An analysis of the current news coming from South Vietnam suggests that the primary problem confronting the counterinsurgent forces in their operations against the Viet Cong arises from a substantive inability to identify and subsequently isolate the insurgent from the mass of the population. Since it is quintessential for the forces of insurgency to “Exist everywhere, but [be] . . . nowhere tangible,” it follows that the single most important factor governing the success or failure of counterinsurgent operations is the ability to isolate the insurgent from his base of support in the people. This, in turn, requires that there be formulated and efficiently administered some measures of the physical, ideological, economic, and administrative control of the people. This article directs itself to a cursory survey of such measures as traditionally were and currently are in use in Communist China and Vietnam.
Before proceeding, it is advisable to pause for a moment to reflect briefly upon the character of measures for the prevention and suppression of revolts. Initially, it must be conceded that measures for the control of the population, by the very nature of revolutionary warfare, must affect the entire social environment within which the conflict is fought. It is also axiomatic that control measures will involve the use of coercion. It is not, therefore, a question of whether or not coercion is used to counter insurgents; the questions are, “to what degree is it advisable to use coercion,” and “what form should such measures take?”
Both the principle and the form of current Communist Chinese and Vietnamese systems for the prevention and suppression of revolts were expressed by the author of the oldest military treatise in the world, Sun Tsu, who said, “The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men. It is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.” This principle lies at the base of the system for the control of the population instituted by the Chinese prior to the establishment of the first empire in 221 B.C. Lord Shang Yang, Prime Minister of the State of Ch’in, proposed that the people be organized into “groups of families which would be mutually responsible for each other’s good behavior and share each other’s punishments.” If, however, one voluntarily “denounced a culprit, [he] would receive ... reward.”
Subsequent to the establishment of the empire, and for its consolidation, additional controls were instituted. These control measures forced the relocation of families to facilitate their surveillance, disarmed the population, and, by the threat of double taxation, disintegrated families with more than one adult male. Book burning, branding, and forced labor on the Great Wall theoretically coerced the numerous scholars to refrain from advocating opposing philosophies, thus contributing to ideological control. Administrative control in the form of a censurate functioned to ensure the execution of state policy while simultaneously ferreting out administrative inefficiency and corruption.
The philosophy of the Ch’in is best summed up in the words of its most able philosopher, Han Fei Tzu:
Those who are ignorant about government say: “Win the hearts of the people.” If order could be procured by winning the hearts of the people, then even the wise ministers . . . would be of no use. For all that the ruler would need to do would be just to listen to the people. Actually, the intelligence of the people is not to be relied upon any more than the mind of a baby. If the baby does not have his head shaved, his sores will recur; if he does not have his boil cut open, his illness will go from bad to worse. However, in order to shave his head or open his boil someone has to hold the baby while the affectionate mother is performing the work, and yet he keeps crying and yelling incessantly. The baby does not understand that suffering a small pain is the way to obtain a great benefit. . .
Although the positive aspects of the Ch’in placed the land in the hands of the people, excessive taxation, forced labor, and inept administration caused the collapse of the regime shortly after the death of China’s first emperor, Shih Huang-ti.
Succeeding dynasties employed the principle of mutual responsibility, mutual surveillance, and mutual denunciation in league with the subdivision of the population into family groups. Additional safeguards were added, such as the requisite examination in the Confucian classics emphasizing obedience to the emperor for entrance and promotion in public service (added during the Han dynasty after 165 B.C.). It was not, however, until the Sung dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) that the system of dividing the population into family groups became known as the pao chia (approximately five families constituted a chia, five chia constituted a pao, and all were under the direction of the district magistrate). Wang An-shih, Prime Minister (1069-1086) submitted the following proposal to the Emperor:
For hundreds of thousands of years [sic] the people of the empire have been free to live together or to disperse and go in all directions as they chose, not subject to any restriction. Now we want to change it forthwith, organizing the people into units of fives and tens [families] and attaching one village to another. Unlawful activities would then be kept under observation.
