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"Patience: Bedrock of Strategy in the 1960s”
(See pages 26-33, February 1965 Proceedings)
Walter Darnell Jacobs—The Proceedings and Mr. Hessler do a great disservice to Lord Nelson.
Quite often, indeed, the correct thing to do is just watch and wait. But to call such strategy Lord Nelson’s substitute for victory is a horror of logic and a horror to that great fighter’s memory.
Let us remember Trafalgar as a victory and also let us not forget that the ship Lord Nelson made famous was not the Patience but the Victory.
Clark D. Lewis, Jr. (Former Lieutenant, U. S. Navy)—As a former naval aviator, I find it hard to accept the theory that the U. S. Navy or any other U. S. military service could consider any choice other than “complete victory.”
Many of us remember when wars were won or lost depending on which side you were on. That was before the United Nations and Korea. Even during the Korean War a great soldier, General of the Army Douglas Mac- Arthur, had the idea but was recalled because of his “zealous impatience.” As a result, that failure is still present and will be until one side wins or loses.
Patience has not unified Germany nor torn down the Berlin Wall. On the other hand, a little impatience did get the Soviet ballistic missiles out of Cuba.
History has shown, and I believe will continue to show, that whenever the United States has exhibited more than patience (determination, bluster, bluff, call it what you will) the enemy has backed down. The problem is we have not exhibited enough.
The United States has failed to realize that the Communists have just as much or more to lose than we do. It has also failed to heed Communist boasts that complacency and so- called “patience” are the very tools they expect to use to dominate the world.
I am happy to say that the United States has just become “impatient enough” to retaliate with air strikes on North Vietnam. If we are going to settle that issue, we must “win the war”; win the war in the old fashioned way, if necessary by seizure and occupation. We must at least obtain capitulation.
Sir Winston Churchill, in addition to saying “there are no safe battles,” made another remarkable statement: “Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.” That still means “total victory” in my book.
Admiral Farragut’s “Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!” may have been uttered in 1864, but we could do well to reconsider that famous order in 1965.
Leo D. Patterson—It is a strange paradox that Mr. Hessler’s article is illustrated with a photograph of the USS Patrick Henry (SSBN- 599), namesake of the man who, with the words “give me liberty, or give me death!” rejected the philosophy of the Hesslers of his day. It would be interesting to know Mr. Hessler’s opinion of Patrick Henry and of other great American patriots of history, such as John Paul Jones. These men did not lack patience. It was as important in military operations of their time as it is now.
Raymond J. Barrett (Foreign Service Officer)—As a “practicing diplomat,” I must applaud Mr. Hessler’s article. I know from discussions with my military colleagues how frustrating a doctrine of forbearance and limited objectives can be and, with the same American desires for positive action and decisions, I sympathize with them. I can only add that it is no easy matter being the diplomat who must go out and practice moderation and patience in an uncertain world and personally confront many of these problem situations. But, as Mr. Hessler pointed out, we must deal with the world as it is. The hard truth is that we practice diplomacy in an age of dilemma.
I would point out, however, that despite the limitations and even frustrations, there are some positive aspects to be kept in mind. One is that in a world living under the possibility of nuclear devastation there is much to be said for achieving a state of “non-war” even if complete peace and order are not possible. Armistices, demarcation lines, United Nations peace-keeping operations, etc., have not “solved” problems, but they have contained them to some degree and thus reduced the risks of big-power confrontations and the dangers of nuclear escalation.
Another point to remember is our record of accomplishment, despite the problems and limitations we have confronted. Quite naturally, we tend to be more conscious of our frustrations. The record, of course, is mixed, but there is a lot on the positive side. Since World War II, we have seen our European allies rise from the ashes to vigorous progress, freedom, and strength. More than 50 nations have achieved independence and many of these are responsibly and perceptively on the road to development and dignity. None of these countries has gone Communist. On the other hand, the more measured attitudes of the Soviet Union today are very much in contrast with those of Stalinist Russia of hardly more than a dozen years ago. Signs of division and tension in the Communist world seem just as great as those among the “free,” developing nations of the world.
Our difficulties and limitations in the World are also, in another sense, a mark of our success. We seek freedom for all men, yet freedom by its very nature means that there will be disagreements. Many of our problems arise from divergencies between ourselves and various of the newly independent countries of the world. Tension and disagreements are attributes of human society that seem unlikely to disappear. If nothing more, the mathematical opportunities with so many new states are far greater for differences to develop between us and others. The level of disagreements and consequent difficulties and limitations for us seem likely to remain high. It is a condition we live with in our personal and national lives and one that we are, as a people, attuned to handling in responsible fashion.
