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America’s Best Weapon
Rear Admiral Robert H. Rodgers, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The only way that the United States can win in Vietnam, in my opinion, is with a naval blockade of North Vietnam. President John F. Kennedy had only to threaten to blockade Cuba to bring the Soviet Union to terms. Had the blockade been employed, Fidel Castro would have withered on the vine. When Communism can no longer expand its influence with open sea lanes, Communism will die.
The most dangerous act, short of all-out- war, is reprisal. One reprisal begets another. The Communists act, then we react. How can we regain the initiative?
Our current dilemma results from failure to employ sea power properly. Why has blockade been a dirty word to our policymakers? The failure to blockade Red China in the Korean conflict was due to the Department of Defense’s land concept, the Department of State’s abhorrence of the word, and the constant prodding of our Allies, who feared most a loss of trade.
The blockade has always been accepted in international law as a legal step short of war. The main ingredient in war is armed conflict. The naval blockade avoids this.
Recognized blockades include:
(1) A paper blockade established by merely stating that an area is out of bounds. No force is used and none is intended. It might scare the timid, or bluff those who fear its expansion to more effective steps.
(2)A commercial blockade using persuasion to encourage friendly nations to refrain from trade with an offending state. Commercial blockades seldom succeed as evidenced by the current U. S. action against Cuba.
(3) The war blockade employing an all-out effort to bottle up an enemy after hostilities have commenced. The Allied blockades of Germany in both world wars are examples.
(4) A pacific blockade with the closing of a sea area until such time as a limited objective is attained. Used in connection with an ultimatum, it is not only an act short of war, but, in many cases, it will prevent one.
The essence of blockade is effectiveness. There must be a clearly defined area into which ships venturing must confront real danger. The Declaration of Paris (1865), which was agreed to by all major powers including Russia, clearly supports the use of a pacific blockade.
In 1827, Great Britain, France, and Russia blockaded Greece in order to induce Turkey, with whom they were at peace, to accept mediation in its war with the Greek insurgents. Since that incident, a pacific blockade has had the full sanction of international law.
This code, like common law, is affected by social and technical developments. Bolstering a blockade by new weapons and methods falls within accepted usage. For example, mines, radio, radar, aircraft, and underwater demolition teams could be employed in such an operation.
In Vietnam the United States faces ultimate defeat as long as it tries to slug it out in the jungles, employ air strikes, or make an uneasy and temporary peace. A new approach is needed.
It is proposed that the U. S. Navy activate, equip, train, and position a strong blockading force. Its composition would include minelayers, underwater demolition teams, destroyers, and supporting ships. Carrier forces would back up the blockade by providing air cover, by warning of approaching ships, and by showing force.
This blockade force would lay a mine field around the entrances to North Vietnam’s ports. Additional mine fields, perpendicular to the coast line, would be planted as barriers to coastal shipping. The largest ship or the smallest junk would be in grave danger should she attempt to run the blockade.
U. S. warships would warn off shipping, search the suspicious, and detain or reroute ships attempting to breach the blockade.
The mine blockade gives the greatest coverage with a minimum effort. It is equally effective against friend and foe.
In Vietnam, the shallow Gulf of Tonkin is a prime target for mines. Mining it would close the water supply lines to China and Prevent the replenishment of the Viet Cong.
Such a blockade would also be effective against Communist China and Cuba, should the conditions warrant.
To blockade China it is only necessary to cut off seven ports. Ninety per cent of that nation’s trade would be halted by such action. Vessels bound for Hong Kong would be searched to see that they did not carry cargo destined eventually for Red China. In retrospect, the United States would be much better off if a blockade had been used in the Korean conflict in place of disastrous land warfare.
Cuba has only four main ports. It would be simple to seal off this Communist base. The longer such action is put off, the more difficult it will be.
It took the United States a century to build its sea power. It should not be thrown away. It is unthinkable that the United States should attempt to engage the Russian or Chinese hordes on land. This nation’s policies should be oriented toward the
weapons and methods that it excels in. The best bet is to restrict action to operations on the sea, over the sea, under the sea, and from the sea. In war or peace, the safe path is to make a judgment as to where the balance of power lies, and having made that judgment to act decisively.
