Professional Notes, Notebook and Progress

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Operation Sea Orbit

By Rear Admiral Bernard M. Strean, U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy is an old hand at “show­ing the flag,” at conducting good will visits, and at entertaining foreign dignitaries on board ship. The Navy is also an old hand at conducting test and evaluation cruises and at establishing records. But rarely does the Navy have the opportunity to do all of these things in one operation.

Operation Sea Orbit, the unprecedented around-the-world cruise by the Navy’s three nuclear-powered surface ships, did all of these things and more. Not since President Theo­dore Roosevelt sent out the Great White Fleet of 16 first-line battleships in December 1907 had the Navy attempted such a cruise.

The three ships which comprised Task Force One, formed specifically to carry out Sea Orbit, were no longer news in the Navy. The attack carrier Enterprise (CVAN-65), the guided-missile cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9), and the guided-missile frigate Bainbridge (DLGN- 25) had a total of eight years service, but the three ships had never operated together as a unit, as a self-contained task force, until Sea Orbit.

Until Sea Orbit, no ship in history had ever covered a route of 30,500 miles in 64 days. Task Force One covered the 30,500-mile track in this time, with 57 actual steam­ing days, keeping its schedule almost to the minute. Throughout this period, the ships maintained a speed in advance of 22 knots, operating in all conditions of sea and weather. The three ships were in the Indian Ocean in the monsoon season, rounded Cape Horn during the Southern Hemisphere’s winter, crossed the equator four times, and, in all, experienced two winters, two summers, one autumn, and one spring.

It is not enough merely to say that this could only have been accomplished with nuclear-powered ships. Nuclear power de­serves credit, certainly, but so also do the officers and men of the task force. This was a long, hard cruise for the personnel. The usual exercises, tests, and alerts were carried out, as on all cruises, but, because of the nature of this task force, many extra exercises and tests were conducted. And, because of the good will aspect of the cruise, all of us, to a man, were called on for an extra effort.

The major effort in the good will part of Operation Sea Orbit was given to the “under­way” visits. For these visits, the Enterprise would launch two, three, or four of her C-1A Trader aircraft to fly inshore, pick up foreign government officials, and fly them back to the carrier for briefings and to view an air fire-power demonstration. All of this was ac­complished while the task force was under­way. The aircraft would leave the carrier when the ship was from 45 to 190 miles off­shore, depending on the country concerned. In the first phase of the cruise, we conducted underway visits for officials from six African countries: Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast in West Africa, and Kenya in East Africa. Subsequently, we conducted underway visits for dignitaries from Pakistan, Australia (separate visits for Perth-Fremantle, Melbourne, and Sydney), and New Zealand. Off South America we had visits for Argentina and Uruguay. Finally, off Brazil, we took on board groups from Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Recife.

Because of our tight steaming schedule, our speed of advance, the distance offshore, the necessity to hold the fire power demon­strations far from shipping lanes, the range of the C-1A aircraft, and the eight-passenger capacity of each aircraft, we were limited in the number of guests we could accommodate. We therefore sought persons of at least cabinet rank or the equivalent. In most countries, thanks to the efforts of the U.S. ambassadors and naval attaches, we were successful.

Very few of our high-ranking foreign guests had ever made a carrier landing before, and we found that only a few indicated, or at least would admit, to some nervousness about it. Needless to say, practically every man on board the carrier considered, at one time or another, the embarrassment that would result to the U.S. government if we dropped a high-ranking foreign government official in the sea. Flight and deck crews were specially briefed and ready for every contingency in this regard, but all take-offs and landings were faultless.

The seating arrangement in each plane and the landing sequence of the planes was worked out in advance for each visit; this was to delay the highest ranking guest the least time pos­sible before all the guests were assembled. With this arrangement, there was a minimum of waiting for anyone. The flight deck officers and crew worked out a procedure whereby four C-lAs could be landed and all 32 pas­sengers could be disembarked, greeted by senior officers on the flight deck, and as­sembled on the flight deck elevator within four and a half minutes!

As soon as the party was on the elevator, it would be taken down to the hangar deck.There, in what one African cabinet minister described as a “dramatic military dress parade at attention,” were sideboys flanking a length of red carpet, at the end of which stood the task force commander and the com­manding officer of the Enterprise. Seventy-two Marines formed the honor detachment, and a 16-piece band rendered the honors. On three sides of this formation were four ranks of sailors at attention, 230 in all. Our guests knew we were out to impress them, but they liked it. They knew we wanted to honor and not flatter them.

After honors were rendered, the visitors were led a short distance down the hangar deck for a brief welcoming address and slide presentation to enable them to appreciate fully what they were soon to see in the fire­-power demonstration. The welcoming address and slide presentation were basically the same for every country. We had to consider the political sensitivity of the African coun­tries—many of our African guests had just come from the Cairo Conference of the Or­ganization of African Unity, where there was considerable discussion of “nuclear dangers”—and be careful not to give national opposi­tion parties political ammunition to embarrass our guests at a later date. From visit to visit, our presentations differed slightly. But in every case, the message was the same: The cruise was being made under the motto “Nu­clear Power for Peace.”

The visitors were also given information on the capabilities and specifications of the ships and information about Carrier Air Wing 6 and its planes. They were advised that during the cruise the ships were not taking on one ounce of food, fuel, or other supplies for the ships. One purpose of the mission, the visitors were told, was to show friends of the United States these powerful and modern ships and their up-to-date weapons and aircraft. We underlined the fact that the task force was an important factor in the determination of the United States to maintain peace and that our nuclear power is dedicated to freedom throughout the world. During every phase of these visits, the briefings centered on the defensive capabilities of the task force. We did not apologize for, nor in any way play down, the tremendous offensive capability of Task Force One, but this message came across in its own way during the fire-power demon­strations. The tenor of the parting remarks of a number of the guests gave tacit acknowledg­ment that the best defense is a strong offense.

The remarks of most of the guests reflected their amazement at the high degree of tech­nical sophistication and training in the equip­ment and the men who operate the equip­ment. We Americans have come to accept this, but for many of these officials, especially in the areas not normally visited by the Navy, this was their first close look at a huge carrier and her jet planes. The reaction of one visitor, while not necessarily character­istic, mirrored the reactions of our African guests for many of us in the task force.

The visitor, Emile Badiane, Minister of Education, Health, and Welfare in Senegal, was representing the president, then on a state visit to France. Minister Badiane watched the entire air show, from the launching through the air demonstration, to the recovery of the aircraft, with hardly a word of comment. As he took the departing honors on the hangar deck, he stepped up to the microphone and made a moving speech of thanks. He declared that he and his colleagues were convinced of the friendliness and good intentions of the United States; “We have watched a demon­stration that only a great nation could pre­sent.” He pointed out that in his job he is responsible for the education and training of youth, and added: “I only wish our youth could have been here to see what hard work really is.”

For the most part, reactions voiced by the foreign visitors gave a good indication of their national preoccupations. The Africans re­sponded warmly to our statements that this was a nuclear force for peace and that we stood ready to use it for the defense of free­dom. They marveled at the high degree of training and professionalism represented in the crews and were particularly impressed by the youth of the aviators who could perform intricate flight maneuvers. The Pakistanis asked questions about the costs and availa­bility of various aircraft and other equip­ment. The Australians and New Zealanders were more interested in the range of the air­craft, the accuracy of the missiles and rockets, the speed and ability of the ships to get to trouble spots quickly and to arrive ready for practically any type of engagement.

Surprisingly, there were very few questions about radiation and radiation hazards. In several of the countries, we held small press conferences on board the carrier, and in Sydney and Rio de Janeiro we held press con­ferences with more than 50 reporters and correspondents at each place, but questions about radiation were few. This may have been because we addressed ourselves to this subject in the welcoming remarks at every visit and for every press conference, citing the Navy’s long experience in the field and the fact that we have never had an incident attributable to atomic radiation. We also arranged a demonstration with a Geiger counter to show that the amount of radiation present directly over one of the ship’s reactors was less than that from an ordinary, luminous-dial wrist watch.

