It has been over five years since the USS George Washington (SSBN-598) was commissioned as the Navy’s first Polaris submarine. Not the least of the many new ideas conceived as part of the fleet ballistic missile system was the assignment of two crews to one ship. At first a novel idea affecting but a few ships and a few hundred men, the two-crew concept has now grown to the projected total of 82 crews —nearly 10,000 men.
Perhaps the most complex period in the life of a two-crew ship is the precommissioning period, and the single most complex aspect of the period is that shipboard organization and training methods must be second to none if the basic goal of having two well-trained crews equally capable of operating the ship at commissioning is to be achieved.
The two crews are known officially as the BLUE crew and the GOLD crew, these appellations stem from the U. S. Naval Academy’s colors. By custom, the BLUE crew commanding officer is designated as the senior of the two prospective commanding officers, and he is ordered to arrive at the shipyard prior to his GOLD crew counterpart. Once the ship has been commissioned, each commanding officer will, in turn, have sole authority over his crew and responsibility for the submarine. It is obvious, however, that during the precommissioning period, when both prospective commanding officers are present, there can be only one “boss,” even though eventually two separate organizations will evolve. Consequently, all officers and men ordered to the ship are inherently responsible to the BLUE crew prospective commanding officer during the precommissioning period.
The military authority of the PCO (BLUE) in the strictly legal sense undergoes some changes that are tied to different phases of the ship’s schedule. During the initial period of construction, he and his crew report to a shipyard commander, district commandant, or supervisor of shipbuilding. At this time, his military authority is essentially advisory. When the ship reaches a certain stage of construction, the PCO becomes an Officer in Charge and has military authority over all officers and men assigned to the ship. However, his powers of punishment as outlined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice are not as broad as they will be when he becomes a commanding officer at commissioning.
In spite of the fairly complex legal changes that occur during the precommissioning period, there is never any doubt as to who is in charge. It is always the BLUE crew prospective commanding officer.
The officers and men ordered to the ship will be given a BLUE or a GOLD crew label. An analysis of the terminology of the orders written would show some differences in phraseology depending upon the time the in- vidual reports in relation to “In Service, Special” but it is sufficient to understand that each individual is designated BLUE or GOLD; that he clearly understands the BLUE crew PCO is in charge; and that he recognizes that there is some chance he could end up in the “other” crew (officers rarely are transferred from one crew to the other, however).
The relations between the two PCOs are absolutely clear in the legal sense, but it is imperative that a working understanding and accommodation be achieved by them.
It is evident that any basic differences left unresolved between PCOs will cause great difficulties. A fundamental dispute over how records will be maintained or over preventive maintenance routines could affect the operation of the ship during her entire lifetime and must be prevented. This is not to say, however, that the PCO (GOLD) should remain in the background to guarantee that problems of conflicting desires do not develop. The reverse is more the case. An early statement of any fundamental disagreements with procedures in effect or planned is essential toward a permanent resolution. The executive officer (BLUE) can do much to ensure that any differences in viewpoints are quickly identified by methods which will be discussed later.
The position of the PCO (GOLD) during the precommissioning phase is a difficult one requiring considerable tact and judgment. Though junior to the PCO (BLUE), he can influence the proposed organization and operation of the ship to a very great degree. This works to the mutual advantage of both ultimate crews if the methods of influence used are not directed toward the ultimate GOLD crew department heads but toward the BLUE executive officer.
Department organization. During the precommissioning phase, there is just one department for each function, e.g., one weapons department headed by one responsible officer. This department is composed of all other officers and enlisted men who will eventually split into a BLUE and GOLD crew weapons departments upon commissioning.
Assume Lieutenant Commander Jones is ordered as BLUE Weapons Officer and is joined a few weeks later by Lieutenant Smith, the GOLD Weapons Officer. It is no problem for Lieutenant Commander Jones to organize his department and operate it in the manner desired by the PCO (BLUE). Since Lieutenant Smith is working through a chain of authority to Lieutenant Commander Jones and the PCO (BLUE), it does not appear that Lieutenant Smith has any problems either. Lieutenant Smith is responsible only to Lieutenant Commander Jones and the PCO (BLUE) and must carry out their policies to the best of his abilities. He realizes, of course, that at commissioning he will be responsible to the commanding officer (GOLD) but, as yet, Lieutenant Smith must legally regard the PCO (GOLD) as if he does not exist. But suppose the PCO (GOLD) has basic conflicting ideas on training, record keeping, or personnel procedures which cannot be mutually resolved with the PCO (BLUE), and he tells Lieutenant Smith of his objections. This now places Lieutenant Smith in a frustrating if not untenable position. He has one legal superior, but his ultimate commanding officer has certainly intimated that policies will be changed at the time of commissioning. Lieutenant Smith thus is in the unenviable position of knowing that a great deal of what he is doing in organization, administration, and teaching is going to have to be done over.