“The Role of the U. S. Navy in Mine Warfare”
(See pages 52—63, May 1965 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas H. Suddath, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Cowie’s article was most timely because it is periodically necessary to bring offensive mine warfare out from under the rug, where it manages to stay most of the time. Captain Cowie will have done the U. S. Navy a great service if steps can be taken to place mine warfare in proper focus vis-a-vis the U. S. military establishment of 1965.
I agree wholeheartedly with Captain Cowie’s thesis that mine warfare planning should be entrusted to centrally located people who have knowledge of the entire spectrum of mine warfare. Furthermore, I agree that there will never be a mechanical vade mecum, which, when one of its buttons is pressed, will produce the answer to all mine warfare problems. That realization leads to the identification of two fundamental problems concerning mine warfare in the U. S. Navy today.
The first problem is to identify the roles and missions of the Commanders Mine Force, Atlantic, and Mine Force, Pacific. I submit that they are, in effect, commanders of the mine countermeasures forces, and have never had responsibility for over-all planning or conduct of offensive mine warfare. I would suggest that their titles be changed to Commander, Antimine Warfare Force, Adantic, and Pacific, respectively. This nomenclature would be compatible with the rationale behind the establishing of the antisubmarine commands in these two Fleets.
The second problem which needs to be solved is to locate the proper place to do the over-all planning for offensive mine warfare. It was done in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations during World War II. Since the CNO has since been stripped of his operational authority and has become, in effect, chief logistician for the operating forces, his office can no longer be considered the proper place for central planning of offensive mine warfare.
I would suggest that the responsiblity for planning and conducting this most effective function of limited warfare be entrusted to the operational planners on the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is one note of caution, however. In my considered judgment, there is only one flag officer on active duty with the Navy today who has the knowledge, background, and experience to guide this effort. This is symptomatic of how offensive mine warfare has been relegated to the bottom of the list of naval weapons systems in peacetime.
Mine warfare is a very potent weapons system, containing all the elements of strategic, tactical, and psychological planning that could be used with considerable effectiveness in limited wars.
“The Military and Power in the United States”
(See pages 38-45, May 1965 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Donald Moore, U. S. Naval Reserve—Once again the “military mind” is assailed from a purely academic posture. And again, the successful professional officer is portrayed as a mindless man of action. The spectre of military takeover runs as a frightening threat throughout the entire article in a manner which only serves to make us all—public and military— suspicious of each other’s motives. What the article suggests to correct this horrible, albeit completely fictional, state of affairs remains somewhat vague.
It is long past time to examine both the motives and the actions of our professional officers and lay to rest these periodic demoralizing attacks on their good sense and integrity. Far from being the narrow-minded, self-seeking, inflexible power-chasers the modern sophist would have us believe our officers are becoming, military leaders are generally dedicated to progressive improvement, to high moral and ethical standards, and, most of all, to the furtherance of the democratic system they are sworn to defend. The activities of two professional officers were selected by the author as evidence of military threats to democracy and civilian government. These situations should be examined in more detail.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s conduct in 1950 was introduced in the article as a case in point, but the implications of his methods and objectives were not discussed. Did he challenge the right of civilians to give him orders? He disobeyed no purely military orders or restraints; he conducted no bombings beyond established limits; he displayed no negligence or withholding of his professional talents in pursuing the campaign to the best of his ability; there was no attempt at a military coup, passive resistance, or subversion; he made no attempt to hide from his superiors any intelligence information he Possessed; and he did not attempt to seize Power from the people of the United States. His real mistake was one of insubordination m challenging the judgment of the President through the medium of the press.
The Commander-in-Chief cannot be chal- icnged in public by his subordinates in matters of command. However, the precise idea the incident was introduced to prove, that the military must be watched with suspicion lest they seize the reins of government, ls more soundly disproved by the very route General MacArthur took in advancing his views—he appealed to the people themselves. This is a rather strange route for a leader who is supposedly a threat to civilian control. He did not presume to use his power, his army, nor his fellow officers to force Political opinions on the government or the People. There was never any fear or danger lhat he would assume political power as a general, regardless of his “hero” image. Although he was definitely wrong in by-passing 15 superior to plead for more support in the
enter the forum
Regular and Associate Members are invited to p'rite brief comments on material published in the Roceedings and also to write brief discussions on any °P>c of naval interest for possible publication in . ese pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings s to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
fight, he was in fact asking for help against an external enemy—not for political power.