Political, economic, and social evolution to meet conflicting and changing needs has been the hallmark of American history. As we patiently and maturely cope with disagreements and limitations in international affairs, we give the world an important example of the type of responsible freedom that may some day make its problems less frustrating.
Diplomacy and strategy in an age of dilemma are not easy, but, on the other hand, they are not unrewarding.
(These are my personal views, and should not be construed as representing the official views of the Department of State.)
"Advisory Warfare vs. Sanctuary Warfare”
(See pages 34-42, February 1965 Proceedings)
Colonel R. G. Jones, U. S. Army (Advanced Tactics Project, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command)—Colonel Black has added another interesting and informative article to his earlier ones on the politico- military situation in Southeast Asia.[1] He has emphasized many of the more sensitive aspects of what are now alluded to in the Army as “stability” situations. Such presentations can well receive a great deal more study and emphasis since they will continue to comprise the most probable type of confrontation with which the Allies must contend.
In many respects, the “advisory vs. sanctuary” approach focuses on the essential issues. Although the role of the United States in this context is theoretically advisory in nature, it no longer falls fully within the accepted meaning of the term as it has been applied to U. S. Military Advisory Assistance Group effort. The task of keeping the advisory effort geared to the changing complexion of the in-country situation is a real problem. The military advisor by definition normally works well within the area of his recognized and undisputed competence, such as training, maintenance, or organization. His advice has been directly related to materiel aspects as reflected in the aid program.
In some countries, of which South Vietnam is a good example, the local military establishment has evolved to the stage at which most advisors have properly worked themselves out of their jobs. To be an advisor implies greater knowledge or experience on a given subject than held by the advised. In many cases the national military forces of the host nation have been grappling with insurgency or counter-insurgency actions for decades. A considerable segment of the local military element may only need tools, not advice. Thus, the need for advisors, particularly the larger numbers at lower military echelons, becomes a moot question. In any case, the character of the advice they proffer must change. It necessarily intrudes into the more subjective and ambiguous areas of tactics and techniques or provincial administration directly related to the local stability threat with all of the attendant politico- military subtleties.
The newly emerging nations often have extreme shortages of competent administrators, often to the extent that these positions fall by default to officers of their armed services. An American counterpart who is paired off with such an official has a major challenge facing him. The contributions of the foreign advisor, which perforce originate from his own background of experience, are usually unpopular and more often than not invalid due to basic cultural and economic differences between the two national representatives. One can almost coin a theorem: solutions to apparently similar problems in dissimilar national environments differ proportionately to the degree of environmental dissimilarity. Advice in this environment has complex psychological overtones and is a ticklish proposition, with the advisors’ popularity somewhat akin to that of a not very expert or tactful “kibitzer” at a bridge table.
Large advisory elements also provide fuel for Communist propaganda attempts to apply the “colonialist” label to any kind of U. S. aid to an emerging nation. National pride and that of individual members of the host government, both political and military, are challenged, by inference, by too much foreign assistance except when it takes the form of materiel resources.
The importance of the “country-team” approach and the relationship of the military to the total effort is well recognized. The military must provide a permanent atmosphere of relative security for the. other programs to be effective. But a sweep through a given area invariably flushes out few guerrillas unless the insurgency has progressed to the stage of conventional operations. It certainly contributes little to the kind of an atmosphere needed for the slower evolution of the other vital programs. Thus, the “hold” portion of the “clear-and-hold” concept is the more important. It implies long-term military and security commitments. Even more important than this, it implies a government-to-village relationship which is essential in the creation of a national image.
From the “sanctuary” point of view,
Colonel Black exposes again the “blackmail” aspects of Communist foreign policy. One is reminded of the rationale which has characterized that dialectic of Communist foreign policy: “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” The effect of terrain and Political orientation is basic to the concept of the sanctuary. Neutralization of the sanctuary is possible if terrain favors a barrier as it did between Tunisia and Algeria, or if the indirect agent can be induced to cease and desist by the measured application of various kinds of convincing persuasions. This is somewhat akin to “plugging” the leaky dike by lowering the water level behind it. A small nation can often cope with a spontaneous insurgency, but not when it is actively pursued by an unfriendly, contiguous country.
