For the first time in history, nations have the weapons, technology, and means of waging war to enable each to obliterate, in a few hours, almost everything valued by the other. This destructive power has attached prime importance to the avoidance rather than the winning of war. Nonetheless, the maintenance of peace is by threat of war—by deterrence.
The deterrent policy, stated initially as “massive retaliation,” was adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1954. Although the conditions under which massive retaliation would be applied have been altered frequently since that time, the policy still remains the prevention of war by threat of nuclear retaliation. Is this a credible policy? To what extent can it deter a potential aggressor? Can it prevent all wars—general and limited, nuclear and conventional? What are its implications and consequent requirements for NATO?
Basis of Deterrence. The policy of deterrence is not new. Whether it was based on superior numbers, weapons, or defenses, the aggressor always compared the risks to the stakes involved. If the cost of the conflict did not exceed the advantages of victory, the risk was taken. When applied to nations which possess nuclear weapons, this risk entails the existence of the aggressor and defender, who would both suffer in generally equal terms. Therefore, to avoid mutual destruction, the aggressor must be made fully aware of the risks involved and the inevitable consequences of his actions. Not only must the defender openly proclaim his strategy and retaliatory capabilities, but he must also ensure that his proclaimed deterrent is credible. What does this credibility involve?
A deterrent is credible only when retaliation can inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy, and when the prospects of such losses restrain him from resorting to an aggressive blow. Therefore, the deterrent must possess two elements, both of which must be publicized continually for the benefit of a potential aggressor with the hope that he will accept the facts as stated and will act and react in a rational manner. These elements are an adequate reprisal capability in terms of weapons, and the will to use such weapons to retaliate automatically. In consideration of the first element, it is imperative that the weapons be relatively invulnerable to any type of initial enemy attack to ensure the survival of retaliatory means after an aggressive blow. The implements of retaliation must be quantitatively and qualitatively adequate in terms of range, accuracy, destruction, and in their ability to penetrate enemy defenses to cause him unacceptable losses. In addition, these weapon standards must be maintained through technological and scientific research, involving enormous costs which must be within the financial capacity of the defender.
The second element dictates that retaliatory weapons must be supported by reliable command machinery. This is essential to ensure that weapons are secure against accidental detonation to prevent initiation of war; that initial aggression can be absorbed; that reprisal will be automatic; and, that the will to retaliate, in the face of devastation will not waver. It is this reliability of command and certainty of response which constitute the main element of the deterrent policy and must cast no doubt. These are the essentials which lend credence to the deterrent. Can it prevent war?
War is usually considered in two main categories—general and limited. A general war can be defined as one in which the issue is a direct and mortal threat to the survival of a nation or group of nations, thereby implying the use of all weapons. A limited war is one in which neither side demands total victory or unconditional surrender, and the use and types of weapons are determined by the objectives of the operations. Depending on the types of weapons and forces used, war can be further classified in each category as nuclear or conventional.
It has been stated that the aggressor and defender would suffer in equal terms in a nuclear conflict. However, if target intelligence and selection, area destruction, and inaccuracies in weapon delivery systems create a favorable position, the advantage must go to the defender. The aggressor, to avoid reprisal, initially must aim his weapons to destroy those of reprisal before they are launched or before they reach their targets. It would be impossible for an aggressor, even with the benefit of a surprise, massive, nuclear attack, to destroy all retaliatory weapons on board ships, aircraft, submarines, and on mobile and underground launchers ashore. The tremendous amount of weapons that would be required to destroy these dispersed targets would reduce the numbers available for area destruction. Unknown locations of all such targets, the need for pinpoint accuracy to destroy protected targets, and the lack of an adequate defense against missiles which may have been launched in retaliation would further frustrate attempts of the aggressor so that very few of these targets could be destroyed. Retribution would be swift, inevitable, and devastating. The defender would not need to be so selective, because the aggressor’s launchers would be empty. He needs only to attack targets for area destruction, such as urban centers. Their known locations and vulnerability, coupled with the nuclear firepower that the defender would be able to obtain, would ensure their devastation. Regardless of his desire for conquest, a potential aggressor must surely decide that pursuit of his aims through general nuclear war can only result in utter disaster, with no gain or victory for either side. Thus, the deterrent will likely prevent planned general nuclear war.