Except for the newspaper of the Communist Party of Australia, none of the press reports we received along our route criticized Sea Orbit. We had anticipated a certain amount of critical comment, particularly on the topic of radiation, but we have not seen any so far. This is, of course, particularly heartening, and may well constitute a great breakthrough for the Navy. It is extremely important that key government officials in foreign countries feel assured that there is no danger involved in the visit of a nuclear-powered warship to their waters and ports.

Task Force One was fortunate in another way; the conduct of the crews ashore was out­standing. Despite the long periods between liberties—taken in Pakistan, Australia, and Brazil—and the size of Task Force One’s com­plement—6,057 officers and enlisted men—there was not a single incident involving U.S. sailors and members of the local populations. Certainly there were individual morale prob­lems, as on any cruise, long or short. But, in general, the esprit and behavior of the men were of the highest levels. One factor that undoubtedly contributed to this situation was that every member of the task force was thoroughly briefed on the aims of the opera­tion. This was not just another cruise for the men. Talks by the ships’ skippers, daily situa­tion reports, stories in the ships’ newspapers, specially prepared port information folders, and special programs on the Enterprise’s closed-circuit TV system all served to get across in­formation on the nature, meaning, and pur­poses of Operation Sea Orbit.

The purposes of Operation Sea Orbit, stated simply, were:

•       To test the capability of these nuclear-powered ships to maintain high speeds for indefinite periods over long distances in all environments of weather, seas, and seasons, without refueling or replenishment of any kind.

•       To demonstrate the mobility, flexibility, and strength of this element of U.S. power for keeping the peace.

•      To show these powerful, modern ships and aircraft to peoples in remote areas of the world.

•       To familiarize Navy personnel with in­frequently visited ocean areas.

•       To provide training and experience de­signed to improve our staying power at sea, particularly in remote areas.

•       To demonstate our ability to reinforce or to bring U.S. power quickly to areas far from established bases, and to arrive with that power ready to fight.

•      To enhance the military and political image of the United States.

Many Navy men experience a shudder at that word “image,” with its connotations of Madison Avenue and PIOs with overactive thyroids. Yet, we were acutely conscious of the public affairs aspect of this cruise in our visits arranged for these various foreign countries.

The senior officers of the task force met every evening for sessions during which the visits were discussed. We went over the econ­omy and geography of each country, the struc­ture of its government and political parties, its relations with other countries and other pertinent issues. The Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and other parts of the government had supplied us with up-to-date “position papers” on all the countries where visits were to be held. With the co­operation of the USIA, films produced by the various foreign governments showing their own countries were obtained on loan and projected on the Enterprise's closed-circuit tele­vision with the movies of the three ships. In effect, we first did a good public relations job on ourselves so that we could do a good public relations job for ourselves.

If the press coverage and the amount of radio and TV time in the foreign countries visited and the comments made and the messages received from our foreign guests are any indication, the men of Task Force One did an outstanding job.

 

Practicalities of Sonar Range Prediction

By Lieutenant Commander Allan N. Glennon, U.S. Navy, Staff, Operational Test and Evaluation Force

When sonar, particularly active sonar, was first introduced in the fleet for subma­rine detection, one of the mysteries attached to its use was the radical manner in which de­tection ranges varied with time and location. Even the physicists disagreed on the cause of these fluctuations during the middle and late 1930s. Eventually, refraction caused by varia­tions in sound velocity was generally accepted as the cause. Today, virtually everyone con­cerned with sonar operation has some appre­ciation of how to interpret a bathythermogram in terms of sonar performance.

It has taken a long time to reach this point. Only in the past ten years or so has the Navy produced a generation of tactical commanders who have enough knowledge of the idio­syncrasies of sonar to recognize that a set that detected a submarine at 3,000 yards in the morning will not necessarily do the same in the afternoon. Despite greater understand­ing of the effects of the environment on sonar performance, there remain significant gaps in the knowledge of many daily users of sonar. One such gap concerns the prediction of sonar detection ranges.

Since the publication of the sonar range prediction tables a decade ago, the fleet has had ample time to become familiar with them and proficient in their use. Yet, judging by periodic complaints that the tables are inac­curate, it is obvious that many of the users do not yet fully understand the meaning and function of a sonar range prediction.

The mechanics are deceptively simple. Given a known sonar frequency, surface tem­perature, layer depth, and performance figure, the tables provide a predicted range for an in-layer and a below-layer submarine. Because the tables are printed in an official publication of the Bureau of Ships, there is a natural tendency to assume that when the book says 3,000 yards, all submarine detec­tions should occur at precisely 3,000 yards. When an actual detection occurs at 2,500 or 4,000 yards, the immediate reaction is to as­sume the prediction system has failed.

Predicting a sonar detection range in­volves equating the sonar system capability to a combination of transmission loss in the water and target characteristics. Very few of the quantities involved in this equation can be relied on to remain constant for any length of time, and most of them are beyond the control of the sonar user.

The sonar system capability is described by the performance figure, an indicator of the overall state of the hardware. This figure is the difference, stated in decibels, be­tween the source level (acoustic power out­put) of the sonar, and the background noise level, which governs the detectability of the echo. As the sonar performance figure in­creases, sonar detection range capability improves. With a well-maintained sonar, the per­formance figure is relatively stable, varying mainly with ship’s speed. The effect of ship’s speed is usually well-known on board ship, so the basic performance figure seldom offers a problem in the range prediction process.

Although the performance figure itself is relatively stable, the effective use of a sonar calls for an operator to recognize that an echo has been returned. The signal-to-noise ratio needed by individual operators to de­tect an echo may vary over a spread of as much as 15 decibels from the poorest to the best operator. An individual operator may have his own variation of 5 to 10 decibels, depending on his physical and mental condi­tion and his knowledge of whether a submarine is in the area. Some of these influ­ences can be accounted for as adjustments to the sonar performance figure, but some un­known variation will always be present.

The transmission loss depends on many separate characteristics of the ocean, the most critical of which is summed up on a bathythermogram. These environmental condi­tions are, at best, known only approximately, and for specific times and places. A bathythermogram taken four hours ago and 60 miles away is not a very satisfactory indicator of present sonar conditions. Less obvious is the fact that, even at the instant it is taken, it is not necessarily an accurate indicator of ex­pected performance, since it speaks only of the particular place and time it originated and tells nothing of conditions elsewhere in the regioji being searched by the sonar. De­spite these limitations, it is the best available indicator of the local environmental factors and certainly should be used.

Among sonar users, the effect of the sonar frequency on transmission loss is well-known, at least qualitatively. Similarly, most people concerned with sonar are aware to some ex­tent of the effects of sea state, of layer depth, and of negative thermal gradients. Less ap­preciated are the short-term changes in all these factors which cause transmission loss to vary in a random, unpredictable manner.

Target strength is the final factor to be considered. It is both intuitively apparent, and borne out by tests, that a submarine pre­senting a beam aspect will return a stronger echo than one presenting its bow or stern to the sonar beam. From a large number of measurements made by several different laboratories, a standard curve of target strength versus aspect has become well ac­cepted. Since the curve is a composite, repre­senting several submarines, several frequen­cies, and several different measuring tech­niques, individual submarines may not follow this curve exactly. This can lead to small errors in assumptions based on the curve. An additional source of error has been indicated in target strength measurements using scale-model submarines. In these tests, a change in aspect of only a degree or two led to sizeable changes in target strength. Changes of this sort may very likely occur with full-sized sub­marine, but get smoothed out in the measur­ing process. Even if we ignore this possibility, and assume that all submarines fit the stand­ard curve of target strength exactly, there is a spread between the target strength at bow and beam aspects.