Major General Edwin Walker’s activity, the other example given in the article, is equally weak as evidence of a hazard, but for altogether different reasons. He did attempt to use his military position for political activity. However, his fellow officers, were more vehemently opposed to his actions and attitudes than was the general public.
One section of this article was especially disturbing. That “the . . . ambiguous nature of the military profession in a liberal society ... as an appendage . . . not as a part” is to be inferred from the expressions of “sincere” men is truly a surprise to the officers who find themselves an integral part of the communities in which they and their families live. Officers have been led to believe that a military career was honorable and worthwhile because they were to defend the principles, advantages, and responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic country for their own children and for their neighbors. Now, suddenly, the officer is to be viewed with suspicion by his neighbor as the tail who will wag tomorrow’s society.
If the equally confusing and contradictory idea expressed in the article—that the military is eager to retire into a monastery of intellectual and social isolation—is to be taken seriously, then the officer’s hunger for power must be causing him acute emotional indigestion. In any case, the idea of isolation is roundly refuted during every contact with officers, both young and experienced. The idea of intellectual isolation is particularly disproved by officer education programs which permit and encourage officers to spend as much as half of their service life in institutions of higher learning. If the military is, as this article infers, so inflexible, so dedicated to the past, so interested in the supres- sion of the individual as to be a danger to democracy, then how, in the name of all logic, have military seniors dared to take the chance of exposing any individual to all of that education?
If popular hysteria is so potent as to push the military to greater power, as the article contends, it would certainly pay to re-examine as well the hysteria this “military mind” prose is developing. The expression of some
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of these viewpoints, particularly by professionals still in uniform who “must know whereof they speak,” can do nothing but cause further suspicion, discontent, and fear, alienating military professionals from each other and from their civilian superiors and counterparts. Officers are not hidden from the world nor are they stagnated.
It is time to cease speaking of the “military mind” as if such a quantity existed; there is no such element. Attitudes, methods personalities, and levels of intellectual achievement are as varied in the military as they are in any other profession.
Finally, if the military man’s caution toward innovation, born of a true sense of history, is the crime or dangerous trait he stands accused of, then every man who learns from the mistakes of others is a hazard to progressive society. If such is not the case—if the professional officer can indeed contribute his knowledge and experience to the tasks to which he is appointed—then let him get about his job without this constant demand to justify his stature.
Major William V. Kennedy, Armor, Army National Guard—When will professional military authors weary of repeating the trite, and by now quite fanciful, dismissal of the “militia” as “incapable of the professionalism required to wage modern war”? It is ironic that this passage should appear, in its latest form, in an article that exhorts its readers to “maintain an active dedication to the democratic processes of government” [Author’s italics].
The language is even more ironic, coming as the Secretary of Defense, after an opportunity of several years to consider the existing and potential professionalism of the present- day organized militia, has deemed the “militia” worthy of expansion, of increased responsibility, and of unprecedented additional expenditure in terms of modern equipment.
This greatly increased role of the organized militia—now the National Guard—represents neither a gamble nor a capitulation to the much diluted political power of the United States. It was plainly foreshadowed by the performance of Army National Guard air defense battalions over the past decade in assuming full-time responsibility for nearly half of all Nike Hercules air-defense missile sites, and by their performance in winning all of the top missile firing awards offered by Army Air Defense Command for the last three years.
A similar performance has been recorded by the Air National Guard. There are now elements of 22 Air National Guard interceptor squadrons operating full-time as an integral part of the North American Air Defense Command. Air Guard transport squadrons fly more than 1,300 over-water missions each year in support of the Military Air Transport Service.
All of these operations involve a combination of full-time and part-time Guardsmen, with the part-time citizen airmen being in the majority.
