Looking at the international scene of vast military confrontations, the scholar tries to assume his traditional detached perspective. He calculates national interests and relative power and often tries to show that the former are really identical or that the latter can be balanced, on the one hand, or completely eliminated, on the other. But such optimism has foundered on the bitter realities of conflict in such places as Korea, Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam.
The counsels of harmony and balance seem hollow and ineffective as guides to actual policy. The contemporary pseudo-scientific, almost mechanical, view of international relations omits the human view and the human choice. If theory is to prove of any value to the policy-maker, the equations and models must be re-examined and corrected by the addition of factors of human will.
When referring to international relations, the word “power” is used most frequently to mean the strength of a nation. When an analyst argues that the United States is more powerful than the Soviet Union, he is arguing that the United States is stronger—probably in terms of military strength, but perhaps he is including much more subtle forms of strength as well.
Such writers as Hans J. Morgenthau have undertaken detailed analyses of what they term the elements of national power: geography, resources, industrial capacity, military strength, population, morale, government efficiency, etc.
But, to use the word power as a synonym for strength is to neglect other factors that are of equal importance in international relations. We are interested not only in the possession of strength but also in the use of strength. For example, we might say that in the period following the Civil War the United States had great strength but little power in world affairs. The question of most vital concern is whether strength can be used in carrying out particular objectives. Such use of national strength can best be described as power.
This is not to imply that there must be a military attack before the strength of a nation can be considered as being “used” in foreign affairs. The empirical evidence of power is the accomplishment of the particular objective in question. The Communist bloc had the power to take Hungary in 1956, but not Korea in 1950, or Berlin in 1959. Military combat was used to determine effective power in Hungary and Korea, but not in Berlin. Economic strength is being used against Cuba by the United States, with the degree of effective power still in doubt.
In predicting effective power with respect to any objective, we are concerned with the factor of human will, be it determination, resolve, fear, or indifference. We have seen that power should not be confused with strength. Strength has little significance in international politics unless it is in some way used. And strength cannot be used at all unless the will to use it is present in the nation concerned. Strength without will accomplishes nothing, just as will without strength can achieve little. Power is directly proportional to both strength and will, a relationship that can be expressed by the formula P = SW.
This simple definition of power assumes that there is no opposing strength employed, and this would be true only in those special cases where other nations were completely lacking in either the will or the strength to resist the particular action. In the more general case, the resulting power would be determined by the difference between the elements of strength which the opposing nations or blocs were willing to use, a relationship which can be expressed as P = S1W1 —S2W2. (This is a relational view of power. Will depends on the particular objectives and values of the states in question.) While it may never be possible to quantify these variables, the relationships portrayed by this formula may still contribute to a better understanding of policy problems.
Many of the wars of history have been won not because of a test of strength, but because of the failure of the will of one country or the other, in many cases that of the superior in strength. Some wars, such as the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War of the 18th century, were obviously limited wars in the sense that the will of the defeated contenders was patently insufficient to mobilize and apply the actual strength of their countries.
An all-out war would be one in which there was the will on both sides to use all possible national energy, if necessary. It is questionable whether very many conflicts in history could be termed all-out wars.
A nation’s will is not a simple factor. It has little meaning unless identified in terms of a specific objective. One can say that the American people have a very strong will, but this has meaning only in terms of the strength of their will as applied to Korea, or Berlin, or their will to prevent Communist infiltration of South America. In other words, a nation’s will varies with the objective. Indeed, a nation’s will establishes objectives.
National will is formed by the interacting wills of many individuals and groups. In questions concerning short-run policy, the will of the head of state and supporting governmental groups is likely to be the deciding factor. But in a constitutional democracy, such as the United States, the will of the government is influenced by the existing or predicted will of the people. In case of sudden aggression against U. S. interests, the will of the general public for some time might be unknown or even unformed. The will of the U. S. government would be the deciding factor in determining our response, as was the case in the Gulf of Tonkin crisis last August. But after action was taken in that crisis, the will of the general public and that of the government turned out to be the same. This might be expected in a democracy, where the governmental leaders must stand for competitive election and as a result tend to share common values with their people. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the will of the government tends to determine the national will, with far less deference to popular opinion. The will of the Soviet public is engineered to agree with the will of the Party leaders.
This is not to imply that the U. S. government does not attempt to influence public opinion, but there is a significant difference in degree between influencing opinion and controlling it, and this difference must be taken into account in planning policy.
