In the post World War II era, the areas of possible conflict have become far greater than at any time in the history of the world. The U. S. Navy is today a major force operating over thousands of miles of oceans in the containment of the Communist empire in Europe and Asia. As a result of the abilities of our naval planners and the periodic opportunities provided by the Communists for us to test our forces, our strike capabilities have constantly grown in effectiveness. We have also developed a great appreciation of the logistic tether on which our strike forces operate, but there is still a certain amount of the maladie de paix in our logistic planning. Just as we approached World War II with logistic capabilities predicated upon the type of naval operations experienced in World War I, our logistic concepts and capabilities today reflect very little change from those used to support World War II and Korean operations.
While recognizing that our mobile logistic support system is a product of the basic elements of delivery capability, built-in endurance in the combat ships, floating base forces and shore bases, this study will focus upon the element of delivery capability. Without capability for delivery to the operating ships on station, there can be no mobile logistic support as we know it. Therefore, after a brief glimpse at the history of mobile support, we shall look at the recent improvements in our delivery hardware, consider the ways in which we employ this hardware, discuss its deficiencies, and consider some possible improvements in both concepts and hardware.
Development of Underway Delivery. It is sometimes difficult to realize how recently developed are the techniques of underway replenishment, or, for that matter, how recently the U. S. fleet even obtained a logistic train capable of supporting a world-wide fleet. It was not until the commencement of World War II in Europe that the Navy commenced building stores ships and oilers reasonably capable of keeping up with the Fleet. The U. S. Navy’s technique of underway replenishment was first used in 1924 with the refueling at sea of a light cruiser being towed alongside an oiler in a calm sea. The first at-sea refueling of an aircraft carrier did not take place until June of 1939, only 30 months before Pearl Harbor. The lack of experience in fueling at sea contributed to the inability of the carrier USS Saratoga (CV-32) to refuel and reach Wake Island with relief forces prior to its surrender to the Japanese in December 1941.
Underway replenishment techniques developed rapidly during World War II and became the keystone to maintaining fleet mobility in that war. With the general demobilization and drastic economy measures in the years following the War, the concept of mobile support rapidly became a thing of the past, and reliance was placed upon advance bases. When the Navy found itself suddenly involved in the Korean War, mobile logistic support was quickly reorganized along the same lines as during World War II. During the Korean War, several innovations were developed; including night replenishment, the use of helicopters for inter-ship transfers of personnel and light cargo, and the technique of Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) of personnel and cargo. Except for the addition of the helicopter, the ships, aircraft, and equipment used by logistic forces during the Korean War were generally those that were in the inventory at the close of World War II.
Hardware Development Since Korea. In the decade since the cease-fire in Korea, we have made significant progress in improving our hardware. Of primary importance in new ship construction is the recently built fast combat support ship, USS Sacramento (AOE-l). This ship, with a speed of 26 knots, represents the first breakthrough in underway replenishment ship design since World War II. Instead of being a single purpose ship, she is a combination fleet oiler and ammunition ship, carrying the two commodities which are most critical under combat conditions, and she is designed to operate as a part of a strike force rather than an underway replenishment group. She also carries moderate quantities of provisions and stores, thus further reducing the dependence of a task force upon the traditional rear area underway replenishment group. The Sacramento can carry two cargo helicopters, each having an operating radius of over 100 miles. She is also rigged with constant-tension transfer rigs and a device called “Fast Automatic Shuttle Transfer” (FAST) for missile transfer. A second AOE, the Camden, is under construction, and a third, priced at 74 million dollars, has been funded in the fiscal year 1965 budget.
Two new Combat Store Ships, the USS Mars (AFS-l) and the USS Sylvania (AFS-2) have also been recently commissioned, and three more are under construction. These ships, costing approximately 18 million dollars, have a top speed of 20 knots, organic helicopter capability, constant-tension transfer rigs and modern internal materials-handling equipment. The AFS carries one-third to one-half as much provisions as an AF, and as much general and aviation stores as an AKS and AVS combined. These combat stores ships will probably replace the four 20-to-25-year-old former commercial cargo ships now being used as AKSs, the now decommissioned AVS, and perhaps some of the equally ancient AFs.
