The movement of forces, and the subsequent introduction of these forces ashore, has become a major segment of Defense Department planning. There are two basic means of accomplishing this projection of troops and equipment. One is, of course, either the amphibious or the airborne assault. The other means involves “the administrative movement and landing” of designated forces through secured or friendly airbases, seaports, or beaches. Complete freedom from enemy interference is mandatory if this latter means is to be successfully employed. Assault forces, on the other hand, can execute either tactical or non-assault operations.
Airborne assault forces have the capability to attack inland objectives, although this feature does attach certain limitations. These limitations today relate to their sustaining power and their dependence upon external sources and resupply by air or surface link-up in order to continue major land operations. Their continued effectiveness is thus often dependent upon parallel surface operations.
The hallmark of amphibious operations has been the capability of an amphibious task force to project ashore and sustain a hardhitting landing force. The assault shocking power and the combat and service support to weight and sustain that assault are all an inherent part of that task force and not contingent upon other sources. An amphibious assault operation is an attack by ground forces launched from the sea upon a hostile shore. Its successful execution depends upon extremely close co-operation and co-ordination of all elements afloat, ashore, and aloft. While it is fundamental in an amphibious operation to provide adequate lift for the landing force’s troops, square footage for the combat vehicles, and cubic footage for supplies, the paramount criterion is the preservation of tactical integrity. Unit integrity, or the normal administrative organization, at this point is a secondary consideration. Landing forces must be embarked in accordance with the manner in which they will be projected ashore and initially employed. As the subsequent operations ashore continue, the organization structured for landing is dissolved, and the various elements normally revert to their basic tactical organizations.
In order to test operational procedures and to determine the capability of naval forces to execute large amphibious assault force operations, the Department of Defense directed the conduct of Exercises STEEL PIKE (in co-operation with the Armed Forces of Spain) and SILVER LANCE. The long years involving the continuous deployment of smaller forces and reduced scale exercises had opened the question, “Just what is the current ability to conduct Marine Expeditionary Force or Marine Expeditionary Corps level landings?”
From Defense Department studies it has been determined that the Marine Division/ Wing Team organized as a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the best-sized landing force to be employed in sustained combat against major determined opposition. The Marine Expeditionary Corps (MEC) utilizes the resources of one or more MEFs.
The MEF is the force appropriate to the majority of situations involving Marines in sustained combat against determined opposition. It normally consists of the following Marine Division reinforced with appropriate force combat units: (1) A Marine aircraft wing, task organized to conduct tactical air operations ashore in an expeditionary environment; (2) A logistic support group built around a force service regiment, and other force combat service support units. An engineer support group is often organized as a second combat service support element. The combat service support capabilities of a Marine Expeditionary Force provide support for sustained air and ground operations. A command element is included which is composed of a separate air-ground headquarters and the communications and service facilities required for its support.
In amphibious assault planning, it is well to remember that the contemplated scheme of maneuver ashore determines the ship-to- shore movement requirements and the landing plan. Whether or not the amphibious assault can be carried out in accordance with the desired plan depends upon both the composition of the landing force and the amphibious assault shipping available. The selection of ground units for the assault echelon as well as their supporting air elements, is based upon anticipated requirements in the objective area during the first five days of the assault, such as the tank capabilities or the engineering support needed. The amphibious assault commander desires to take only those units and items of equipment he feels he must have, taking into account that which intelligence tells him are the enemy’s capabilities and the mission and tasks assigned. Once his forces are committed, however, it is essential that he have available all the means necessary to accomplish his mission.