Other departmental problems. The prospective GOLD department head may be senior to the prospective BLUE department head and due to personnel distribution difficulties he may arrive before his BLUE counterpart. There is no perfect answer to this kind of situation. If there is a considerable seniority difference, it is in most cases best that the GOLD department head be responsible for the entire department, since the installation of the junior officer is bound to cause problems. If a senior GOLD officer is made responsible for the department over a junior BLUE officer, the situation is still somewhat unsatisfactory, because most probably the BLUE officer will be serving as a division officer and will find it difficult to be cognizant of the department as an entity.
There is no difficulty in assigning significant responsibilities to all officers in a department during precommissioning. The ultimate organization can combine two or more divisions under one division officer whereas, prior to commissioning, each division may be assigned one officer. This is not so much for close attention to personnel but for close scrutiny of the myriad of installation details in order that minute familiarity with the equipment will result. This must be achieved quickly so that any design changes or alterations can be requested before it is too late. It does no good to pinpoint a design problem when there is only a month left before commissioning. There will then be no time left for correction in an orderly manner.
The integration of enlisted personnel into the department is handled in the following manner. Every attempt is made to put the senior man in charge up to the time of arrivals who come so late that it is impossible to train them adequately before commissioning. It is ideal if the first arrivals form the cadre of senior petty officers for both crews and if the later arrivals are the junior petty officers, but with an expansion rate in submarine personnel that borders on an explosion, this is frequently impossible.
The preparation of the department paperwork comprising organization manuals, qualification requirements and instructions must be accomplished and approved, bearing in mind that after deployment, the crews will have extremely limited contact with each other. There are verbal modifications to procedures or instructions that occur with time, and this does not present a great difficulty if these are well known and not too many in number. The situation can perhaps be accepted in a surface ship that is absorbing new personnel at reasonable intervals, and while the ship is conducting normal operations. The problems that this imposes on an FBM crew, however, are of much greater magnitude. For example, assume that after commissioning and the commencement of the patrol cycle, Missile Technician Anderson reports to the GOLD crew during the off-crew period. He is a numerical replacement for Missile Technician Brown who has been already transferred to a new construction assignment. The problem is to teach Anderson as rapidly as possible the ship’s procedures. There are training facilities where Anderson can see similar equipment, but how does he learn the detailed instructions for his particular watch or become indoctrinated quickly in ship’s emergency bills? Since he will not see the ship for another two months, the only possible method of training in these areas is in the careful study of off-crew copies of department paperwork. Now suppose there are defects in department procedures. Missile Technician Brown is not there to tell him that “that isn’t exactly the way we do it,” and even if he were, Missile Technician Brown probably would not recall unless his memory is stimulated by an actual operational event. This cannot occur due to the absence of the ship.
This is the essence of the requirement for paperwork as indicative of actual procedures as possible. The imposition of this requirement almost guarantees that changes will have to be made to almost every original document. The workload this imposes upon the clerical staff and reviewing authorities is enormous.
In order to have an instruction correctly drawn up, the review process must be somewhat laborious, but the time spent is worth it. Instructions must not be written too early. It is natural to want to get all the paperwork out as soon as possible, but the detail and accuracy needed cannot be achieved until the responsible officers become familiar with their equipment through many weeks in the ship yard. Not to require early paperwork may sound like coming out in favor of man-eating tigers, but it will save time in the long run.
The order of preparation and review is as follows. Preparation and concurrence by both prospective department heads, then forwarding via the following officers, (1) GOLD PXO, (2) BLUE PXO, (3) GOLD PCO, (4) BLUE PCO, with the BLUE PXO being responsible for resolution of comments. It is by this means that an instruction reaching the PCO BLUE should serve as a valid “completed-staffwork” document, and it gives the PCO (GOLD) ample opportunity to influence the content of the document. This influence is felt and resolved by the PXO (BLUE). The responsible department head may be asked for additional opinions, but he is not placed in the position of direct communications with the PCO (GOLD). There are some points which must be resolved between PCOs, but these they can resolve with relative ease.