And what of the conclusion Lieutenant Commander Kurth attributes to George Washington, that a “civilian militia” is useless in war? This oft-repea ted “conclusion” is not an accurate statement of Washington’s thoughts. It is the product of selective research by some late 19th century professional military writers with an axe to grind. Read in full context, it is plain that Washington was condemning not the citizen militia concept per se, but an untrained and largely unorganized militia.
As Admiral Arleigh Burke, U. S. Navy (Retired), pointed out in a Look magazine article discussing Seven Days in May, the National Guard was intended to play a major role in the military policy and structure of this nation, with particular reference to the problem of safeguarding our basic political institutions. The time has come to take a quizzical look at those histories, some of them still in use in our military classrooms, that attempt to dismiss this significant aspect of the American system of military as well as political “checks and balances.”
Edmund A. Gibson (Educational Specialist, Bureau of Naval Personnel)—Lieutenant Commander Kurth asks in his article: “Why is it so easy for the civilian community to view the military as an appendage possibly threatening to the society from which it emerged?” The first most obvious answer is found in modern history. Military tyranny has been all too common. In societies of weak political structure suffering from severe economic depression and political frustration, the established order has been overthrown for reversion to military dictatorship.
Taking “modern history” as beginning in the mid-16th century, the first conspicuous overthrow of the established order occurred during the English Civil War. The forces responsible for this overthrow were led by an ex-brewer. Scarcely a single professional soldier was engaged on the side of the Parliament in this conflict.
Concurrently, was the overthrow of the established order in the Netherlands. By and large, almost all of Spain’s professional soldiers were engaged in the attempt to maintain the established order. The order was overthrown principally by ex-civilians.
The persons mainly responsible for the overthrow of the established order in the English colonies in America (1775-1783) included not a single professional soldier.
The overthrow par excellence of modern history was, of course, the overthrow of the ancien regime in France, beginning in 1789.
Almost to a man, the professional officers of the French Army and Navy were engaged in the attempt to maintain the established order. The order was overthrown by civilian do- gooders, rabble-rousers, lawyers, and other non-military persons.
After the collapse of Napoleon I, the previously established order was restored in Europe—mainly by professional soldiers. In 1848, it was again overthrown—mostly by newspaper men and pamphleteers. Napoleon III established a military dictatorship in France in 1851, but he had not previously served one day as a professional soldier.
The overthrow of the established order in Russia, began about 1905 and culminated in 1917. Again the professional military fought to maintain the established order. The order was overthrown by civilian do-gooders, rabble- rousers, lawyers, and a new breed this time, professional, civilian revolutionists.
In 1933, the established order was overthrown in Germany by Adolf Hitler. Although Hitler had served as a corporal in World War I, he was, by his own account, a professional politician. A short time before, the established order in Italy had been overthrown by Benito Mussolini—another professional politician. In both countries, the professional military viewed the overthrow of the established order with something considerably less than enthusiasm. The only determined attempts to overthrow Hitler in Germany were carried out by professional military men.
The professional military have consistently been the defenders rather than the subverters of the existing order. Naturally this is inherent in the very state of the case. The military are trained and conditioned to obedience to the civilian power. An old civilian power is overthrown by a new civilian power. Once the military are satisfied, albeit perhaps with reluctance, that the new civilian power is de jure, the theory of civilian control of the military requires the subjection of the military to the new power. This is the real fact brought out by “modern history.”
But during the time when the up-and- coming new power is in the bomb-throwing and barricade stage, the professional military man usually views it with a perhaps not unnatural disgust. When the old power issues orders for the defense of the existing regime, the military man obeys them, as he should. Therefore, to the professional revolutionist the professional soldier is always a “reactionary,” and thus anathema. This is the real reason for the fantastic dragging-in-the-mud of the military which appears in such works as Seven Days in May and Doctor Strangelove.
It would have been interesting if Mr. Kurth had included, with the paragraph cited, a few specific examples of historical occasions in which the established order was overthrown by the professional military. It is my own conviction, based on very extensive study in politics and modern history, that of all the factors which could conceivably threaten an existing order, the military establishment is the one to be dreaded least.