To make a sonar range prediction, the per­formance figure, which may be corrected for operator characteristics, is equated to the transmission loss corrected for target strength. Thus, if we knew at any instant the precise value of the unpredictable parts of the equa­tion, we could correct the performance figure accordingly before entering our range predic­tion manual.

To achieve a workable system of range pre­diction, the short-term variations must be smoothed out. There are, fortunately, sta­tistical techniques that permit this. In studying transmission loss, for example, thou­sands of measurements at many sonar fre­quencies and under a wide variety of en­vironmental conditions permit a general cor­relation of transmission loss with range. For a given sea surface temperature and layer depth, the transmission loss to a specific range will have some average value, and fluctuations about that average follow a normal distribu­tion. An average operator and a random-aspect submarine can similarly be described. By using these statistical inputs for operator, transmission loss, and target strength, it then becomes possible to construct a set of tables predicting average detection ranges.

From the way the actual values of the in­puts fluctuate it is apparent that these tables cannot be expected to give the precise range at which the next submarine will be detected. Nor does it appear likely that any system could be devised, with our present knowledge, that could do this.

Even though the precise range cannot be stated with any certainty, there are several statements that can be made with consider­able confidence. First, over a long period of time, and with a large number of contacts, the average of all detection ranges will correspond to the tabulated average. This has been shown recently by an analysis of more than 1,000 in­dividual detections made in both the Atlantic and Pacific during the past 11 years. The average values and the spread of values were within the limits stated in the introductory pages of the range prediction manual.

Second, if the spread of values in the input factors is known, the accuracy of the range prediction can be estimated. To oversimplify statistical terminology and practice, standard deviation is the term used to denote the spread of data. For a normal distribution, about two-thirds of the point are within one standard deviation of the average. The standard devia­tion of a combination of factors is the square root of the sum of the squared standard devia­tions of each of the factors. For example, if the operator, transmission loss, and target strength each had a standard deviation of five decibels, the total standard deviation of their combination would be between eight and nine decibels. If this were the case, a look at the range prediction tables eight or nine decibels either side of the tabulated performance figure would show the ranges within which two-thirds of all targets will be detected. Three standard deviations encompass about 99 percent of all contacts.

Third, since sonar detection ranges tend to follow a normal distribution, the predicted range will be the median detection range for all contacts. That is, it is the range for a 50 percent probability of detection since, over a long term, 50 percent of all contacts will have been made by the time the range has closed to the tabulated value. By the same reasoning, 50 percent of all submarine detections will not have occurred by that range, so must occur at some lesser range.

In the case of the sonar range prediction system, analysis of the 1,000 contacts men­tioned previously has demonstrated that it is as accurate as knowledge of the required input data allows. Refinements to the system might be possible but would be very difficult to ob­tain, and might be more costly than they would be worth. The effect of refinements can be estimated on the basis of standard deviations. In the previous example, a five-decibel standard deviation for each of three factors resulted in just under nine decibels total standard deviation. If operators could be standardized to a standard deviation of one decibel without affecting the other two factors, the new effective standard deviation would be just over seven decibels, for a net reduction of less than two decibels.

It would be overly optimistic to suppose any similar reduction could be obtained in the standard deviation of target strength. This could occur, perhaps, if enemy tactics were so inflexible that we could invariably count on every submarine having a specific aspect when detected. No other means for feducing the spread of target strength ap­pears reasonable.

The spread of transmission loss appears to be as difficult to reduce as that of target strength. Even if we had knowledge of oceanographic conditions for several miles around each ship, this knowledge would be difficult to keep timely. Such area-wide knowledge would of necessity have to treat with gross characteristics and ignore the microstructure of the ocean. Transient effects not covered by any data collection system would continue to cause a spread in the data.

Unlikely though it is that these reductions could ever be achieved, let us arbitrarily as­sume that the three factors could be reduced to standard deviations of one, two, and three decibels. The effective standard deviation would then be less than four decibels, or down five decibels from what it had been. Even though the standard deviation is more than halved, it still exists, and although the spread in predicted detection ranges is smaller, the precise range at which the next target will be detected still cannot be predicted.

A demonstration that the range prediction system now in use rests on a firm statistical base is small comfort to the operator who wants to know what his detection range is going to be and never seems able to pull a precise prediction out of the book. He is not likely to feel any great elation at being told there is little prospect that he can ever do better than he now does. On the other hand, knowing these two facts, it would be well for him to adjust to them, for the time being at least, and learn to live with them as long as they are the facts of life.

To live with our sonar range prediction system, one must first consider its functions. Primarily, a range prediction system assists a tactical commander in the disposition of his sonar-equipped unit or units, whether he is screening, conducting a hot search, or patrol­ling a barrier. Second, it aids him in specify­ing the range scales and search sectors for his sonars. Third, it may help him to select an area or a routing best suited to his mission. Finally, he gets an assessment of his own detectability by submarine sonar.

The next question to consider is how differ­ently a commander would dispose his units, or otherwise change his tactics if he knew that his next three submarine detections would occur at precisely 2,245, 2,810, and 3,985 yards, rather than at 3,000 yards, give or take 1,000 yards. It seems reasonable to assume there would be no difference in the commander’s reaction to the two situations.

It is conceivable that some on-scene cor­rections could be made to get a slight increase in the accuracy of predicted detection ranges or to reduce any consistent error, or bias, that may be present. By careful testing, for ex­ample, a performance figure correction could be derived for each operator. Since the opera­tors change off every half hour, taking ad­vantage of this knowledge would require that the tactical commander readjust all his units twice every hour, with the changes tailored to the new performance figures of each of his units. With continuous bathythermograms, he could spend all his time reorienting, if he desired, fitting the half-hourly operator cor­rections into the continuous corrections for temperature changes.

This plea to the absurd is made simply to point out that if a range prediction system is to be workable, the physics, the ocean, and the human factors combine very persuasively to make us favor the use of averages. Stand­ard operating procedures designed around the averages compensate for some of the extremes and make certain that inherent inaccuracies in the system do not lead us into major error.

The function of the sonar range prediction system is, therefore, to give the tactical com­mander a picture of the overall performance of his units rather than to predict the precise range to the next submarine contact. The system, by the limitations of nature, cannot do the second; it does the first to as great a degree as our knowledge of conditions will permit.

 

Sea Legs for the Hercules

By Lieutenant James J. Mulquin, U.S. Naval Reserve, Ship Installations Office, Bureau of Naval Weapons

A test program during October and No­vember 1963 resulted in the successful launching and recovery of a KC-130F Hercules transport/tanker aboard the aircraft carrier Forrestal (CVA-59). The giant aircraft—the largest ever to operate from an aircraft car­rier—was recovered without the aid of an arresting hook or crossdeck cables, and the take-offs were made without any assistance from catapults or other launching devices.

The initial trials of the project were con­ducted at the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, with a modified KC-130F and a simu­lated Forrestal-class flight deck. The test air­craft was the standard transport/tanker ver­sion of the Hercules with its inflight refueling pods removed, a modified nose strut added, and an improved anti-skid braking system installed. When the work at Patuxent was completed, 95 take-offs and 141 landings had been logged at aircraft weights between 80,000 and 100,000 pounds. These tests con­firmed optimum take-off and landing tech­niques, established wave-off characteristics, stall response, and related flight qualities.

Optical landing system approaches were made on both wet and dry runways at be­tween 2-degree and 3-degree slope settings. Average sink speeds were found to be well within aircraft limits, and, with all other char­acteristics being satisfactory, shipboard testing commenced.

