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The Protection of High Civil Office
Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie, Jr., U. S. Navy (Deputy Chief of Staff, Commander-inChief, Atlantic Fleet)—The rapid development in recent years of fast, secure, and reliable world-wide communications has made possible a centralized control of military operations from the seat of government. This has led, in general, to an increasing exercise of direct authority from the seat of government in the detailed conduct of military operations throughout the world. This, in turn, has led to a prevailing centralization of both authority and responsibility for military actions in the senior civilian officials of government.
This assumption of rather detailed direction of military operations by the civilian officials, and by their civilian assistants, has at times disturbed the responsible military authorities both in Washington and in the several unified commands. At the same time, the concept of “civilian control” and the thesis of the inseparable interlock between politico-diplomatic and military operations has served to reinforce this rather marked shift in operational authority from the military to civilians.
Behind all of this is a state of mind exemplified by the well-known quotation that “war is too important to be left to the generals,” a state of mind rendered increasingly acute today by the prevailing sensitivity to the possibilities of escalation. The thought of nuclear weapons is ever in the minds of those involved with what might otherwise be the most trivial incidents. One result of this participation in military operations by civil officials is that the senior civil authorities, at times even including the President, have found themselves in situations in which they felt they had no choice but to take on themselves the stigma for an action which had “gone sour.” Examples of this include the Powers U-2 affair
of 1960 and the Cuban affair of 1961.
This has not always been the case. Until recent years, the military commander in the field has been relatively detached from the seat of government, free of detailed control by his Washington seniors, and able to function in a context within which he had not only authority, but with it responsibility and, most important, public accountability for the results. In this lay a unique advantage which is largely forfeit to the current process of detailed control from the seat of government.
Were we to turn the current trend and redirect it toward the practice of assigning to a military commander a basic task and then letting him work it out himself, the senior civil officials of government would in large measure be spared the risk of the onus of failure.
In the older system, the military commander was given a task, and with it was given the limits within which he could operate. He then turned to. If he succeeded, he received a medal and became a major or minor hero, and there was plenty of glory left for all of his seniors who had shown the demonstrated wisdom to select the right man and assign him the right task. If he failed, then clearly the fault lay with him. He was relieved, court- martialed, and, on occasion, shot. Little or no blame was attached to his seniors. With this system, the high civil office and its charisma were not automatically tarnished by failure in the field.
(One of the best examples of this process may be found in the Pearl Harbor story of 1941. In the summer of that year, Admiral James O. Richardson objected to basing the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. When the debacle came in December his successor, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, was held accountable and summarily relieved from active service in the Navy.)
Military officers understand and accept
this. They are quite willing that they and not their civil seniors take the blame for failure. The two instances cited earlier (the Powers case and that of Cuba) appear to have been more “backfires” of the Central Intelligence Agency than purely military faux pas, but the principle holds. In either case, the President could have been protected by the legitimate assignment of blame to an operating official Well down the chain of command. But in order to do this in the face of gossip and efficient newsmen, there must be not only a delegation of responsibility, but a genuine delegation of both the associated authority and accountability.
Much the same argument can be applied to the current tendencies to allocate the authority to lesser civilian officials in specific localized operational situations. A civil official, for instance, might publicly be placed in charge of all activities, including military and quasi-military operations, in some small,
troubled country. There are many good reasons why such a person, in this hypothetical illustration perhaps an ambassador, might be actually in charge; but whether this should be an open and public delegation of authority is another question. In cases of this kind, a civilian representative, and most particularly an ambassador who is by definition the direct agent of the President, is possibly the last person who should have responsibility for violent or potentially violent action because this makes it virtually impossible for the President to disavow personal responsibility for an operation which has “gone sour.”
This is not to imply that there is any personal desire on the part of any senior civil official of government to disavow responsibility. Indeed, the demonstrated tendency is just the opposite. Our normal ethical probities strongly impel all of us, civil and military, to accept responsibilities. None of us likes to pass the buck. However, in situations of this sort, personal desires should be submerged. It is necessary, for the good of the nation, to protect the official stature of the high offices of the land. It is not Jones or Smith or whomever may be the incumbents who must be protected, but the offices they hold.