"The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges”
(See pages 34-41, March 1965,
and 110-115, June, 1965, Proceedings)
Captain Harold E. Shear, U. S. Navy—- The article by Dr. Katzenbach, with its rather controversial statements and positions, was in all likelihood written and published with the thought of producing comment and discussion. As one who attended the Armed Forces Staff College in 1954 and the National War College in 1965, I feel at least partially qualified to comment on the views of Dr. Katzenbach. I consider that he is about 50 per cent dead right and about 50 per cent far off base.
I would take issue with several of the generalities at the beginning of the article. As for professionalism being on the wane in the military and service becoming a “job,” there may be some slight indications of this in some quarters, and we must continually be on guard against them. There must be adequate compensation for the military and proper authority and responsibility in their hands. However, I question whether the degradation of professionalism and the alleged drudgery of the service have reached significant proportions. They have not certainly, amongst those who truly know their profession. I, for one, am not going to quit until I am thrown out.
As for technology and non-military criteria dictating strategy, and industry’s technical representatives maintaining our weapons systems and operations analysts specifying their use, I cite the Polaris weapon system in rebuttal. It is true that technology and the genius of American industry produced the system, but the leadership of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke and Vice Admiral William F. Raborn and a handful of other professional Navy men gave it drive and direction. American sailormen today are operating and maintaining the Polaris system in a superb manner, on a full wartime basis, and with little assistance from anybody. Hard-headed, no-nonsense naval officers under three major joint commands in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Europe, ably assisted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, direct its use. Quite properly, the efficient use of this vital deterrent system is monitored closely by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
With regard to the specific comments of Dr. Katzenbach on the war colleges, it is wrong to try to equate the National War College with the service war colleges. The missions are different and for good reason. The mission of the National War College, as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is:
To conduct a course of study of those agencies of government and those military, economic, scientific, political, psychological and social factors of power potential, which are essential parts of national security in order to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the Armed Forces and State Department for the exercise of joint and combined high- level policy, command and staff functions and for the planning of national strategy.
The National War College does carry out its mission, but there certainly are areas in which improvements can be made. Dr. Katzenbach fails to face up to the fact that national security policy, its formulation and execution, is much more an all-hands job now than it may have been in the past. Today the defense of the nation requires the participation and co-operation of the White House staff, Department of Defense, Department of State, and other federal departments and agencies. It is difficult to separate military doctrine per se, nor should such separation necessarily be a goal, particularly at the National War College.
With regard to the faculty, I would agree that it needs beefing up. This can be done in two ways. One way would be to increase the use of civilian chairs filled for one year or more by distinguished authorities in specific fields. The only way which will achieve longterm, consistent results in the military faculty composition would be to make the billets so attractive and highly desirable that they would be sought after by every “comer” in each service. The faculty billets must become recognized as being as important as any assignment in the Department of Defense or in major staffs outside the Washington area. Until this is done no real change can be expected. This upgrading will require the firm support of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the heads of the services with binding edicts on the service personnel chiefs to produce the proper officers.
However, no faculty can ever expect to replace the vast cross-section experience of the student body itself. Nor should it try. One °f the particularly valuable aspects of the National War College year is to have the experience and expertise of the students “rub off” on one another throughout the course.
With regard to the curriculum, I would agree that there is room for improvement. There is a great deal of lost motion in the National War College year at present; the program could stand tightening up. I would consolidate some of the seminars and discussion groups. Dr. Katzenbach’s thought on adding material on systems analysis is good. 3Ve must emphasize decision-making based on facts and demonstrated performance rather than on opinions or questionable “experience factors.” I would expand greatly the required reading to include 25 to 30 or more top- notch books in the fields of strategy, politics, Politico-military affairs, international relations, diplomacy, international trade, and economics.
As one who was enrolled in the George Washington University Program while attending the National War College, I also tend to agree with the views of Dr. Katzen- bach concerning this “extra-curricular” activity. The credits granted for the war col- ■ege year are liberal. The courses offered by George Washington are good and they complement the war college courses. The professors are excellent. As a matter of fact, it is such a good program that I felt I could not turn it down. However, whether one admits it or not, the George Washington program takes more time than a few hours a week. Furthermore, it is a distraction from the war college year. I would recommend that the program be de-emphasized. If a master’s degree is so important, let the War College issue its own. I imagine that mine is a minority view on this subject. Yet, we are in the business of broadening experienced, professional, military and foreign service officers; not producing prospective schoolteachers.