The Forrestal conducted three series of evaluations, one to verify airflow effects on approach path stability, and the two with actual launches and full-stop recoveries. The carrier’s crossdeck arresting cables were detached, and all aircraft were cleared from the flight deck to provide the maximum unobstructed area. The landing signal officer windshield was lowered to permit additional wing clearance, and a white stripe was painted the length of the axial deck for pilot reference. The standard Mark 6 Model 0 fresnel lens was employed at settings between 3.5 degrees and four degrees, depending on wind over the deck.

On 30 October 1963, the Hercules made 44 approaches to the Forrestal, 16 resulting in touch-and-go landings, with the remainder wave-offs, executed to determine the aircraft’s performance response along the glide slope. A week later, three touch-and-go and four full-stop landings were made at weights up to 92,000 pounds. At approach speeds of 90 to 100 knots, landing roll-outs were accomplished to as little as 270 feet. By providing direct voice contact with the pilot, it was possible for the landing signal officer to give the pilot a verbal “cut” when four feet off the deck. The pilot could then reverse engine throttles while still airborne and immediately initiate braking action upon touchdown. Four deck take-offs were made with the aircraft operating at weights up to 90,000 pounds and roll distances as low as 330 feet. These launches were ac­complished in gusty wind conditions (36 to 43 knots) and intermittent rain. Lift-off speeds ranged between 60 and 80 knots.

The final carrier test period, 21 and 22 November, resulted in 24 approaches, including seven touch-and-go and 17 full-stop landings. These were on both wet and dry decks, at gross weights in excess of 100,000 pounds and approach speeds from 91 to 109 knots. An average shipboard sink rate of approximately five feet per second was obtained, with touch­downs consistently recorded within 50 feet of the optimum 3-degree glide slope target. Seventeen deck take-offs were made under varying sea and wind conditions.

The extreme dimensions of the C-130, its 132 1/2-foot wingspan, 97 2/3-foot length, and 38 1/4-foot vertical stabilizer make its presence on a typical flight deck restricting to normal opera­tions. Although the Navy has no plans to make such landing and take-off procedures normal within the fleet, the promise of a logistic aircraft capable of taking off and landing with 30,000 pounds of cargo and offering a range of 1,500 to 2,000 miles is certainly attractive to naval planners.

(The aircraft pilot in these tests, Lieutenant James H. Flatley III, U.S. Navy, has been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for these tests and his co­pilot, Lieutenant Commander Walter W. Stovall, U.S. Navy, has received a Gold Star in lieu of a third Air Medal.—Editor.)

 

The Procurement of Patents

By Lieutenant Harold E. Ford, U.S. Navy, Formerly assigned to Air Development Squadron Four

Navy personnel design, build, and use a great variety of tools, test machinery, test equipments, or technical procedures that are patentable. To process patents, the Navy Department has established a number of Patent Counsel Offices. These offices are in the business of helping the Navy and the per­sonnel of the Navy, both civil and military, to obtain patent rights for their inventions.

Private enterprise usually requires the in­ventor to give up his rights completely in the invention in return for a small stipend, thus permitting the company he works for to hold the patent exclusively. The Navy receives either total rights or royalty-free use of such patents as are granted through the efforts of the Patent Counsel Offices, depending on the circumstances of the development of the in­vention. The assignment of the rights to an invention depends primarily on what it is and how it was developed. To own an invention exclusively, a Navy man must have paid all the expense of its development him­self, have made the invention during his off-duty hours, and have invented something that did not involve use of a government con­tribution in facilities, equipment, materials, funds, information, or time or services of other government employees on official duty. Also, the invention must not bear a direct relation to the inventor’s official duties nor be a con­sequence of them. If the service inventor can show he did invent something without any of the government help outlined above, and that the invention is of value to the government, he may let the government patent it for him in exchange for royalty-free rights he gives to the government.

There is considerable confusion as to what constitutes a patentable idea. Most inventions that result in patents are not new machines or processes, but are improvements or changes to existing machinery, ideas, processes, chemical combinations, or tools. Whether the in­dividual concerned feels that his idea, process, tool, or machine is patentable does not enter into the picture. As a member of the govern­ment, he has a certain obligation to disclose his invention to the proper authorities so that the government’s interests can be protected. This can be done by a simple letter through channels or by a formal patent request.

A patent request requires certain back­ground work before it is submitted. First, a determination of the validity of the patent request must be made; the invention must appear to be in fact a new idea or a patentable improvement to an existing idea. Second, the work done to develop the invention must be documented. Finally, the invention must be illustrated or a model of it must be made.

Determination of the validity of the inven­tion is always difficult. No serviceman can know all the inventions that are on the market, but he does know of certain problem areas in his work, and he can make an educated guess as to the validity and originality of his ideas for improving or solving them. The best rule to follow here is to contact the nearest Patent Counsel Office for assistance in de­termining if the idea is patentable.

Documentation of a patent is perhaps the hardest of the prerequisites because of the overabundance of paperwork in the Navy. The inventor should keep a bound workbook, in ink, with corrections lined out with single lines and initialed. The pages should be dated and signed, if feasible even witnessed as they are signed. The workbook should have no pages torn out. This workbook is more authentic if done in the inventor’s own long­hand. Bureau of Aeronautics Instruction 5210.4 of 15 December 1954 prescribes the exact standards for this workbook.

There is also the requirement that the in­vention be put in transmittable form. This may require building a model, making a drawing, or some other form of illustration or descrip­tion. The inventor should be certain to include the exact dimensions, changes in materials, or anything that sets the idea apart from items that may be currently available. If a workable model is built, any tests of it should be entered in the workbook.

Once the invention is firmly developed in drawing or other form, it is necessary to “dis­close” it. This can be done by showing it to anyone who has sufficient knowledge in the field of the invention (i.e., electronics, food preservation, metallurgy) to understand the presentation. It is best to disclose the idea to several qualified people and to get a few dated signatures on the drawings, as such dates come into play when the patent office has to decide if the invention was thought of before some other, equally good design was de­veloped. If the invention is in model form alone, the inventor should get the disclosure authenticated on a document, dated and signed by the person(s) to whom the inven­tion was disclosed.

After the disclosure, it is necessary to submit two governmental forms, NAVEXOS 2374 and 2375, the Record of Invention and the Dis­closure of Invention, respectively. The forms should be submitted, along with the docu­mentation of the invention, to the nearest Patent Counsel Office.

From the division officer’s viewpoint, the field of patents can offer some very beneficial side results. The first is the mental attitude of his men, who will have proof that the service does care about their attempts to find a better way to do the job. Often one successful at­tempt at patenting an invention will infect others of the division with a desire to dupli­cate the feat, thus multiplying the good de­rived from the patent.

However, overcoming the inertia of the average division and getting the people to participate in an inventing program is not easy, due primarily to the misinformation that surrounds this subject. Usually the first false statement that has to be squelched is the one that proclaims a Navy man to have no property in any invention he devises while in the service. This concept is erroneous because the commercial rights to an invention are often assigned to the inventor. Each determination of the government’s equity in an invention is reviewed by a Government Patents Board ap­pointed by the President.

The Navy is so strongly in favor of en­couraging inventions by its personnel that the Navy Commendation Medal and the Secre­tary of the Navy Commendation for Achievernent are authorized for award to personnel who invent items and processes of benefit to the service. Such awards would be reflected in the inventor’s record, and they would give weight to his application for the limited duty officer program or his multiple for advance­ment in the enlisted grades.

It has been the author’s experience that there are many patentable, worthwhile ideas being generated in the minds of naval per­sonnel. To illustrate this it is only necessary to describe the results of a recent drive that was made to obtain patentable ideas from the men of my present division. To date, one chief petty officer has proposed a way to hang a certain ordnance store on an aircraft that was not originally designed to carry it; another petty officer has designed, built, and is using a test bed for an aircraft composite air data computer. Still another petty officer, not in the division, has invented a tool for jet engine maintenance, and a warrant officer has pro­duced a workable navigation aid for aircraft. Of these men, only one, the warrant officer, made any attempt to patent his idea. At this writing, all of the inventions mentioned are being prepared for patent application.