The American public, through the Congress, has a right to inquire into “what is there to show” in exchange for aid amounting to ntore than a million dollars a day in some cases. On a short-term basis, most concrete evidence of returns on the investment will unfortunately reflect a status quo situation tvith negative overtures. A chain of events which denotes deterioration has been interrupted; a decline has been arrested. The United States is not locked in a big war in Southeast Asia. South Vietnam has not become a Communist-dominated nation. The United States has not been forced out of Southeast Asia. This is hardly the kind of a Situation report designed to please a nation which bisects most problems into win or lose, right or wrong, good or bad. It becomes fairly °bvious that by the nature of the “beast” we cnnnot expect a quid pro quo and that our °Ptions bring us face to face with hard decisions. Faith in the motivation and competency of the aided nation as a whole rather hian any political clique, and our beliefs in ue cause of freedom which we espouse must e basic elements of our policy.
U;e must also achieve a new appreciation aud understanding of how time operates and ^Se it to our advantage. Even such a confined advocate of “protracted conflict” as cneral Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the orth Vietnamese armed forces, recognizes . serious threat of extreme protraction upon 'nsurgency: “To keep itself in life and develop, guerrilla warfare has necessarily to develop
into mobile warfare. This is a general law. But if guerrilla warfare did not move to mobile warfare not only the strategic tasks of annihilating the enemy manpower could not be carried out, but even guerrilla activities could not be maintained and extended.”
Although both sides vie for the “hearts and the minds” of the people, there comes a time when survival becomes the main issue for the inhabitants. Then, a manifestation of the ability to protect and to prevail eventually becomes a determining factor in the contest. Patience, resolve, and understanding, as Colonel Black states, are equally essential. There is no place in this fateful confrontation for the short-term, “easy come—easy go,” or “panic button” type of solution. Success is often long in coming and even then difficult to discern. One might very well succeed merely by not losing. If we do not choose to accept the type of challenge which our opponents force upon us, we must consider using measures of a more forceful, less ambiguous kind or leave the field to the enemy. Such responses are fraught when proportionately larger risks and costs on one hand, or on the other with confirmation in the eyes of the world that the United States is really a paper tiger.
The events of the past few months add a new dimension to the confrontation in Southeast Asia and to similar situations elsewhere in the world—not that any two will ever be sufficiently alike to permit the application of duplicate countermeasures. It is reassuring to note that the United States has more than anything else demonstrated endurance and guts in the current conflict.
"The Meaning of Service”
(Seepages 76-81, January 1965 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Richard C. Smith, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, USS Thomas J. Gary, DER-326)—-Lieutenant Howe presents a very welcome, enlightening, and thought-provoking discussion of the meaning of service.
As Lieutenant Howe stated in his article: “There is nothing more satisfying than being given a position of responsibility.” A young naval officer must gain this sense of satisfaction by virtue of accomplishment in a responsible billet during his sea cruise, or he
will never gain admiration for or desire a career in the Navy. I personally feel that too many commanding officers expect a newly commissioned officer to be immediately a full-fledged, qualified-in-all-respects division officer the minute he reports aboard ship. To assume that in a few months this young officer can become completely qualified, in depth, in every area, is not realistic.
From my own experience, I am convinced that the quality of the young officer being commissioned today is as good as it ever was in the history of the Navy, and probably better. These young officers have a lot to learn in a very short time, expecially so in this age of rapid technological advances which create much more complex problems than the Navy has ever been faced with in the past. It is useless and unrealistic to expect a newly commissioned officer to know all that an experienced seagoing officer should know, particularly those aspects of seagoing life which come only with actual experience.
To instill the meaning of service in our young officers, it is important for the commanding and executive officers to provide all young officers under their authority with an appreciation of the Navy as a profession and as a career, whether or not the particular junior officer indicates a desire for such a career. To accomplish this, they can underline the achievements of the Navy over the past centuries through various periods of unrest and national crises, and point out the Navy’s valuable contribution toward ensuring future peace and security.
There is a tremendous untapped potential in the newly commissioned officers in our ships, and to unearth this potential we must guide, train, and encourage these young officers in the tangibles and the intangibles of the Navy profession.