If general nuclear war is not likely to occur, the possibility of general conventional war, wherein vital interests are involved, can be summarily dismissed. No nation which possesses nuclear weapons would allow itself to be overrun by an enemy using only conventional means. If a general conventional war approached this state, as it undoubtedly would, it is inevitable that the nation about to be defeated would be driven to unleash its nuclear weapons. Such reprisal would transform the defender into the nuclear aggressor, who must then destroy the retaliatory weapons or face devastation. The impossibility of destroying these weapons would result in a full-scale nuclear exchange or general nuclear war. Since general nuclear war is not likely to occur, and general conventional war is likely to lead to a nuclear exchange, it is apparent that the threat of nuclear weapons is a reliable deterrent to any type of planned general war, or a course of action which may risk general war.
The possibility of limited wars cannot be discounted. The Korean War showed that massive retaliation was not, in practice, applicable to every contingency. Nevertheless, the policy of deterrence does play an important role in limited wars. Massive retaliation and the development of low-yield nuclear weapons tend to apply a deterrent to limited wars. Decentralized control of low-yield weapons to military commanders who, in the heat of battle, might elect to use them to save defeat of their forces could cause a limited war to spread into general war. And who will determine whether a low-yield nuclear weapon, or its use, is tactical or strategic? This definition could result in general nuclear war. Finally, inaccuracies in delivery systems and the inability to pinpoint targets could result in dependence on larger and larger yield nuclear weapons, thus providing a built- in mechanism for escalation to general nuclear war.
Conversely, these same facts strongly support the possibility of limited wars, since neither side would be tempted to introduce nuclear weapons into a limited conflict, or to increase their sizes or targets at the risk of escalation. Therefore, although the deterrent does not prevent limited wars or preclude the use of nuclear weapons in such conflicts, it is very effective in keeping them limited when vital issues of the nations involved are not at stake. It follows that, despite a policy of deterrence, limited actions are still possible if a potential aggressor feels that they are not worth the risk of general war or that the defender will not take that risk. In fact, a reliable deterrent to general war makes limited wars, particularly limited conventional wars, even more likely.
Implications for NATO. The NATO policy of nuclear retaliation was based on a collective deterrent provided mainly by the United States, which assumed responsibility under NATO to retaliate with nuclear weapons even against a conventional attack by the Soviet Union, thereby preventing the latter from using its numerical superiority. However, the United States was invulnerable to retaliation. The acquisition of intercontinental ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union has provided a mechanism for general nuclear war by nullifying this invulnerability. Although the United States has maintained a realistic deterrent through technological and scientific research, dispersion, protection, and warning systems, the fact remains that its territory is now open to attack. Nuclear retaliation by the United States in the event of conventional attack would put it in the position of the nuclear aggressor. It would face the impossible task of destroying retaliatory weapons, and could not prevent receiving the full load of Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory. Thus, the validity of the deterrent policy was adversely affected when applied for the benefit of another nation.
To counter this invalidity, and in realization of the consequences of massive, nuclear retaliation, the United States accepted the possibility of limited wars. Massive retaliation was restricted for use only when vital interests were at stake. The weapons of massive retaliation were placed in support of low yield nuclear weapons which were introduced into Europe for limited reprisal, prevention of limited wars or, failing this, use in such wars, and to counter Soviet numerical superiority. The United States retained control of these weapons because of fear that their indiscriminate use could cause escalation to general nuclear war and subsequent destruction of its territory.
