Peacekeeping has become a valid military operation in the post World War II years. Mixed contingents of national military forces have been used in the name of, through the machinery of, and under the general (although limited) control of the United Nations.
The United Nations has engaged in 11 peacekeeping operations since 1945, including a full-scale police action in Korea. But, more typically, these operations have been limited to what amounts to the dispatching of observer groups. Small U. N. units have reported on compliance with ceasefires in Indonesia and in Kashmir and the disengagement agreement in the Yemen; they have enforced the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreement, and served as a Special Commission on the Balkans. A larger element, the 600-man observer corps, helped prevent illegal infiltration in Lebanon in 1958.
A subject of growing attention, however, is the larger and more complex military operation. Thus far, three of these large peacekeeping forces have been assembled under the U. N. banner: the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF), the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
UNEF is a 5,000-man force established at the time of the Suez Crisis in 1956 as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. ONUC was comprised of troops from 28 countries, numbering more than 20,000 at its peak and intended to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. UNFICYP was a 6,300-man military force of Britons, Canadians, Danes, Finns, Irish, and Swedes (plus Austrian, Australian, New Zealand, Danish and Swedish forces and an Austrian military hospital team) assembled to restore order and keep the peace in Cyprus.
The concept of a U. N. peacekeeping force has evolved in order to meet urgent requirements. Simply stated, its broad purpose is to prevent international crises from getting out of hand. The U. N. Charter (Articles 43-45) made provisions for member states to place military forces at the disposition of the United Nations. But the intent seems primarily to have been to supply the organization with effective sanctions against aggression or similar calculated threats to world peace. The United Nations Command in Korea was the only U. N. force of this nature, and it seems unlikely that this type of operation can ever be repeated. The type of U. N. operation that has since emerged has come in response to crises ranging from disorder to anarchy rather than in response to direct big-power confrontations. It is significant that the first force of this type was specifically labelled an “emergency” force. As the term implies, all of these forces were organized in haste, and the mandates and arrangements were not always adequate for the fulfillment of the task. In each instance, however, it was possible (albeit with extensive negotiations) to get a political consensus in the Security Council or the General Assembly.
This article cannot pretend to examine the complicated, controversial political and financial questions involved in the U. N. peacekeeping concept. Suffice it to say that, crisis- impelled and confused though some individual operations may have been, there has been a gradual—albeit reluctant—increase in the use of international military force through the United Nations over the past several years. And the indications are that there will be a continuing use of such forces.
U. N. peacekeeping efforts have been most useful in three kinds of situations. First, the United Nations has been able to obtain and enforce ceasefires in quarrels and border disputes between small states. Second, the United Nations has helped to reduce the possibility of big-power confrontations or the spread of violence by containing internal strife in situations—the Congo and Cyprus are examples—that threatened to draw in outside meddlers. Finally, in other situations, such as Greece at the end of the 1940s and Lebanon in 1958, the United Nations has reduced the explosive potential by exposing subversion and infiltration. It must be admitted, however, that none of these operations was intended to—nor did they—“solve” the crisis in question.
Still, U. N. peacekeeping forces have been able to achieve a condition of “suspended violence” either by maintaining an uneasy status quo or by stabilizing an uncertain demarcation line.
Lower spectrum conflict—the resort to force J in political developments—is increasing greatly. The postwar years have seen as many occurrences of major political violence as the entire period from the beginning of the century until the end of World War II (See Table), and the trend of recent years is unmistakable. It is increasingly important, then, that these smoldering coals of incipient violence be smothered before they become conflagrations. These disputes, small in themselves, invite outside interference and subsequent escalation into major conflict.
There are great restraints on intervention by the United States in these situations, because such action would more likely precipitate than avoid a great-power confrontation. The only firebreak available, at least to date, to control lower spectrum conflagrations is the U. N. peacekeeping operation.
But peacekeeping operations could not be used in an area of vital security concern to the United States (e.g., Cuba) or the Soviet Union (e.g., Hungary). Moreover, in the realities of world power, they are no substitute for nuclear deterrence and national power, nor for NATO forces or for such involvements as the U. S. units that are helping South Vietnam to resist Communist insurgency. Still, it is clear that there are situations—and likely to be more of them—in which U. N. peacekeeping forces can move in, where the big powers cannot, and fill a dangerous power vacuum with a force that is politically acceptable to either big power.