Wang added collective security as an integral part of the pao chia when he instituted village self-defense forces. According to his plan each chia was required to furnish able- bodied men for the defense of the village, and villages were to assist one another when the necessity arose. The regular army would then be released for more direct action against the common foe.
Seeking to gain the support of the population, Wang simultaneously instituted numerous reforms, among which were the provisions for low-interest agricultural loans, equal division of the land, the abolition of forced labor, equitable taxation based on property values, and the establishment of granaries that purchased in the good years for distribution in the lean years. None of these reforms lasted to exceed the tenure of their author; for the reforms incurred the wrath of the wealthy and influential landowners whose champion, Ssu- Ma Kuang, succeeded Wang as Prime Minister and quickly abolished the system.
A system of rural economic control, which originated about 519 B.C., became closely integrated with the pao chia during the Mongol or Yuan dynasty (1260-1368) and the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). This system, the agricultural she, regimented the rural population into family groups for the purpose of mutual assistance. During the Yuan dynasty, the head of the she became responsible not only for the supervision of the “planting of farm crops,” but also the “general conduct of the inhabitants belonging to his organization.” The alleviation of famine took the form of one of Wang An-shih’s reform measures, the re-establishment of the state granaries. Being alien, however, the Mongols were driven out of China as soon as there was evidence of weakness, and the government passed to the Ming. The Ming, in turn, were overthrown by the invading Manchus (1644).
Ideological control under the Manchus (1655-1912) saw the re-establishment of the examination system based on the Confucian principle of obedience and human relations. In order for an official to attain public office, he was required to pass a series of these examinations. Previously, the Confucian doctrines reached the peasant only incidentally; however, the Manchus made an effort to extend these teachings to the lowest individual and the hsiangyueh system of public and compulsory lectures was instituted. Accordingly, a hsiangyueh head was appointed in each community. It was his duty to address the illiterate population twice monthly and to record “the culpable as well as the praiseworthy conduct of persons living in their neighborhoods.” Although the hsiang yueh was originally separate from the pao chia, the hsiangyueh head was gradually forced to assume the duties of the pao chia head, causing the two systems to appear as one.
Inept administration and the incursions of the Western nations, which the Manchus were powerless to halt, caused the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1912. This marked the end of imperial China, but not the end of the pao chia. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government used the pao chia system in their efforts to eliminate the Communist conspirators. At the inception of the system by Chiang, the officials of the pao and the chia were appointed from above; however, in 1939 the system was converted into a form of basic democracy embodying a semblance of local self-government with elected representatives. The structure remained primarily the same as the original pao chia.
Within this structure, the heads of families met at a Chia Affairs meeting and a Pao People’s Assembly. Their authority, however, did not extend beyond the discussion of official policies, the election of chiefs every two years, and at the Pao Assembly, the election of a representative to attend the People’s District Representative Assembly. Intercourse between the district and county offices was restricted to the attendance of an elected representative of the district assembly at a quarterly meeting of the county council, and a meeting twice a year of the district and county chiefs.
Under the Nationalists, administrative control manifested itself in the form of the Control Yuan. The Control Yuan was identical in function to the traditional Censurate originated by the Ch’in.
The militia, by now an integral part of the pao chia, required all males 18 to 45 years of age to participate. Militia units were formed in each of the subdivisions of the pao chia as well as in each district. All were under the authority of the People’s Self-Defense Headquarters. The central authorities, unfortunately, feared an armed peasantry and refused to furnish arms to the militia; consequently the militia (the min-fuan [people’s corps]) was for the most part, armed with privately owned weapons.
These forces evidently were quite effective. Edgar Snow, who was traveling with the Chinese Communist guerrillas at the time, provides an explanation of the duties of the militia, and also gives us an evaluation of their effectiveness.
The min-t’uan is selected, organized, and commanded by the landlords and gentry. Its primary duties are to fight Communism, to help to collect loans and interest, and to support the local magistrates’ efforts to gather in the ever-increasing taxes.
Hence it happened that, when the Red Army occupied a territory, its first, as well as its last enemy, was the min-t’uan. For the min-t’uan had no base except in the landlords who paid them, and class-warfare of China was best seen in the struggles between the min-t’uan and Red Partisans. . . .
