It may be thought somewhat impertinent for a retired British naval officer to enter into a discussion on the U. S. Navy’s role in mine warfare. It is believed, however, that the basic principles governing the conduct of mine warfare, as evolved by the British prior to World War II, were proved to be sound, at any rate insofar as the planting of mines in enemy waters was concerned. This belief is supported by the fact that some 1,070 enemy vessels, or vessels under enemy control, were sunk (including 17 U-boats) and a further 540 damaged as a result of the planting of just over 76,000 British mines. An average of one casualty for every 47 mines planted, over an extended period of hostilities, is a fair return in any language.
During the War, these principles were in large measure accepted by the U. S. Navy, with whom the British established a close liaison. This article therefore will be concerned chiefly with a reconsideration of those principles, modified where necessary in the light of war experience, and amplified where practicable in relation to certain specific types of operation which might, in the opinion of the Writer, be carried out by the U. S. Navy.
The objective of a mining campaign, on the one hand, is the protection of one’s own sea-communications by the destruction—or threat °f destruction—of the naval forces of the enemy, and, on the other, the fragmentation of the enemy’s war effort.
The conduct of individual operations designed to achieve this objective must be delegated to the men on the spot. The long-term planning, however, must be entrusted to centrally located people (however unpopular this idea may be with the Fleet), who are not only informed students of mine warfare, but who have sufficient technical knowledge to enable them to talk to scientists and engineers in their own language. As a corollary, the latter groups must be afforded every possible opportunity to associate their thinking with that of the planners. Without such a centralized organization for planning, technical cooperation, and, obviously, procurement, the full mine warfare potential of the U. S. Navy, cannot be exploited completely.
The foregoing proposition in no way implies that the Fleet, the research and development activities, industry, or even private citizens, should be precluded from putting forward ideas, whether such ideas be technical or operational. What it does imply is that the technical tail must be prevented from wagging the operational dog, and it is suggested, with great respect, that there is a tendency for this very thing to happen.
There is, it is suspected, a further tendency toward the production of a mechanical vade mecum which, when one of its buttons is pressed, will produce the answer to all mine warfare problems. While there is something to be said for having available a “book” containing rule-of-thumb information of general application, mine warfare is essentially an intellectual exercise, involving a constant battle of wits and a profound knowledge of enemy psychology. Somewhere along the line, and the sooner the better, the trained human brain must be brought into action, and the utmost caution should attend the use of predigested data. Lastly, it would be preferable to have our mines be simple, stolid weapons which we employ with sophistication, rather than to have them be sophisticated weapons which we employ stupidly. This statement must not be taken to mean that there is no room whatsoever in the bag for the occasional “clever” club, and those responsible for research and development should in no way be deterred from evolving clever devices, more particularly if such devices can be incorporated in otherwise simple parent bodies and the nature of their cleverness can be varied at will by the ultimate user. This could be an important factor in the case of operations which might have to be carried out at a considerable distance from continental America.
The point is that mere cleverness for its own sake must be avoided. It would be infinitely more sensible to evolve a sound policy, and then to produce the weapons best suited to the implementation of that policy, rather than to produce the weapons (however intrinsically clever) and then to evolve a policy simply for the sake of enabling them to be used.
One naturally hesitates to revive memories of the Wonsan incident, but in the present context, it was not only an outstanding example of the intelligent employment of simple material, but was conceived in accordance with the soundest of principles.
The essential feature of a mining campaign in enemy waters is the persistent and widespread planting of comparatively small minefields. The enemy must be induced to believe that his ships are in constant danger whenever they move in mineable waters. He must be forced to divert the maximum possible proportion of his resources to the provision of various forms of countermeasures, to the detriment of his over-all war effort.
Amongst the principal methods of attempting to confound an enemy there may be cited:
• The planting of minefields comprised of several different types of mines (commonly referred to in mine warfare circles as the “mixed bag” gambit). The enemy is then faced with the alternative of either providing a large number of minesweepers, each capable of dealing with a limited number of different types of mines, or of a smaller number each equipped to deal with any known type of mine, and laden with such a variety of assorted hardware that they may experience some difficulty in remaining afloat. The periodic introduction of a “joker,” with which the enemy is not equipped to deal, tends to intensify his problems.
• The employment of devices which have the effect of replenishing automatically a minefield after the passage of the enemy minesweepers, or of devices designed to recognize the enemy minesweepers as such, and to refuse to allow the mines to be swept.