From past and present practices, we can distill five conclusions:
1. For the good of the country, the President and his cabinet should be protected, insofar as possible, from whatever blame may be attached to the unsuccessful use of military force.
2. This can be done by the orthodox and long-sanctioned process of delegating to military commanders not only responsibility, but genuine authority and accountability.
3. If the result is successful, there is praise enough for all.
4. If there is either failure or later doubt as to the wisdom of the action, the military commander and not the senior civil officials can shoulder the criticism.
5. This applies comparably to the delegation of authority to civil officials on the scene of military action, since they would be, by their nature, direct agents of the President but they are not, in the public eye, acceptable as scapegoats in event of failure.
Recognition of these conclusions as being valid, and applying them even in the context of our modern communications, might serve to diminish our national embarrassment and provide more political sea room if there is a next time when a well-laid plan goes awry.
"The Ivy-Clad Man on Horseback”
(See pages 42-49, March 1965 Proceedings)
Captain A. Lincoln Baird, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Schratz, in his well considered article, cites service parochialism by its several service members as one cause for the lack of joint military professionalism in the staff work of the Joint Chiefs. In turn, this too often results in unimaginative military positions which do not command respect, which are understandably overriden by the responsible civilian officials who are not so shackled. This leads to a widespread concern that military experience is being ignored. Maybe it should be because it does not meet the need.
Captain Schratz notes that an exception to such parochialism is often found in Navy planning where tactical and strategic operations involving “Navy and Marine Corps surface, subsurface and air units are developed with co-ordination of all—with ofttimes keen rivalry between each—but a threat to the existence of none” (my emphasis).
Each service has its own honorable traditions; its esprit de corps. These attract promising young men to dedicate their lives to a career of service which they consider worthy of respect, and perhaps leading to glory. The service is the avenue to promotion and recognition. If a change in world politics, technology, tactics, or strategy (and changes come rapidly these days) threatens the relative standing of one of the services, what happens? The service cannot attract good young men, the prospect of recognition dissipates, and the service maintains itself with difficulty. No
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceeding is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
senior officer who has dedicated his life to the country through his branch of service is going to accept the threat lightly. In addition to his own aspirations, the officer carries on his shoulders the weight of those who have preceded him in honorable service, as well as the future of all the young careerists he has inspired to look toward the future in that service.
Although it may be unconscious, a consequence of the service system is a tendency to oppose blindly and utterly any tactical or strategic development which might be foreseen, even dimly, as a threat to one’s own service. Accepting the diminution of one’s own service role may be military professionalism on a high level, but it may also betray a lack of appreciation for the system which provides the next generation of leaders.
Is there any way then that minds can be open to real consideration of timely tactical and strategic doctrine without this powerful Parochial constraint?
My own generation has seen a number of major shifts in emphasis: the age of the gun, °f the aircraft bomb, of the atomic bomb, and of the ballistic missile. Each age requires careful reconsideration of doctrine. The doctrinal changes of the past have called for a readjustment of service roles, of relative size, Perhaps, but they have not threatened any service’s actual existence. The emphasis which shifts away from a service may even shift hack again. But when an adjustment is in order, is it less honorable for a man to transfer to another service which is in need rather than hang back in familiar surroundings tvhere his contribution is less vital?
I do not expect that the idea of interservice transfer will be acceptable to the committed empire builders or to those who think they have it made if “no one rocks the boat.” I expect that transfers would have to be made carefully with due regard for re-education, seniority, and equity. Though difficult, these should be soluble problems. I do expect that a little freedom of maneuver which such a safety valve mechanism should provide would §° far to eliminate the hidden unreasoning ear which now meets the examination of Joint problems and to permit the military Professionals to study and more freely formulate doctrine appropriate to this age.
Lieutenant (j.g.) William K. Carr, U. S. Naval Reserve—There is an amusing irony behind Captain Schratz’s comment that “strategy has become the captive of contract groups and the scholars.” The scholars seem to be completely unaware of this turn of events.
During the past few years, an increasing number of scholars have been knocking on the doors of the Pentagon, demanding admittance to the inner sanctum. Captain Schratz makes a good case for their having already been admitted.