This tempered deterrent policy has served to complicate the NATO deterrent problem. NATO European nations wish to retain some degree of control over their destinies, and do not want to lose out on technological advances through dependence on the United States, which could seriously affect their future security and economic welfare if the United States should choose to withdraw from Europe. The recent withdrawal of ballistic missiles from Europe not only suggested U. S. disengagement as a real possibility, but also abolished the remaining meagre European influence on nuclear strategy. As long as the United States maintains control of nuclear weapons for NATO, European nations do not feel obliged to contribute conventional forces which can be destroyed by nuclear weapons against which they have no means of retaliation. They fear that the United States will hesitate to retaliate because of the consequences to its own territory, and argue that the deterrent loses its significance because the aggressor has the upper hand whenever intervention is in doubt. For the reasons discussed, and in the belief that it would be more realistic if the victim of aggression itself had a national retaliatory force, France has taken the lead in developing a national deterrent independent of NATO.
On the other hand, the United States submits that there is no thought of withdrawal from Europe and, instead of decreasing nuclear retaliatory power, it was being increased by the replacement of Thor and Jupiter missiles with generally invulnerable and, therefore, more credible Polaris missiles in submarines. The United States claims that its nuclear arsenal is more than adequate for a NATO deterrent and feels that other member nations should provide more adequate conventional forces. To encourage the provision of these forces, to discourage pursuits of national deterrents, and to give Europeans some control of their destinies, the United States has suggested an integrated nuclear deterrent under NATO control, but over which the United States would retain veto power. These divergent views of Europe and the United States have caused disunity and serious deficiencies within NATO, both of which adversely affect the credibility of the deterrent and must be examined in the light of deterrent factors discussed earlier.
An independent national deterrent has several advantages when considered in isolation. It can be less powerful than that required for territorial pacts and still be successful, as long as it will cost the aggressor more than he is prepared to sacrifice to conquer a nation. An independent national deterrent provides credence due to national spirit, and automatic retaliation because sovereignty is threatened and popular consent of several nations is not required for its use. Finally, such a deterrent suggests no direct confrontation of the great powers, and reduces the possibility of general nuclear war.
These advantages, however, when compared to the deterrent provided by the United States, fade into insignificance. Geography has provided the United States with distance for warning and territory for dispersion to enable it to retaliate even after an initial nuclear attack. European nations would have no such warning and would be bombarded in an initial nuclear attack to the extent that retaliation would be improbable. The immense costs of nuclear weapons and maintenance of a reliable deterrent preclude other countries from competing in the same class as the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which have a permanent lead in technology. Development costs of a national deterrent affect other NATO members, because such financial burdens lead to neglect of other obligations within NATO.
Moreover, an independent national deterrent poses considerable danger to NATO unity and existence. The obligation of the United States to deter the Soviet Union from aggression might become weakened or cease to exist. Countries which possess independent nuclear forces might consider them to be of such significance that they might ignore NATO as a whole, or pursue external political or military ambitions which could jeopardize not only peace, but the very existence of their NATO partners. Such a deterrent might be used against the will of the United States to start retaliatory forces into motion or cause confrontation of the great powers, the fear of which could cause the United States to isolate itself from Europe or impose limitations and qualifications on its obligations to its allies. NATO members might avoid taking risks in the defense of another member which possesses an independent nuclear deterrent for fear of nuclear destruction. Nations which possess independent nuclear forces are exposed to the danger of ultimatum-type demands supported by threats of nuclear destruction, commonly called nuclear blackmail, directed solely against themselves. In such cases, the nuclear forces of the threatened state would cause its allies to go off and “leave it in the lurch.” Although it must be agreed that a nation’s desire to control its destiny is the overriding factor, it is also obvious that the solution is not an independent national nuclear force. Such forces in the hands of European nations threaten the very existence of NATO and Western civilization, and lack conviction from the outset as a threat to the Soviet Union.