In addition to analyzing will in terms of the individuals and groups involved, we can break it down into its contributing factors. One of the most important of these is the relationship between the national value system and the type of objective in question. For example, as a result of their fundamental beliefs, the American people place a definite value on the preservation of freedom in Berlin. Another factor affecting will is the value of an objective as an element in military strength, hardly applicable in the case of Berlin and, as an indication of will to achieve more general objectives, an important consideration in Berlin policy.
In time of peace, the will of a nation must be judged by such things as the degree of mobilization, the tone of the popular press, and the public announcements of political and military leaders. But these indicators are often unreliable. This was demonstrated in the early 1950s in Korea, where the United States chose to act after indicating that it probably would not, and Indochina, where it chose not to act after indicating that it probably would.
Hitler correctly judged the will of France and Britain when he entered the Rhineland in 1936. The result was a victory for an inferior military force as a result of a failure of will on the part of Britain and France. Such actions must always be somewhat of a gamble since the will of a nation can never be known fully until the time of decision has arrived.
Nuclear Weapons and the Power Equation. The advent of nuclear weapons has resulted in new levels of strength that drastically alter the power equation. Stockpiles of nuclear weapons combined with multiple delivery systems have elevated the level of national strength nearly to infinity. Of course, this condition is not static, nor does it mean that war necessarily would result in mutual annihilation or even equal damage. The development of either an effective first-strike capability (that could be used to destroy an opponent before he launched his weapons) or of a reliable first- strike defense would bring the level of strength of the opponent back down to finite values or even to zero. Nevertheless, during any period in which the opposing powers have the capability of causing what approaches unacceptable damage, regardless of which one strikes first, total strength begins to play a much lesser role in power than will.
When each of two countries approaches infinite strength, will becomes the chief determinant of power, P = W1— W2. As long as strength remains at such a level on both sides, the main concern of foreign policy becomes the balance of will rather than the balance or preponderance of forces. This condition might be called the war of wills, and it continues as long as each side maintains the ability to exercise such strength against an opponent. Power is determined in the war of wills not by the total destructiveness of national strength, but rather by the effectiveness with which degrees of strength can be used to demonstrate and reinforce national will.
Prior to the “balance of terror,” when strength was a more meaningful determinant of power, it was possible to assume maximum will on the part of the enemy, compare indications of potential strength, and produce an estimate of power with a reasonable probability of accuracy. One’s power might have been even greater than estimated if the enemy’s will should fail, and it could only have been lower in the case of some unexpected event such as defection of allies, a weapons breakthrough, or an adverse balance of tactical skill.
When strength approaches infinity and will is the key determinant of power, estimates of success involve much wider margins of error. Will is hard to judge at any particular time and is likely to fluctuate widely with the passage of time. Planning must be far more closely tied to time intervals and particular objectives if it is to take into account the key factor of will. The old question of the credibility of the deterrent now becomes a question of the credibility of will. The existence of infinite strength is now self- evident. The existence of a will to use strength when necessary is far less certain.
During the war of wills, the problems of foreign policy are mainly those of strengthening and demonstrating will. The alternative to surrender is not extermination, but evidence of the will to face severe destruction if necessary. This requires not only total strength but the capability to use varying degrees of strength. When viewed in the context of the war of wills, our aims and requirements in both non-military and military policy become less obscure.
Military Policy and Survival. Although the Soviet Union hardly wishes to bring about the mutual destruction of itself and the United States, it will continue to use military force whenever it feels that such a policy has a high probability of success. And since the United States is capable of using an infinite amount of force in return, Soviet military success can occur only in conjunction with a failure of American will.
The first priority for military policy must be to insure that our military strength remains sufficient to destroy the aggressor, if necessary. Should the Soviet Union achieve a technological breakthrough that would permit an attack on the United States without warning, or an effective defense against the American counterblow, it is unlikely that the Soviets would lack the will to press their advantage. Albert Wohlstetter has provided the classic demonstration of the difficulties involved in maintaining the infinite force relationship.1
It is equally important to provide evidence of the will to resist lesser forms of military advance during the war of wills. The possession of a powerful missile force alone would not suffice to prove our willingness to resist an attack on our allies in Asia or the Middle East. The probability that we would immediately trigger a total war as a result of a conventional military attack in a distant region is very low.