Notebook

U.S. Navy

s Navy Speeds 'Gun Gap’ Cure (From A1 Costello in Navy Times, 6 January 1965): The Navy has ordered full steam ahead on a many­pronged program that, by the mid-70s, not only will eliminate the “gun gap” but actually will exceed the firepower the Marines insist they need to support amphibi­ous landings. Discussing the shape the new program may take, a high-ranking naval officer told Navy Times that the requirements the Marine Corps recently submitted to De­fense Secretary Robert S. McNamara indicate that the present “gun gap” boils down to “one cruiser in each ocean.”

This is in terms of numbers of cruisers, of course. The Marines feel that the present cruisers have too few guns and that the missiles which have replaced guns do not carry out the job of shore bombardment as well. In fact, the Marines would like some of the 16-inch guns of the World War II and Korea battle­ships, as well as the 8-inch guns of heavy cruisers, backing them.

Atop the list of revolutionary changes in ships and equipment is a program calling for development of surface-to-surface guided missiles mounted on “super” landing force support ships which will be “triple threat­en.” In addition to missiles, the ships will be armed with conventional guns and rockets. In effect, they will replace at least one, prob­ably two and possibly three cruisers and close the “gun gap” breach.

Development of these ships, scheduled to make their appearance in 1972-1975, already has begun. Only the incorporation of the missiles, which must be especially constructed and developed, is holding up drawing of blueprints for their construction.

Development of these ships not only has the full approval of McNamara but so in­trigued is he by their many possibilities he has ordered acceleration of their develop­ment, it has been learned.

The reduction of guns aboard warships (gun gap) through the installation of missile systems was described by Marine Comman­dant Gen. Wallace M. Greene when he pre­sented requirements the Marines figured they needed in support of a beach assault.

The Marines asked for six destroyers in direct support of the landing battalions; two cruisers in general support; one cruiser in general support of the entire division and four medium landing ships rocket (LSMRs) in general support of the expeditionary force. McNamara okayed all of the requirements except the one cruiser for general support of the division.

The third cruiser could not be obtained except by taking two (one for each ocean) out of mothballs. Thus, the Marines will be operating in amphibious assaults from the present until 1971 one cruiser short of re­quested requirements.

“That is the ‘gun gap’ difference,” the high ranking Navy officer says, “one cruiser in each ocean.”

By 1972-1975, when the new landing force support ships are available, the Navy figures requirements will be these:

Seven destroyers in direct support of the Marine landing battalions; three of the new landing force support ships in general sup­port; one cruiser in general support of the landing division and one of the support ships in general support of the expeditionary force.

Thus, four of the new support ships will eliminate two cruisers and the four LSMRs, yet with the support ships’ “triple threat” ability with guns, rockets and missiles, the “gun gap” is expected to be effectively closed. At least the Navy believes so.

s Skyhawk Trainer (Flying Review Inter­national, January 1965): The U. S. Navy cur­rently plans to re-programme Fiscal 1965 funds in order to purchase thirty-five Douglas TA-4E two-seat trainer versions of the single­seat A-4E Skyhawk attack aircraft. These are scheduled to supplant the Grumman TF-9J Cougar in the trainer inventory.

ft* Phantom II Developments: (Flying Re­view International, January 1965): The USAF ^ls currently studying a more advanced model pf the Phantom II designated F-4E. The F-4D ^!s funded for Fiscal 1965 and differs from the F-4C in having a modified sight system and ■toproved ballistic computer, and the F-4E '''ill have a new fire control system for im­proved air-to-air intercept and air-to-ground ^afiack capability. The designation F-4J allocated by the U. S. Department of De­fence to the proposed Spey-powered version fer the Royal Navy has reportedly been suc­ceeded by F-4K.

S3 New Missile for Navy ( The Christian Sci­ence Monitor, 2 January 1965): The Navy has °rdered development and pilot production of ^a new antiaircraft missile which would re­place two other missiles plagued by accuracy Problems.

It awarded a $13,050,000 contract to Gen­eral Dynamics, in Pomona, Calif., to make toe new standardized shipboard missile to ^replace the Tartar and the Terrier.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ^told Congress earlier this year the Navy had experienced difficulties with these missiles.

ft* Drop in Soviet 'Overflights’ (Albert Sehlstedt, Jr., in Baltimore Sun, 6 January 1965): Russia’s aerial reconnaissance of Amer­ican aircraft carriers at sea decreased sharply to 1964, according to information made avail­^able yesterday at the Pentagon.

There were four instances involving Soviet toconnaissance of carriers last year, com­pared to fourteen such instances in 1963, the defense Department said.

These occurred in the Sea of Japan in Jan- "ary; the Atlantic in May; the Western pacific, also in May, and the North Atlantic to September.

Soviet surveillance of American carriers toceived considerable attention in February, 1963, when Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, held a press conference to describe some “overflights” of carriers by long-range reconnaissance planes from Russia.

McNamara indicated that the planes actually flew over the carriers in several in­stances.

Since these occurrences in early 1963, the term “overflight” has often been used to describe Russian aerial reconnaissance of American carriers.

Actually, in most of these aerial inspections, the Russian planes have remained several miles away from the carriers.

The Navy, concerned that the flights could be regarded as an indication of aircraft carrier vulnerability, has repeatedly pointed out that the incoming planes have been picked up on radar and escorted to the area of the ships by American planes from the carriers.

It has also been noted by the Navy that finding carriers at sea in peacetime, when the ships’ place of departure and destination are not secret, is a much easier task than locating the same vessels with wartime restriction on that kind of information.

There is nothing illegal about these flights, as McNamara observed nearly two years ago. The United States has, on occasion, flown over Soviet vessels at sea.

When announcing the overflights in 1963, McNamara implied that there had been re­connaissance of American ships by short- range planes, but never before by long-range aircraft. He said:

“I think the difference between these in­cidents I have outlined to you and those of the past is in the use of long-range aircraft and the carrying out of reconnaissance at a much greater distance from the Soviet Union than has been customary in the past when they limited their reconnaissance operations to the use of medium and shorter range air­craft.”

In response to a question about various Soviet motives for the overflights, the Defense Secretary said it would be “sheer specula­tion” to answer, but he thought the flights were a routine reconnaissance operation.

Nor is there any apparent reason for the marked decrease in these reconnaissance flights in 1964. One possible explanation: the Soviet Union proved its aerial surveillance capability in 1963 and only conducted a few flights in 1964 as reminders of what they could do.

S8 First of World War II E-wex-Class Axed

[Naval Aviation News, December 1964)—En­dorsing a letter originated by the President, Board of Inspection and Survey, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze approved the strik­ing from the Naval Vessel Register the USS Franklin (AVT-8). The ship, the ex-CVS-13, was declared “unfit for further naval service,” and stricken 1 October.

The Franklin was commissioned CV-13 on 31 January 1944. She was active in the Pacific until struck by a kamikaze on the flight deck. The plane crashed through to the gallery deck, showering destruction. Battered but under her own power, she proceeded to New York for battle damage overhaul, via Ulithi, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal.

Maritime General

s 'Float-On’ Vessel Planned (The New

Fork Times, 16 December 1964): The Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, of New Orleans, the nation’s largest subsidized cargo-ship operator, unveiled today a new concept in cargo shipping, the float-on, float-ofT vessel.

The concept, termed the Lykes Sea Barge Service by the company, represents, accord­ing to observers, the wedding of two existing transport methods—containers and the Navy’s LSD (landing ship dock).

The vessel proposed by Lykes is called the sea barge clipper. It would transport its cargo packaged in 22 to 24 large barges that would be stowed on two special decks. The barges would be floated on or floated off by submerg­ing the vessel and then pumping her dry again, as is done aboard LSDs.