The establishment of a believable integrated deterrent under NATO control is also impractical. The greatest difficulty of such a force would be the status of the commander. To avoid dependence on a lone decision of the United States to retaliate with nuclear weapons, the employment of an integrated force suggests that several governments would run the risk of nuclear devastation. A unanimous decision, if reached at all, would hardly be made in time so that an aggressor would have less to fear than if one nation had the nuclear weapons as a right. It is also unrealistic to assume that states would surrender their sovereignties and place their fates in the hands of one NATO military commander. On the contrary, many nations would seize control of integrated forces stationed on their territories in time of tension, to avoid provoking retaliation. In an emergency, therefore, NATO would court the danger of falling apart since the integrated force might lose its value.
The reliability of an integrated deterrent in terms of invulnerability is also lacking. Land-based missiles serve only to attract nuclear fire and are not welcome to nations with a high population density or small area. Missiles on board ships or submarines might be suitable for deterrence against nuclear blackmail or attack against Europe, but the credibility of such a force would be very much less than the current credibility of the threat of retaliation by the United States. It would be quite misleading to imagine a nuclear duel only between the Soviet Union and the European part of NATO. It is apparent, therefore, that an integrated nuclear force cannot rid NATO of its strategic dilemma or reduce the long-term risk of nuclear retaliation to the United States.
Regardless of the continuation of the present collective deterrent, or the emergence of a national or integrated deterrent, the policy of deterrence adopted by NATO has produced serious deficiencies in its structure. Despite the fact that nuclear parity makes limited wars more likely, NATO has not the means to meet such events without risking general war. NATO has chosen to ignore the laws of nuclear weapons which favor the defender, and threatens to meet any type of Soviet aggression with nuclear weapons, thus automatically accepting nuclear devastation regardless of the stakes of the conflict. Dependence on this policy has provided an inadequate ground defense in Europe, and forces that do exist are used merely to provide justification, if attacked and overrun, to use nuclear weapons. Again, NATO would seemingly choose to become the nuclear aggressor and pave the way for retaliation. Member nations have not honored their conventional force obligations, and forces that have been provided are national in organization, size, mobility, equipment, and concepts. It is not reasonable to expect such a mixed force to be capable of offering prolonged resistance.
The advantage gained by low-yield nuclear weapons in countering numerical superiority was nullified by similar Soviet weapons. Yet, these low-yield weapons have had the effect of producing even fewer ground forces, not strengthening the deterrent, and they can cause general war in the hands of military commanders. This puts NATO at a disadvantage when compared to the Soviet Union which maintains both nuclear and conventional forces. In case of conventional war, NATO would have the choice of surrendering territory, accepting piecemeal capitulation, or initiating nuclear war, for its mere token forces could not be effective in anything less than a life-and-death struggle. In short, the nuclear stalemate has increased the need for NATO shield forces as a deterrent and defense, and has increased the risk of belonging to NATO unless adequate forces are provided without resort to nuclear weapons. Since it is not likely that the Soviet Union will attempt nuclear suicide, but might pounce quickly for limited objectives, NATO must meet this threat.
Requirements for NATO. NATO has two basic requirements: a nuclear capability to counter or dissuade Soviet use of nuclear weapons, and for use in limited situations of vital importance; and a structure to counter limited non-nuclear aggressive activity without resort to nuclear weapons. Within these requirements, the primary one for NATO is the maintenance and improvement of the nuclear deterrent which must be suitable for both strategic and tactical employment under centralized control. The next requirement, but of equal importance, is the creation of adequate conventional forces.
The sole purpose of the strategic nuclear force must be to prevent general war, or aggression whereby vital interests are at stake, by threat of nuclear retaliation. Since this force will not be committed until after it fails in its purpose and an aggressive blow has been struck, it must possess all the essentials of a credible deterrent discussed earlier. The United States now has such a trustworthy deterrent on behalf of NATO, consisting of long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and missile-firing submarines and surface ships. Since quality and performance, not quantity, are essential, there is no need to create additional strategic nuclear retaliatory forces, either national or integrated, within NATO. In addition, the United States is the only nation within NATO which can continue to maintain a reliable deterrent because of finances, resources, advanced technology, and vast territory. The question of hesitation rather than automatic retaliation on behalf of a member nation is insignificant when applied to the strategic nuclear force, because no nation would hesitate to retaliate in a life-and-death struggle. The use of this strategic nuclear force for retaliation against any other type of Soviet attack will not be necessary with the provision of tactical nuclear forces and adequate conventional forces.