While the numbers of men, equipment and supplies needed by each task force will vary, these requirements may be less than the total available. As an example, the Marine Corps’ statement of embarkation requirements for the assault echelon of a Marine Expeditionary Force excludes many items that are not initially required. Further, the total vehicular square footage requirements have been reduced by ten per cent in order to reflect those vehicles which might normally be expected to be unavailable for embarkation with the assault echelon. In addition, the Navy’s amphibious assault force is designed to lift and land only the assault echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Forces. Accordingly, the assault follow-on echelons must be embarked in Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) ships or in chartered private shipping. Therefore, assault ship capabilities are not balanced against total landing force organization requirements, but rather against only portions of such organizations. The assault follow-on echelons are required within five days after the assault (D+5) and should, ideally, arrive in the objective area in ships with the same amphibious characteristics as those of the assault echelon. These characteristics include the proper type of booms, organic means of unloading, adequate communication to participate in the control nets, troop habitability, and spaces designed for assault equipment. However, MSTS or chartered merchant ships can be made to suffice, provided these ships are augmented with U. S. Navy personnel and equipment. (This echelon should not be confused with purely resupply shipping, which is not a part of the amphibious task force.) The feasibility of such augmentation was one of the major test objectives during Exercises STEEL PIKE and SILVER LANCE. In STEEL PIKE, a total of seven MSTS and ten chartered commercial ships were used, while SILVER LANCE used three such ships.
Exercises STEEL PIKE and SILVER LANCE were both major assault landing operations; however, each had to satisfy its own particular set of circumstances. In SILVER LANCE, which was conducted in February and March 1965, the situation developed was similar in some respects to the current world situation and U. S. commitments. Briefly, the hypothetical circumstances were as follows: at the request of a friendly nation, a small U. S. force had been landed administratively to assist in a limited situation. The large, aggressive, and unfriendly neighbor attacked this small force. Subsequently, a large amphibious assault force was required and committed in order to save the smaller force and restore the friendly national government to power.
SILVER LANCE was extremely complex and included an unparalleled civil affairs and counterinsurgency effort. Its landing operation, at Camp Pendleton, California, was large and responsive to many varying situations.
On the other hand, STEEL PIKE—conducted near Huelva, Spain, in October and November 1964—had a somewhat similar general situation; but it concentrated on the landing aspect. It was a test primarily directed to show the capability of the Atlantic Fleet to execute a long transit and very large landing. And it also included a supplementary landing of the Sixth Fleet amphibious force. This was, however, complementary to the main landing rather than a separate operation as was the initial Brigade landing in SILVER LANCE.
A comparison of the scope of the landings in SILVER LANCE and STEEL PIKE is as follows:
|
STEEL PIKE |
SILVER LANCE |
Assault ships |
43 |
25 |
MSTS ships |
17 |
3 |
Troops |
21,642 |
14,908 |
Sq. ft. of vehicles |
627,354 |
363,774 |
Cu. ft. of cargo |
984,408 |
577,131 |
Number of vehicles |
5,174 |
3,300 |
STEEL PIKE. This major exercise involved the II Marine Expeditionary Force being embarked by the amphibious force of the Atlantic Fleet. Subsequently, the entire amphibious task force transited the Atlantic Ocean under combat operational conditions and landed its landing force in Spain, with elements of the Armed Forces of Spain participating. The scope of this exercise was such that complete planning in all aspects was required. Further, the various details concerning weather, exercise intelligence development, hydrography, and protection of the forces at sea required the degree of professional execution necessary to assure that the state-of-the-art, mandatory for the conduct of large assault operations, was being maintained in the Fleet.
The political factors and scenario that were developed as a vehicle for the primary purpose of the landing accomplished this purpose. The selection of the objective area and the landing beaches provided the opportunity for detailed staff and command co-ordination at all levels and by all of the forces that were participating.
The composition of the landing force for Exercise STEEL PIKE was the result of a fourway compromise. The initial task organization was based on requirements dictated by the tactical situation, the terrain, and the assigned test objectives. The tactical situation called for a typical assault echelon. The terrain, however, especially the beach exits and poor cross-country trafficability in the Huelva, Spain, area, made it necessary to include additional engineering support within the assault echelon.
The desired task organization was then tailored downward to exclude units otherwise committed. Units excluded consisted of those CONUS alert units assigned to contingency plans and those forces deployed to the Caribbean and Mediterranean.
The shortage of available amphibious shipping necessitated the use of MSTS nucleus and chartered shipping to lift a sizeable portion of the assault echelon. Consequently, the II MEF had to leave behind approximately one- half of its amphibian tractors (LVTs) and a portion of its heavy tanks because of the lack of suitable amphibious shipping. Certain types of equipment simply required assault ships.