On the Navy ship, however, landing craft are used instead of barges.

The development of the concept was prompted by the fact that the average mer­chant ship in regular service spends half her

active life in port loading and unloading cargo- With the sea barge clipper, unproductive time in port—ships earn money only when they are at sea—would be cut to a minimum- According to Frank A. Nemec, executive vice president of the steamship line, “the only outstanding problem to be solved is the crea­tion of suitable terminals both here and abroad.”

“The idea of the vessel is feasible and the ship itself is feasible,” he said.

The vessel would be 755 feet long with a beam of 110 feet and a speed of about 25 knots. Cargo space available in the 24 barges carried would be about 775,000 cubic feet— equivalent to the space available on the most modern American cargo ships.

See Photograph, Page 146

In operation, the clipper would travel to foreign ports but would stop off only long enough to launch and receive loaded barges- It would then go on to the next port on a fixed route. The barges, meanwhile, would be towed into port for unloading.

At a news conference at the offices of the Maritime Administration, which was also at­tended by Solon B. Turman, board chairman of Lykes, and Nicholas Johnson, maritime administrator, Mr. Nemec said that consider­able savings for shippers could be realized with the new vessel.

The savings to shippers of cargo, he said, could run 10 to 20 per cent below current costs. With employment of this new type of vessel, he declared, Government operating subsidy costs for a round trip would be about $27,000 as compared with about $60,000 for a conventional vessel.

Further economies, Mr. Nemec continued, could be realized by such practices as loading an outbound cargo barge at St. Louis, Mo., and then towing the barge down the Missis­sippi for overseas dispatch by the sea barge clipper.

Mr. Turman said that the integrated- system efficiencies inherent in the proposed float-on, float-off new service portend real and substantial reductions in the combined total cost of transportation in foreign trade—all to the advantage of the foreign commerce of the United States.

53 Russia to Build Super-Tankers (Balti­more Sun, 17 December 1964): The Soviet Union plans to build tankers of 75,000 dead­weight tons, a naval designer in Leningrad said yesterday.

Tass news agency quoted Dmitri Sokolov as saying the ships will be fully automated.

Leningrad designers will devote the whole °f next year to designing the super-tanker,” he said.

The displacement of the ships will be 100,000 tons, Sokolov said. Tankers are Usually measured by the amount of cargo they ^Can carry, called dead-weight tonnage, Whereas displacement tonnage measures the amount of sea water displaced by the loaded ship.                                                     ⁷

. Until a few years ago most tankers were m the 20,000-ton range but they are now be- ^lng built up in sizes over 100,000 tons and in ^a few years may reach to 150,000 tons.

53 Red China Orders Ships From Britain

(The Journal of Commerce, 5 January 1965): Communist China has ordered two 15,000 deadweight ton motorships from Britain and has purchased a third new ship already in commission from a U. K. operator.

It is understood that the construction transaction, on a cash-on-delivery basis, was Worth £2.3 million (S6.44 million).

The deal was worked out during a visit last July to Peking by a five-man shipbuilding mission representing several U. K. companies. The group decided that the first company most able to meet competitive conditions Would build the two vessels.

The two motorships will be built at the Sunderland yard of Wm. Doxford and Sons Whose chairman and managing director was a member of the Peking mission. Delivery of the first vessel is scheduled for the latter part °f 1966. The second will follow early in 1967. These cargo ships are the first to be ordered hy the People’s Republic of China, states the U. K. shipbuilding conference, and comments it is hoped that a further share of China’s ^shipbuilding demands will be secured in the future.” Both vessels will be cargo liner types father than general tramps.

The third ship is the London-owned 15,130- ^l°n cargo motorship London Tradesman which Was sold for £1,090,000, outright cash.

Delivery was effected at Whampoa earlier this week. Owned by London & Overseas Freighters Ltd., the ship has been in service for only one year, trading to the Far East from the United States Gulf, including one voyage to Australia.

The 17-knot vessel was built in Sweden by Uddevallavarvet A/B as one of a series of ships ordered by the owners in the mid-1950s.

This is the second modern ship to be pur­chased by the Communist Chinese in the space of a few weeks. In November they ac­quired the German-owned Etha Rickmers, an 11,330-tonner built in Bremerhaven in 1959.

s Cunard Awards Queen Contract (From James Feron in The New York Times, 31 December 1964): The Cunard Steamship Company, Ltd., signed a contract yesterday with John Brown Co., the Scottish shipbuild­ers, for a trans-Atlantic liner to replace the Queen Mary.

The keel will be laid next summer in the same berth of John Brown’s yard near Glas­gow in which the larger Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth were built before World War II.

The new ship, still unnamed, is scheduled for completion in 1968. She will have the same passenger capacity and cruising speed as the older Queens, but will be 30 per cent lighter, have a shallower draft and use half the amount of fuel.

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She will double as a cruise ship and be convertible to two classes. She will also have outdoor heated swimming pools, restaurants on higher decks with large windows, special launches to take passengers ashore and, unlike the other Queens, the ability to pass through the Panama Canal.

Official announcement of the signing ended months of speculation over the recipient of the highly prized contract, thought to total about $64 million. Five British companies submitted bids for the contract, although two later withdrew.

It also brought joy to Scotland, where shipbuilding has been in the doldrums.

John Rannie, managing director of John Brown, said the new ship would be a single­funnel ship equipped with automatic control systems. Most of the supplies will come from British concerns. The labor force at the ship­yard probably will total 6,000 at the height of construction.

Mr. Rannie said his yard’s good labor re­lations might have swayed Cunard in award­ing the contract.

“We have not lost an hour through demar­cation [jurisdictional] disputes for 11* years,” he said, “and I can’t remember when we had an unofficial strike.”

The financing was arranged by the Finance Corporation for Industry, Ltd., Ship Mort­gage Finance, Ltd., 11 clearing banks in London and five Scottish banks. Five-sixths of the construction cost will be provided by the Government in the form of a 10-year, 4* per cent loan.

John Brown will call the ship No. 736, after the number in its order book, until a name is selected. The Queen Mary was No. 534 and the Queen Elizabeth 552.

The ship will probably continue to be called the Q-4, however, until the name is chosen. The Q-3 project, an earlier attempt by Cunard to replace the aging Queen Mary, failed because the Government and the com­pany could not agree on credit terms.

	Queen	Queen	New
	At ary	Elizabeth	Ship
Launched...........	1934	1940	(Est.) 1968
Tonnage..............	81,237	83,673	58,000
Service speed, knots............	28 J	28*	28*
Length.................	1,020'	1,031'	960'
Beam...................	118'	118'	104'
Draft....................	39'4"	39'6”	31'
Passengers..........	2,000	2,200	2,000
Crew....................	1,282	1,290	1,000
Screws.................	4	4	2
Tons of fuel used a day............	800	800	400

s Metric Devices on Ships Urged (Wer­ner Bamberger in The New Tork Times, 27 December 1964): The Beaufort scale of wind measurement and Fahrenheit thermometers are doomed to extinction in world shipping if the World Meteorological Organization has its way.

A proposal to do away with the Beaufort wind instrument and to replace all shipboard Fahrenheit thermometers with metric-scale instruments was made earlier this month in Geneva. The proposal was made during a 15- day meeting of the United Nation’s agency’s Commission for Maritime Meteorology.

According to Paul H. Kutschenreuter of the LTnited States Weather Bureau and chief of the five-man American delegation at the Geneva meeting, a new and more accurate international system for measuring wind velocities is needed.

Mr. Kutschenreuter, who is deputy director of the Office of National Meteorological Services, said last week that the Beaufort scale was an indirect way of gauging wind speeds.

The Beaufort scale, originated in 1806 by Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort for use by British men of war, estimates wind speeds ac­cording to sea or wave conditions.