Over the years, a body of ground rules and experience in U. N. peacekeeping has developed. To date, some 54 countries have assigned personnel to U. N. operations, and some 27 nations have made major contributions of military units (100 men or more) to one or more of the U. N. forces. Each force has been made up of contingents which, while maintaining their national integrity, have been subject to the general direction of the Secretary General within the mandates provided by the Security Council or the General Assembly.
National contingents take orders from the U. N. commander in the field, but control— including disciplining—is maintained by national unit commanders. Consent of the host government is necessary for the entry of the force; the “freedom of movement” needed to accomplish the mission has also been a condition, but in practice it has been difficult to define or obtain. The composition of the force must be decided by the United Nations, although the views of the host state are taken into account. U. N. troops may use force in self-defense, although this action would be taken only as a last resort.
U. N. peacekeeping has involved a great variety of military tasks and unusual requirements. Establishing coherent operations out of separate national units, often with varying staff patterns and procedures, differing equipment and logistics requirements, and even several different languages is a colossal job. In addition, it has usually had to be done in great haste with units assembled and shipped with little notice in the midst of the tense situation. U. N. troops have had to police and patrol. They have had to separate combatants and to exert the utmost in persuasion to terminate hostilities. The dispersal of rioting mobs has been thrust upon them. In the Congo, at one point, U. N. units found themselves guarding Congolese political leaders from each other. On another occasion, in the Congo, they were instructed to close the airports and radio stations to try to maintain public order. They have had to help civil administration and circumstances have often made them de facto mediators and quasi-magistrates. Swift and impartial investigations and accurate observations, frequently in tense and obscure situations, have had to become one of their fortes. Actual military operations, as in Katanga, cannot be entirely excluded, but, as stated earlier, they require special U. N. Security Council authority and special controls to maintain minimum force conditions and limited objectives.
Efforts are now being made to try to solve some of these practical problems. In November 1964, Canada acted as host for a “Meeting of military experts to consider the technical aspects of U. N. Peacekeeping Operations” which was attended in Ottawa by representatives from 22 countries that have contributed units to U. N. peacekeeping missions.* The aim was “to review past experience of the U. N. peacekeeping operations and to exchange views on the practical and technical problems which have been encountered in the course of these operations.” Delegates were working-level representatives—mainly military experts—with practical knowledge of the problems. (Canada made clear that the wider political questions of authorization, control, and financing of U. N. operations were entirely outside the sphere of the conference and crisply denied a Soviet allegation that the meeting was designed to put pressure on those countries that had defaulted in paying the costs of peacekeeping operations.)
The points covered—composition, command, control and liaison, training and operational problems, environmental operating information, logistic support, personnel administration, public relations, accounting procedures and legal problems—indicate the scope of U. N. peacekeeping.
The conference discussions were informal and without commitment, and the final communique noted only the hope “that the exchange of views . . . would contribute to the effectiveness of such national forces as might be made available to the United Nations in the future and had therefore served the general purpose of strengthening the capacity of participating nations to support the United Nations to engage in peacekeeping operations.”
The Secretary General of the United Nations has called on member nations to train and maintain in readiness special forces for use in future emergencies. Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and Iran have designated specific units of their armed forces to be on “stand-by,” ready for duty when and if their governments agree to participate in a U. N. peacekeeping mission.
Canada has nominated a regular infantry battalion as its stand-by force. This unit is specially equipped and trained in air transportability and peacekeeping tasks and kept close to full strength ready to move on short notice. The Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Navy have also developed procedures to move the U. N. stand-by unit quickly and support it effectively. Under the recent Canadian White Paper on Defence, one of the Canadian Army brigade groups is being reorganized as a light-scale infantry brigade group with vehicles and equipment that can be transported by the RCAF; this force will provide a source of trained units and personnel for U. N. peacekeeping operations. Additional air transports for the RCAF and some additional sealift capability for the RCN are also projected by the White Paper.