• The turning of the enemy’s minesweeping methods to one’s own technical advantage.
• The imaginative employment of ruses de guerre, which may be either of an operational or of a technical nature, or a combination of both types.
It would not be proper to elaborate on the technical aspects of any of the foregoing methods. But the very fact that those aspects do exist points up the need for the establishment and the maintenance of the closest collaboration between planners and technologists.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that a mining operation begins—not ends—with the planting of mines. Every step should be taken to exploit the presence of the minefield, e.g., by attack on enemy ships forced into open waters by reason thereof, or (where practicable) by air attack on enemy minesweepers. If the crews of such vessels can be led to expect that the sweeping of one single mine is followed inevitably by attack from the air, it tends to induce in them a somewhat jaundiced outlook on war in general, and on service in minesweepers in particular. Alternatively, if the enemy can be forced to provide air cover for his minesweepers, a further diversion of his resources is achieved automatically.
Mines can be planted by surface vessels, by submarines, by aircraft, and (in some inland waterways) by clandestine forces tipping them into the water by hand.
After the conclusion of World War I, British mine warfare enthusiasts were vociferous in demanding that mineplanting vessels be designed and built for operations in enemy waters. They contended that such ships would be capable of carrying the best mines, as opposed to the mines having to be tailored to fit ships not so designed. The holders of the national purse strings, on the other hand, were adamant in their contention that public funds should not be expended on the building of vessels which could perform no useful function in peacetime, and which might never be required at all in war.
Apart from an early compromise in the shape of the cruiser-minelayer HMS Adventure, the controversy raged for some years, but, eventually, the six minelaying submarines of the Porpoise class were built. These ships, of 1,500 tons displacement, and capable of carrying 50 mines apiece, had a large radius of action. They were primarily designed for service in the Far East, but they proved too large and unwieldy for employment in restricted waters.
The next step taken by the British was to build several flotillas of destroyers whose initial structural layout was such that they could be converted rapidly to carry the best types of mines, and, with even greater rapidity, could revert to their role as destroyers. (The actual times were 48 hours and five hours, respectively.) In one sense, this was the perfect answer to the problem, but for the facts that they could only carry 60 mines and that there could be no guarantee that they would be available to carry out minelaying operations should the need arise.
Thus, after further strongly worded representations by the mine warfare enthusiasts, approval was given for the building of the fast minelayers of the Manxman class, with a capacity of 160 mines and a speed of 39 knots. These ships, the first of which did not commission until shortly after the outbreak of World War II, gave magnificent service, not only in their primary role but (as in the case of several of the submarines of the Porpoise class) as unescorted transports which were used for the conveyance of vitally important supplies and personnel, particularly in the Mediterranean theater.
Lastly, it was appreciated that small, fast craft such as motor torpedo boats and motor gunboats could be equipped readily to plant mines (as opposed to being structurally converted to do so), and the necessary equipment was designed, produced, and stockpiled by the British prior to the outbreak of war. Craft of this type were called upon to plant some 6,500 mines off the Dutch, Belgian, and French coasts during the War.
As to the planting of mines from the air, there was never any serious suggestion that British aircraft should be specially designed and built for the purpose, the result being that the size, contour, and release arrangements of the first of the family of British mines designed to be laid from the air were conditioned to the characteristics of the aircraft equipped to drop torpedoes. But, fortunately, this situation did not prevent the parents from producing progeny which were capable of being carried and dropped by almost anything that could fly.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we are in a position to review the policy which reasonably might be held to determine the provision of mine-planting vehicles, and to offer some tentative observations as to the ways in which the various types might be employed. Before doing so, however, it should be noted that one of the principal modern arguments against the provision of “specialized” minelayers,—craft which are incapable of performing any other role,—is that possibly prolonged periods of inactivity could have a most deleterious effect on the morale of their crews. Planting mines merely for the sake of maintaining technical and operational efficiency, is a proceeding to which no merit whatsoever attaches. The fact that this argument (quite fortuitously, let it be clearly understood, in the case of the fast minelayers and submarines of the Porpoise class) did not apply to any of the offensive mine-planters employed by the British in World War II should not be allowed to impair our judgment with respect to possible activities by the U. S. Navy in the future.
It can be argued that under modern conditions, a large surface vessel has little chance of being able to approach within a few miles of an enemy coastline without being detected. The validity of this proposition must, of course, depend to a very large extent upon the length of that coastline, upon which factor in turn will depend the extent to which the enemy can effectively cover it by radar or by surface or air patrols. It might well be that as hostilities progressed, offensive operations of this nature would be attended by an unacceptable degree of risk, but on the other hand, they might, in the opening stages of a war, represent a first class example of the exploitation of the principle of surprise.