A third new type of ship, the AOR, is a combination fleet oiler, ammunition ship, and stores ship. Two of these ships have been funded in fiscal 1965. With a 38,000-ton fullload displacement, they will carry relatively small quantities of ordnance, provisions and stores, will have helicopter capability and a speed of 20 knots. Also scheduled for construction are two new AEs, which will have the same basic hull as the AFS.
Of the other ships designed to operate in underway replenishment groups, only two of the 15 AFs now in commission, five of the 18 AEs and six of the 39 AOs have been built since World War II. Minor modernization of the AFs and AEs has been accomplished by mounting helicopter pick-up platforms on some of them, and by making internal improvements and installing better transfer rigs on the AEs. The most dramatic improvement in the AO fleet is the so-called “Jumboizing” of the five Mispillion-class ships, adding an additional section in the midship area to increase carrying capacity by some 100,000-to- 150,000 barrels, or 50 per cent, and providing room for carrying fleet freight. Some of the AO-143-c\ass oilers, now carry a cargo helicopter, used to supplement the alongside delivery of stores from AFs and AKSs, the latter being too small to carry a helicopter. Two other developments improving the Navy’s underway fueling capability are the introduction of the aircraft type probe fueling connection which cuts fueling time, and the development of underway transfer capability in several of our MSTS T-AOs.
The C-1A Trader, the current COD aircraft, replaced the cargo configured TBM of the Korean War in 1955. With a payload of only 3,500 pounds of small cube cargo and a range of 700 miles, this aircraft is capable of handling only a portion of the air logistics needs of our striking forces. Its replacement, the C-2A, with a 1,300-mile range carrying a 10,000-pound payload, or a shorter range carrying a 15,000-pound load, is not due to be operational until 1966. The C-2A, which has a tail-loading capability, can carry the largest carrier-aircraft engines, has the potential for air-to-air refueling, and will be the first naval air logistics aircraft really worthy of the name.
Although large-scale use of helicopters originated during the Korean War, the first serious vertical replenishment effort came in 1958 with the use of the H-34 and a platform mounted over the side of the USS Altair (AKS-32). This helicopter, with a 4,000-pound payload capacity is now being replaced by the UH-46A, which has an 8,000-pound payload, tail loading and internal cargo space. Also available for use in vertical replenishment is the SH-3A, carried on board escort carriers. If this helicopter were fitted with an external cargo winch, it could not only perform vertical replenishment chores, but retain its ASW capability as well. The UH-2A, with a 2,000-pound payload capacity, is the standard rescue helicopter on board attack carriers and can also accomplish replenishment chores.
Current Concepts. A major change in the concept of logistic support over that of the Korean War era is the recognition of the need for replenishment of combat ships while they are in the operating area without rendezvous with an underway replenishment group. The AOE, a product of this change, could supply the fuel and ordnance needs of a strike force under combat conditions for up to three weeks.
The present concept retains the need for a rear area rendezvous with a conventional underway replenishment group for replenishment of stores and provisions. With combat ships theoretically carrying 60 to 90 days of stores and provisions, this type of replenishment would be relatively infrequent. Under this concept, the AOE could either retire with the strike group and replenish from the underway replenishment group, or return independently to either the replenishment group or to an advance base to top off. Emergency spare parts are flown from advance bases to carrier strike forces in COD aircraft.
The current concept for air logistics, with the exception of some refinement in control, shows almost no change from that of the Korean War. Underway air logistics using fixed-wing aircraft continues to be available only to carrier forces within range of the nearest land-based air terminal. Seaplanes have almost completely disappeared from the logistics scene, and helicopters continue to be used as a supplement to the alongside method of cargo transfer.
A Critical Review. When we review our underway replenishment hardware and concepts in the light of conceivable tasks which we could be called upon to perform, certain less-than-desirable attributes are indicated. These attributes fall into the following broad and sometimes overlapping categories:
Inadequate materials handling equipment in our ships.