Midshipman Edwin C. Finney, Jr. (U. S. Naval Academy)—Lieutenant'Howe’s article is the finest expression of those things which motivate men to choose the Navy as a career that I have read.
Particularly meaningful was his initial stress on the naval service as a vocation. Officers consider or should consider their careers as far more than just a job. To me, the dedicated officer has a vocation just below the
plane of those who serve in the clergy.
Also outstanding, in the discussion of patriotism as a motive for naval service, was the example of most officers putting their shoulders back and quickening their pace at the sound of a band. It is just a minor example but, at a time when such “feelings” are treated with an almost embarrassed spirit of levity, it is good to see a young officer admit that such things are still moving experiences to him.
Another particularly good part of the article was the mention of the importance of the wife in regard to the naval service of the husband. As the son and nephew of naval officers and as one familiar with the families of both senior and junior officers, I heartily agree with his references to the rewarding “group pride and common bond . . . between officers and between their families.” Perhaps even more meaningful were his statements that Navy life is the test of a wife and that she often has to be both father and mother to the family.
Lieutenant Howe did point out the distressing aspects of Navy life—“at times the service tends to treat its men as pawns”—but his criticisms are those of a man familiar with the service, not those of a civilian observer who has not experienced the pride and trials of being “in the club.”
As a midshipman, I was especially glad to see that while recognizing and praising the curriculum changes at the Naval Academy, Lieutenant Howe was concerned that equal progress be made in the Academy’s purpose for existence—to provide graduates who are dedicated to a career of naval service. Career naval officers, not first-rate engineers, mathematicians, or Rhodes scholars are what the Naval Academy exists to provide. When even here at the Naval Academy the most voiced
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
desire is one for a civilian line rather than Navy line, an article like Lieutenant Howe’s comes as a real morale booster. I recommend Lieutenant Howe’s article to every midshipman, officer, and officer’s wife or fiancee.
"Prestige of the Navy Family”
(See pages 58-65, Novmber 1964 Proceedings)
Commander John L. Thom, U. S. Navy (Officer-in-Charge, Fleet Home Town News Center)—Captain Blee’s hard-hitting article cuts through the welter of problems besetting all in the Navy today to strike directly at fundamentals.
The first major problem area cited by Captain Blee was that of loaded news stories which stress service connection and carry headlines such as “SAILOR ASSAULTS LOCAL MAN.” To counteract this, he suggests that efforts be made to persuade publishers and editors to ease off in view of the damage they are inflicting on the Navy. He further suggests that we offset the loaded stories with stories about the creditable and admirable things that Navy people are doing.
Easier said than done! An editor is a professional newsman and he knows what he is doing. The editor says he writes the headline to fit the story and does not single out the Navy for this kind of news treatment. Every Public information officer worth his salt develops close relationships with newsmen, and many commanding officers and senior officers ashore do the same. Rest assured that the subject of news treatment comes up frequently and the journalists’ answer is always the same: “We do not pick on the military man. The headline is written to fit the story. So long as the incidents occur, you will have these headlines.”
Regarding Captain Blee’s second suggestion, that the Navy counteract bad publicity with good stories about our Navy men and Women, I must say, in all modesty, that this ls being done. Granted that no job of this order can be done to perfection, literally millions of news stories about the noteworthy Accomplishments and experiences of Navy men and women are fed into the nation’s uews media each year.
The Navy’s Public Information Manual states that the foundation of the Navy public in-
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formation program is the individual story, or “hometowner” as it is called, for most stories about individuals are of interest only in the hometown area where those persons grew up and are known to the local residents.
Aside from the flow of news releases from most Navy commands directly to the news media, the Fleet Home Town News Center at Great Lakes, Illinois, processed and mailed out some 3,000,000 individual stories to some 14,000 hometown newspapers and radio stations in 1964 alone. These included stories, photographs, and taped interviews.
This flood of material did not go out “broadcast” with the faint hope that it might be used. Rather, the material went only to those editors and publishers who had specifically requested the material, and who use it. Pick up almost any weekly newspaper, or small daily, and you will find these hometown stories.
Granted, there is always room for improvement, but the Navy story is being told now.
