 Border Guards; the second, 370 men from the 368th Guards Rifle Regiment. Other units followed, without serious opposition during the crossings.
Two other crossings were also successful, and the river area was cleared in two days. Stormy resistance was, however, met at Aigun itself, where the Soviet attacks were repulsed. In fact, the Japanese 135th Brigade continued to hold positions at Aigun until 19 August when they learned of the Japanese capitulation, although Soviet forces had bypassed them and advanced toward Nenching. Similarly, pressed by the Soviet 3rd and 12th Rifle Divisions, the Japanese 123rd Infantry Division at Sunwu also held out until the ceasefire on 15 August, and on the 19th the Soviets were still short of Peian.
The Amur Flotilla gave fire support to the three major crossings in the Blagoveshchensk-Aigun area, and in the battle for Aigun. But it performed its main service in that region by ferrying large forces across the river. At the main Konstantinovka crossing point, from 11 August to 1 September, 64,891 men, 4,933 horses, 747 tanks, 3,545 other vehicles, and 406 artillery pieces were ferried across.
In all, on the whole Second Far Eastern Front from 9 August to 1 September, a total of 104,737 men, 8,097 horses, 6,011 vehicles, 3,348 carts, 649 tanks, and 1,109 artillery pieces were taken across the Amur River into Manchuria.
The Soviet Navy did not play a major role in Soviet operations in World War II in any theater. Its opportunity, though limited, was greatest in the brief Far Eastern campaign against Japan in August 1945. It performed adequately, and in some instances very well, in the light of conditions and its own limitations. Nonetheless, serious shortcomings were evident; indeed, many of them are recognized by Soviet military men. Above all, lack of clear command, co-ordination, and communications arrangements were responsible for glaring failures, which were not more serious only because the enemy they faced was weak and rapidly disintegrating.
As for naval combat operations at sea, the Soviet Pacific Fleet claim that for the entire Far Eastern campaign, and mostly by air action, they sank two destroyers, 28 transports, three tankers, five cutters, and 12 barges. Even this claim is overstated, perhaps unwittingly; at least one of the claimed destroyers is incorrect. (In a recent article, Admiral Yumashev himself has advanced the more modest—and probably more accurate— claim that by air and submarine action the Pacific Fleet sank eight transports and one destroyer.) With respect to landing operations, the Soviet record has nothing else to match this performance, since operations in the Baltic and Black seas were even more limited, with the debatable exception of the large-scale but short distance ferrying of troops at Novorossisk on the Black Sea in 1943. Weather hindered and complicated the landings on Sakhalin and in the Kuriles, but the only seriously contested major assault landings were at Chongjin and Shimushu, and these hung in the balance due to shortcomings in Soviet planning and performance.
No doubt the Soviets have learned a great deal from their experience, as well as from studying ours, and it is beyond the scope of this article to consider current Soviet doctrine or capabilities for landing operations. This article has been written on the assumption that it may, nonetheless, prove currently useful, as well as of historical interest, to acquaint ourselves with the record of the most recent Soviet naval and landing operations, against the Japanese in 1945.