Lack of incentives to exploit the potential of vertical replenishment as a primary underway replenishment technique.
High cost of providing adequate protection for replenishment groups.
Current inadequate range and capacity of COD aircraft and inadequate numbers in the foreseeable future, which will mean a continued marginal air logistic capability.
Lack of incentives to exploit the potential of air logistics for underway forces.
Inflexible dependency upon fixed bases.
Our concentration upon the increase of alongside transfer rates is reducing time alongside, but it is not materially changing the down time of combat ships which have their decks piled high with ordnance and stores. These increased transfer rates, with no improvement in the strikedown rate in many instances has increased this down time. This is particularly critical in aircraft carriers, because as more deck space is needed to handle the stores, the aircraft must be packed tighter, lengthening the time required subsequently for launch preparations.
Even the most casual observer of an underway replenishment operation will be impressed by the primitive methods of materials handling in the combat ships. Strikedown operations from any large volume transfer using any method other than FAST continue long after the transfer operation is completed. The FAST system, although in terms of units-per- minute transferred is anything but fast, at least tackles the problem of strikedown. All other transfer systems depend upon raw manpower, assisted here and there by elevators, hoists, chutes, dollies, roller skate conveyors, and hand trucks for strikedown.
The lack of materials-handling and strike- down equipment in combat ships is a major factor impeding the exploitation of the possibilities of vertical replenishment beyond its present role as a supplement to the alongside transfer method. It seems futile to attempt to increase greatly transfer rates in large-volume replenishments until the means exist to increase strikedown rates. Indeed, there are some items of ordnance that the FAST system is designed to handle which are almost impossible to handle on the decks of combat ships with present equipment, if they are delivered by helicopter.
Another factor impeding further development of a vertical replenishment concept is the extremely limited deck space for helicopters in our few modernized replenishment ships, and the total absence of this space in some of the older ones. Even our modern replenishment ships are being designed with a single helicopter transfer station on the fantail, which means that all material must be moved to that one spot if the helicopter is the sole means of transfer. If high rates of transfer are to be attempted, this cannot help but increase mutual interference on the part of helicopters and make more difficult the movement of material within the transferring ship.
Although the discussion up to this point has focused upon the problems of improving our capabilities for high volume replenishments, the practicality of that type of replenishment is open to question. While we were successful in World War II and in the Korean War with the use of large replenishment groups, it seems unlikely that many future conflict situations will provide the same environment as we experienced then. In World War II, we used the rear area underway replenishment group while we were attacking either fixed island targets over which we could exercise the initiative, or Japanese fleet units which had no greater logistic staying power than did we. The submarine and long-range air threat was far less ominous than it is today. In the Korean War, we enjoyed almost complete control over the seas and could rendezvous and replenish—virtually at will.
With a modern carrier striking force being capable of consuming over a quarter of a million pounds of ordnance, stores and food in a day, every effort must be made to replenish as frequently as possible. The AOE provides the means for almost continual replenishment of fuel and ordnance and to a much lesser extent food, but this will be an advantage enjoyed by very few task forces until more AOEs are built. Even with the AOE, an operating force will still require periodic replenishment of spare parts, general supplies, and food. In these three items alone, the quantities consumed in a three-week period will require the greater part of a day to transfer and strike below in each ship with our present materials handling equipment. To this must be added the transit time to and from the rendezvous. If all material transferred in such a replenishment except that from the AOE or AOR while delivering fuel were delivered by helicopter, defense of the formation would be somewhat simplified. However, it is inconceivable that an enemy with a potent submarine force or long-range air force would ignore the opportunities afforded by either the periodic all-day rendezvous of the combat force with the replenishment force, or even the large replenishment force itself, plodding slowly near an operating area.