As for the effectiveness of the pao chia itself, Edgar Snow remarked that “as a measure for preventing the organization of peasant opposition, it is nearly unbeatable.” It should also be pointed out that Mao Tse-tung, in his “On Coalition Government,” demanded, as one of the prices for the Communists’ co-operation with the Nationalists against the Japanese invaders, the abolition of “The pao chia system that oppresses the people.” It is doubtful that he was motivated by purely humanitarian reasons in his demands.
Although obviously effective to a point, the pao chia was not sufficient in itself to prevent the Communist takeover in 1949. This, however, does not necessarily reflect upon the system, but more on the ability of the Nationalists to put forth any sweeping agrarian reforms to gain the unwavering support of the people (further benefiting the Communists, who posed as agrarian reformers). There was also the fact that the Nationalists were confronted by two enemies, the Communists and the Japanese invaders, and therefore could not energetically direct themselves to the improvement of the economy.
Because the character of the Chinese society was suited to the operation of the pao chia, and because they had past knowledge of the system, the Japanese invaders also employed this system for the regimentation of the population into family groups as the basic structure in their rural pacification program. The Japanese implementation in China of the hoko system, their version of the pao chia, provides an excellent opportunity to compare its simultaneous employment by two separate Japanese occupation armies.
In North China (1938-1945), which was considered by the Japanese to be vital to their national interests, the pao chia quickly took on the characteristics of a purely negative system of control. Despite the subdivision of the population into more manageable family groups, mutual responsibility, the posting of wood plaques on each house inscribed with the names of the occupants, the taking of the census, the restrictions on travel, and the obligatory identification cards or armbands, the Communist guerrillas remained active. Deliberate provocation finally caused the Japanese to launch the drastic “Three-All” program of kill all, burn all, destroy all. Subsequently, the exasperated Japanese surrounded sectors suspected of harboring guerrillas, systematically annihilated everyone, and burned or destroyed everything inside the circle. Motivated by a determination to survive, thousands of Chinese peasants joined the Communist guerrillas.
The use of the pao chia by the Japanese in Central China presents a different picture from that in North China. Here, the Japanese were neither motivated by a sense of urgency to institute the drastic measures taken in the North, nor were they equipped to do so. They turned instead to the hoko or pao chia system in combination with self-defense units and travel restrictions under the “Rural Pacification Movement” which was supported by economic and administrative reforms, particularly in the tax system.
After having cleared areas of known guerrilla activities by direct military action, the military units were garrisoned away from the population to prevent friction. “Model peace zones” were set up, and the administration was turned over to Chinese officials of the puppet New Nationalist Government. Propaganda work was carried on through the media of the classroom and regular pao chia meetings. The popularization of the pao chia by propaganda and the resultant peace and stability in the model peace zones aided economic development and gained for the Japanese some degree of acceptance from the Chinese population. All of this worked to the disadvantage of the guerrillas, who learned that their propaganda efforts alone would not be sufficient to disorient the people. Several model peace zones were established before it became obvious to the Chinese that the Japanese were losing the war. This precluded any extension of the original Japanese successes.
Communist reaction against security control by either the Chinese Nationalists or the Japanese included the usual propaganda and promises of agrarian reform. A more dramatic and effective measure employed was the use of “armed propaganda teams.” These teams conducted a studied campaign of terror to disrupt the control system and consequently disorient the people. Intimidation and disruption techniques included the assassination of officials and “traitors,” the destruction of identification cards and travel visas, provocation raids, and the organization of mutual aid teams among the Chinese peasants. But, for the purposes of this paper, it is the mutual aid teams that are of particular interest. Organized among the disoriented peasants, the teams were used to dig up roads, lay mines, form local guerrilla units, and generally disrupt rear-area communications of the Japanese and Nationalists. Their formation also laid the foundation for the Chinese Communist’s own elaborate security system, as well as the economic organization of Communist China.