Limitations on funds allocated for Exercise STEEL PIKE did not permit the hiring of sufficient ships by MSTS to offset the remaining deficiency in amphibious shipping. Thus, the over-all shortage of shipping, both amphibious and MSTS, necessitated further cutbacks. These cutbacks had the following effects on the landing force composition:
The motor transport and engineer equipment of the 2d Marine Division and attached Force units was reduced. All major replacement items normally carried by a Marine Division in combat were deleted or reduced. There was a drastic reduction in the repair vans and equipment required by the 2d Force Service Regiment to provide maintenance support. Replacement items normally carried by the 2d Force Service Regiment were forced to be deleted. Reduction of ground support equipment required by fixed-wing aircraft units to operate ashore was necessary.
The assault echelon shortages expressed in terms of the number of unavailable ships amounted to 10 AKAs, 4 LSDs and 11 LSTs.
The embarkation planning for STEEL PIKE was extremely detailed and its execution reflected this depth of planning. Command interest was at the highest possible level. The operation and embarkation orders provided detailed embarkation grouping and ship assignments. Subsequent problems during embarkation were referred to and resolved by the amphibious task force and landing force commanders, who continued to maintain full control, as well as monitoring, of their subordinate units’ activities during this phase. The landing craft, helicopters, amphibious vehicles, and major ordnance items embarked are shown below:
Major Ordnance Items
Tank, M48A3—21
Tank, M48A3 w/Dox—1
Tank, Flame M67—4
Tank, Recovery—5
Tank, M103A1—8
8-inch Howitzer (SP)—6
155-mm. Gun (SP)—4 155-mm.
Howitzer, towed—12
Howtar M98—18
105-mm. Howitzer, towed—51
Landing Craft Available
LCVP—118
LCM 3/6—51
LCM 8—13
LCM—14
Amphibian Vehicles
LVTC—5
LVTR—1
LVTP5—4
DUKW—3
Helicopters Available
UH-34P—87
UH-1E—10
CH-37—8
The amphibious force flagships (AGCs), one with the II MEF staff, naval task force and amphibious task force commanders and staffs embarked, were extremely crowded, and communications were over-saturated by the burden imposed.
The status loading reports received by the II MEF were generally prompt and accurate, and the MSTS ships, although new to such procedures, responded well. The MEF staff required and maintained a high degree of documentation during embarkation. The small amount of load adjustment from the prepared loading plans during actual embarkation was noteworthy.
One interesting and new aspect concerned the very successful loading of the SS Export Bay in Morehead City, North Carolina. She is a large C-4 hull commercial ship, and of a type never previously used in such operations. This ship had hydraulic quick-opening hatch covers, Stulken-rigged booms and other refined loading gear. The new construction attack cargo ships (AKAs) in the current building programs will incorporate all of these same features, and in addition, will have heavy landing craft and the other essential assault ship requirements. This situation merely highlights current inadequacies and the importance of the current assault ship modernization program.
During the transit phase, an extensive antisubmarine exercise was conducted. Submarines opposed the Fast Movement Group, which was protected by an ASW group throughout the movement. The protection force was thus afforded a training opportunity without parallel since World War II.
Upon arrival in the objective area, a rehearsal was conducted followed the next day by the landing itself. The ship-to-shore movement was conducted and accomplished as scheduled and in accordance with the detailed plans. The surf and beach conditions were ideal. There were minor deviations in time from the scheduled landing of each surface assault wave. However, while such deviations are serious and must be avoided due to naval gunfire and air support co-ordination, none was so gross as to cause serious concern about the planning that had been involved.
The landing schedule and actual touchdown times are shown below.
An 18-section pontoon causeway was assembled at sea prior to the surface touchdown at H-hour. It was placed on the beach exactly as scheduled. The actual depth of water in the assault area was greater than previous reconnaissance had indicated. As a consequence, two 9-section causeways could have been used instead. The 18-section causeway was an outstanding success during the landing and provided a safe approach, but it did stereotype this part of the landing.
SCHEDULED WAVES SURFACE |
|||
|
Blue Beach |
Green Beach 1 |
Green Beach 2 |
WAVE 1 |
|||
Line of Departure |
260728 |
260728 |
260728 |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260740 |
260740 |
260740 |
Actual Touchdown |
260739 |
260741 |
260741 |
WAVE 2 (Minus 4 LVTPs) |
|||
Line of Departure |
260734 |
260732 |
260736 |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260743 |
260744 |
260744 |
Actual Touchdown |
260745 |
260741 |
260741 |
WAVE 3 |
|||
Line of Departure |
260742 |
260747 |
260739 |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260750 |
260748 |
260748 |
Actual Touchdown |
260748 |
260749 |
260752 |
WAVE 4 (Minus 1 LCM-8) |
|||
Line of Departure |
260752 |
260754 |
260744 |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260800 |
260752 |
260752 |
Actual Touchdown |
260755 |
260802 |
260757 |
WAVE 5 |
|||
Line of Departure |
260802 |
260751 |
260750 |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260810 |
260800 |
260800 |
Actual Touchdown |
260810 |
260800 |
260800 |
WAVE 6 |
|||
Line of Departure |
260812 |
260751 |
— |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260820 |
260805 |
— |
Actual Touchdown |
260819 |
260805 |
— |
WAVE 7 |
|||
Line of Departure |
— |
260803 |
— |
Scheduled Touchdown |
— |
260810 |
— |
Actual Touchdown |
|
260811 |
|
VERTICAL ASSAULT | |||
Landing Areas |
Sparrow |
Robin |
Wren |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260800 |
260800 |
260800 |
Actual Touchdown |
260800 |
260800 |
260800 |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260806 |
260806 |
260806 |
Actual Touchdown |
260807 |
260807 |
260807 |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260812 |
260812 |
260812 |
Actual Touchdown |
260812 |
260812 |
260812 |
Scheduled Touchdown |
260820 |
|
260820 |
Actual Touchdown |
260823 |
— |
260820 |
The air and naval gunfire support at H- hour and L-hour (helicopter touch down) appeared to be inadequate: caused by lack of adequate support ships. The SACC on board the USS Pocono (AGC-16) reported that a total of eight heavy bunkers in the landing area had not been destroyed at the time of touchdown. They had been hit by 5-inch direct support DD fire; however, the number of heavy caliber, 8-inch or above, guns were not sufficient to handle all targets prior to the landing, and therefore these targets remained. The USS Newport News (CA-148) and the USS Boston (CAG-l) were in general support of the Division. There were no cruisers available for the general support of the regimental landing teams, although the teams all were landed in assault conditions. This situation, coupled with the fact that there was only one aircraft carrier, a CVS, available for air support duties at the time of landing could have been disastrous in an actual combat landing. Further, the number of point targets requiring naval gunfire combined with the inability of air support to remain on station, eliminated any true pre-landing heavy beach neutralization. STEEL PIKE clearly shows that heavy gun cruisers for point targets and rocket ships for concentrated neutralization fires were insufficient or non-existent for a landing of this scope. A counterattack on the night of D-Day or pressure against the beach operations would have created a greater requirement. Direct support artillery units were still being landed at 0930 and later on D+1.
Another problem was the lack of communication between battalions ashore and their direct-support destroyers. The cruisers in general support did maintain communication with the Marine assault division and consequently were better used. The Newport News fired 46 8-inch missions on D+l; however, the use of naval gunfire by Marine units was not consistent with realistic combat requirements.
The surface landing, due to near perfect conditions, became so far advanced that on D-day, at 1900, the Transport Group Commander ordered a temporary slowdown to consolidate the men and equipment landed with the Landing Sequence Tables. By 2100, all six LSTs had been unloaded, and they were being used to unload AKAs and TAKs.
During this operation, the II MEF attempted to land the vertical assault elements of one Regimental Landing Team by helicopter from three LPHs and two LPDs. It was not previously believed that this number of ships would provide the required operating spaces for such operations. STEEL PIKE proved that this belief was certainly correct. Although the troops were landed on schedule, once the cargo lift started the landing sequence tables slipped so far behind that by 1600 on D+2, the serials to be landed by vertical envelopment were 23 hours behind schedule.
With the perfect surf conditions and tremendous effort expended by the ships, the shore party, and landing zone helo support teams, unloading was still proceeding at a high rate up to 0700 on D+3. At this time, the surface landing was far ahead of the established schedule but, as previously mentioned, the vertical effort was behind schedule.
The speed of unloading is indicated by the following number of amphibious assault ships in the assault areas which had been completely unloaded at the times indicated.
Time |
Day |
Number of Ships |
0700 |
D+1 |
14 |
2130 |
D+2 |
23 |
0700 |
D+2 |
30 |
1200 |
D+2 |
38 |
The unusual speed of unloading was made possible by the use of LSTs as ferries for the unloading of the heavy equipment. This is an expeditious way of getting a large amount of equipment ashore in a short time when causeway, sea conditions, and the availability of LSTs permit.
The performance of the Cargo Handling Battalion in its off-loading of the MSTS/ charter ships, was outstanding despite its personnel limitations. Also, the performance of MSTS/charter ships within their communication and other operational limitations, was excellent throughout. Their attitude, willingness, and capabilities were a great asset.
The bulk fuel system was established ashore and the afloat line was ready for operation at 1430 on D+1. At this time, the LST designated to provide fuel was involved in a shuttle operation and pumping did not start until 1710. At 1330 on D+2, 70,000 gallons of gasoline and 10,000 gallons of diesel fuel had been put into the system. The fuel pods of the amphibian tractors had been used extensively for refueling vehicles prior to establishment of the bulk fuel system.
The Shore Party, with only one generally inexperienced operator per piece of equipment, was severely taxed in this operation. In STEEL PIKE, the success of the Shore Party was greatly dependent upon the professional skill and excellent equipment of the Navy Beach Group.
Throughout this landing phase, the coordination and effort required in an exercise of this scope was obvious. After so many years of BLT-sized landings (demonstrations), those involved in the exercise found that the planning and execution of a Division/Wing landing were in effect a refresher course in the “basics.” The assault landing of multiple RLTs by various means supported immediately by Division/Force/Wing elements bears little resemblance to the small and somewhat stereotyped normal training exercises.
The planning and execution of the landing by the II MEF and PHIBLANT elements were outstanding. Unquestionably, it was one of the smoothest operations ever executed, including the heavy reliance on MSTS and the fact that many of the participating units had not been employed together for many years. Most of the real problems encountered, both Navy and Marine Corps, were really in areas which the Exercise was designed to check or judge, and in this STEEL PIKE served its greatest purpose.
SILVER LANCE was a major landing involving a Marine Expeditionary Corps, consisting of a Division/Wing Team and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. In total personnel involved and complexity of planning and execution, few exercises in history could match SILVER LANCE. This major exercise included all aspects of naval warfare and was marked by its civil affairs considerations.
The embarkations accomplished as part of STEEL PIKE and SILVER LANCE are similar only in that they were both well planned and well executed. The control measures were different, the facilities were different and, most of all, the number of ships simultaneously loaded and sailed were completely different. In STEEL PIKE, with the greater number of ships but fewer and much poorer ports of embarkation, speed of loading in order to clear the berths was essential. In SILVER LANCE, with many ports of embarkation each containing excellent facilities, but fewer ships to be simultaneously loaded, the problem was to properly schedule the recycling of the ships.
In SILVER LANCE, the III MEC was embarked through the ports of embarkation indicated: San Diego Naval Station, Long Beach Naval Station, Del Mar Boat Basin, and Port Hueneme. These ports are separated by a maximum distance of about 250 miles.
Because of the time available, the excellent facilities and planning, and the fact that berths did not have to be vacated for other loading, the embarkation appeared almost leisurely. It could have been completed much faster if required, or if the III MEC had been embarked simultaneously rather than in the piecemeal manner dictated by the available numbers of assault ships and lack of MSTS chartered ships for SILVER LANCE.
The total personnel, equipment, and supplies embarked for SILVER LANCE are shown below. This consolidated total includes all forces actually embarked in ships or craft, and landed via surface or vertical means. It includes all elements initially embarked in assault ships, subsequently embarked in turnaround assault ships or embarked in MSTS ships and those lifted directly from Del Mar to the landing beaches.
Organization |
Personnel |
Sq. Ft. |
Cu. Ft. |
EMB GRU ALPHA |
1,067 |
5,853 |
33,176 |
EMB GRU BRAVO |
11,869 |
267,617 |
390,403 |
EMB GRU CHARLIE |
1,222 |
57,480 |
86,325 |
EMB GRU ECHO |
750 |
32,824 |
67,227 |
Totals |
14,908 |
363,744 |
577,131 |
Items of representative equipment embarked included
Vehicles |
Number |
Truck, ¼ Ton M422 |
343 |
Truck, ¾ Ton M37 |
170 |
Truck, 2½ Ton M35 |
351 |
Truck, 5 Ton M51 |
25 |
Truck, 5 Ton M52 |
19 |
Truck Refuel M49 |
24 |
Truck, Wrecker M62/54 |
16 |
LIWC M274 |
73 |
Tank M48A1 |
36 |
Amphibian Tractor |
24 |
105-mm. Howitzer |
30 |
LAAM Launchers |
8 |
155-mm. Howitzer (TOW&SP) |
16 |
8-inch Howitzer (SP) |
4 |
HOWTAR |
12 |
Those assault ships of TRANS GROUPS BRAVO, DELTA and ECHO which embarked initial elements of the III MEC sortied on 25 February for participation in the sea exercises. Twenty-five assault ships were the largest number together at any one time during SILVER LANCE. The great difference between the Landing Force requirements and assault-ship lift capabilities was made up by turnarounds, MSTS augmentation, and direct lift between Del Mar and the beaches by landing craft.
The transit phase provided a great opportunity, as did STEEL PIKE, for the evaluation of the effectiveness of many Navy aspects such as ASW and AAW.
A recapitulation of the actual number of support ships is shown below. Many of the ships within the Maritime Control Force and the Amphibious Task Force were used in several task organizations, both inter-force and intra-force:
3 carriers (2 CVAs and 1 CVS), 1 cruiser (CA) 13 destroyer types (1 DLG, 2 DDGs, 8 DDs, and 2 DEs), 2 high speed transports (APD), 1 ammunition ship (AE), 2 oilers (1 AOG and 1 AO), 1 store ship (AF), 11 minesweepers (10 MS Os and 1 MSI).
The anti-air, antisubmarine, anti-small boat, anti-swimmer and other similar support operations in SILVER LANCE were very imaginative and played to the hilt. Also, the naval gunfire support, although deficient in appropriate number and types of ships, did get a full play and was tested by actual firing. This was co-ordinated with the air support and thus provided valuable training at the level established.
The initial landing during SILVER LANCE was the administrative introduction of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
The 13th MEB, with only a small portion of its numbers actually embarked aboard ships, landed on 1 March 1965 over Red Beach. The remainder of this unit was phased in administratively from Camp Pendleton. This phasing was controlled, timed, and staged to be as realistic as possible.
The rehearsal for the main landing was held on 2 March. This was conducted off the Silver Strand at Coronado. It consisted of wave forming, communication check-outs, and all aspects of the D-Day landing, less actual landing. It was done at reduced distance but with boat lanes of approximately the same size and position. This rehearsal involved the surface ship-to-shore operations, only. A physical rehearsal of the vertical assault phase was not made.
A separate naval gunfire exercise was conducted at San Clemente Island on 2 March 1965. The target areas and targets on San Clemente were not related to simulated targets in the actual landing area of 5 March. This situation precluded a more accurate assessment of the true naval gunfire requirements and capabilities in SILVER LANCE.
The naval gunfire firing was judged to be “good to excellent.” It was further reported that the CASEX (air strike) results were better than any previous efforts of recent years. This appeared to be due to having actual targets and increased command attention.
The III MEC landed on 5 March. Surface landing H-hour was 0900. Helicopter landing L-hour was 1000.
The Assault Waves are shown below:
RED BEACH |
|||
Wave |
Composition |
Due |
Touchdown |
1 |
3 LCM-6 |
0900 |
0901 |
2 |
3 LCM-6 |
0905 |
0905 |
3 |
3 LCM-6 |
0910 |
0909 |
4 |
3 LCM-6 |
0915 |
0912 |
5 |
3 LCM-6 |
0920 |
0920 |
6 |
3 LCM-6 |
0925 |
0925 |
7 |
3 LCM-6 |
0930 |
0930 |
8 |
3 LCM-6 |
0935 |
0937 |
9 |
3 LCM-6 |
0940 |
0938 |
On Call |
3 LCM-6 |
— |
0938 |
On Call |
3 LCM-6 |
— |
0947 |
On Call |
3 LCM-6 |
— |
0949 |
On Call |
4 LCU |
— |
0955 |
Initial landings on Red Beach proceeded very smoothly. This landing was entirely accomplished by landing craft.
WHITE BEACH |
|||
Wave |
Composition |
Due |
Touchdown |
1 |
2 LVTE 4 LCM-8 |
0900 |
0859 |
2 |
8 LVT |
0910 |
0910 |
3 |
8 LVT |
0915 |
0913 |
4 |
9 LVT |
0920 |
0916 |
5 |
10 LVT |
0925 |
0924 |
6 |
9 LVT |
0930 |
0927 |
7 |
3 LCM-6 |
0935 |
0932 |
On Call |
3 LCU |
— |
0938 |
On Call |
1 LCU |
— |
0945 |
In helicopter landing zone Olive, five waves, each containing three UH-34 helicopters, were due to touchdown at 1000; but, instead, they touched down one minute early. This was the total helicopter effort at L-hour. Subsequenlyy, helicopters continued to offload the LPH. There was only one LPH in SILVER LANCE and no LPDs.
Causeway Landings. The causeway touched down at 1001, D-Day; it was ready at 1130.
Ship |
Marriage |
Broke |
LST-1084 |
1145 |
1400 |
LST-854 |
1410 |
1600 |
LST-1158 |
1630 |
1715 |
LST-762 |
1745 |
1830 |
These LSTs, the only ones in SILVER LANCE, subsequently began turnaround lifts from Del Mar.
Following the landing of the scheduled and on-call waves, the ship-to-shore movement commenced to deteriorate. By D + l, it had become obvious that the lack of assault ships, landing craft, and complete beach organization was affecting SILVER LANCE landing operations. At 1700 on D + l, the Commanding General III MEC ordered 25 serials, of men and equipment staged for turnaround shipping at Del Mar, to be moved into the problem administratively over-the-road. These serials, due to be landed on D + l, were now 16 hours behind landing schedule and critically needed to keep the tactical problem going. This “reluctant decision” meant that the forces scheduled to land in assault over- the-beach could not be handled as planned and that the execution of the ship-to-shore movement and the logistic support for SILVER LANCE was revealing serious deficiences.
The beaches selected were inadequate for the force to be landed. Both White and Red Beaches were essentially only BLT-sized beaches in width. Red Beach had only one exit. White Beach had only one exit until D+1, but even after that only one exit was actually used. At 1230 on D + l, Red Beach was closed in order to consolidate all effort on White Beach. The Navy Beach Group Shore Party personnel and equipment from Red Beach were moved to White Beach at 1500. The Beach Group/Shore Party organization as early as 1400 on D-day appeared to be inadequate for the task just commencing. This situation was due to the Pacific contingency requirements, apart from the Exercise, which had widely deployed the Shore Party and Beach Group personnel and their equipment.
Landing craft non-availability was a primary contribution to the failure of the landing operation. All III MEC plans were based upon the advertised availability of LCUs and LCM-8s. The difference is shown:
Scheduled avail |
Actual D+1 |
Actual D+2 |
13 LCU |
5 to 8 LCU |
5 to 6 LCU |
8 LCM-8 |
2 to 7 LCM-8 |
4 LCM-8 |
Thus, the landing craft (LCM-8 and LCU) listed as available were not in fact available to the force. This situation had a deleterious effect upon the landing sequence schedule.
The above availability, coupled with the causeway delays which held up LST unloading, and the principal fact that much too large a force was attempting to land from far too few ships, created the situation that dictated the deletion of scheduled serials and the starting of extensive over-the-road introduction of equipment and forces. This circumstance is shown by the low level of supplies ashore and the prospect of an even worse slippage in unloading through D+4.
The III MEC had prepared very detailed and imaginative plans for its landing. These plans necessarily involved many turn-arounds due to the lack of sufficient ships. They were also dependent upon an adequate beach organization and sufficient available landing craft. The turnaround plans were risky and unrealistic but essential in- order to provide full problem play. Again, SILVER LANCE was a highly complex exercise that was forced to land too large a force with the limited ships, craft, and naval support units available.
In SILVER LANCE, the ship-to-shore movement of the scheduled assault waves was controlled by radar from the Primary Control Vessels. This system was very effective and should become the normal procedure.
MSTS ships performed their missions. They were not augmented by sufficient personnel, but this was well understood before the Exercise started. The primary problem in MSTS ship employment during this operation was that the landing force was not furnished with individual ship characteristics in a timely manner.
The Navy Beach Group and Cargo Handling Battalion personnel were understrength, seriously delaying craft and ship loading and unloading operations. The bulk fuel system was established quickly and easily, however, despite a low manning level. The AOG was pumping fuel ashore on D + l. The AO was not actually used.
The AGCs employed in SILVER LANCE were inadequate for the tasks assigned. The arrival in the fleets of the new construction AGCs at the earliest is of critical importance. Operational spaces, staff spaces, and communication facilities on current AGCs are no longer compatible with requirements.
This landing, in the true sense of an Exercise, provided a valuable teaching medium, and it will better prepare all forces involved for large-scale operations. Certainly, it established again that the current amphibious assault forces lack sufficient ships, craft, supporting forces, and modernization. The landing forces need much more experience in this type of landing and improvements in task organization, Tactical-Logistical Group (TAC-LOG) procedures, beach discipline and the commander’s understanding of his responsibilities to TAC-LOG and the beaches.
SILVER LANCE was seriously crippled by the withdrawal of major elements just prior to the landings. This was unfortunate; however, it did provide the various staffs with realistic operational problems which were aggressively attacked at every echelon.
Both STEEL PIKE and SILVER LANCE highlighted the inadequacy of current assault ships, both in number and design. The currently approved Amphibious Ship Program, extended to its completion as proposed by the Navy, however, will provide adequate modern assault ships for the assault echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Forces. The assault follow-on echelons of these two Marine Expeditionary Forces will still be dependent upon MSTS-type shipping.
The MSTS ships involved performed to the very best of their capability; however, these ships are not satisfactory when used in the assault echelon. They are totally dependent upon external sources for unloading, for landing craft, manpower, and tactical communications. When employed as part of the assault follow-on echelon they are satisfactory. This is especially true of the newer commercial ships chartered by MSTS which have greatly improved characteristics and capabilities for use with the assault follow-on echelon. As an example, STEEL PIKE showed that one C-4 hull type ship equalled two-and- one-half C-2 type ships in lift capability.
An amphibious task force should be composed of ships having the same speed characteristics. In STEEL PIKE, the force at one time was spread all the way from Rota to the East Coast of the United States. This complicates the ASVV problem immensely. The program to provide an amphibious force of ships with compatible speeds is most important.
However, both of these exercises, and especially STEEL PIKE, served to assure friend and foe alike that the United States can deploy assault strength over great distances without any dependence upon tenuous prepositioned bases, supplies, and equipment. This maritime strength is not dependent upon elaborate unrealistic administrative preparation. It simply moves, completely self-sufficient, to the objective area. The landing force can be landed in assault, withheld, or landed administratively. This is the unique capability of the amphibious assault force. It was this asset that SILVER LANCE and STEEL PIKE so ably demonstrated.
In both STEEL PIKE and SILVER LANCE, when the amphibious task force was there, it was ready for operations afloat and ashore. No external source augmentation or joint dictionary was required. It was the Navy/Marine Corps team in action.