Force must be ready for use in increasing increments as necessary to prevent the success of aggression. A Communist take-over of a country with evident national will to resist could succeed only if the West failed to act. Additional Soviet moves would follow, and the experience of defeat might weaken the credibility of American support, which in turn would weaken the will to resist, at least in countries bordering on the Communist bloc.
If the Soviets wish to test the Western will to hold a particular area, they will do it by committing strength that just exceeds what we have supplied or have indicated an intention to supply. The lower the level at which such a test can be conducted, the more reasonable it will be for the Soviets to initiate action. This explains why past military action has come in areas of disengagement such as Korea and Indochina.
The response to Soviet tests of American will must be effective, immediate, and appropriate to the threat. In the power equation, P= (W1 — W2) ∞, only one of the W values is known to each side. Maximum will can be defined as the will to use all necessary force to hold a position regardless of consequences, and can be assigned a value of unity. Minimum will can be defined as a complete lack of will to do anything and can be assigned a value of zero. If the Communist bloc were willing to use a level of conventional armaments similar to that used in the Korean War to take a border area, the equation might appear to them as follows: PU.S.S.R.= (.5 — Wu.s.) ∞. Action would then appear reasonable only if they felt that the value of Wu.s. were less than .5. In this case, it might be best for them to take military action immediately rather than risk the possibility that Wu.s. might increase as a result of lesser pressures on the area concerned.
On the other hand, if the Soviets were sure that Wu.s. was equal to unity, even maximum will on their part would fail to result in power—PU.S.S.R. = (1 — 1) ∞. In cases where it was likely that Wu.s. equalled unity or exceeded Wu.s.s.r.j only action at a low level such as Communist party political activities would be effective. Such activities would be designed to undermine the will of the local area in a way that might go unnoticed by the Western powers.
This analysis indicates that the Communist challenge is likely to appear either at a moderately high level, which the Soviets feel is above the point of Western will to respond, or at a very low level, at which response may be very difficult.
The much touted danger of mutual destruction exists only at the higher level of challenge. The likelihood of such destruction is equal to the probability that both WU.S. and WU.S.S.R. are at a maximum and that the challenger continues to raise the level of testing until he destroys himself.
Fortunately, the defending side has a decided advantage in the war of wills. The choice of death even in hopeless defense of one’s whole way of life is a believable action, but the choice of death to avoid seeing one’s schemes of aggression thwarted is an irrational form of behavior, especially if one’s strategy is long-term and includes the use of many tactics. A nation with better than subsistence living conditions and with the possibility of peaceful development and progress probably will not choose total destruction for the latter reason. While irrationality is not unknown in national behavior, the Marxist doctrine of the inevitability of Communism would tend to preclude a suicidal act on the part of the Soviet Union. The probability is high that the Soviets will be rational and will back down if we meet their challenges with sufficient force to demonstrate our will to resist while avoiding an excessive response that involves their total destruction.
Paradoxically, a high level of response might be less likely to lead to escalation than merely an equal level. If the United States barely blocks a Soviet move, the Soviet Union might assume the following power equation: PU.S.S.R.= (-5 —.5) ∞ Soviet leaders might then be tempted to increase their own level of pressure just a little, let us say to .6 or .7. This could produce the often-suggested escalation of conflict. On the other hand, if a Communist attack were met by a response that indicated that all necessary strength would be used—this might even require low- yield nuclear bombing—the evidence of such a high level of will on the part of the West might well result in an abandonment of the attack. In short, it appears that escalation to total war is much more likely if the defender holds back his weapons and attempts to apply equal force than if he immediately takes decisive action to stop the advance.
But one indication of will may not be enough. Since a nation cannot prove its will to use all necessary force without actually using it, and since it hopes to avoid this ultimate step, its initial action must be designed to provide a credible indication of ultimate determination. The first such indication, even though carefully designed, may not be believed, and the opponent may choose to reply in kind. The result may be a series of military actions and counter-actions, and the power equation may well change at any point in time. Each action taken must be planned to maintain one’s own will at maximum strength and at the same time prevent the enemy’s will from increasing. For example, it would not be wise to demonstrate national will by attacking enemy cities or even destroying unnecessarily large numbers of enemy military forces, since these very acts might change the opponent’s purpose from a careful effort to add territory at minimum risk to an irrational will to mutual suicide. And it would be equally unwise to permit the consolidation of a Communist aggression before taking an adequate response, since the Soviet leaders might then look on their stand as a defense of their own territory and way of life, thus increasing their will to sustain the advance.