In the rural areas, the basic unit in the Chinese Communist pao chia-\\kt division of the people was the mutual aid team. Ostensibly organized for economic and defense purposes these teams, along with the numerous mass organizations, not only provided an audience for incessant propaganda but also provided the basic unit for criticism and self- criticism sessions. Much has been written about the mutual aid teams; therefore, it is only necessary to point out that the teams advanced to low-level co-operatives, to high- level co-operatives, to collectives, and finally to communes.
Today, despite the retrenchment of the commune program following the disastrous 1958 “great leap forward,” the people in Communist China are still divided into the pao chia-like organization: the work group of about 10 to 12 families, the production teams of approximately 40 families, the production brigade of about 200 families, and the commune, composed of several production brigades, corresponding to the district level of government. Elected according to the principle of “democratic centralism,” each subdivision down to the production team has its own legislative and administrative bodies and all, with the exception of the production team, are indirectly elected by the next lowest body. The candidates, of course, must have Party approval to run for office, and the acts of each echelon in the governmental structure are subject to the veto of the next highest echelon.
The population subdivision in the urban areas, aside from urban communes, includes the street offices which are branch offices of the municipal and urban district councils. The street offices are further subdivided into residents’ committees of 100 to 600 families, and residents’ groups of 15 to 40 families, within which mutual surveillance and denunciation activities are carried out.
Additional pao chia-like grouping of the people may be found in the study groups of the mass organizations, the function of which is similar to that of the original hsiang yueli. The groups are made up of ten to 15 persons. The smaller mutual aid study group, a subdivision of the large group, is made up of three to five persons.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the largest of China’s security organs, also employs the principles of the pao chia for the control of the troops. Mutual aid teams of three to five men are formed within each squad. At least one member of the mutual aid team is a Party member, and one member is an activist. The remaining men may be “backward elements” (those who have not wholly accepted the Communist doctrine), who need guidance that is forthcoming continually. These members attend criticism and self-criticism sessions twice a week.
Even the fishermen must organize into units of five to 15 boats within which at least one spy is assigned. The families of fishermen reportedly are required to remain on shore as hostages when the boats go to sea.
Facilitating the control of the population at the local level are the substations of the Ministry of Public Security and their household police who check on all travelers, births, deaths, marriages, and divorces. They also compile dossiers on every member of every household. Census officers check on all suspicious persons and keep records of the movement of the population through registration. They are assisted by the public security committees and teams established at the various levels of government in each factory, cooperative, street, and village.
There is also the much publicized militia (which functions to ensure local order and assist the PLA), the People’s Armed Public Security Forces (which operates to secure the border areas and assist the PLA in the suppression of counterrevolutionary activities), and the Chinese Communist judicial system, including the courts and the procuratorate (both of which function to “educate” the people).
Ideological control is facilitated through the use of the mass organizations which organize the people into study groups of ten to 15 persons each for criticism and self-criticism sessions requiring mutual surveillance, responsibility, and denunciation.
Administrative control presents itself in the form of the People’s Supervision committees, teams, and correspondents. It is the function of this organ of control to ferret out instances of corruption, waste, mismanagement, and deviation within the various governmental agencies (as did the Censurate and Control Yuan) and economic enterprises through the use of informers.
The Communist Party, which organizationally parallels all echelons of government, prevails over and permeates all of the other organizations and enterprises.
In the minority regions, the population is relocated in strange surroundings to make them conspicuous and further facilitate security control. The policy of gerrymandering of districts is also employed to ensure an ethnic Chinese majority even in a minority area.
To summarize the security control system in Communist China, there are the vertically structured agencies of control, whose functions of surveillance and supervision are carried out on both horizontal and vertical planes for the maintenance of internal peace and public order. Each echelon is subjected to surveillance from above by the next highest echelon, from below by the people, and horizontally by each of the other organizations, whose functions purposely overlap one another. The people are watched by all organs of control, by each other, and through introspection, by themselves. Security for the individual in Communist China is analogous to the security of incarceration; freedom is nonexistent.
That a great deal of attention has been devoted to the control of the population in China is evident from our cursory investigation of the history of that country. Equally evident is the fact that the security systems used by succeeding dynasties, the republic, and the Communists bear a striking similarity. It is also apparent that such controls were successful only when they were accompanied by positive inducements to offset the negative characteristics of security control.