The obvious question to ask at this point is “why can’t the submarine force operate each of its FBM submarines in the same manner?” Standard organization and instructions would seem to be the perfect solution. The answer is that each ship is unique. Ships of the same class often do have major material differences which affect the way certain evolutions are performed. The material differences arise from a variety of reasons, such as different building yards, different contractors for equipment, and differing numbers of design changes that can be fitted into the production schedule of a particular ship. The latter reason was amplified considerably by action taken as result of the Thresher loss. The standard organization manual and instructions are essential to ensure that the fundamentals are present in every ship’s instructions, but any standard manual is obsolete as a verbatim document before the ink is dry.
Assignment of enlisted personnel. A technique used to lighten the personnel administration load and also to provide for personal planning by enlisted personnel is to retain the BLUE or GOLD designations given them in their orders. By considering them as two different crews for advance planning purposes, the prospective executive officers can immediately divide the responsibilities for diary preparation, service record processing, advancement in rating preparation and any other personnel matters. Each PXO thus works with more manageable numbers of personnel, about 80 per cent of whom will ultimately end up in his crew. The advantage to the crews is that with the same 80 per cent assurance they can plan their personal futures since they know whether or not they will make first patrol. The fact that initial crew assignment is not absolute is stressed in all arrival briefings so that all hands know that the possibility of crew transfer exists. The guidance for final crew alignment will be discussed shortly.
Qualifications. Qualification in submarines must be regarded in a different light in these ships. Ten years ago a qualified SS man really knew how to operate most of the equipment on board his ship. Cooks were expected to be able to start the diesel engine, and we demanded the same sort of cross-training for everyone.
The situation is far different today. Each of the three major departments (engineering, weapons, and navigation) has an array of equipment of immense value and complexity. Qualification in any one department is more difficult than submarine qualification in its entirety was a few years ago. Each department member requires specialized and extensive schooling prior to arrival. Superimposed on this are restrictions on the operation of certain engineering and weapons equipment by only those specifically trained and qualified. The net effect of this is to make the essential qualification that enables the ship to be operated heavily dependent on department qualification.
This qualification program must have real teeth in it, with definite weekly requirements. Final department qualification can be made more meaningful with the use of qualification boards made up of department heads, division officers, and leading petty officers.
Ship qualification must come after this and must be oriented toward the essentials of submarining, i.e., damage control equipment, shipwide systems such as air, hydraulics, telephones, plumbing, etc.
The time and effort cannot be afforded to have crew members cross-training outside the major departments acquire anything more than a basic understanding of major components. Even if time and legal restrictions were not complicating factors, the possibility of equipment damage in the thousands of dollars could result from over-zealous qualification programs for inexperienced personnel.
Prior to commissioning, the training goals to be accomplished by each department must be stated to each new crew member upon arrival. Department qualification and qualification in one watch station are mandatory before first sea trials. The series of sea trials undertaken from the building yard represent the sole underway time for training both ultimate crews prior to commissioning. Consequently, a system of rotation should be set up that will ensure that each ultimate BLUE and GOLD crew member gets equal time at sea on sea trials. As a general rule, it is possible without undue effort to take approximately three-quarters of the combined crews and all of the officers on every sea trial. The problems of new watch, quarter, and station bill preparation, sleeping arrangements and messing hours for eight or nine sea trials require considerable forethought and effort, but the results in training are worth it.
Final crew alignment. Sometime during the last three or four weeks prior to commissioning, final crew alignment should take place. The cornerstone of crew alignment should be based on the early understanding between PCOs that prospective BLUE and GOLD department heads must agree that the personnel assignment after commissioning is mutually satisfactory. In order to reach this agreement, a certain amount of personnel swapping is necessary.
For example, if all of the BLUE-crew-desig- nated enlisted men in the weapons department arrived early enough to have taken part in all testing and the GOLD-crew-designated men missed significant testing by late arrival, some BLUE crew personnel must be placed in the GOLD crew upon commissioning. It is really to the self interest of the prospective BLUE crew department head to propose this, since the condition of the ship after a GOLD crew patrol will be in direct relation to the experience and training of the GOLD crew. If the BLUE crew should retain all of the experienced people it would eventually make for an increased work load to prepare the ship for her next patrol.
Since neither prospective department head can be assured that a particular man will not eventually be in his department upon commissioning, the attitude toward a poor performer should be unrelenting. The precommissioning period places great strains on the senior petty officers, the great majority of whom respond magnificently by working long hours, weekends, and in general do more voluntarily than anyone could be asked to do.