But, “open letters to the President” still appear with academic signatures and, as recently as December 1964, the professional journal Current Anthropology carried an 8,000- word article bemoaning the national policy of strategy thinkers who “reduce conflict to pure power terms without considering the socio-cultural setting.”
In obvious ignorance of the probability of Captain Schratz’s contention that the responsibility for strategy has been surrendered to the academicians, the writers of the cited article are resigned to their belief that “anthropologists cannot enter the Pentagon.”
"Prestige and the Navy Family”
(See pages 58-65, November 1964,
and pages 103-106, March 1965 Proceedings)
Captain Richard B. Redmayne, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay)—Please record my vote as fully subscribing to Commander Blair’s recommendation to change the Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual to read: “Dunning letters will in no circumstances be answered.”
Commander Richard H. Sproule, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Commander Blair states that “the Navy’s policy of handling indebtedness is completely unsatisfactory.” I must take strong exception to this statement.
The handling of dunning letters is, at best, a distasteful business. The officer concerned is dismayed to think that one of his men has gone back on his word and bitter that, on the face of it, some unscrupulous merchant has taken advantage of the man.
Commander Blair states that dunning letters should in no circumstances be answered.
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He feels that ultimately the Navy’s image will be improved because the loan sharks will soon identify the bad risks and not extend credit to those sailors. No mention is made of the vast majority of Navymen who are good credit risks. What will happen to the seaman apprentice who wants to make a purchase just before pay day? Even a second-class or a first-class petty officer would have a tough time if the sort of immunity Commander Blair proposes is put into effect.
This is written after 23 years in the Naval Reserve and 19 years in business in a naval shipyard town. I feel a close affinity for the Navy because of my many associations with officer and enlisted personnel. This still does not alter the fact that I must exercise care in the granting of credit. I, too, take the precaution of noting a man’s rate and service number. Only twice has it been necessary to use this information. I was gratified, on those occasions, to receive the same consideration I would extend to someone writing about one of my employees. This has continued my faith in the Navy. As a result, I shall continue to boost the Navy at every opportunity and encourage the rest of the civilian community to do the same.
Examples of vigorous and effective leadership are cited in the comments of Commander Bulmer, commanding officer of the USS Barb (SSN-596) which followed those of Commander Blair. No real comparison can be made, for the conditions were quite different. However, the fact remains that command attention to indebtedness in the case of Barb's crew contributed to the success of the relations between the Navy ship and the civilian community.
Failure to answer correspondence, even a distasteful dun, would damage the Navy’s prestige at a time when we must work to build it up. The overworked word “leadership” and all that it entails is the only satisfactory solution. We can only do our best—and then a little extra, all the while hoping that we are getting through to the man. This course will enhance the prestige of the Navy.
"The Changing Climate In Federal Labor Relations”
(See pages 60-69, March 1965 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Eugene M. Aval- lone, U. S. Navy—Commander Lewis’s admonition to federal administrators to learn the complaints of their work force and to consider them is good advice. Unfortunately, it is advice which has not been the practice in the past, nor is it likely to be heeded in the future.
A conclusion which could be drawn from the article is that labor in the federal government was on the verge of being very well organized in 1962. Thus, Executive Order 10988 was needed as a pacification to a growing, active union group among the employees in federal agencies. The Federal Task Force, headed by the former Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg, made extensive studies into the matter in 1961. This Task Force had been appointed by President John F. Kennedy to gather facts from the federal agencies. As a result of public hearings in seven cities and studies of 57 federal departments and agencies, the Task Force reached two major conclusions in 1961:
1. Excluding postal employees, who were 84 per cent unionized, only 16 per cent of the
federal employees belonged to labor organizations, as compared to 33 per cent of the private, non-agricultural work force.
2. The right to belong to employee organizations, established by the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912, had never been implemented by a clear, consistent policy controlling the government’s relationship with union organizations.