The scale, which has been in international use since 1874, should be supplanted, he said, by a system of reporting actual wind velocities as registered by shipboard anemom­eters.

“It is of much more scientific and naviga­tional value to know that winds of 85 knots are prevailing in a certain area than to know that ‘Force 12,’ or hurricane winds in excess of 75 knots, have been observed,” he said.

In addition to a new international wind scale, he said, all merchant vessels should be equipped with electrical anemometers (wind meters), calibrated either in kilometers or knots.

As for the commission’s proposal to do away with shipboard Fahrenheit thermom­eters, Mr. Kutschenreuter said world wide adoption of the metric, or Celsius, scale would “greatly simplify” weather reporting from ships by eliminating the need to convert Fahrenheit reading into their Centigrade equivalents.

A number of other proposals designed to

¹ niprove or extend the worldwide voluntary system of weather observations by ships were ^also submitted during the meeting, which was ^attended by 59 delegates from 32 countries ^and eight international bodies.

They include the following, Mr. Kutschen- ^reuter said:

•      Agreement on a new illustrated nomencla­ture to classify sea ice and on a new ice code for use by observers on ships and aircraft.

•      Agreement to widen the scope of weather observations at sea, particularly in sparsely traveled areas, by a system of stationary ocean 'veather buoys. These buoys would record and transmit such data as air pressure, surface ^Sea and air temperatures, wind direction and Velocity and underwater temperatures.

•      The extension of weather warning and forecast service to areas not now covered by ^such services.

•      Closer international cooperation in the development of ship routing techniques, to allow vessels to steer clear of storms and to reduce damage to ship and cargo.

•      The creation of more facilities aboard ^ships to take upper air readings to obtain more data needed for long-range forecasts.

69 Advanced U. S. Ships (Ingalls Ship­building Corporation Release, 31 December 1964): Ingalls Shipbuilding Division of Litton Industries will build four new advanced and ^automated cargo ships for American President bines, Ltd., of San Francisco, under a ^54,862,360 contract signed today in Wash- •ngton, D. C. between the two companies and ^lhe Maritime Administration, U. S. Depart­ment of Commerce.

Each ship will be 572 feet long, 82 feet 'vide, and have a 19,230 ton displacement.

Each will have a total cargo capacity, in­cluding refrigerated space, of 830,000 cubic feet. The liners have been tailored to handle ^a variety of cargoes, including liquid cargoes, reefer cargoes, bulk cargoes, automobiles, containers, and pallets.

_ A significant feature of the new hull design ^ls the use of high strength steel. The four ships will be the first commercial cargoliners to use high-tensile steel throughout.

It has been estimated that the hull weight "rill be reduced approximately 18% or 800— 900 tons, subsequently increasing cargo dead-

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weight and speed, and saving power.

To reduce port time for ships, APL has equipped the vessels with an increased num­ber of cargo handling devices at each hold and two of the seven holds will be equipped with triple hatches. This will allow quicker handling of cargo.

Another deviation from the standard American cargoliner design will be the use of a single boiler. The newly designed boiler, a larger and more efficient design than in con­ventional use, will require less maintenance and supervision by watch crews. The power plant will have central controls that will per­mit operation from the bridge.

The ships will have a cruising speed in excess of 23 knots. Luxury accommodations will be provided for 12 passengers in each of the four ships.

Although conventionally powered, the ships will have auxiliary- power for the gen­erator supplied by a 740 kw aircraft type gas turbine, which is being considered for possible propulsion use in future steamships.

s Grumman to Charter Denison (Mari­time Administration Release, 11 January 1965): Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., of Bethpagc, L. I., has bareboat chartered the Hydrofoil Ship Denison under an agree­ment negotiated by the Maritime Adminis­tration, U. S. Department of Commerce, it was announced today by Nicholas Johnson, Maritime Administrator.

The ship is being chartered to Grumman for SI a year, with a requirement that half of any profit in excess of 10% of expenses will be paid to the Government. The charter will permit a continuation of experimentation on oceangoing hydrofoil craft at no cost to the Government. The ship will be operated under U. S. flag and will continue to be available to all elements of the Government and indus­try for use as a valuable technological re­source. While structural changes may be made by the charterer, the ship is to be re­turned to the Government in its original condition.

The HS Denison was built by Grumman for the Maritime Administration as the world’s first oceangoing high-speed hydrofoil ship. Development of the ship was a cooperative project of the Federal Government and in-

dustry, with the government paying about ⁰ne-third of the total $9 million cost of build- ^Jng and operating the ship. The rest was con­tributed by Grumman, General Electric Corp., the Aluminum Company of America, and 70 other companies, which provided funds, materials, and components.

The ship was delivered in 1962 and was successfully tested off the Atlantic Coast, ^exceeding its designed speed of 60 knots and operating at over 50 knots in ten-foot waves.

In March 1964 it ran aground in the Cape Fear River and was extensively damaged. The ship has now been repaired and is ready to he returned to service.

Foreign

59 4 NATO Nations Plan Test (Albert Sehlstedt, Jr., in Baltimore Sun, 13 January 1965): Four NATO countries will soon form a squadron of destroyers to test the ability of an international naval force to operate as a unit for a long period of time.

The countries are Canada, England, The Netherlands and the United States.

Each nation will contribute one destroyer to the squadron which will sail under NATO command and engage in various maneuvers associated with anti-submarine warfare opera­tions.

The squadron, which will put to sea in February or March, might be the forerunner of other NATO naval units assigned to the North Atlantic.

The NATO countries involved in the de­stroyer operation, called Exercise Match­maker, regard the test as unique in that the Vessels will constitute the first such unit or­ganized for an extended period at sea.

The Matchmaker group will work together five or six months.

Member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization regularly conduct small exercises at sea for short periods, and large- scale maneuvers are held once every three or four years. But in all these instances the ships of the various nations are only together one or two weeks.

Matchmaker will provide the participating countries with an opportunity to study each other’s equipment and methods of replenish­ing vessels at sea and in port. The possibility of standardizing certain shipboard equipment for all the countries will be studied.

Each destroyer will be manned by its own nationals. There will be no mixed-manning of crews as has been proposed for the Multi­lateral Force of surface ships armed with Polaris missiles.

However, these four nations are among the seven NATO countries cooperating in the mixed-manning demonstration now being carried out aboard the United States de­stroyer Ricketts.

The Matchmaker Exercise will be con­ducted by Adm. Sir Charles Madden, of the Royal Navy, who is NATO’s commander in chief of the Eastern Atlantic with headquar­ters at Northwood, England.

Adm. H. P. Smith, of the United States Navy, and Supreme Allied Commander, At­lantic in the NATO structure, said Match­maker will involve a “new and promising con­cept” in the exercise of the Western alliance’s seagoing forces.

It has been pointed out that the NATO countries have always had the opportunity for joint maneuvers of land forces in Europe for extended periods, but not naval units. Matchmaker will change that.

s Repair Ship in Service {La Revue Mari­time, January 1965). The large repair ship HMS Triumph was commissioned 31 Decem­ber last. It is expected to depart soon for the “Far East Fleet,” in which it will replace the HMS Hartland Point.

The Triumph is a former light aircraft carrier of the Colossus class. Laid down 27 January 1943 and launched 2 October 1944,

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she was commissioned 9 April 1946. The conversion to “heavy repair ship” was begun in 1958 and has proceeded at considerable expense since that time. The vessel has been equipped with workshops and stockrooms.

s Last Corsairs (Flying Review International, January 1965): Flottille 14F, the last F4U-7 Corsair-equipped unit of France’s Aeronavale, was disbanded on October 1st at Cuers- Pierreten. The unit will be re-formed this year on the F-8E (FN) Crusader.

s U. S. to Help Spain (Paul Hofmann in The New York Times, 3 January 1965): Madrid —A United States mission is expected to visit Spain soon to prepare for a joint naval con­struction program, a navy spokesman an­nounced yesterday.