While, therefore, there is much to be said in favor of having available and ready surface vessels capable of “fouling the enemy’s doorstep” immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, the probability that it may prove impracticable to continue such activities for any significant length of time tends to suggest that the provision of specialized surface minelayers is no longer justifiable. It would seem that this view is held by the British Ministry of Defence, for it is understood that the Manxman, sole survivor of the original fast minelayers, has been relegated to the role of “mother ship” for coastal minesweepers with a speed of only ten knots.
Nonetheless, there could continue to be opportunities for the employment of fast small craft which, as already noted, can be readily fitted to plant mines, as opposed to being converted to do so. Such craft would proceed either under their own power, or else they would be carried or towed to within striking distance of the enemy coast.
It is a peculiarity of mine warfare that one of the principal preoccupations of those who engage therein is to avoid contact with hostile forces. It has for many years been accepted that, in waters where the submarine can operate at all, the power of evasion conferred by her ability to submerge renders, or should render, her a highly effective type of mine- planter. Moreover, her commanding officer can, on occasion, carry out his own reconnaissance and use his own discretion as to where and when he plants his mines, as opposed to doing so in a manner pre-deter- mined by higher authority.
At first sight, therefore, it would seem that the building of specialized submarine mine- planters has everything to commend it, but there are, in fact, certain important considerations which appear to militate against this course. First, if they are to be capable of performing other useful tasks, then their size will probably be such as to restrict, to an unacceptable degree, their ability to operate in mineable waters. If they are not capable of performing other useful tasks then, as already noted, there arises the problem of the adverse effect on morale and the impairment of technical and operational know-how resulting from possibly prolonged periods of inactivity. Secondly, it is suggested that it would be preferable to employ craft whose personnel, while engaged in more orthodox submarine operations in waters in which it is desired to plant mines, have had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the conditions obtaining in those waters.
If these be sound reasons against the building of specialized submarine mine planters, then the only alternative would appear to be the employment of mines designed to be launched from the torpedo tubes of standard vessels. They might not be the best mines, but the requirement to produce them would, at least, operate as a challenge to the designer to ensure that they were good ones.
Whether or not, in any future war, the U. S. Navy will in fact be possessed of any submarines capable of operating in inshore mineable waters, or indeed of any equipped to discharge torpedoes, is a consideration which may well serve to consign the foregoing observations to the limbo of the purely academic.
As already noted, the provision of specialized mine-planting aircraft has never been accorded any really serious consideration, which is not to say that the idea has not been canvassed actively by those interests whose motto is “nothing but the best.” In sober fact, all logical thinking must be against such provision, which means that here, again, the designers are faced with the challenge of producing a good mine, or, more correctly, a good family of mines, capable of being carried and released by orthodox aircraft.
From whatever angle one approaches this question, it emerges that the potential value of aircraft as mine planters remains virtually unimpaired, and to this somewhat categorical statement there must be added the rider that except insofar as individual radius of action is concerned, the carrier-borne, mine-planting aircraft possesses a considerable operational advantage over her shore-based counterpart.
Apart from the mobility and the power of evasion inherent in the aircraft carrier, she can so place herself as to “take the airfield” as close as possible to the target area, carry out her own reconnaissance, be fully cognizant of the local weather conditions, and (perhaps most important of all) the aircraft carrier can act in concert with, or as an integral unit of, a task force equipped and ready to deal with any enemy vessels forced into the open sea as a result of the minelaying activities of her aircraft.
The first minelaying operation by carrier- borne aircraft was that carried out by the Royal Navy in connection with their activities at Oran, and similar operations subsequently were carried out off Sicilian and Tripolitanian ports. These operations were not, however, truly representative of the type under discussion, but they were indicative of the ubiquity of the aircraft carrier in this particular role.
Of far more significance were the operations carried out by British carrier-borne aircraft toward the end of World War II in the Norwegian “inner leads,” which were successful in driving enemy shipping into the arms of a supporting task force.
The basic factor underlying the conduct of such operations is that the senior officer to whom their execution is entrusted, while being given instructions as to the area or areas to be mined, must be accorded complete freedom of action as to when these instructions are to be implemented. He then can dispose his forces according to the local situation, and should thus be in a position to exploit the principles of mobility and surprise to the fullest possible extent.
In any event, aircraft, whether carrier- borne or shore based, offer the only means of planting mines in enemy rivers and canals (other, of course, than those which may perhaps be classified as the nefarious activities of clandestine operators), and all experience has shown that this type of offensive operation can offer a rich return in terms of the effort expended. So, we can conclude our consideration of the various methods of harassing a potential enemy with a brief reference to the following:
Clandestine Operations. The surreptitious introduction of mines into the inland waterways of an enemy is not necessarily a “naval” operation in any sense of the word, but should some cloak and dagger organization wish to engage in such activities, it is more than probable that they will call upon the Navy not only to design and produce the mines, but also to provide a certain number of skilled personnel to assist in the preparation of the mines for service.
From the technical point of view, the mines should be as simple and as light as possible, observing that sooner or later they may well have to be transported by hand in the dark over rough and unfamiliar terrain, and then rendered dangerous and planted. The skilled personnel, in addition to possessing a built-in disregard for their own safety, should also be capable of speaking the local language. There can, clearly, be no basic principles involved in the conduct of such operations; they must, inevitably, be planned and executed in accordance with the circumstances of each particular case. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that those who may bring them to a successful conclusion should be entitled to count as their brothers that happy band of pilgrims which the well-known hymn advises to look upward to the skies, where such a small affliction may win so great a prize.
Defensive Minefields. So far, we have been dealing with mines planted in enemy waters. Insofar as defensive, or “protective” minefields are concerned, the principal point to be taken is that while the submarine probably represents the greatest menace to seaborne traffic, and while the minefield can, in theory, be an effective antisubmarine weapon, a note of warning must be sounded against its over-optimistic employment as such. The so-called “protective mine barrage” can never, in other than the most exceptional circumstances, present an impenetrable barrier to a determined and skillful enemy. It would be entirely out of place to burden this writing with a detailed exposition of either the technical or the mathematical considerations which support this assertion; let it suffice to say that the matter resolves itself into an appreciation of the effect of the forces of nature on the one hand and, on the other hand, a working knowledge of the law of probabilities, backed by practical experience in time of war.
While the planting of protective barrages may seem justified in certain areas and in certain circumstances, it is urged that the most painstaking evaluation should in each case be carried out in order to determine whether the time, money, manpower, and material resources involved, or likely to be involved, might not be devoted better to some other form of activity. Above all, there should be a constant awareness of the extent to which such projects are prone to engender a false sense of security; an area shaded red on a chart does not in itself represent an effective antisubmarine measure.
There is, nonetheless, much to be said for the planting of deep “trap” antisubmarine minefields, or systems of minefields, over which one’s own and allied ships can pass in safety, but which an enemy submarine is bound to encounter if she is to come within striking distance of her target. This, in truth, represents an offensive rather than a defensive use of the minefield; that is to say, the lethal weapon can be placed in a potentially useful position by almost any type of vessel, as opposed to being carried in a specialized and costly antisubmarine vessel, which may or may not be able to position herself in the right place and at the right time.
It would be out of place to attempt to discuss in any detail the localities in which protective minefields of any type might be planted by the U. S. Navy, but to an outside observer, the eastern continental shelf of the United States automatically springs to mind as an area to which the student of mine warfare might conceivably apply his mind. Whatever the locality, it can at least be said that such operations do not call for the provision of specialized mine planters, as they can be carried out by converted merchant vessels whose primary requirement is large minecarrying capacity. (The installation of purely local “harbor defense” minefields, controlled from the shore, does not fall within the scope of this article.)
Other Considerations. There are certain other considerations of a more-or-less general nature which practical experience has shown should influence the conduct of a mining campaign.
First, those responsible for the over-all planning of the campaign must be afforded constant access to the best available intelligence as to enemy dispositions and movements, as to his technical and operational reactions to the planting of various types of mines, and as to the results achieved. In this latter connection, it is seldom possible to relate a particular enemy casualty to a particular planting, and this is most true in the case of mine-planting sorties by aircraft, but whenever it can be done, and the relevant information passed on to the personnel concerned, such action can have a marked effect on their morale and general keenness.
Secondly, there is the problem of security. Essential though it may be to take every step to prevent an enemy from knowing precisely where mines have been planted, it is of equal importance to ensure the safety of one’s own forces while at the same time ensuring that their freedom of movement is not hampered unduly through lack of such knowledge. In short, secrecy can be overdone, and it was established by the British in World War II that the most satisfactory form of compromise was to inform merchant vessels of the routes which it would be safe for them to follow, and to inform naval forces of the areas which it would be dangerous for them to enter. In the latter case, the estimated danger to various types of ship was reviewed progressively as minefields “aged,” and the estimates relayed to senior officers who might be faced with the decision as to whether or not they should order or permit the forces under their immediate control to enter a mined area in any given set of circumstances. This process, it need hardly be said, placed a somewhat severe responsibility upon the operational staff at the Admiralty and upon their technical advisers, but although some regrettable incidents occurred in British minefields, not one single one was attributable to the fact that the ships concerned were not in possession of sufficient information to ensure their safety.
Thirdly, there is a curious school of thought which assumes that those responsible for the planting of mines must by definition be in the opposite camp to those responsible for the provision of mine countermeasures. Nothing could be further from the truth; the two are members of the same team, whose common object is, on the one hand, to confound the enemy, and on the other hand to prevent the enemy from confounding them, and the one should consult with the other at every stage of the game.
We are thus led naturally to a consideration of the following problems:
Mine Countermeasures. Commander Charles W. Saar, U. S. Navy, contributed a valuable analysis of the extent to which the thinking of the Soviet Union might result in the adoption by them of an offensive minelaying policy directed against the Western Powers in a possible future conflict.* In the February 1964 issue of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Dr. Donald W. Mitchell traced with considerable clarity the historical proclivity of the Russians for the employment of sea-mines. I am in full agreement with the views expressed by both Commander Saar and Dr. Mitchell, although in dealing with representatives of the Soviet Union on matters of mine warfare during World War II, I formed the opinion that, in general, they were technically capable but operationally somewhat inept. It clearly would be folly to assume that this opinion (even though it may have been well founded at the time) remains valid today; rather should it be assumed that the Russians are capable of making intelligent use of both simple and sophisticated mining material, and that steps should be taken on this assumption.
What form should these steps take? Once again, we are forced to consider the principles involved, as opposed to making suggestions of a purely technical nature. Nonetheless, and at the risk of being accused of embellishing the obvious, it must be clearly understood that there are two broad ways of dealing with a mine, i.e., it can either be “swept,” or it can be “disposed of.” Sweeping includes, in the case of an influence mine, (whether ground or moored) causing it to detonate by some external method best suited to the particular type of mine.
The day has long passed when the only mines to be contended with were of the simple, moored, contact type, when “minesweeping” was only an educated form of “trawling,” and when a reserve both of suitable craft and of experienced personnel were available to enable a smooth transition to be executed from the catching of fish in peace to the sweeping of mines in war. In other words, it seems highly probable that specially- built craft will be required for dealing with moored mines, and that it is beyond doubt that, with one possible exception, they will be required for dealing with influence mines. The possible exception is that in cases where “location” and “disposal” can be organized as two distinct operations, almost any type of craft can be equipped to locate an object resting on the bed of the sea.
With particular reference to influence ground mines, however, a further important consideration arises. Such mines may be virtually impossible to “sweep,” at any rate for some indeterminate period after a technical surprise has been sprung by the enemy, while, in inshore waters, and especially in inland waterways such as canals it may in any event, be highly undesirable to do so even when such sweeping is possible. This proposition, if valid, involves the development of techniques for the location and disposal of individual mines. In cases where this disposal can take the form of countermining, well and good; where it can not, as in the case of canals and restricted dock areas (i.e., where the resulting potential damage to local installations, canal banks, and so forth would be unacceptable), the only solution would appear to be the location of individual mines and their rendering safe by teams of experts.
This concept of the problem involves a consideration of two further points. First, if location is to be by technical methods, then every potentially mineable area should be surveyed periodically for what may broadly be described as “false contacts,” arising from the incredible and ever-increasing amount of ancient metalware and other solid bodies to be found in the waters of practically every harbor in the world, or in the approaches thereto. Secondly, if location of mines is to be by visual means, and this necessity may well arise in the case of canals, then a corps of persons (possibly volunteers in times of peace) could be trained to spot mines dropped from aircraft, and could be capable of using equipment designed to assist in determining the positions of such mines with accuracy.
Finally, three points emerge:
• As in the case of those responsible for the formulation of minelaying policy, those responsible for the provision of mine countermeasures must be kept fully informed of the over-all strategic picture, and, in addition, must be continuously alerted as to the technological nature of the menace with which they may have to cope.
• It is, in the opinion of the writer, absolutely essential that in time of war a central agency be set up to which every situation involving the use or suspected use of mines is reported without delay, giving all details (whether or not they appear relevant). Such a procedure can enable the central agency, in the light of other reports and of accumulated technical intelligence, to evaluate the local situation and to tender advice to those on the spot with the minimum of delay.
It was in this connection that the Japanese fell down in World War II. Local commanders, confronted with an Allied mining offensive, with which they were not equipped to deal either technically or operationally, avoided “losing face” by refraining from reporting to higher command that their harbors were closed. Thus, the planting of a comparatively small number of mines resulted in a widespread dislocation of Japanese communications by sea. This effect had, in fact, been forecast by an Allied committee sitting in London, but its achievement in no way detracted from the skill of those who planned the mining operations, or from the courage and determination of the aircrews who carried them out.
• Minelaying operations must, by definition, sooner or later involve the planting of mines, but mine “countermeasures,” in the broad sense of the term, may take forms which do not involve the sweeping of any mines at all. These may range from the diversion of traffic to the total elimination of traffic; for example, during World War II, it was essential that the supply of coal to London’s power stations be maintained, and this coal had to be transported through the mineable (and mined) waters off the east coast of England. Serious consideration was given to the pulverizing of the coal at source, and the “piping” of it to London. Although not at first sight a mine countermeasure, that is precisely what in fact it would have been, and the possible substitution of transportation of vital supplies by rail or by road for transport by coastal sea-borne methods is by no means to be discounted; the cost and the diversion of effort must, of course, be weighed against the importance attached to getting the supplies to their destination.
Although, as suggested earlier in this article, the closest possible liaison should be established, both in peace and in war, between those responsible for minelaying and those responsible for mine countermeasures, the two organizations are, in fact, confronted with problems of an entirely different nature.
On the one hand, the conduct of a minelaying campaign, and, in particular, one conducted in enemy waters, can be both stimulating and rewarding. Those concerned know, or at least should know, what they are doing and why they are doing it. But if so disposed, they need not do anything at all. In the case of countermeasures, however, the initiative is with the enemy, and those concerned must be prepared to deal with his mines whenever and wherever the need arises.
Commander Saar has demonstrated the nature and extent of the menace with which the Western Powers might be confronted should the Soviet Union embark on a minelaying offensive, and a cursory glance at the map shows the Soviet Union and many other satellites (not to mention Red China) to be at least equally vulnerable. It is believed that the potential of the U. S. Navy in the sphere of offensive mine warfare is considerable, especially so in the planting of mines by carrier-borne aircraft.
We have noted briefly the value of the aircraft carrier as a mobile airfield. From the point of view of the mine-planting aircraft themselves, then:
• In open waters, the best possible use must be made of all available aids to navigation, and reports called for as to any mines known or suspected to have been planted outside the prescribed area.
• In canals, many of which run in a straight line over comparatively long stretches of countryside, fast low-flying aircraft can plant their mines without regard to the precise spots in which the mines enter the water.
• In some rivers and inland waterways, where varying depths of water or other considerations may dictate that the mines must be planted with accuracy in pre-selected positions, special measures may be necessary to obtain local information as to landmarks in the vicinity of those positions.
In addition, it may well be that the U. S. Navy could play a useful role in the planting of protective antisubmarine minefields, subject always to the proviso as to the exercise of extreme caution before a decision is taken to embark on any large-scale operation.
That the U. S. Navy must be ready to counter an enemy mining offensive which might assume the proportions of a widespread and serious menace to the Western Powers appears to be incontrovertible.
It is concluded, then, that the U. S. Navy could, if so disposed, play an important role in the sphere of minelaying, and could well be forced to play a vital role in the sphere of minesweeping.
It is believed that the U. S. Navy is well equipped technically to perform both these functions, but all history has shown the rapidity with which the sea mine can fall into disrepute if improperly handled, and the degree of alarm and despondency which can be engendered by ineptitude in the deployment of mine countermeasures.
Hence, it is submitted, the paramount need is for the adoption of sound principles, for their acceptance by the Navy as a whole, and for the education and training of officers capable of engaging in mine warfare in accordance with those principles.
It therefore seems fair to ask whether the wealth of technical talent and the vast productive resources available to the U. S. Navy are, at the present time, in fact capable of being fully and intelligently exploited in the operational sense.
It is understood that in some quarters, both naval and civilian, the answer to this question is held to be in the negative.
*See C. W. Saar, “Offensive Mining as a Soviet Strategy,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1964, p. 42.