Low-yield nuclear weapons, augmented as required with higher yield, longer range weapons, should be considered as part of the nuclear deterrent and not part of the ground or air forces. The value of armies is essentially that of providing a non-suicidal safeguard against attack which these nuclear weapons would nullify because their decentralized control and use by military commanders to avoid limited defeat could cause general war. In addition, dual-purpose forces deployed for conventional warfare but equipped with nuclear weapons invite the very attack to which they are most vulnerable. The proper employment of low-yield nuclear weapons, therefore, is within a separate NATO nuclear strike force designed to counter limited nuclear aggression, or for use in limited vital issues, by engaging battlefield targets and military targets of interdiction. For the same reasons that the United States should provide the strategic nuclear forces for NATO, the weapons of the nuclear strike forces should also be provided by the United States. The communications available, and ranges and delivery means of these weapons, will permit nuclear strike forces to be held well to the rear where the use of their weapons can be considered dispassionately within the over-all tactical plan rather than in the heat of the battle. Thus, an additional safeguard against escalation to general war is provided.
It is also through nuclear strike forces that a nation’s desire to control its destiny can be satisfied, by assigning a dual purpose to these forces—a NATO deterrent and a national deterrent function. It is conceivable that certain types of aggression, such as nuclear blackmail or punitive occupation of some sovereign territory, could be more realistically deterred or eliminated by a national nuclear force without involvement of other nations or confrontation of the great powers. To provide a dual-purpose nuclear force, agreements are required between the United States and each nation which aspires to a national nuclear force. Such agreements should provide for a co-ordinated program of research and development to ensure that technology keeps pace with that of the Soviet Union, for a scientific breakthrough by the Soviet Union could alter the balance of power and invalidate a credible deterrent. The conditions under which a NATO nuclear strike force would revert to a national nuclear force must be specified in advance and publicized so that there can be no misunderstanding by a potential aggressor. To eliminate further the risk of nuclear reprisal to other NATO members, the use of the national nuclear force must be restricted necessarily to the defense of the nation for which it performs a national deterrent function, and nuclear weapons used in this role must be confined to the boundaries of that nation.
The control of the nuclear deterrent force, including nuclear strike forces, is of paramount importance. Because their use affects the sovereignty of states, threatens the existence of civilization, and can be interpreted as tactical and strategic, they both must be controlled at the highest political level. Although this control must be within NATO, the need for instant decisions indicates that NATO must agree to the control by one man, elected or appointed for a fixed term of office by member nations, within prearranged limitations and safeguards. Similarly, when a NATO nuclear strike force reverts to a national nuclear force, its control must remain at the highest political level of the nation. Requests to use a NATO nuclear strike force as a national nuclear force must be submitted by the political leader of the nation involved to the NATO political leader in a manner similar to requests for aid to the civil power, but the ultimate decision to use such a force in defense of a nation must be made by the political leader of that nation.
Too, NATO must plan for limited conventional wars. There is a need for both reinforcing the nuclear deterrent and for developing a more workable deterrent not connected with suicide—it must be a defense and, thereby, a deterrent. In short, there is a need for adequate conventional forces to act as policemen and to defend against minor incidents to prove to the Soviet Union that such incursions are not profitable. Adequate conventional forces are also needed to provide time to learn Soviet intentions and hold them, if necessary, while the counter-offensive of the deterrent policy takes place. Finally, blocking Soviet attempts at conquest in Europe has pushed such attempts farther afield so that adequate conventional forces are required to counter such threats in other regions.