As late as 1957, the Department of Labor had published statistics which indicated that at the time approximately 550,000 of some two and a half million federal employees were unionized. Of this group, some 400,000 were members of the postal unions. The Department of Labor report went on to caution that the statistics might be questionable since they Were obtained from the unions. This does not imply that a preponderance of the federal employees were unionized. It would in fact show that, except for the postal unions, very few of the remaining federal work force were unionized.
Executive Order 10988, as issued by President Kennedy, could be interpreted as a stopgap measure to pacify certain pressure groups, ft was also considered by the late President to he a necessary measure long overdue. Representative George M. Rhodes of Pennsylvania and the late Senator Olin O. Johnston of South Carolina, with strong urgings from labor, had sponsored bills calling for federal legislation to grant federal employees the right to bargain collectively. An unenlightened Congress and poor public opinion °f federal employees combined to have the Rhodes-Johnston Bill almost become a law shortly before the 1960 presidential campaign began.
If passed, the bill might have caused serious Rouble for federal administrators. Thus, Executive Order 10988 filled a need and eliminated the requirement for strong legisla- h°n by pacifying people clamoring for legislation.
Nearly 600,000 of the two and a half million federal employees are now working under 205 bargaining agreements negotiated since ^resident Kennedy issued his executive order. An advance summary of a Department of Labor study of the 205 agreements showed that 407,000 of the 593,000 employees covered in late 1964 were included in the national agreement between the Post Office Department and six postal unions. Apart from the postal unions, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFL-CIO) is the largest federal employee organization, representing 55,000 workers under 108 contracts. Next is the Metal Trades Department (AFL- CIO) with 37,000 federal workers. The government employees do not have the right to strike. Their bargaining is confined largely to working conditions, grievance procedures, promotions, and similar matters. As yet this does not represent wide-spread implementation of the executive order.
Wilson R. Hart, whose 1961 book Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service foreshadowed President Kennedy’s 1962 executive order, and who published an appraisal of the order in the January 1964 issue of Industrial and Labor Relations Review, is pessimistic about the results of the order. An editorial in The Washington Post by Mike Causey on 22 March 1965, under “The Federal Diary,” supported Mr. Hart’s position and presented a more recent analysis of the results of the executive order. It stated, in part:
One of Uncle Sam’s top labor experts believes a “deep and growing disenchantment with the Government’s three-year-old program for employe-management cooperation is building up among rank and file employes as well as union leaders.”
Wilson R. Hart . . . believes the growing, disillusionment “could ultimately lead to the establishment of another presidential task force on labor relations . . .”
Hart said “the leaders of Government labor and of Government management have been sliding back toward the positions they had dug themselves into before 1962.” . . . union leaders who had regarded the Executive order as their “Magna Carta” now are demanding legislation “to make it work.” . . . union leaders believe management has hamstrung the order “by provoking impasses which unions are powerless to overcome since they have no bargaining power comparable to that which unions can exert in private industry.”
It would appear then that Commander Lewis’s evaluation of the success of 10988 is premature or based on inconclusive evidence. This leads to his statistical analysis of a random sampling he conducted. Were the questionnaires designed properly? Did those ques-
tioncd answer honestly? The responses might have been honest, but the statistical analysis of them incorrect. What specifically was Commander Lewis measuring in his random sampling? A validity of 0.75 would mean that 75 per cent of the time he was able to measure something which he intended to measure. Eighty-five per cent of the time he received the same answers on specific questions. From the results reached, which are not consistent with those reached by Mr. Hart, it would seem that the survey was improperly designed or the response to it is questionable.
The article develops the history of the “blue collar worker.” No mention at all is made of the “white collar worker” who makes up a good percentage of the total number of federal employees. It is unlikely that the “white collar worker” in government will ever be unionized. In industry, where the pressures to unionize and gains are greater, “white collar workers” have resisted unionization. In the federal government no such force exists, so this group in unlikely to join the ranks of unions.
Commander Lewis has introduced a subject to the pages of the Proceedings which can stand a great deal of airing. The naval officer has for too long been aloof to the need for knowledge of collective bargaining procedures. As a group, naval officers should be aware of the benefits which can derive from collective bargaining. They should have an awareness of what the men want, and the processes to follow in granting or pacifying their demands. Properly used, this knowledge is a weapon to strengthen relationships with civilian contemporaries as well as enlisted men.