The problems facing the men and women of the Navy and their families in their quest
for deserved prestige and recognition are indeed fundamental. Discipline in the professional ranks and adequate pay and housing so Navy families can be proud members of the community rather than underprivileged citizens are basic requirements which are now lacking. An unmarried sailor is the world’s most independent and cocky creature, and an unexcelled combatant when molded into a disciplined crew. So is a married sailor, if and when he knows that his family is comfortable and secure. This is not so if his family is living in cramped quarters in a poor area, and is scrimping to get by. Such a sailor is naturally embittered. When one considers that most petty officers fall within this group, with most compelled to seek supplementary employment while stationed ashore, it is small wonder that our Navy prestige has suffered.
The size of our armed forces has made defense so expensive that any pay increase for the military imposes a real burden on the taxpayer.
But today’s society measures success largely in terms of income. Until our sailors can meet their civilian neighbors on equal grounds in terms of this common denominator, Navy family prestige will continue to suffer.
Captain John V. Noel, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—As Captain Blee points out in his excellent summation of some of our current leadership problems, the heart of the matter is not only a current lack of qualified division officers, but a lack of appreciation on the part of many senior officers of the important role of the division officer.
It is ironic, and tragic too, that at least once a year since the end of World War II, we have read very much the same ideas in the Proceedings. Someone quite regularly reveals that the source of most postwar leadership problems is inexperienced division officers who cannot manage and inspire their men. One logical result of unskilled leadership at this level has been fewer re-enlistments. After World War II, this state of affairs became obvious to most officers at sea who remembered prewar division officer standards. In 1952, the publication of the Division Officer's Guide by the Naval Institute led to division officer training being introduced into officer candidate curricula, although somewhat half-heartedly. In the years since, division officer training has been pushed into the background and is now supposedly done on the midshipmen’s cruise, along with officer-of-the-deck training, practical aspects of navigation, deck seamanship, et at.
Here at least the Navy can be considered consistent since on all levels of management training, from junior officer to senior line officers, the Navy is not only behind industry but is even behind the other military services. The Navy has no senior management school of its own, as do the Army and Air Force, and does not even have a correspondence course in management. It would seem obvious that the one outstanding common denominator of nearly all naval officers careers is the management of men and affairs and enlightened human relations. It has long been accepted in industry and in education that management and human relations can be taught, learned, and instilled.
The Navy still faces, more acutely than ever, the disheartening problem of low retention among skilled petty officers. Yet the one basic effort which we could make to pull ourselves up by our bootstraps is still not being seriously attempted. This is to teach every officer, before he is commissioned, the major techniques of directing, leading, understanding, and inspiring his men. Even officers who do not intend to make the Navy a career, and this includes most of our OCS and many of our NROTC graduates, can and should be taught how to be effective and efficient division officers.
This would not be a simple project, but it could contribute more to the esprit and effectiveness of the Navy than a major pay raise. The undertaking of a serious division officer training project would involve a considerable investment of the best officer instructors, chosen for their proven ability to lead, not to drive.
The implications of such a project, in preparing a curriculum and in selecting and training instructors, could be revolutionary. Those who direct the Navy’s personnel programs might realize that in the vital field of human relations the Navy has not yet completely made the transition from sail to steam. We still accept and even sometimes applaud the rough-and-ready, hard-bitten, arbitrary
officer who leads by fear and oppression. He is considered a character, in the tradition of those notorious sundowners whose names are as well known in wardroom bull sessions as Nimitz and Halsey. Sundowners get shortterm results in the eyes of their seniors, but the human wreckage left in their wake is the real hidden cost. The efficient command ruled by an iron hand is familiar to us all. What we do not see are the dozens of young officers and many more intelligent and promising enlisted men who have only one objective after serving under such a regime—to get as far away from the Navy as they can.
Of course, the basic problem of poor and untrained division officers is far more complex than the elimination of the occasional sundowner. Today, most newly commissioned officers who assume division officer duties are unprepared for the many human problems they face. Since they are but slightly older than their non-rated men, and often younger than their petty officers, they cannot be expected to realize and appreciate the human as well as technical complexities of Navy life. How can we expect the well-educated, carefully screened junior officer to understand, for example, the small but significant number of dull enlisted men from broken homes or slum areas who provide most of the disciplinary problems—or the older petty officer with an errant wife who is becoming an alcoholic? Newly commissioned officers are not even trained in basic personnel procedures and must refer questions from their men to a personnelman. We expect a newly commissioned officer to know instinctively the best ways to organize and administer a group °f men, to train them, motivate them, and, above all, to persuade them that their service in the Navy is vitally important, significant in the defense of the nation, and well worth the sacrifices involved.