The Viet Minh, greatly influenced by the way the Chinese conducted the revolution, organized and functioned in much the same fashion. During the Franco-Vietnamese war of resistance (1945-1954), those people who where successfully separated from the French administration by the terrorist tactics of the “armed propaganda teams” of the Dich Van were organized into household groups of three to five families each.
There was also the coalition of mass organizations of the Lien Viet, which encompassed every aspect of Vietnamese society. Within each of these organizations the people were divided according to age, sex, occupation, and class. They were further subdivided into study groups for the purposes of propaganda, criticism, and self-criticism requiring the practices of mutual responsibility, mutual surveillance, and mutual denunciation.
The setting up of a local government was considered by the Communists to be a precondition for the establishment of local guerrilla forces to prevent them from evolving into roving bands doomed to eventual destruction. The Viet Minh therefore organized numerous political and military committees that extended from the central authorities through the interzones, interprovince, province, district, and down to the village. Paralleling these governmental bodies and the mass organizations of the Lien Viet was the Lao Dong Party, which permeated all. There were also the ever-present agents of the Cong An (secret police).
As a means for maintaining local order and security as well as for the development of a large and well-trained armed force, there were organized the self-defense, fighting self- defense, and regular military units. At the village level in the administrative hierarchy were the unpaid units of the self-defense units who engaged in small-scale guerrilla action, and provided intelligence information and recruits for the half-salaried and better trained troops of the district fighting self-defense forces. These better-trained and better-equipped district forces engaged in more sophisticated guerrilla activities and represented a ready reservoir of battle-hardened recruits for the full-salaried regular forces at the provincial level of government. Each person in these units was watched internally by the political commissars of the Lao Dong Party and by each other through criticism and self-criticism sessions.
Following the 1954 Geneva Agreements and the establishment of the Communists’ Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the political and military executive committees were replaced by the elected people’s councils and administrative committees, which, along with the electoral system, functioned under the constitutionally avowed principle of “democratic centralism.” This provided an illusory democratic form of government while the central authorities retained all of the power.
For both economic and security purposes, Hanoi has endeavored to group the population in the remote mountain regions into cooperatives generally limited to “from 20 to 30 families, or at the most, 60 families.” In the delta region, however, co-operatives of hamlet size may contain up to 200 families. Mountain co-operatives are of the “lower level” type, or collectives, which places them in the first step above mutual aid teams. They are divided into “brigades” (about equivalent in size to the mutual aid team), each composed of a separate ethnic group to help prevent the friction between the different ethnic groups that has been plaguing the North Vietnamese authorities. In the delta region, the co-operatives of 150 to 200 families are subdivided into production brigades of about 40 families each, and are further subdivided into work groups or teams of five to 12 families each. The urban people are organized according to wards, urban districts, streets, and blocks under the surveillance of inhabitant protection committees.
To facilitate control in North Vietnam, the self-defense forces have been retained, but are now subdivided into an inner and outer group. That is, there appears to be “basic militia” of the more politically reliable members of the community who work closely with the security control agencies of the government and the regular military. The remainder of the self-defense force is charged with the gathering of intelligence, patrolling, and in time of war, with the conducting of local guerrilla activities.
The mass organizations with their study groups and criticism and self-criticism sessions have been retained in North Vietnam to facilitate ideological control. The Lao Dong Party still parallels and permeates all other organizations and governmental bodies. Additional organs of control include the Regular Army and the People’s Armed Security Forces, which, like its Chinese counterpart, guards the borders and augments the local militia and self-defense forces. The People’s Supreme Organ of Control, like the Chinese procurator general’s office, acts as prosecutor in the People’s Supreme Court and also carries on a program for the “education” of the people.