"A Century of
Foreign Languages in the Navy”
(See pages 43-51, February 1965 Proceedings)
Lieutenant John F. McKenna, U. S. Naval Reserve[1]—Rear Admiral Tolley’s fine article recalls how bleak the picture was in the teaching and use of languages in the armed services before World War II. Since that time giant strides have been made, but much could still be done to continue the good work.
There are, for example, thousands of personnel in both the active Navy and the Naval Reserve who, having studied a foreign language in either civilian life or the armed services, would like to keep in touch and increase their ability with it, and yet whose knowledge of the foreign language is daily fading. What a waste of a human resource still so lamentably scarce in the Navy and of so great a potential value! Even if the language-trained active or reserve officer were able to do so, to what American college or university could he go, for instance, for a course in oceanography conducted in Russian? Or a course in East African coastal geography conducted in Arabic? Or one in seamanship conducted in Norwegian? Or one in guerrilla tactics conducted in Chinese? The list is almost limitless.
Such courses could be organized by the Bureau of Naval Personnel and carried out through correspondence courses. By the time a student has answered 60 or 70 appropriate multiple-choice or true-or-false questions on a ten-page chapter, with both the chapter and questions in the foreign language, he will not only have absorbed some meteorology or cryptography or whatever, but will also have learned things about the foreign language that he never knew before, and would never have learned without the course.
The unique value of such courses is, in fact, in the combination of subject matter and language. When learning a language can be made a sort of by-product of studying something else, and when learning something else can be made a by-product of studying a language, interest in both subject matter and language is heightened, and motivation is strengthened. Witness the fruitful combination of foreign languages with literature, or with geography, history, culture, or civilization in so many eminently successful school and college texts.
Are there really enough people in the Navy who can say in Vietnamese or Thai, “Did they put both mortars into the boat?” Or in Norwegian or Turkish, “How long was he on the surface?” Or in French or Japanese, “How much time will it take that pump to empty the tank?” Or in Indonesian or Korean, “When did you leave port?”
Thanks are due to Admiral Tolley for having reminded us of the importance of “communication of ideas in a common language.
"The Soviet Maritime Establishment”
(See pages 26-37, December 1964 Proceedings)
Commander Bernard M. Kassell, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Since Adr. Nemec did not reveal his source materials, it may be well to Point out that he has incorrectly designated the number of state steamship lines as 13. While this number may have been correct in 1954, the date he gives for the reorganization of the Ministry of the Soviet Merchant Fleet, the current organizational breakdown contains but six:
Black Sea Steamship Company, with headquarters in Odessa.
Baltic Steamship Company, with headquarters in Leningrad.
Northern Steamship Company, with headquarters in Arkhangelsk.
Far Eastern Steamship Company, with headquarters in Vladivostok.
Caspian Steamship Company, with headquarters in Baku.
Soviet Danube Steamship Company, with headquarters in Izmail.
The Black Sea Steamship Company contains four specialized administrations: that for the dry cargo fleet, in Odessa; for the passenger fleet, in Odessa; for the tanker fleet, in Novorossisk; and for the coal and ore fleet, in Zhdanov.
The Baltic Steamship Company includes operations of the basic group of dry cargo ships as well as the entire passenger fleet in the basin, but controls the Latvian Administration for the tanker fleet and the Estonian Administration for the dry cargo fleet. The Company has also organized a maritime agency in Klaipeda to handle petroleum business.
The Northern Steamship Company has di-
The new Soviet passenger liner lvan Franko (571 feet over-all and displacing 19,000 tons), seen herein Riga, Latvia, is typical of the growing Soviet maritime Establishment. Two Proceedings contributors disagree as to the organiza- b°n and direction of that growth.
Sovfoto
UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE
OCEAN SCIENCES
Edited by
Captain E. John Long, USNR (Ret.)