To start a meaningful division officer training program, it would be well to estab- iish at first hand what in reality each division officer should know. The leadership field teams could make a personal survey and elicit major tasks, responsibilities, and problems from a fairly large sample of division officers in the Fleet. From this raw data, the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel could design a curriculum, specify
ing relatively new teaching methods. From here it is not difficult to envision a directive introducing the curriculum into all officer candidate training programs, including the Naval Academy.
It would be naive to expect every officer to become a first-rate division officer, but at least a vigorous program of pre-commission division officer training would improve the Navy’s over-all leadership situation. This could not help but be reflected in improved retention rates. Can we afford not to try it?
"The Future of the 'Second Segment’ ”
(See pages 76—81, November 1964 Proceedings)
Carlos C. Wood (Division Vice President, Engineering, Sikorsky Aircraft)—The importance of the CVS and its aircraft complement to the flexible solution of the ASW problem was well handled by Captain Whidden.
However, the SH-3A Sea King helicopter represents the conscientious application of the current technology of 1958 to the solution of very demanding mission requirements. The aircraft, as specified and as now operating, alternately flies and hovers for four hours, carrying a payload which includes a dipping sonar, two operators, and weapons. Mission performance in all weather (short of heavy icing) required the incorporation of extensive navigation and stabilization equipment and provisions for flotation in the event of engine failure in hover.
That these features were not designed for passenger service is indicated by the fact that the commercial S-61 aircraft represents drastic modifications of the basic SH-3A.
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cation indicated that endurance is more important than speed, and 120 knots was initially designated as the minimum acceptable top speed. This speed is now being regularly exceeded in operations. The aircraft was certified at mission gross weight at 162 knots true air speed. Navy experience has resulted in establishing operational top speed at 85 per cent of this figure to avoid the possibility of encountering blade stall under some conditions. An improvement program on the SH-3A envisions supplying a blade stall indicator so that the pilot can select his own maximum speed. (The speed record of 184 knots was made in an aircraft which was “cleaned up” aerodynamically by removal of the sponsons, and flown at a gross weight less than that which normal antisubmarine warfare missions require.)
Thus the mission requirements as specified are such that top speed must be sacrificed in favor of the more vital requirements of endurance, payload, and hover-over-water safety. If, as Captain Whidden suggests, top speed must be increased to improve ASW effectiveness, considerable development is still required. Although this will be costly, the expenditure of funds on such development can be justified by the definition of an urgent mission. The Navy has not as yet published a requirement of this nature.
"Clausewitz, Cuba, and Command”
(See pages 24-33, August 1964 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, Royal Navy (Retired)—There would seem to be an element of contradiction in the argument used at the beginning of this thoughtful and penetrating study of one of the most important problems of the day.
In one place, Captain Schratz states: “Military power must give moral sense and political direction within the national strategic concept.” Yet, later, he counters with the statement: “Power must serve a political goal; military action must be subordinate to political aims.”
The conflict between politics and strategy is an age-old one, and the advent of nuclear weapons has served to aggravate it because they create both political tension as well as a military threat. This applies not only to relations between East and West, but also to those between the states which possess them and those that do not. The Cuban crisis and its masterly handling by the late President John F. Kennedy brought home to the other members of the Atlantic alliance what an informed few had long recognized: that the prevention or unleashing of a nuclear war lay in the hands of one man on each side. Paradoxically, the realization of this fact has upset the political harmony of the European members, with the result that today the alliance is in greater disarray than at any time since its inception. Fortunately, the predominance of U. S. power minimizes the weakening effect of these differences, but it is difficult to see how a single, comprehensive strategy for absolute war, as recommended by the author, can be evolved so long as they remain. We have, as Captain Schratz points out, progressed from the doctrine of massive retaliation to something which we are still searching to define, and it would be unrealistic to minimize the difficulties of the task.