A senior petty officer who cannot perform to the degree required cannot remain in a position of responsibility. The man must have his NEC removed and/or be disqualified and transferred depending upon the severity of the situation. Perhaps the individual can eventually become a good performer, but the ship cannot gamble in this period that he will.
During the final alignment of the crews, a leading petty officer should not be juggled back and forth between BLUE and GOLD like a hot potato because each crew thinks he is worthless. The previous policies should have been carried out to ensure that the man is no longer there. There will be personnel problems, of course, on a junior petty officer level, but they should be shared equitably with reasonable prospects of correction at the senior petty officer/division officer level as the ship begins to operate.
Commissioning to deployment. Within two to three weeks of final crew alignment, the ship is ready to be commissioned. The commissioning creates two separate commands, and, if the goals have been properly met, the result should be simple. Each crew should be equally capable of operating the ship—and each man should feel a personal sense of responsibility and pride in having played an essential part in meeting that goal.
There is one period after commissioning where the crews do meet again for a considerable length of time. This period is the postshakedown availability (PSA), occurring shortly prior to the first patrol. The crews still remain as separate commands but with the GOLD crew commanding officer reporting for temporary additional duty to the BLUE crew commanding officer who is responsible for the ship during this period.
The relations existing between the two crews will be largely dependent on the mood that has been created during the precommissioning period. The amount of work scheduled during a typical PSA requires the unceasing efforts of both crews to progress, and the attitude of the crews toward this work will determine the material condition of the ship for years to come. The fundamental principle here is to ensure that the GOLD crew officers and men are given as much responsibility as possible for the work to be performed. The principle is sound for two reasons: (1) each crew will feel equally responsible for work and will retain a high interest and competence in operating the ship after PSA, and (2) the amount of work to be surveyed is so large and the schedules so tight that problems must be quickly identified.
Shortly after PSA, the BLUE crew departs on first patrol and the routine of crew rotation after each patrol begins. Each crew will develop its own personality. If you were to visit the BLUE crew of a ship in mid-patrol, you might find them on a watchstanding routine that followed the conventional four-on, eight- off watch schedule, and recreational activities would be sandwiched in on a routine that would approximate normal shore life. Movies would be shown in the evenings, broken by an occasional Bingo game with the cooks contributing pizzas and popcorn.
If you went back to the same ship with the GOLD crew aboard, you might find them on an elaborate watchstanding scheme that had uneven lengths of watches where one third of the crew followed the time zone of Bombay, India, another third the time zone of New York, and the remaining third, Hawaii. You would note that the entire crew is bearded, and you would see one group of men having breakfast in the mess hall while another group was preparing for supper, while the local time at the ship’s geographical location was 1400.
All of these crew idiosyncrasies vanish when an alert is received. Either crew will rapidly man its stations and use exactly the same procedures to bring the FBM weapons system to complete readiness to launch.
The rotation of crews between patrols is now carried out in a routine manner and the basic command structure continues uninterrupted afloat or ashore. There are, of course, many problems associated with crew turnovers. The importance of accurate recordkeeping and attention to detail in order to provide counterparts in each crew with adequate information on the material condition and performance of the ship is not easily learned, but cannot be overstressed. The problems involved in training replacements ashore so that they can quickly become watchstanders at sea is another major consideration. Each patrol has its own problems of preparation and execution and requires an unending attention to detail. The FBM submarine patrol record is now an enviable one, and it has proven that the two-crew concept can be carried on over long periods of time.
Conclusion. The commissioning of a ship as complex as an FBM submarine with the complement of two crews is a problem of considerable magnitude. The procedures outlined have been successful in creating an organization capable of training each crew and in making each crew member feel a sense of responsibility in being a part of the Navy’s prime deterrent weapons system and were designed to form a solid foundation for sustained two-crew operation.
Perhaps we shall apply the two-crew principle to other types of ships, and this concept which is of particular interest to submarines, may be employed elsewhere in the Navy. We may be able to show one day that it is cheaper to operate some of our ships in this manner even when maximum time at sea is not the prime consideration.
Whether the Navy will use the two-crew concept in other ships is unknown. If the cost of two crews can be recouped by better reenlistment rates, better material condition, and better command readiness, it becomes a worthwhile project to pursue in a surface ship.
There is no doubt that the Polaris program has proven that the two-crew concept works. It might well prove to be “cost-effective” in other naval applications.