The suggestion that NATO has insufficient manpower to raise adequate conventional forces is invalid. NATO has a greater population than the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations together, and need not live in fear depending on mutual suicide for existence. The NATO alliance is also superior to the Soviet Union in conventional industrial war potential. The problems are obviously a defective organization and a lack of willingness to make sacrifices.
Financial considerations will be of prime importance in any substantial increase in the size of NATO conventional forces. There are many areas in which savings can be made and directed toward force build-up without added financial burdens. Out dated preparations for a long war should be rejected for, if the deterrent fails, general war will be short because of the destructive quality of nuclear weapons. Savings can be made by limiting reserves, armaments, and materiel to a war of short duration. Nations which aspire to a national nuclear deterrent should admit their backwardness and dependence on the United States, reach agreement for dual-purpose nuclear forces, and divert monies allocated for national deterrent projects to the maintenance and development of conventional forces. Other areas in which savings can be realized are: integration of logistics and procurement; a co-ordinated program in conventional research and development to avoid duplication and produce not only more effective weapons, but simpler and less expensive ones; and standardization of equipment coupled with closer and earlier marriages between experiments in tactics and new developments in technology.
Conventional forces must not adhere to national concepts and organizations. Tactical concepts and organizations must be adopted in view of probable employment of such forces under NATO. These must include the possibility of nuclear and conventional wars in Europe, as well as the ability to thwart Soviet aggression elsewhere if necessary, to extinguish “brush-fire” wars, and to prevent their spread. Mobility must receive high priority, and forces must be maintained at a high state of alert with air transport at their disposal so that they can move anywhere in defense of NATO members and interests outside the NATO area. The ultimate aim, however, must be to present a conventional posture equal to the numbers of divisions required by NATO regardless of the shadow of nuclear war, for vulnerable troops can enjoy the same protection as vulnerable cities—nuclear attacks on them can be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation.
The chief task of NATO, then, remains that of preventing the outbreak of military conflicts while stopping Soviet encroachments. To achieve this aim, NATO has chosen to retaliate with nuclear weapons against any type of Soviet aggression. It has been noted that a credible deterrent must present a certainty of response to aggression and, if taken seriously by the Soviet Union, it will likely prevent general war but will also increase the possibility of limited wars. Therefore, the NATO policy, which invites immediate nuclear retaliation and provides for escalation to nuclear war, lacks credibility from the outset because its execution is doubtful in anything less than a mortal struggle.
Future success of NATO can only be assured if its defense structure and strategy pose real, unacceptable risks to the Soviet Union for any type of aggression. NATO can only hope to deter the Soviet Union from using its nuclear mass destruction weapons by maintaining in being its own credible deterrent provided by the United States, in the form of a strategic nuclear force under one political commander, and the threat of retaliation which it poses. NATO can only hope to deter the Soviet Union from the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and prevent escalation to nuclear war, by holding nuclear strike forces at readiness and apart from ground or air forces under one political commander who has absolute authority for their use. NATO can only hope to deter the Soviet Union from attacking with conventional forces by maintaining its own adequate conventional strength in readiness to go anywhere.
Furthermore, the over-all structure of NATO must seem to the Soviet Union to be so firmly welded together that the Soviets will not expect to be able to bring a single NATO member to its knees. To achieve unity, NATO must satisfy nations’ desires to control their destinies by providing national nuclear forces so that member nations can deal with minor incidents within their territories when the vital interests of NATO, as a whole, are not at stake. This, in turn, will limit the involvement of other member nations in minor incidents, thus providing greater insurance against escalation to general nuclear war. Common institutions and common loyalties are the necessary and, in fact, the only conditions for a genuinely shared defense system giving credible deterrence to all; and resources sufficient to match the Soviet Union at a conventional level.
It is nonsense to base one’s security on a weapon which, employed in a war, would mean suicide for both sides. The maintenance of atomic armament would be comprehensible only if we considered ourselves inferior in the realm of conventional weapons. . . .
George F. Kennan