With regard to the selection of officers for the war colleges, I would agree that there is a tendency to select officers who are too senior. In too high a percentage of cases, officers are selected after, rather than before, they have had the duty for which they are being prepared. When officers are too senior, the Departments of State and Defense do not get a fair return on their investment. In many cases, they can only expect one tour of duty in which they can use their war college experience to advantage. In my own case, I feel that I should have attended the National War College at least five years earlier. It was something of an anti-climax after lengthy tours in the Pentagon and on a joint staff.
I would recommend that the selection for the senior colleges cover about a five-year spread from officers in their last two or three years in the grade of commander and their first two or three years in the grade of captain. I would also recommend that the number of Department of Defense civilian students be increased in each class, but not at the expense of any military billets. The civilians can stand broadening with the rest of us.
With regard to the subject of military professionalism, I do not subscribe to the high school approach of a junior officer technical school or of a command and staff school curriculum for the senior war colleges. I question whether such an approach meets any definition of military professionalism. I do not really believe that Dr. Katzenbach thinks so either, although that can be read into his proposition. Nor do I subscribe to the soph- omoric views which have been voiced in some military quarters of clamping down on the war colleges, treating the student bodies as
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undergraduates with frequent quizzes, final exams, fitness reports to match, and all the rest. Such an approach would defeat the purpose of the year and turn it into one of drudgery and discontent. If a system of regimentation of this type were to be instituted in the senior war colleges, it would be the end of them as worthwhile institutions.
What then is the value of the year at the senior war colleges, particularly the National War College? In discussions with students and graduates, many of whom are now flag officers, three assets stand out: First is the association within the multi-service student body, getting to know one another and their families, exchanging views, and developing friendships. Second is the lecture series; the parade of first-rate speakers who appear before the students throughout the year is difficult to beat, although an occasional “lemon” slips through. Third is the luxury of a year free from the press of daily business, where one can relax, think about the world scene, and do a vast amount of reading which he should have been doing over the years but never seemed to find time for.
Of these three valuable elements the first stands out head and shoulders over the rest as the most lasting and the most significant. The broadening aspects of the year are extremely important. There are still Air Force colonels who have been too long in SAC, naval aviators overly in love with their flight decks, submariners oriented too long to the narrow confines of submarines, and others equally in need of broadening, including some of the foreign service officers and Department of Defense civilians. The war college year is an outstanding means of accomplishing this broadening. Since the mid- 1950s, we have made vast strides in communication and co-operation within the military and between the military and the Department of State. This progress has been due in no small measure to the achievements of the war colleges, particularly the National War College.
In summary, there definitely are improvements which can be achieved in the year at the senior war colleges. Dr. Katzenbach has done a service in bringing them out for discussion. Some of his views are solid; some, in my opinion, are mere straws in the wind.
Jack H. Newman (Treasury Department) —Dr. Katzenbach evidently takes a dim view of an institution where, for one year in midcareer, hand-picked officers can indulge in an intellectual smorgasbord; satisfy intellectual whims and curiosity in depth (e.g., through individual research papers) and in breadth; associate with about 135 other topflight military and foreign service officers for ten months in an academic environment; be stimulated and provoked by lecturers presenting a broad range of great issues on politico-military affairs; and, in general, catch up on their reading and take some deep breaths.
It is necessary, as Dr. Katzenbach implies, for a professional military man systematically to learn and learn and achieve and achieve for his entire career? Does it really “demote professionalism” for career officers to take a year off to think, detached from day-to-day pressures?
The basic issue is: What kind of an institution do we want—what kind of results are we looking for? The Katzenbach route would give us just another school, an advanced school perhaps, but a school with a product measurable in terms of hours and subjects taught and skills learned. The National War College route, on the other hand, offers an intellectual experience that does not lend itself easily to measurement. Its influence on those who have gone through the experience is deep, and it finds expression in subtle forms.
I believe that a man comes out of the National War College bigger—and more truly professionally developed—than he would out of Dr. Katzenbach’s school.
Captain William B. Hayler, U. S. Navy—It is not possible to comment upon all the facets of Dr. Katzenbach’s scholarly contribution, but it may be pertinent to treat the subject from the viewpoint of an officer who has completed three years on the staff of the Naval War College.
Has the Naval War College, the oldest of the colleges, been guilty of forgetting why it exists? Inspection of the curriculum will indicate that it has not. The mission is to Prepare students for higher command and positions of greater responsibility.
The Naval Warfare Course—formerly known as the Senior Course—is perhaps best described as a piece of pie served in three wedges. First, the student is placed on the National Security Council level and must assist in writing national strategy. This is strategy at the highest level, and it will expose the former destroyer skipper, the fighter squadron commander, or the former force or type supply officer to many considerations of which he was only vaguely aware. The superb lecture program supports this study as it does those which follow.
The next wedge of pie is the strategic planning study. The student finds that he has been fired from his cabinet level post, and has been moved across the Potomac to the Pentagon and installed as a member of the Joint Staff. For the next several months, he must write war plans on the joint and theater command level.
The student spends the final part of the course down still another notch. He is now only on the two-star or three-star level, and is concerned with fleet or force plans. He is concerned with amphibious warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and anti-air warfare. He has the opportunity to war game his plans on the Naval Electronic Warfare Simulator.
Does the above program constitute an intellectual smorgasbord? Perhaps, but there is a tremendous amount of protein in the meat, and the students who absorb it leave the college with a tremendously enhanced value to their services and to themselves.
Contrary to Dr. Katzenbach’s article, the Naval War College, and undoubtedly all the others as well, do care what an officer learns. Although no grades are assigned, on rare occasions it becomes apparent that a student is over his head, and he will leave.
The course itself is under constant scrutiny and is hammered out each year in countless staff meetings. Its scope and content are designed to benefit the maximum number of students. Like the design of a ship or airplane, it will always be a compromise. Again like a design, new marks and modes are cranked in each year when it is apparent that a given part of the course has lost its usefulness or can be improved.
It is true that the staff officers may be only a year removed from being students themselves, and they receive no special training.
But the staff officer does have an opportunity to research thoroughly that facet of the course which is his responsibility, and his quest for knowledge is spurred by the fact that when he gives his lecture there will be several in the audience—staff or students—whose expertise is greater than his. If he does not wish to be embarrassed, he had best do his homework.
The Naval War College has grown and changed in many ways since it was founded by Stephen B. Luce. But it is still a service college oriented toward the Navy. Officers from other services and civilians from government agencies who attend come away with a considerable store of knowledge about the Navy. Navy and Marine Corps officers graduate with a better understanding of the problems of government and of the country.
"Why Not A Naval Medical School?”
(See pages 64-70, May 1965 Proceedings)
Dr. William K. Bottorff—I wish to commend Captain Whatley on his fine essay. His plan is feasible, his argument cogent, his sense of mission admirable. I especially agree that the American Medical Association has no legitimate objection to the founding of this much-needed school. A Naval Medical School would benefit not only the naval service, but the entire nation. Perhaps it is time for us to begin requesting our senators and representatives in Washington to consider Captain Whatley’s proposal.
"Kashin-Class Missile Frigates”
(See pages 138-140, June 1965 Proceedings)
Philip O’Brien—I applaud Lieutenant Webber’s latest article on the new Soviet naval construction.[1] The table which he includes comparing the specifications of the Kashin and Kynda type frigates with the U. S. Leahy and British County classes is particularly illuminating.
The appearance of these new Soviet warships brings up several points that merit further discussion.
The Kyndas are unique among the world’s frigates in that they alone mount a main armament apparently intended exclusively for use against surface targets. This is very noteworthy in a decade that has seen the mothballing or disposal of most other surface warships whose main batteries have a capacity against surface targets only (e.g., battleships and cruisers).
It could very well be that the Kyndas are an effort by the Soviet Navy to close its “gun gap.” Much has been said about the U. S. Navy’s “gun gap,” but let us remember that a similar problem confronts the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Soviet problem is probably more severe than that of the United States. The Soviet Navy operates no aircraft carriers, and hence has a more severely limited capacity than has the U. S. Navy for backing up amphibious operations and other deployments with high-volume conventional fire.
Admittedly, the Soviet Union has the second largest number of cruisers of any navy in the world. But many reports indicate that a majority of these ships are inoperative. Some have been scrapped. The newest ones, those of the Sverdlov class, cannot be deployed without considerable preparations. Thus, they lack mobility. Also, there is little comparison between the destructive capabilities of six-inch shells and guided weapons five or six feet in diameter, such as the Kyndas carry.
Since January 1964, an often spirited discussion has been carried out in the Proceedings on what an ideal destroyer-type ship should be. The proposition of a fleet of pairs of specialized anti-aircraft and antisubmarine ships—“for all practical purposes, a destroyer force of ‘Siamese twins’ ”—was advanced, then quickly rejected.! Operating as a pair, one Kynda and one Kashin could make up a set of “Siamese twins.” As Lieutenant Webber’s chart points out, the Kyndas and Kashins are remarkably alike in size and performance characteristics. Since their armaments differ so greatly, the two classes may well have been envisioned as operational complements to each other.
f James G. Roche, Comment on “USS Bainbridge Is Not the Answer,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1964, pp. 120-121.
Special Notice...
GENERAL PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST
ny person, civilian or military, is eligible for this contest. A prize of not more than $1,500, a gold medal, and a life membership in the Naval Institute shall be offered annually for the best essay on any subject entered in this contest which contributes toward the mission of the Naval Institute, “the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy,” subject to the following conditions. If no essay is adjudged of sufficient merit to receive the prize, an “Honorable Mention” may be awarded in lieu thereof. Regardless of whether or not a prize is awarded, additional essays of merit may receive “Honorable Mention.” The author of an essay awarded “Honorable Mention” shall receive a silver or a bronze medal dependent upon the quality of the essay, similar in all other respects to the gold medal, and such compensation as may be adjudged by the Board of Control, but not including a life membership.
In the event that the author of a General Prize essay is adjudged a medal and already holds this medal, he shall be given a bar suitably engraved in lieu of a second award of the medal. In the event that the recipient is awarded a medal of dissimilar metal to that which he holds, he will be awarded the new medal. If an author awarded a life membership is already a life member, his cash award shall be increased by the commuted value of a life membership in his case.
In the event that no essay is adjudged of sufficient merit to receive the “Prize” or an “Honorable Mention,” the best essay submitted may receive a special award in lieu thereof.
The following rules will govern this competition:
(1)Essays must be original and should not exceed 5,000 words.
(2) Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer on or before 1 November 1965.
(3) The name of the competitor shall not appear on the essay, and each essay must have a motto in addition to the title. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, (b) on the outside of a sealed envelope containing identification of the competitor, (c) above the name and address of the competitor inside the envelope containing this identification. This envelope will not be opened until the Board has made the selections. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a large sealed envelope marked “General Prize Essay Contest.”
(4) The selections will be made by the Board of Control, voting by ballot and without knowledge of the names of the competitors.
(5) The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors at the annual meeting on Thursday, 17 February 1966.
(6) All essays must be typewritten, legible, double spaced, on paper approximately S/2" X 11", and must be submitted in duplicate, each copy complete in itself.
(7)Essays awarded the “Prize,” “Honorable Mention,” or “Special Award” are
for publication in the Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS. Essays not awarded a prize may be published at the discretion of the Board of Control, and the writers of such essays shall be compensated at the rate established for articles not submitted in competition. .
(8) Attention of contestants is called to the fact that an essay should be analytical or interpretive and not merely an exposition or personal narrative.
R. T. E. Bowler, Jr.,
Commander, U. S. Navy (Retired), Executive Editor
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[1] See also Richard M. Basoco and Richard H. Webber, “Kynda-Class Missile Frigates,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1964, pp. 140-142.