Of the six courses of action which the author has examined, the most fruitful would appear to be the control of the area of war, because there is agreement between East and West as to its desirability, but not as to the manner of implementing it. The Berlin issue remains a major obstruction to progress. Yet a wide zone of countries between the Communist bloc and the West, whose security was mutually guaranteed and whose armaments were fixed at the minimum for internal security, would do much to ease international tension. The control of tactics and the rules of war must necessarily be dependent upon a change in the Soviet approach to these problems. It would seem that the latter’s mentality is still so hedged about with fear and suspicion that any “loss of face” resulting from a “nuclear shot across the bow” would still produce a violent reaction. History teaches us that a country faced with an overwhelming threat, such as a united Atlantic alliance could offer to the Soviet Union, is stimulated thereby to exert even greater efforts in its own defense. It is important, therefore, that military power should be subordinate to political direction, in order that it may, as the author suggests, operate “within a national strategic concept.” "Patrol Guerrilla Motor Boats”
(See pages 70-79, April 1964; pages 107-109, July 1964; and pages 111-113, November 1964 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Alexander W. Wells,* U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I have the feeling that some of the writers on the subject of PT-type boats (by whatever name called) have no real conception of the number of miles such boats move at idling speed. Getting to and from stations, a PT boat moves at faster than idling speed, but when on station, idling speed is used almost exclusively. In most patrol situations, the PT boat’s station 0r patrol is as close to the coastline as the draft of the craft will allow with safety.These operations preclude high-speed maneuvering.
Lieutenant Commander Fagan, in the
November 1964 Proceedings, states “Many PT boat losses to aircraft in World War II were ascribed to the craft’s highly visible and persistent wake.” The use of hydrofoils would not eliminate the threat of air attack.
According to the official U. S. Navy history of PT boats, At Close Quarters, seven U. S. PT boats were lost to enemy aircraft during World War II.f Three of these were lost in daylight raids on U. S. bases; two were daylight losses to suicide planes; one was sunk in a daylight strafing attack; and only one, the PT- 123, was lost by a direct bomb hit because of visibility of the wake at night. The PT-123 was hit off Guadalcanal at about 2345 on 1 February 1943. The attacking airplane twice strafed the PT-123 ineffectually. On its third run, the plane glided silently up the boat’s wake at an altitude of less than 500 feet. The
PT-123 was proceeding at idling speed about to attack Japanese destroyers. At such times attacking aircraft were largely disregarded because “big game”—the original raison d’etre of the PT boat—was present. This direct hit was, in my judgment, a million- to-one shot and a hydrofoil proceeding at idling speed would have presented as much and probably more wake than the standard displacement hull.
If a hydrofoil and a displacement hull were proceeding at high speed in the middle of the night, I think one would be just as difficult as the other to hit from an aircraft even though the hydrofoil might create a slightly smaller wake at higher speeds. It was a land-based, fixed-wheel airplane which successfully placed a bomb on the PT-123, and these slower planes had less tendency to overrun the target. And therefore they gave the pilot a much greater opportunity for hitting a moving target. (I was executive officer of the PT-123 and was at the wheel when she was hit. The crew of the PT-116 was riding the PT-123 that night because the former boat was temporarily out of service and
it was the PT-116’% turn to go out on patrol.)
The presence of aircraft over the PT boat patrol areas caused a good deal of trouble because of the wake visibility. The air threat caused tactics to be changed, hampered patrols, often cut off pursuit of small surface craft, and sometimes made attack impossible. But this would have also been true with hydrofoil boats because they would have had to patrol at idling speed and hence in displacement condition.
Persons unfamilar with PT boats appear to be obsessed with the idea of speed and believe extreme speeds are used frequently. This just is not so. The tactics of PT boats are very similar and sometimes patterned after the tactics of the old horse cavalry. The gallop was used very seldom.
Lieutenant Commander Fagan implied that with increased speed on patrol more will be seen and identified. I disagree. One must remember that the enemy coastal vessels are moving just a few yards offshore and often blend with the background, blending so nicely that many times the radar will not pick them up. I defy anyone to go along at
high speed, at a distance far enough offshore (2,500 feet?) to permit this fast navigation and pick out enemy small craft moving 20 yards or less off a wooded shoreline in the middle of the night.
I recommend following Rear Admiral Harllee’s proposal to perfect the displacement-hull boat and continue to experiment tvith hydrofoil craft where close-to-shore maneuvering is not necessary.
The water-jet propulsion system, which Admiral Harllee mentioned in his article, is a turbine pump which discharges the water through the transom just above the craft’s waterline. Steering is accomplished by turn- mg the discharge nozzle. In 1959, the Turbo Division of the Indiana Gear Works, was producing a 16-foot, water-jet boat powered hy a 109-horsepower Gray Marine engine. (Larger water-jet craft are now being built.) Fuel consumption for the water-jet was said to he approximately ten per cent less than for the standard propeller-driven craft. Why not turn over to the Indiana Gear Works (the Perfectors of the water-jet) one of the Norwegian “Nasty” craft with the order to move
it with full war load at better than 50 knots? I believe the water-jet displacement hull can be perfected in a short time with relatively little effort or money.