The People’s Supreme Inspection Institute, established in 1961, is charged with the inspection of law enforcement in government, work camps, enterprises, farm camps, and cooperatives. This appears to be the North Vietnamese version of the Chinese People’s Supervisory committees, the Nationalist Chinese Control Yuan, and the traditional Censurate. Inspection institutes operate at all levels of government down to the district level, and inspection teams are theoretically placed in each village for the purpose of “guaranteeing for the people the complete and timely fulfillment of a dictatorship against those who try to destroy the revolutionary works.” In the performance of their duties, the personnel in this new organization use denunciatory letters submitted by the people to uncover waste, red tape, and corruption. Aside from the People’s Supreme Inspection Institute each department of government has its own control organs. The functions of the Cong An and the Army are about the same as they are anywhere in a dictatorship.
As may be expected, the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam and the Front for the Liberation of the South in South Vietnam are of the same kidney. The techniques for the control of the population instituted by the military arm of the “Front,” the Viet Cong, are identical to those of the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists before them. From a foothold in the community established by the armed propaganda teams of the Dich Van, the Viet Cong gradually extends its control outward. From the initially established cell of political activists in the villages, the people are systematically enrolled in one of the mass organizations of the coalition Front. Once the first of the parallel hierarchies has been established, local government gradually takes shape in the form of political and military executive committees that are systematically extended upward from the village through the district, province, interprovince, and interzone. Below the basic level of local government the people are regimented into three-family and five-family units wherein they are obliged to practice mutual surveillance and mutual denunciation of one another.
For the protection of the “base” as well as for the pursuit of the war, a three-tier military development program is installed. At the base of the program are the unpaid village self- defense units that operate locally and furnish partially trained recruits to the half-salaried and better-trained and equipped fighting self- defense units at the district level of government. These regional troops operate as a more sophisticated guerrilla force and furnish battle tested recruits for the elite, regular forces at the province level. The regular forces unite to form regiments at the interprovince level.
The Viet Cong actually wears two caps, for while it extends Communist control over new areas of the countryside, it also performs local police functions in the villages. It, in turn, is internally controlled by a system of political commissars and the formation of mutual aid groups of three soldiers each, one of whom is a Party member who watches the other two. There are also the inevitable criticism and self-criticism sessions that act to correct mistakes committed in battle and to stifle individuality among the participants.
Criticism and self-criticism are also practiced among the local people within the framework of the three-family and five-family groups, and the study groups of the various mass organizations of the Front. The people and the soldiers are simultaneously under the internal surveillance of the Party, the external surveillance of the Cong An, as well as surveillance by each other through mutual responsibility and denunciation.
The Communists are cognizant of the fact that to receive the support of the people, negative measures of control must be accompanied by positive inducements. These positive inducements manifest themselves in the form of promised and actual land reform. Once the land goes to the peasant, he is not likely to wish the early return of his former landlord and the collection of the rent, which he feels will be retroactive. Whether or not this is true matters very little; it is what the peasant thinks is true that is important. His opposition to the Communists comes later, when he is classified by them as being a rich landlord, or a rich farmer, and his land is confiscated.
Except for its use by the Viet Cong, it could be expected that the pao chia would halt at the 17th parallel, but this is not the case. A system exists in the Republic of Vietnam that is remarkably similar to the traditional pao chia. The “Mutual Aid Family Group” program was instituted in 1957 under the regime of President Diem. The rural population was organized into lien gia consisting of five to eight families each, and into khoms of 25 to 35 families each. Both had appointed heads whose duties included the oral communication of instructions to the illiterate peasants, the reporting of visitors to their respective groups, or any irregularities committed by any member of their group. There was also the 1957 “Communist Activities Denunciation Campaign” under the provisions of which all persons 18 years of age and over attended obligatory monthly Communist denunciation meetings. In the urban areas a similar system—“Interfamilial Groups”— was organized in February 1960.
To facilitate the control of the rural population, obligatory house plaques were displayed in a conspicuous place. Inscribed upon each plaque was the number of persons living in the house, their relation to the head of the household, and by means of colored circles, the sex and literacy level of each occupant. In addition, there appeared the family number, group number, and in the urban areas, the street number.
A 14 July 1964 news article stated that census teams were operating in provinces where they listed each family in the area, and required one member of each family to complete a bimonthly questionnaire which asked for information about local Viet Cong activities, and solicited complaints about the local government.