Danish, Finnish, and Norwegian units will comprise the Scandinavian U. N. Stand-by Force, totalling about 5,000 men. Its organization allows the troops of each country to be brought into action either singly or as part of an integrated Scandinavian unit. Sweden plans to provide two infantry battalions, and the other countries one each. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark will contribute to a movement control unit. Norway will furnish the nucleus of a workshop and plans to earmark a frigate and a special harbor unit for U.N. use. Signal and medical units and the nucleus of a military police detachment will be provided by Denmark. Sweden will supply a technical unit and will join with Norway to set up an air transport unit with helicopters and transport planes.
The Netherlands’ stand-by contingent is an independent unit of about 300 from the Netherlands Marine Corps that can be made available from the Netherlands proper or from the Netherlands Antilles. It is made up on a contingent staff, infantry company, and supporting units and incorporates signal, medical, supply and other functions.
The designation and training of such standby units is undoubtedly a step forward. A small and effective U. N. contingent that arrives early in a situation may be of much greater benefit than a large force later. The varying political and practical requirements of each occasion in which a U. N. force is called for will likely require continuing the present ad hoc provision of units. But the formation of the force would obviously be easier and more successful if a number of trained units—with a variety of capabilities—are readily available. Further, if such units are available, it should be easier to get agreement on setting up U. N. peacekeeping forces to head off crises. And, each time a peacekeeping operation is successfully set up it should tend to improve the organization of subsequent forces.
Peacekeeping could well become the focus for military professionals of smaller countries. The requirements certainly exist, and the professional challenges are enormous. It is a most demanding type of duty because of the constant, inevitably vague, constraints on the use of force.
There is no conflict between the peacekeeping mission and that of the normal type of military force, trained and equipped for internal security, that is common in most countries of the world. The essential additional capabilities are the unique type of staff skill, readiness, and an adaptability in transport and sustenance that are required. The military forces of most countries of the world are thus capable of developing significant, if limited, peacekeeping capabilities.
The United States has supported the Secretary General’s initiative in encouraging trained national stand-by units. At present, it is not desirable for the United States to earmark units, inasmuch as one advantage of U. N. peacekeeping is the avoidance of big- power confrontations. Still, the United States has participated in every U. N. peacekeeping operation, with troops in Korea, observers in Greece, Palestine, and Kashmir, and, most often, by providing crucial airlift and sealift, as well as communications and logistic support. Obviously, then, without direct involvement there are a number of practical things that the United States can do, and is doing, to encourage and improve the U. N. peacekeeping capability.
Helping other nations develop units earmarked for U. N. service should be an accepted part of our Military Assistance Programs. We can help train and equip contingents for those MAP recipients who desire to earmark units. We can identify needs and help develop capabilities to meet them. Stand-by communications units, for instance, are badly needed. At present, it is virtually impossible to recruit a communications unit on short notice from any but the most advanced Western countries. In other countries where there is more preliminary interest in U. N. peacekeeping, our MAAG or military missions can assist their host country’s interested officers by furnishing documents or obtaining for them literature from other countries which have earmarked units or have had U. N. experience.
U. N. peacekeeping offers a meaningful external mission for small armed forces of limited capability and one that relates well to their primary mission of maintaining internal stability in their own countries. But more than that, an awareness of a possible peacekeeping commitment will improve the readiness and flexibility of a country’s military units and, equally important, spur the development of common procedures.
Perhaps we can help these countries devise and carry out staff exercises to improve their peacekeeping potential and to assist them in identifying those areas of staff work that may need attention. We may be able to help these countries to modify equipment or procedures to make them more adaptable to peacekeeping operations or to increase flexibility in operations or logistics. Experience has shown, for instance, that peacekeeping units are likely to need equipment beyond that normally supplied to infantry units. Shotguns, tear gas equipment, shields and batons, helicopters or light aircraft, and extra portable radios and telephones, are examples of such equipment.
Because of their complexity, past peacekeeping operations have tended to be inefficient and overly expensive. To the degree that we can facilitate more effective logistics support, the more efficient are future operations likely to be, and the lower will be the United States’ share of the costs. Where opportunities offer, we should bring those countries with earmarked contingents together with others that are interested in examining this idea.