The cost of providing protection for an underway replenishment group will be high. These ships are among our slowest, have the least firepower, and would be the most promising of targets for a prudent submarine commander or air commander. If we are to give these ships an adequate AAW and ASW defense, this defense must include an airborne capability in addition to the normal screen of destroyers. While a CVS might be one solution to providing the needed airborne defenses, it is indeed an expensive solution to a screening problem, as it would take advantage of only part of the total capability of the CVS.
Turning now to the Navy’s air logistic concept, it appears that this concept must remain one of short-range delivery of mail and relatively small packages to aircraft carriers until the C-2A becomes available. The recent C-130 carrier-landing experiments provide food for thought of the possibilities of large-volume air replenishment, but the size of this particular airplane makes it unlikely that it will be used in conjunction with our attack carriers except in extreme emergencies. Even with the C-2A, which will not require the evacuation of the air wing’s aircraft, there is no indication that any change or expansion of the Navy’s air logistic concept is contemplated. So long as we must rely upon our CVAs and GVSs as our only air terminals afloat, we will continue to be tied to nearby land bases and to view air logistics as a tool for the almost exclusive support of our few carrier forces, and primarily for the carriers themselves.
Since the beginning of World War II, one of the Navy’s primary aims has been to free its striking forces from dependency upon fixed bases. In our concentration upon this problem, not enough thought has been given to increasing the independence of our logistic forces from fixed bases, particularly those on foreign soil. The efforts which have been made in this direction have concentrated upon placing more inventory afloat and improving our afloat maintenance capability. The extent to which the Navy depends upon advance bases for its air logistics system is not always recognized. As more and more items of our high priced parts inventory are pulled from advance base stocks to Continental United States (CONUS) depots to save on inventory costs, our dependency upon air logistics to make up for any shortcomings in our afloat inventories will become more acute. With our 700-mile-range C-1A or even with the 1,300- mile C-2A, the difficulties of providing air logistics to some of the more remote parts of the world are very real. The denial of one or two key bases nearest to such an area could spell disaster for an operation. While we have always been able to improvise in the establishment of COD bases on a temporary basis in various exercises, such as the recent NATO Exercise teamwork, such improvisation is not consistent with maintaining freedom of movement. The criticality of air logistics to a strike force was underlined in the teamwork exercise when the only outside logistic support for the force while in the strike zone came by air. The strike portion of the problem may have been realistic, but we must admit that there are areas in the world where COD bases will not be so convenient as were those in Great Britain and Norway for this exercise.
We are also inclined to think of the volume of air logistics required by afloat units as being relatively small, and we occasionally view it as being relatively unimportant. The falacy of such thinking was demonstrated by the magnitude of the effort expended during the 1962 Cuban crisis to provide air logistics to a force at sea only 100 to 200 miles from CONUS.
Some Proposals for Change. If we are ever to make significant progress toward solving some of the problems just discussed, we must accept the tenet that combat operations and replenishment operations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. If the means exist to deliver material at will, there is no reason we should not replenish continuously as material is consumed, drastically reducing the volume of each replenishment. A carrier striking force containing an AOE could replenish ordnance by helicopter throughout the day between launches or at the convenience of the other combat ships, in quantities which would not interfere with other operations. A carrier could even develop the technique of replenishing in advance—by co-ordinating with the AOE for helicopter delivery of the exact loads needed for a particular strike just as it is needed. This concept would permit reduction of quantities transferred alongside during fueling operations to those which could be struck below while refueling is actually in progress and without a large respotting of aircraft in the carrier. Recognizing the many undesirable features of the alongside transfer operation, and hopefully looking ahead to the day when nuclear power will reduce the frequency of trips alongside for fuel, we should aim at making the alongside method a supplement to the vertical method instead of vice versa as it is at present.
To accomplish this aim, our helicopter delivery system must be improved. An all- weather capability and particularly a night capability need further development. A “winching down” system in which a slip-setting on a cargo winch in the helicopter permits the cargo to be pulled to the deck of the receiving ship under constant control seems promising. This device could permit the helicopter to stay at greater hovering heights, or if connected to a sensor in an auto-pilot it might permit constant clearance between the helicopter and the deck to be maintained.