Adjuncts to the family group program were the inevitable identification cards. To obtain one of these precious documents, an individual had to appear in person at the district headquarters with two witnesses, a birth certificate, and a letter of verification from the village chief. A visa program was instituted inhibiting the movement of the population from one place to another. This requirement constituted a hardship on those peasants, in areas where there was no double-cropping, who usually supplemented their income by working in adjacent areas. The system was also reportedly used to force the peasants to work on the agrovilles (predecessors to the Strategic Hamlets).
Additional measures used to ensure public order and safety included the Surete (secret police), the village self-defense force, and the district Civil Guard, which augmented the regular army.
Propaganda and community development were carried out by the Civic Action Teams. The District Information Officer, with the assistance of two information cadres in each village, was charged with the dissemination of propaganda in the villages. An alternate means for combating Viet Cong propaganda was instituted in the form of an “armed propaganda team” composed of the District Information Officer, a Republican Youth representative, a National Revolutionary Movement representative, a member of the League of Civil Servants, a member of the district Civil Guard, and a civic action agent. The intention of the armed propaganda team was to organize whispering campaigns and village study sessions and demonstrations, to show films, and to produce theatrical performances designed to promote governmental policy.
There are currently in South Vietnam the New Rural Life Hamlets, formerly named the Strategic Hamlets. Recent articles suggest that that entire security control system including the family groups is in force inside each of these hamlets. It does not, however, appear to be functioning as well as would be wished. The evident ineffectiveness of the system as used by the South Vietnamese government suggests that the people have not given the system or the government their wholehearted support, without which no system can work. Inadequate and inefficient administration may also cause the system to be ineffective. It was reported in 1960, for example, that because of the frequent movements of the population in an area just north of Saigon, the people not only did not have correct numbers on their houses, but did not know to which group they belonged. Perhaps of greatest significance is the fact that there have been no important agrarian or administrative reforms instituted in the countryside that would motivate the people to give their support to the incumbent South Vietnam government.
The cursory nature of this article does not preclude the establishment of a few basic conclusions. The most obvious is that the current systems for the control of the population in Communist China and Vietnam are actually variations of the original system known during the Sung dynasty as the pao chia. Each, for example, has at its base the subdivision of the population into small family groups, and each is characterized by mutual responsibility, mutual surveillance, and mutual denunciation. The inosculation of the ancient agricultural she, the hsiang yueh, the pao chia, and the self-defense units into a composite form by the Communists of China and North Vietnam can also be seen. The system as instituted by the Republic of Vietnam, being a bit more fragmented, bears a greater resemblance to the original pao chia and related systems for the physical, economic, ideological, and administrative control of the people.
It is equally apparent that the structure of the pao chia system conforms with the structure of the society in each of these countries where the family unit has traditionally represented the basic economic and social unit.
In the suppression of revolts, however, the system cannot claim to be an unqualified success. It was not able to prevent the collapse of dynasties or of the Nationalist Chinese regime on the mainland of China; however, these governments may have had their tenure extended by its utilization. Furthermore, the system, when accompanied by administrative and economic reforms, was given some measure of support by the people. Such support undoubtedly was for the reforms and not for the system of control. It is possible that the system of population subdivision and related characteristics aided in the stabilization of the countryside, thereby accelerating economic growth and adding to the well-being of the people. Thus, it is also possible that with the concomitant introduction of reforms, the coercive nature of the system was balanced by positive inducements and consequently made less culpable to the people. The Japanese successes in Central China, and the current Chinese and Vietnamese Communist use of the pao chia system, support this contention. It has often been said that “the Communist security system is virtually impenetrable.”
Such a system requires efficient administration, and in lieu of this, a means for the supervision of administration, such as the People’s Supreme Inspection Institute, or the Censurate. But even efficient administration cannot relieve it of its culpable nature. This can be accomplished only by balancing its negative characteristics with some positive inducements in the form of economic and administrative reforms. As Confucius once so aptly said, “The humane live with humanity; the wise find it beneficial.”