Certainly, U. N. peacekeeping and its implications should not intrude on the major military missions of the U. S. armed forces on which our security and that of the entire Free World really depend. But this country can, at relatively little cost, add an extra dimension to its military experience in appropriate areas that would assist in the U. N. peacekeeping operation. For instance, suitable courses in this subject could be included in our national and service war colleges and in other official schools. Orientation in peacekeeping experience and the U. S. interest in it should be added to the training of military attaches and MAAG members. It would be advantageous to develop a roster of U. S. military officers who are familiar with peacekeeping operations. From this roster, officers could be assigned to a U. N. headquarters military staff unit if such a group is ever established, or detailed on an ad hoc basis for liaison at U. N. headquarters or with a U. N. peacekeeping force. Each service could also identify those ways in which it might be called on to assist U. N. peacekeeping operations and develop standard procedures for making these capabilities available promptly and effectively. The most likely areas, of course, are the air and sea transport, communications and logistic support that the United States has furnished for most U. N. operations, but there are other more specific capabilities that could also be very useful.
Of particular interest to naval readers are those areas in which the U. S. Navy, without detracting from its primary missions, might assist U. N. peacekeeping operations.
The major role of sea transport in previous U. N. operations has been mentioned; analysis of those experiences may indicate ways to increase the flexibility of our improving sealift capacity in meeting future requests and may help other countries (e.g., Canada) in devising sealift well-adapted to peacekeeping needs.
A valuable asset to peacekeeping operations would be the presence of U. S. naval units off the shore of a threatened area while the United Nations debates the establishment of an actual military force. It would probably not be possible to have entire units embarked and waiting to land, but a variety of key contingents—headquarters, communications, base security, etc.—could be so embarked and landed immediately to get the operation started and establish quickly a “visible” deterrent to further disorder. This approach has not yet been used, but it offers a number of psychological and practical advantages, would hardly be more costly than an extensive airlift, and might be the only alternative if for some reason overflight clearances for airlift operations were denied or delayed.
The naval ability to remain poised offshore would also offer other U. S. Navy capabilities that would be very useful in getting a U. N. operation under way, whether the U. N. force arrived by ship or plane. U. S. naval ships offshore could provide medical teams ashore or floating medical facilities offshore that could obviously be helpful to the fledgling U. N. force. Available medical services were not sufficient for the needs of the U. N. force in the early days in the Congo; another sorely felt need was for a movement control capability to bring in and deploy the arriving national units. U. S. ships offshore might also provide emergency power facilities, workshops for the repair of equipment, harbor control teams, communications units or other key technical assistance ashore until the U. N. force could arrive and take over these operations itself. Helicopters and perhaps limited non-belligerent aerial support might also be supplied by U. S. Navy ships offshore.
There are several areas in which U. S. Navy expertise could be particularly useful if the United States should undertake and equip national contingents earmarked for U. N. service under our Military Assistance Programs. In some respects, these areas warrant special attention because, aside from the frigate and harbor control unit earmarked by Norway, the naval aspects of peacekeeping operations have not received much attention. One such area comprises the techniques of, and best equipment for, operations in restricted waters—the rivers and coastlines of the world that are potential sites for future peacekeeping operations. Training of more harbor control units, medical teams, sanitation control units would also be useful.
The readiness and flexibility achieved by the U. S. Marine Corps should offer many techniques and training methods that would be suitable for U. N. stand-by units. Speaking more generally, U. N. peacekeeping offers the small navies of the world an opportunity to put their limited resources to significant use, rather than degenerating into obsolescence.
Too often in the past, we have been unprepared to meet peacekeeping emergencies. The likelihood is that such emergencies will occur again, often without warning. We thus have nothing to lose and much to gain by taking the practical steps open to us to improve our own abilities to support peacekeeping operations and to help friendly nations develop their capabilities to meet peacekeeping emergencies. We thereby obtain a not inconsiderable addition to our own strength and flexibility. Recourse to U. N. peacekeeping can give us, in effect, an additional practical strategic option as a supplement to the direct exercise of national power. In the modern world of limited peace, U. N. peacekeeping operations have served the national interests of the United States and the cause of world peace.
* Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic.