The prospects of limited and total wars exist as long as international conflicts remain unresolved. Hopefully, reasonable leadership of nations will preclude the use of nuclear weapons and the concomitant possibility of national suicide and destruction of much of the world’s civilization. Until the millennium of a world government is attained, however, countries which reject the use of nuclear arms will investigate other means of attaining national objectives. Old weapons will be re-examined, and the search for new weapons and technological breakthroughs will be intensified.
In the numerous public pronouncements by prominent Russian officials concerning the constantly increasing effectiveness of bio- logical/chemical warfare (BW/CW) weapons, there appears a recognition that weapons exist which span the gap between high explosives and modern nuclear arms. This awareness was echoed within the United States by the 1959 report of the Congressional Committee on Science and Astronautics concerning research in toxic warfare. In that report, a note of warning was sounded against reliance upon outmoded concepts of warfare and a strong BW/CW program was recommended. The report concludes that, although these weapons are surrounded by a haze of emotion, “they are very real and likely to be used against the United States.”
In spite of the fact that toxic warfare has not been employed against U. S. forces since World War I, its continued non-usage by enemies certainly cannot be guaranteed. Its employment against this country in the future may well depend principally upon the degree of advantage accruing to its use, rather than upon so-called humane considerations. This degree of advantage will, in turn, depend to a great extent upon the ability of the United States to defend itself in this environment and to retaliate in kind. It is, therefore, extremely important that this country’s leaders understand all of the many facets of BW/CW so that they may intelligently control the response of the United States to a problem old in name but new in scope. This response will of necessity be conditioned by the attitudes of military personnel and civilians within this nation, as well as by the attitudes and capabilities of other nations.
The beginnings of BW/CW are lost in antiquity. Documented case histories of BW range from the poisoning of wells and the distribution of smallpox-contaminated blankets to Indians to the infection of Allied animals by German agents during World War I. In spite of the fact that the employment of biological agents has been extremely limited in terms of number and scope and that no employment could be categorized as a spectacular military success, the feasibility of germ warfare has certainly been demonstrated by nature. Numerous wars of the past have been decided or drastically affected by natural outbreaks of disease. In fact, it was not until World War II that the casualties produced by combat exceeded the casualties produced by disease.
In the case of CW, the use of incendiary chemicals in Greece has been traced back as far as 1200 B. G. The first use of gas in warfare dates back to the Spartan-Athenian wars of 431-404 B. C. when burning sulphur fumes were used to soften the defenses of beleaguered cities. The first employment of a truly lethal gas occurred in 1915 when the Germans attacked the British and French at Ypres with chlorine gas released from cylinders. The Allied forces were completely unprepared, and the results were little short of catastrophic. Fortunately, not even the Germans foresaw what might be achieved, and thus they were not ready to exploit the huge breach in the Allied line. It is significant to note that, although both France and Germany had ratified the agreement at The Hague in 1899 prohibiting the use of gas-filled projectiles, claims were made at this point that neither an earlier use by the French of tear gas nor this use of the pressurized spray containers by the Germans violated their treaty obligations. As the war progressed, both sides achieved new defensive and offensive capabilities, including gas-filled projectiles, and a degree of superiority in CW alternated back and forth. American forces in Europe were not only subjected to gas attacks in 1918 but also carried out offensive chemical operations.
The results of these CW operations were such that one British writer, Philip Noel- Baker, called gas “the most successful weapon of the 1914 war.” All told, gas produced 1.3 million casualties among both sides, and 33 per cent of the American casualties were attributable to this weapon. Artillery shells filled with mustard gas produced casualty rates at least 500 per cent greater than shells filled with high explosive. Nevertheless, CW must be considered a failure in the strategic frame of reference because of a failure on the part of both sides to assess properly its potentialities. Chemical weapons could have been the means of converting the terrible stalemate of immobile trench warfare into a mobile war capable of producing a decisive victory, but recognition of this fact escaped all participants.