Selected by Library Journal as one of the 100 best technical books of 1964. Written by 18 eminent men in selected fields of oceanography, it fills the gap between popular literature and technical writing. An understandable, authoritative book on oceanography. Price $10.00 ($8.00 to Members)
Type ship | Steam | Motor | Total |
Passenger and cargo- | |||
passenger | 22 | 126 | 148 |
Dry cargo | 347 | 873 | 1,220 |
Tanker | 20 | 251 | 271 |
Service and auxiliary | 307 | 324 | 631 |
Industrial | 285 | 2,006 | 2,291 |
Technical | 135 | 150 | 285 |
Other | 13 | 176 | 189 |
| 1,129 | 3,906 | 5,035 |
Finally, while I | have no | wish to | quibble |
rect organizational responsibility for operation of the part of its fleet based in Arkhangelsk, but controls all of the maritime transportation activities in the northern basin, including operations under the Administration for the Arctic and Icebreaker Fleet based in Murmansk.
In the Far East, the Far Eastern Steamship Company includes the Sakhalin Administration for the Merchant Marine (Kholmsk) and the Kamchatka Administration for the Merchant Marine (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy). Also under the over-all administration is the maritime agency in Magadan and the operations of the Tiksi Maritime Trade Port and its fleet.
While there may well have been an Aral SS Line, my sources indicate that operations on that body of water were under the Central Asiatic Steamship Line, an inland organization which has usually been included with maritime organizations in statistical breakdowns, as distinguished from the river fleet activities.
I would indeed be interested in Mr.
Nemec’s source of information for his statement that the fishing fleets are under the control of the Ministry, as indicated in the chart on page 31. It is my understanding that such control is vested in State Fish Production Committee of the Soviet Union.
I consider Mr. Nemec’s statement “any direct and meaningful comparison with merchant marines of other nations is hardly possible due to the paucity of reliable information on Soviet shipping ...” to be something less than accurate. In mid-1964 there was ample evidence to confirm Soviet claims that, in addition to ships building in Soviet yards, there were 152 ships on order or building in foreign yards, including the so-called Satellite yards. As of 1 January 1964, the register of the Soviet Union provided the following breakdown of ships under the Soviet flag of 1,000 gross registered tons and over: over basic statistics, and would prefer to defer to Mr. Nemec’s undoubtedly greater knowledge of the charter market, I question just how “heavily” reliant the Soviet Union is on chartered non-Communist ships for moving foreign trade cargoes. This is particularly the case in the face of a recent claim, validation of which remains open, that the Soviet merchant marine carried 81 per cent of ds turnover in foreign trade in 1963, as opposed to 40.5 per cent in 1953. It may be noted, i° passing, that the planned figure for such carriage in 1965 is 87.6 per cent and 90.4 per cent in 1970.
Frank A. Nemec—With regard to the questions raised by Commander Kassell:
The organization of the Ministry of the Soviet Merchant Fleet was based on detailed discussions carried on while I was a member
of the U. S. shipping delegation to the Soviet Union during the fall of 1962, and was confirmed from independent sources. In each instance during the course of our visits to Murmansk, Leningrad, Odessa, and elsewhere, the managers of these lines were careful to delineate the outline of their responsibilities. Thus, for example, in the case of Leningrad, the headquarters of the Baltic Steamship Line, it was unequivocally stated that while it advised the Latvian and Estonian Steamship Lines, these lines function as autonomous entities.
Thus, organizationally, the statements with respect to the 13 state steamship lines are the latest accurate data confirmed by personal observation. While, as a practical matter, I have no doubt that the dominant lines in the Particular basins co-ordinate and influence policies of the other smaller groups, nevertheless the Soviets make their organizational independence unmistakably clear.
Insofar as the administration of the Northern Sea Route is concerned, this is a service organization which in effect maintains operational control over access to Northern Russian and Siberian ports east of the approximate longitude of Novaya Zemlya. This Administration does not in effect own vessels, but is in charge of all activities in this area. The maritime services are provided either by the Murmansk Arctic Steamship Lines or by chartered vessels requisitioned by it and chartered through Sovfracht.
Also, despite Commander Kassell’s questioning, the Aral Sea Steamship Line does fall under the control of the Ministry of the Soviet Merchant Fleet.