The United States will contribute licenses, information and special equipment to enable Spanish shipyards to build five missile-bear­ing frigates. The units, equipped also with anti-submarine weapons, are earmarked for convoy duty to guard transports to and from the Iberian Peninsula in case of war.

Spain turned to the United States for as­sistance in her naval program after talks with Britain broke down last June and the Govern­ment canceled contracts totaling the equiva­lent of $50 million. The action followed at­tacks on the regime of Generalissimo Fran­cisco Franco by Harold Wilson, the Labor party leader, who is now Prime Minister.

The frigates account for most of the $160 million the Government intends to spend dur­ing the next eight years for the Navy. The United States share of the total has not been disclosed.

Madrid is also negotiating with Paris for assistance in the construction here of two con­ventional submarines of the French Daphne class.

The proposed Spanish-United States col­laboration was prepared in recent months in talks that Vice Adm. Alvaro Guitian Vieito, director of the School of Naval Warfare, had with Adm. David L. McDonald, United States Chief of Naval Operations, and other American officers.

The U. S. Navy technicians who arc to come here will tour Spanish shipyards where the frigates will be built. The vessels will have a displacement of 3,000 to 4,000 tons and will carry Tartar surface-to-air missiles.

Spain’s naval program was approved Thursday by the National Defense Commit' tee, the regime’s military planning board. The Navy Minister, Pedro Nieto Antunez, said that the frigates and submarines repre­sented the first stage of a long-range modern­ization plan. Spain’s small fleet is superan­nuated.

The United States has recently given two transport ships to the Spanish Navy, which had already received several American de­stroyers, minesweepers and other craft.

s Vosper to Build Torpedo Boats for Malaysia ( The Marine Engineer & Naval Archi­tect, November 1964): The Ministry of De­fence of Malaysia has ordered four torpedo craft with speed believed in excess of 50 knots from Vosper Ltd., Portsmouth. The design selected is generally similar to that of the craft built by Vosper for the Royal Danish Navy. In the torpedo boat role the craft will carry four torpedoes each, with long range tanks in lieu of torpedoes can also operate as the gunboats or minelayers. Hull construction will be of resin bonded wood with a fibre­glass underwater covering to protect against marine growths. The three Bristol Siddeley Proteus gas turbine engines drive through special Vosper gearboxes and the two diesel engines are connected to the two wing gear­boxes to provide power for long range cruis­ing when the gas turbine engines are shut down. Small cruising diesel engines will give long endurance at slow speed.

s Nigeria’s New Frigate (The Marine En­gineer & Naval Architect, November 1964): YVilten-Fijenoord NV [The Netherlands] are building a 2,000 tons displacement frigate for the Nigerian Navy. The ship is basically simi­lar to the 1,865 tons displacement standard frigate designed by The Netherlands United Shipbuilding Bureau of which Wiltens are a member firm, and will have a length overall of about 357 ft, a moulded breadth of 37 ft 5 in and draught of 11 ft 4j in. The ship will be armed with 4 inch twin gun mounting, four 40 mm anti-aircraft gun mountings and a triple-barrelled depth charge mortar. The propelling machinery consists of two sets of twin geared, high speed MAN diesel engines, each pair driving a controllable pitch propel­ler through reduction gears and hydraulic couplings. The total output amounts to 15,500 shp for a trial speed of about 26 knots.

js2 Brazil Faces New Crisis (Nathan Miller m Baltimore Sun, 8 January 1965): Another military crisis between the Brazilian Air Force and Navy over who should fly planes off the nation’s only aircraft carrier appears to be brewing.

Newspapers and radio stations reported the resignation of Brig. Marcio Melo e Sousa, the Air Minister, after reports that the Navy has secretly placed planes aboard the carrier.

The Air Ministry, however, refused to con­firm the reports.

The reports quoted the minister’s wife as having said he had resigned but she gave no reason.

Melo e Sousa was appointed Air Minister less than a month ago by President Humberto Gastello Branco when his predecessor re­signed because of the fight over carrier-based planes. The Air Force shot up a Navy heli­copter before his departure.

News of the resignation appeared as a news­paper which has been a strong supporter of Gastello Branco’s military-backed Govern­ment called the administration’s “political solution” to the Goias case “a farce.”

The case involves the replacement of ousted Gov. Mauro Borges, who was pressured out of office by military “hardliners” on charges that he was guilty of subversion.

But a compromise worked out by Castello Branco’s aides with Borges’s Social Demo­cratic party is understood to include the drop­ping of the charges in return for the party’s support for a retired army marshal as the new governor.

The Sao Paulo paper A Folha, in a bitterly tvorded editorial, said:

“The setup has all the characteristics of a farce. It is a typical bargain in accordance with the political customs of a system against which a revolution was justifiable.

“Gov. Mauro Borges is either responsible for the crimes of which he is accused, or he is not. Any formula circumventing this question may demonstrate the cleverness of shrewd politicians but it is hardly compatible with revolutionary ideals...

“Tranquility cannot be reestablished in Goias and Brazil by such deals. Political prob­lems cannot be resolved on a fictitious basis...”

The pro-Government paper 0 Journal— which often espouses the “hardline” view­point—said a deal to drop the charges against Borges “would be the most complete de­moralization of the revolution.”

Castello Branco’s Government came to power through a coup which ousted leftist- nationalist President Joao Goulart last April 1. Borges was one of seven governors who helped choose Castello Branco, then Army Chief of Staff.

The fight between the Air Force and Navy over who is to fly planes off the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais has gone on for nine years. The carrier was bought from the British for $9,000,000 plus $27,000,000 for refitting.

The latest episode occurred as the ship sailed from Rio January 6 to head a Brazilian task force engaged in anti-submarine exercises off the coast.

When the carrier left port it was bare of planes in accordance with presidential or­ders, newspapers said. But it was later re­ported that five Navy planes had flown out to the ship.

Castello Branco is said to be planning to ask Congress to approve a solution for the carrier problem which gives the Navy the right to fly planes from the ship but it would not be allowed to maintain land bases.

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Both the Air Force and the Navy are said to be dissatisfied with the solution.

Float-On/Float-Off Ship—This sea barge carrier, proposed by the Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, may cut more than a month from present round-trip shipping time between Gulf ports and Europe. The LSD-type ship would carry pre-loaded cargo barges which would be floated off at ports of call, considerably reducing the ship s unloading and turn-around time.

First Flights—The Air Force ver­sion of the TFX, the F-lllA, has begun flight tests. The Navy’s F-lllB is expected to fly in May 1965. The large, low-pressure tires on the Air Force version— for rough field operation—will be replaced with smaller, higher pres­sure tires on the F-l 1 IB. The up­per view shows the F-lllA with its wings fully extended (16-de­gree sweepback) for long-range operation. The lower photo shows its wings swept back 72j degrees for high-speed flight.

Also Flew—Britain’s TSR.2 has also begun flight tests. The tactical strike/reconnaissance plane’s fu­ture is now in jeopardy because of the current British defense re­evaluations and the failure of Com­monwealth air forces to place orders for the plane. The F-l 11 has been mentioned as an alternate for the TSR.2.

SPAR Goes to Sea—The un­manned scientific platform SPAR (Seagoing Platform for Acoustic Research) is shown in its vertical operat­ing position (left) and its towing position (below). SPAR is 354-feet long and 16-feet in diameter. When vertical, SPAR has a "draft” of 302 feet and displaces 1,720 tons. Built by the Aerojet-General shipyard at Jacksonville, Florida (for­merly the Gibbs Corpora­tion), SPAR, will be used in ASW research projects. A similar manned research ve­hicle named FLIP (FLoating Instrument Platform) is in operation off the West Coast.