No nation found reason or excuse to use CW from the end of World War I until 1936. In that year, Italy employed mustard gas against Abyssinian forces in spite of both countries having signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of asphyxiating poisons or other gases. During the period 1937-1943, the Japanese are known to have conducted limited gas attacks against the Chinese. No resort to gas warfare was made during World War II, although all major combatants had large stocks of chemical agents on hand. The German reluctance to use these agents at the beginning of the war has been attributed to some fear of retaliation and to their belief that they would not be necessary. When the tide began to turn against the German armies, the decision not to use their recendy discovered nerve gas was based upon the then overwhelming Allied air superiority and the probability of all Germany being subjected to retaliatory gas attacks.
Although most of the chemical agents stockpiled today are those which were developed during World Wars I and II, one significant change in the field of CW has been the development of the incapacitating agents. These are chemical substances specifically designed to incapacitate rather than kill.
Incapacitating agents may be divided into two categories. In the first are chemical compounds which produce severe bodily distress or physical effects such as anesthesia and paralysis. The second category consists of the so-called “psycho-chemicals” which affect the mental processes in various ways ranging from drowsiness to hysteria. In both categories, the ultimate purpose of the agent is to lower the enemy’s will to resist or destroy his capability to do so. Not only do some of these chemicals act swiftly and defy detection by human senses, but they resist purification by boiling or chlorination if contained in the water supply. There is, however, a large safety margin in controlling their use—a significant factor in their favor. Incapacitating agents require a manyfold increase over what might be termed the normal dosage before fatalities result.
The incapacitating agents appear to offer great, if not the greatest, possibilities for future development in the BW/CW field. At the moment, no country appears to have any kind of a monopoly in the investigation of these agents. For instance, the origin of the psychochemicals lies in the attempts to simulate mental illness and their use is widely discussed in unclassified medical and scientific literature. Russia’s interest is reflected by the statement of Major General Druvov, Soviet Military Medical Service, to the effect that the Soviet Union was attaching special interest to the psychic poisons.
Potential BW anti-personnel agents are generally categorized as being incapacitating or lethal. An example of the former is the virus causing influenza, while at the lethal end of the scale are agents like the toxins—-the poisonous products of micro-organisms such as those causing botulism. Of significant interest is the fact that no new diseases have yet come to light as a result of BW research. All known agents are merely a selection of those already found in nature, with some possible combinations and modifications to increase their virulence and resistance to drugs. The term “superinfective agent” remains a myth, as does the idea that BW can destroy entire armies and populations. Nevertheless, certain modifications, together with various improved means of dissemination, do provide greater efficiency in spreading disease than that found in nature.
The proper selection of BW agents is made infinitely more difficult by the fact that BW has never been conducted on a large scale and testing has been essentially confined to the laboratory. It is obvious that no laboratory research can guarantee anything more than a probability that particular agents will be dependable in the production of the effects desired. To be effective, BW agents must be producible in large quantities, highly infectious, difficult to detect, and easily disseminated. Another quality is perhaps the most important of all—stability, or the length of time that the agent remains effective. Micro-organisms may live for hours or days, or for a much longer period if carried by a vector such as a mosquito or animal. The stability of an agent must be sufficient to enable it to survive from the time of production through storage (if any), transportation, and ultimate delivery to the target.
Significant differences between BW and CW include the dosage size, reaction time, and difficulty of detection. With regard to dosage size, the entire chemical dosage must be inhaled or absorbed to produce the desired effect. However, since organisms are self- multiplying, most biological agents will produce a toxic dosage after only minute quantities have been applied to the target. For example, given perfect distribution, one ounce of Coxiella burnetii could infect billions of people with Q fever, far more than the present population of the world. Although this perfect distribution is never obtainable, it is clear that the small quantities of BW agents required simplifies the problem of transportation and dissemination. If a short reaction time is required, then the only choice is a chemical agent where reaction times are measured in seconds, minutes, or possibly hours. The very nature of BW agents is such that an incubation period is usually required, leading to reaction times varying from several hours to weeks. Moreover, this incubation period in the case of anti-personnel agents may vary from individual to individual. Identification of agents used in a chemical attack is a relatively simple matter if known agents are being used. Using a small standardized test set, certain agents can be identified within minutes or even seconds. Detection of a BW attack and identification of the agent or agents is a different situation entirely. Since microorganisms are not detectable by the human senses or identifiable by simple test sets, the first indication of a BW attack might be a sudden high incidence of disease days or weeks after the actual attack. In any case, the identification of both the disease and the causal agent may rest in the hands of the laboratory technician or in the recognition of symptoms after the infection has reached a certain stage. Cultures may have to be grown and weeks might elapse before positive identification could be made. The severity of the problem would be greatly increased if the attacker chose to use a combination of agents.
Major General Marshall Stubbs, formerly Chief Chemical Officer of the United States Army, once stated that “One of the most important characteristics of biological and chemical weapons is the wide range of effects which can be selectively applied in almost any military situation.” Since the beginnings of warfare, the astute military commander has sought weapons which would enable him to apply force selectively and in the degree necessary to the accomplishment of his objective. The tools of toxic warfare have just these capabilities. One example is the supplanting of guns and grenades by riot gases because of their quality of selective control in the controlling of public disturbances. The range of BW/CW weapons now available permits the application of varying degrees of force ranging from mass casualties to mere temporary incapacitation. Flexibility is the keyword in BW/CW warfare.
Much of the potential of BW/CW weapons lies in the fact that, except for individual masks, protective clothing and special shelters, physical protection offers little or no defense since gas and airborne agents will penetrate anything which is not hermetically sealed. Although most of Tarawa’s Japanese defenders were in caves or pillboxes, there is a statement written into the record of the 86th Congress to the effect that the use of gas would have enabled American forces to capture the island without incurring a casualty. Civil defense shelters having ventilation systems without special filters will only serve to accelerate the process of exposing their occupants to BW/CW agents. Shelters adequate in a nuclear war environment may thus be inadequate against biological agents and chemicals.
In addition to direct casualties, the use of BW/CW against personnel may produce many sub-casualty effects which significantly decrease their will and ability to resist. These effects include widespread panic induced by the very nature of this type of warfare, restrictions on normal activity imposed upon those wearing masks and protective clothing, oversaturation of medical facilities, and contamination of food and water supplies. The problem of contamination is of particular importance to the Navy. Whereas the Army may have the option of temporarily bypassing contaminated areas, contaminated ships will have to be cleaned rapidly, or the effective use of that ship will be lost until it can be decontaminated. In this respect, the experience with the merchant ship, Francis L. Lee, is enlightening. In an experiment conducted shortly after World War I, she was subjected to a chemical attack involving an agent contained in an aerosol. Although 50,000 manhours were expended in attempts at decontamination, she was finally sunk because all had been unsuccessful.
No category of military weapons has been subjected to so much distortion of fact and adverse publicity as has the biological/chemical arsenal. Although the world seems to have become inured to the possibilities of nuclear war, no such tacit acceptance of BW/CW exists. Many groups in the Western bloc oppose preparations for defensive as well as offensive toxic warfare, ostensibly on humanitarian grounds, and here the West finds itself hoist on its own petard. For much of the current attitude toward BW/CW stems from the propaganda of the Allies during World War I wherein the Germans were labeled “Huns,” “barbarians,” and persistently vilified for having initiated gas warfare.
There are, of course, numerous additional reasons for the adverse psychological reaction to BW/CW. In World War I, the choking effects of the first gas used, chlorine, and the total unprepared ness of the Allies contributed to the widespread dismay and horror. In the years that followed, sensation-seeking authors grossly distorted the facts of toxic warfare. Future BW/CW possibilities and predicted characteristics have been greatly exaggerated. The general ignorance of the basic principles of BW/CW continues to this day and serves to keep the associated weapons clothed in mystery. There is one fact, however, which has not escaped the nation’s citizens. BW/CW can be directed against the very vulnerable populace as well as the military. Why then does Mr. Average Citizen not demand all the facts as to what could be expected and how best to defend himself in such an event? It is probably because the horrible picture that he has conjured up in his mind exceeds the threshold of what he will allow himself to think about. If one takes the normal individual’s fear of epidemic disease which has lingered on through the ages, adds to it the oft-publicized but faulty specter of a lingering, agonizing demise, and then tells this citizen that he really has no place to hide, it is hardly surprising that he fails to request the full story. On the other hand, it must be recognized that an uninformed and fearful citizenry could be a great liability if the United States were to be attacked with BW/CW weapons.
A concerted educational program directed at the nation’s populace could undoubtedly eliminate this ignorance and the accompanying apathy surrounding biological and chemical weapons. That such a program could succeed is reflected by the attitudes and statements of enlightened individuals. While the United States Navy delegate to The Hague conference of 1899, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan stated that, in regard to the use of gas in artillery shells, “The reproach of cruelty and perfidy against the supposed shells was equally uttered previously against firearms and torpedoes, although both were afterwards employed without a scruple.” In speaking of the denunciation of gas warfare at the Washington Conference of 1921, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart said, “The truth is, one suspects that every new weapon has been anathema until it became familiar; but none has been abandoned once its superior effectiveness to the old has been proved.” Even the Congressional Committee mentioned earlier said of BW/CW in its report that “It can be just as disagreeable as any of the other forms of destruction in vogue in the world; yet it also offers some rays of hope for a more sane approach to an activity which we wish could be classified as irrational.”
Much of the apathy displayed toward the development of an adequate BW/CW capability is indicative of a lack of appreciation as to its effectiveness. Also, the allegations that the use of toxic agents is unfair should be labeled for what they are—immature reasoning. All weapons of war are unfair when judged by such standards. If, in fact, the most humane weapon is the one that produces a decision while having caused the least human suffering and death, and, if the object of war is the overcoming of the opponent’s ability to resist rather than killing for killing’s sake, then the incapacitating BW/CW weapons will assuredly be considered by world states.
It is interesting to note that virtually every conscientious writer on the subject of gas warfare in World War I was of the opinion that gas was the most humane weapon used. Casualty statistics would appear to bear this out. Only 91,000 of the 1.3 million gas casualties actually died. This represents a 400 per cent reduction in the ratio of dead to wounded when compared to other weapons used. Only 2 per cent of American deaths were caused by gas, although 33 per cent of American casualties were attributed to it. It has long been a popular belief that an inordinately large number of World War I veterans were permanently disabled as a result of being gassed, but there is no evidence to support this. Not only was the number of men permanently disabled by gas very low, but those who had been subjected to gas attacks subsequently showed a somewhat lower than normal incidence of tuberculosis.
One cannot help being impressed by the economic aspects of biological and chemical weapons. In terms of the over-all national effort required to develop and produce a specific warfare capability, the ratio of BW/CW weapon requirements to nuclear weapon requirements is overwhelmingly in favor of the former. The production of nuclear material by the United States required the establishment of an entirely new industry and absorbed a large percentage of the national productive effort. Costs related to production of nuclear materials and related hardware are still very high. On the other hand, the production of biological and chemical agents involves only a fraction of these costs and is directly associated with large industries already in existence. Associated research is often the by-product of efforts originally directed elsewhere. Witness the discovery of nerve gas by the Germans, when they were in reality looking for a new insecticide.
The economic significance of BW/CW warfare does not end with the production of the agents. A comparison of the physical destruction associated with the various weapons systems may be even more important than a comparison of their cost. One has only to look at the damage done to Germany during World War II by conventional weapons to recognize how desirable it would be to attain victory without shattering cities, industries, and other physical assets too numerous to mention. The cost associated with postwar rebuilding of shattered countries has been staggering and has posed serious economic problems for the United States. Should another war result in the strategic use of nuclear weapons and should entire cities be obliterated, the economics of rebuilding might well be unresolvable. Contrast this picture with that existing after the employment of BW/CW weapons—no fires, obstacles, or physical damage to inanimate objects. Fatalities, incapacitation, crop damage and residual contamination are all controllable within defined boundaries and can be limited to that which is necessary to achieve specific objectives. Associated with the problems of rebuilding is the problem of fighting on friendly territory. Not only would most toxic warfare agents leave resources unaffected, but the use of incapacitating agents would enable the waging of a war which was least injurious to friendly peoples.
Attempts to prohibit BW/CW warfare by international legislation have been uniformly unsuccessful. The first attempt was The Hague Declaration of 1899 wherein the contracting powers agreed to “abstain from the use of projectiles, the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.” The United States was the only major power refusing to sign, and the reasons given by Admiral Mahan have already been noted. It has also been pointed out that this agreement failed to prevent the use of gas in projectiles by signatory powers during World War I. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 mentioned biological warfare for the first time in addition to prohibiting poisonous gases, and although ratified by 39 nations, neither Japan nor the United States was included. No further formal agreements legislating against BW/CW have been proposed to date.
As previously mentioned, many Russian leaders and commentators have heralded the increasing effectiveness of chemical and biological weapons. Nikita Khrushchev lent emphasis to these remarks by declaring a few years ago that the logic of war required the employment of all available types of weapons. These are indications that moral considerations alone would never deter the Soviets from resorting to BW/CW. That the Russian leadership is also concerning itself with defensive capabilities in toxic warfare is evidenced by their emphasis on this aspect of civil defense. They have trained 50-100 million citizens in civil defense procedures which include recognition of BW/CW agents, use of masks and protective clothing, and decontamination procedures. Approximately 30 million masks and 100 million personal decontamination packets have been produced for civilian use and distributed throughout the U.S.S.R.—for issue when required. Large numbers of shelters are available which are said to be effective in the BW/CW environment. Soviet citizens are even told how to improvise protective clothing for their livestock. In short, their over-all defense program appears practical, effective, and geared to a definite requirement.
The United States military capability in BW/CW will not be discussed in detail because of its classified nature. However, it might be well if each naval officer were to ask himself how well prepared both he and his duty station are to exist and fight in a toxic atmosphere. A satisfactory answer to this question is vital, because what better area is there to employ toxic warfare than at sea? Since the target is isolated, the danger to civilians and non-military installations can be reduced to an absolute minimum. Weather, a big factor in toxic warfare, is more stable and predictable at sea than over land. There is almost always a wind to carry aerosols, and no land irregularities will disrupt the calculated dissemination pattern. Whereas nuclear warheads must still be delivered with accuracy to destroy ships, aerosols need only to be dispensed upwind of a target force. Since these aerosols will not only remain airborne for many many miles but will also spread, the required accuracy is comparatively low. The possibility of BW/CW employment at sea is a real one, and we should not be diverted from recognizing it by the fact that there has been no use of toxic warfare in the maritime environment for centuries.
At the present time, manufacture of nuclear weapons and large-scale associated delivery systems is limited to those nations possessing advanced technical know-how and a large industrial capacity. Although a proliferation of the nuclear capability is taking place, it is doubtful that any other country can hope to approach the United States and the Soviet Union in this branch of military power—certainly not within the next two decades. However, because of the small industrial requirements involved in the production of BW/CW weapons, the number of nations (or even dissident groups) able to attack the United States covertly with biological agents and chemicals is large and constantly growing. Not only can this capability be acquired secretly, but Communist countries such as the People’s Republic of China would be governed by only one thing in its use—expediency. It is certain that they have carefully reviewed the wide range of possibilities offered by biological and chemical weapons and their primary rationale will center on the question of whether the use of these weapons is to their advantage.
The creation or strengthening of BW/CW capabilities throughout the world poses further serious questions in such matters as disarmament. If nuclear weapons were to be abolished on a world-wide basis, the potential role of BW/CW would be greatly magnified. Not only would nuclear disarmament place countries on a more equal military footing, but the idea of initiating toxic warfare might be much more attractive if nuclear retaliation were impossible. Inspection and control of nuclear disarmament would be relatively simple because of the massive and complex production facilities required. However, control over the unauthorized production of BW agents would be virtually impossible since significant quantities of these can be manufactured in small makeshift laboratories. The production of CW agents is so closely allied with the entire chemical industry that inspection and control in this field would also be a difficult if not impossible matter. The manufacture of fertilizers and insecticides goes hand in hand with the preparation of known toxic chemicals. And, should a country be surreptitiously producing an entirely new BW/ CW agent, the problem of enforcing disarmament would be rendered even more difficult.
We must recognize that the horizon of new developments in the world of biological and chemical agents is unlimited. Scientific breakthroughs are possible which could markedly shift the balance of power throughout the world. If the United States is to retain its position in the order of world powers, it must be able to cope with serious challenges in every conceivable form. With BW/CW weapons known to be in the hands of enemies whose decision to use them will be based only upon the criterion of expediency, the United States must have the capability to use and defend itself adequately against these weapons. In this, there is really no freedom of choice.
“Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question.”
General John J. Pershing, in Final Report as Commanding General, A.E.F.