Insofar as fishing fleets are concerned, this could have been amplified so as to indicate that the Ministry of the Soviet Merchant Fleet acts as a husbanding agent for these ships for repairs, maintenance, installation of equipment, provisioning, and probably also the supplying of the navigation personnel. From my conversations with members of the Ministry, it appeared likely to me that at least some of the larger vessels in the fishing fleet, e-g., fish factories, are included in the Soviet
statistics.
Commander Kassell has stated he believes that my statement, “any direct and meaningful comparison with merchant marines of other nations is hardly possible due to the paucity of reliable information on Soviet shipping ...” is incorrect. I carefully phrased the statement to say that any direct and meaningful comparison is hardly possible. This reservation is due to the following combination of factors:
1. Soviet statistics include the intrabasin fleets, many of which are represented by small coasting vessels which ordinarily would not be included in the foreign trade fleets of major maritime powers.
2. They include the landlocked ships of the Aral State fleet.
3. They include specialized vessels which most maritime nations would exclude, such as icebreakers, rescue craft, and other service craft.
4. From information given to the U. S. delegation by the Ministry, the published figures also include tankers under control of the Soviet Navy and which normally would be included in the fleet train.
5. They include some fishing vessels and other specialized craft.
For these reasons, the U. S. delegation had considerable reservation as to the use of unanalyzed figures for direct comparison with the seagoing merchant fleets of other nations.
Lastly, Commander Kassell has questioned Soviet reliance on non-Communist chartered ships. Quite plainly, this reliance is heavy at the present time, but undoubtedly will decrease as the very large Soviet ship procurement program progresses. At the present time, the Soviet reliance on tankers is probably diminishing, but the reliance on dry cargo charters will continue to be relatively high for a number of years. Much of the statistics can be colored, of course, by the manner in which they are stated and the terms under which Soviet products are sold in world markets. Thus, for example, exports of oil, ore, and lumber from the Soviet Union frequently can be and are sold on an FOB basis. In purchasing such commodities, the non-Communist world calculates the laid-down cost of the products at terminal destinations. The use of chartered vessels adds a volatile element to these calculations which may result in adversely affecting markets for these goods. Conversely, on imports the opposite may be true.
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We don’t say, "don’t borrow from other lenders,” but we do say, "borrow as carefully as you would invest." And if prudent selection shows that you should borrow from Navy Federal Credit Union, we shall be pleased to serve you.
• our current standard interest rate is 4/5 of 1 % per month on the unpaid balance. On loans with maturities of 36 months, this is equivalent to an addon rate of 5.15% and a true annual interest rate of 9.6%.
• we accord the same rate of interest to all members, regardless of duty station
• we impose no fines if you make a payment one or two days behind schedule.
He can—
• be quoted deceptive "add-on” or "discount rates instead of true annual interest rates
• pay a higher interest rate because he is a newcomer in the community or because he anticipates a permanent change of station before his loan will mature
• obligate himself to pay exhorbitant fines if his payment arrives a few days late
This is why Navy Federal Credit Union urges you to "borrow as carefully as you would invest." Because we do recommend that you investigate any lender before you borrow, we want you to know a few facts about NFCU.
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Why We Say— "Borrow as Carefully As You Would
In my opinion, the Soviet reliance on the chartering of non-communist tonnage will continue to be relatively high, particularly for the next several years, since Soviet ships are heavily committed to military and aid programs of the Soviet Union. Incidentally, the capability of the Soviet Ministry is attested by the manner in which it has for a considerable number of years been the largest charterer of non-Communist tonnage by negotiating so delicately and with such astuteness that it has obtained charters under very favorable terms.
Collaterally, any last reservation on this point would be dispelled by a visit to Soviet ports wherein will be seen the flags of every major maritime nation in the world, excepting only the United States.
Comparative Studies in Naval History
Jerome K. Holloway, Jr.*—The death last year of Vice Admiral K. G. B. Dewar, Royal Navy, is a reminder of a period in British naval history that may well have meaning for the U. S. Navy today. Admiral Dewar was long a stormy petrel. He had figured prominently in the Royal Oak affair in 1928, when personality differences in the Mediterranean Fleet resulted in the admiral of the First Battle Squadron being retired, and in Dewar, who was then flag captain and chief staff officer, being transferred from the Royal Oak (flagship of the squadron) and severely reprimanded. Six months later, he was appointed commanding officer of the battle cruiser Tiger, but he retired in 1929.