Of equal importance is the need to improve our ability to handle the cargo delivered by helicopter once it is on the deck of the receiving ship. Helicopters can carry greater external loads of stores and ordnance than can safely be handled on deck. One solution might be to use cargo modules which could be fastened to the receiving deck while being unloaded, and picked up on a return trip. The winching down system would also seem to have the potential to tap into the FAST receiving station while the helicopter hovers well above the masts.
Turning next to the problem of inter-force transfer of material, traditionally accomplished by rendezvous with a replenishment group, we have in the C-2A aircraft an essential element for vast improvements. This aircraft could keep a carrier striking force topped off with spare parts, supplies, and food as fast as these items could be normally consumed, by flying only a half dozen sorties a day. In the event an AOE were not available, a strike force could possibly be maintained on station indefinitely by 30 daily sorties of this aircraft supplying all needs except fuel. If air cargo were to be unitized for ease of handling on the flight deck of the receiving carrier, continuous daily replenishment could be conducted with far less interruption of normal flight operations in the long run than we experience with our present concept. Also, refrigerated food, packaged in collapsible, returnable, polystyrene insulated modules, would suffer less thawing than it does today.
The C-2A operating from a carrier in a replenishment force could simultaneously service carrier strike forces as widely separated as 2,600 miles without air-to-air refueling. Likewise, the strike force could draw upon land-based MATS terminals as far away as 2,600 miles from the operating area for emergency items, greatly reducing our dependency upon nearby fixed bases.
An aircraft carrier operating in an underway replenishment group would permit great advances in our delivery capability, reduce the number of replenishment groups needed to accomplish a given objective, and permit considerable changes within the replenishment group itself. An Essex-class carrier, carrying one fighter squadron, one ASW helicopter squadron, two E-1Bs, six utility helicopters and six C-2A aircraft, would provide not only ASW and AAW protection for the force, but would also have the greater part of hangar bay 3 available for use as a cargo consolidation and terminal area. The reduction in air wing personnel and equipment required would provide space for several hundred tons of additional food and stores as cargo. Such a ship would be self-sufficient in ordnance for a considerable period, and if her magazine configuration were retained, could issue limited amounts of ordnance.
A combination aircraft carrier and stores ship could operate as a one-ship replenishment force in support of limited strike operations, or in company with AOs, AORs, AEs and AFSs for extended support. The gain in cost effectiveness of a replenishment group formed around a ship such as this would be significant, and the cost of operating the carrier in this role would be no more than that of a standard CVS performing only the screening function for the replenishment group. Furthermore, if Essex-class ships were reactivated from the reserve fleet for this use, they would, in effect, free an equal number of CVSs for HUK operations in the event of war. Even the conversion of one CVS in each fleet, thinly stretched as they are, would not alter the wartime balance of these ships available for HUK operations.
Additional capabilities which would accrue from the use of such a carrier include:
Capability to replenish independent surface forces and submarines by helicopter while servicing carrier forces at great distance.
Capability to supply counter-insurgency forces in remote areas and to conduct disaster relief operations without diverting CVAs or CVSs for this type of task.
Capability to act as an air logistics receiving and evacuation terminal in support of amphibious operations, pending construction of airfields ashore.
Summary. Our logistic forces have only recently begun to emerge from the concepts which were formulated in World War II and modified slightly in the Korean War. Continued modernization of our concepts and equipment will require money, inventiveness, and courage to avoid the tendency toward the maladie de paix in the face of limited budgets. The basic tools for modernizing our underway delivery capability, the high capacity helicopter and the heavy lift carrier-based cargo aircraft, are at hand. However, until we overcome our reluctance to accept the fact that it might not be a waste of a perfectly good aircraft carrier to use it as a stores ship, our concepts will see little change.
Until we bring our logistic concepts into focus with the realities of the potential conflict situations of today and attempt to project them into future situations, our combat forces will continue to operate on a logistics tether which is likely to remain unseen until it pulls taut in some future conflict. END.