Admiral Harllee pointed out that all of the other major navies of the world have numerous PT-type boats and the U. S. Navy, with more experience than the rest of them combined, has none of its own perfected here in the United States and has had to buy 14 from Norway.
Admiral Harllee further stated that an 80- foot boat has ample deck space for armament yet is still a very small target. I believe he is right so long as the deck of the boat is kept as uncluttered as possible with no superstructure except the cockpit, and the cockpit absolutely no higher than a man’s chest. The only exception to this would be the slender radar mast.
As for armament, I would recommend two mounts of twin .50-caliber machine guns alongside and a little lower than the cockpit, which could be brought to bear dead ahead; a forward 40-mm. cannon with an 81-mm. mortar welded or bolted alongside the barrel
(this method of mounting gives very good placement for the mortar shells and an excellent base); a stern 40-mm. or 75-mm. cannon with a large flame-thrower muzzle bolted or welded alongside the barrel; another 40-mm. or rocket-launcher amidships, and racks for four torpedoes. An 80-foot PT boat could carry all of this and a crew of 18 or 19 if the below-deck space were adequately arranged. The fuel and pressure equipment for the flame thrower could be housed in the engine room or lazerette, and be co-ordinated with the after mount. Naturally, the flame thrower is only feasible if the boat is diesel powered.
I think Admiral Harllee has an excellent idea in the alternatives in armament. It is quite possible to remove the torpedoes and install spin-stabilized 5-inch rockets. The use of a flame thrower may sound unusual, but I think its use and effect is obvious when one realizes that the majority of fighting other small craft is done at grappling-hook distances. These are real slugging matches. In the initial charge on an enemy craft, we need “psychological knock-out” and this can be achieved by having maximum fire power dead ahead. The staggered .50-caliber mounts of the World War II Elco boats (and in Admiral Harllee’s proposed sketch) were an abomination. This left the port side weak because in place of the twin .50-caliber mount which I recommend we had a tripod mounted 20-mm. gun which could not throw the lead a twin .50-caliber could.
It is in propulsion where we can make the greatest improvement over the World War II PT boat and all of the current PT boats in the other navies. The water-jet has no appendages projecting under the boat. There are no struts, no wheels, no scoops, no shafts, and no rudders. This can cut the draft from six feet to three feet for an 80-foot, 70-ton boat. The logistic problems would also be reduced, for the biggest problem PT boats had in World War II was the fouling of the underwater gear by half-submerged logs, uncharted reefs, and other obstacles or debris. If these water-jets are powered by diesel engines, it further reduces logistic problems and increases several fold the range of the boats. (The “Nasty” class boats are diesel powered.)
A boat drawing only three feet of water with no underwater appendages can go as close inshore as any enemy small craft and is immune from the danger of a stray bullet hitting the gasoline tanks and causing an explosion. Also, the turbocraft is practically free of cavitation and can execute a 180-degree turn in its own length at high speed.
I thought Lieutenant Hoffman, in the July 1964 Proceedings, was unfair to Admiral Harllee and showed little knowledge of PT boats, their operations or capabilities. No one goes “thundering toward the beach” when landing or picking up scouts any more than one would “thunder” into an attack on a large warship. Warships are attacked at idling speed in an effort to escape detection and it is only in the retirement that high speeds are used. When maximum speed is needed, it is needed immediately and it is far better to be able to accelerate immediately to 40 knots with a displacement hull than to slowly accelerate to 50 knots with a hydrofoil.
I did agree with Lieutenant Hoffman in that there is no need to change the name from PT boat. The duties of the little giant (who is a jack of all trades and a master of several) may change, but if we change the name from PT, which does not have to stand for any particular words, we confuse all—even those who have worked with them.
This country can produce a better 50-knot- plus PT boat powered by a water-jet and diesel system. When we do we can then adequately fulfill the mission Admiral Harllee says we are not quite doing now; that is, economically control the narrow and confined waters of the world.
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[1] See Edwin F. Black, “The Problems of CounterInsurgency,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1962, pp. 22-39.