However, Admiral Dewar made a lasting mark as a naval critic with the spirit of inquiry, independent judgment, and firm views in his book The Navy from Within (1939). In this book, he attacked many of the Royal Navy’s shibboleths as well as its training, command, administration, and personnel practices.
What gives relevance to Admiral Dewar today is not only the independent thought of this book, but the book’s theme and time span. At Scapa Flow in 1919, the Royal Navy was supreme on the seas, even if the supremacy was due more to a successful de-
* Mr. Holloway is First Secretary and Political Officer of the American Embassy, Stockholm.
fense of a favorable maritime position than to any brilliant victories of dash and determination, though this cold, geopolitical conclusion is less than fair to the gallantry, seamanship, and steadfastness of thousands of British sailors from 1914 to 1918. In the intervening 20 years, the Royal Navy, so huge at the time of Scapa Flow, suffered from attrition of disarmament and arms limitation conferences, stringent budgets, a near-crippling fight with the Royal Air Force, technological lag, and the barnacles of encrusted tradition in peacetime. All this took place while there was no dimunition of responsibility. (Indeed, the end of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1921 increased the Royal Navy’s job.) By 1939, these responsibilities required in addition to the Home Fleet, a Mediterranean Fleet, and squadrons in China, the East and West Indies, and the South Atlantic.
This then is the relevance lor the U. S. Navy today. It will soon be 20 years since the Japanese surrender on board the Missouri. The U. S. Navy at that day stood to the world >n much the same position as the Royal Navy did at Scapa Flow, if it was not even more dominant. True, the world situation has not allowed us the lulls of the 1920s and early 1930s. The difference in reaction to the Mad- d°x- Turner Joy incidents contrasted to what we "'ere obliged to accept in the Panay incident (and the British in the Ladybird) is sufficient ^lustration of that point. Yet, today the U. S. Armed Forces are spread thin for their polit- lcal commitments, technology moves even faster, and the base situation is always touchy. Han it be said 20 years later what historian Haptain S. W. Roskill, Royal Navy (Reared), wrote in White Ensign of his own navy— It is undeniable that in 1939 the position of fhe Royal Navy was immensely stronger in quality of its men than in the matter of giving them modern ships to fight with”? ' crhaps the United States does not need finite the iconoclastic approach of Admiral lUvvar, but 1965 would offer a good opportunity for the Navy to do a “20-years-later” inventory, using a similar study of the Royal Navy from 1919 to 1939 as a departure point. If not the Navy Department, then perhaps the Naval Institute could commission such studies. I, for one, would prefer to see the 1945 to 1965 study done by professional naval officers, and the 1919 to 1939 study done by an eminent naval historian from the academic world.
One does not have to be reminded that history does not repeat itself and that historical parallels are rarely exact. Yet, naval history does seem to offer a well defined scope for comparative history. The sea remains the same, the land is fixed. Ships change, but not the seaman’s art. Navies can not differ appreciably from one another at any particular time. Many such possible comparisons suggest themselves: Did galleys disappear from the Mediterranean for the same reasons they disappeared from Baltic fleets? Did the forced draught naval expansion in Wilhelmine Germany produce the same social, economic, and political consequences as in post-Meiji Japan? Do officers advanced through merit systems in peacetime in various navies make the best officers in wartime? And, we should not forget that Admiral Mahan’s seminal work was not designed as a primary for 20th century naval strategy—it was a study of the European naval wars of the 17th and 18th centuries. There are countless other subjects, but few potentially as profitable as a study of the effects two decades of uneasy peace and far-flung naval commitments upon what were at the beginning of the 20 year periods two apparently invincible fleets.
A last note of Admiral Dewar: He died the same week as Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, Royal Navy, who arrived at Colombo in 1942 to take command of a fleet that had just paid the price of the 1919 to 1939 situation—the Repulse, Prince oj Wales, and others. Admiral Layton spent the rest of the war in effect running the government of Ceylon.
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