It is of crucial importance to maintain the military capability to demonstrate will at several levels of conflict and especially at a high level just below the threshold of total war. If a nation is capable of dominating an enemy’s strategic forces without destroying his population, a high-level response becomes credible, and an aggressor will not be willing to risk escalation which must lead to defeat at any level below suicide.
The timing of an action is also critical in determining the credibility of will and thus the probability of escalation. A delayed response indicates a lack of determination and quite probably the unwillingness to use high levels of force against aggression.
Finally, in determining military policy, we must consider the preservation of will as well as its implementation. Faulty military planning can greatly increase the probability of casualties as well as the cost of any operation. This in turn may reduce the nation’s will to act. And, of course, any failure to maintain superior strategic forces might place the infinite level of strength in doubt and cause a complete failure of will.
It is equally evident that the will to act can be greatly affected by the will of one’s allies and even of neutral states. The failure of the British and French in their Suez expedition of 1956 stemmed not from any real fear that Russian forces would be used, but rather from the realization that their allies, as well as the rest of the United Nations, strongly condemned their action as an unjustified use of military force.
Nevertheless, when a government strongly believes an action is right and necessary, it must act, even in the face of faltering allies. If it has judged rightly, the probability of gaining the support of its own people and eventually that of other states as well will be high. Evidence of a thoroughly reasoned and determined will can both strengthen allies and weaken aggressors.
In the war of wills, the material support given by allies is not as important as their moral support. If the will of one’s allies becomes doubtful, a determined aggressor will find opportunities for open and subversive advances that probably cannot be countered with military strength.
Foreign Aid in the War of Wills. When one has an understanding of the war of wills, foreign aid programs no longer appear to be useless attempts to buy the world, or to create modern military states out of underdeveloped nations, or to convert Marxists by charitable example. The purpose of foreign aid should be to strengthen the will of foreign peoples to resist totalitarian domination. The strength necessary to resist Communist advances can be supplied by the United States, providing the people attacked have the will to ask for support. Without the support of the United States, however, no country is capable of resisting continuing Communist pressure.
Since the will of the local population is the critical factor, increasing indigenous military strength may be an inefficient means of strengthening border areas. If military aid serves to support and enrich an unpopular oligarchy, the result may be a desperate turn to Communism on the part of the people as a whole. The possession of modern military equipment is often an important factor in strengthening a nation’s will, but other factors can be even more important. The Royal Laotian Army was well equipped in 1961, but the Laotian people had no will to resist Communist advances.
A prerequisite for preventing Communist infiltration of a country such as Laos is a strong will on the part of the local people to fight in their own defense—a will which a carefully designed aid program may strengthen, but cannot create. Without such a will, the infinite strength of the United States may prove useless. The use of American military strength to force an unwilling people to remain with the West would result in a possible long-term guerrilla war as well as the alienation of other peoples who look to the United States as the defender of man’s dignity and national independence—a loss of what is perhaps our greatest source of will, the democratic ideal.
Failure to act in support of a people who do wish to resist Communism would be an even worse mistake. There would then be no other course for the weak and the small than to make some sort of peace with power realities.
In these terms, the United States faces a very serious dilemma in many parts of the world. Military action could result in repudiation of our efforts by those we seek to assist, while failure to act could mean collapse of much of the Allied front against Communism. Since this dilemma appears only where the local will to resist is in doubt, the importance of adequate aid programs is heavily underlined. As long as economic problems remain the critical concern of such nations, their will to resist Communism will be weak, or perhaps even non-existent.
If aid programs are to strengthen the will to resist Communism, they must provide an alternative to the Communist form of salvation through submersion in a mass totalitarianism. American aid must be used to provide an environment of individual opportunity and community self-respect. Only a just and progressive community can have a strong will to defend itself against Communist imperialism.
In the light of the key purpose of foreign aid—the strengthening of will—it is easy to see the causes of our past failures. The use of foreign aid for military armaments and industrial establishments may actually have negative influences on the popular will to resist, as it did in Cuba. Social reform is even more important than economic gains— a fact that has been recognized in the Alliance for Progress program. It would be too far afield to discuss social progress in this paper, but many possibilities should be explored. A plan of economic assistance to small businessmen, even very inefficient small businessmen, might be much more meaningful in terms of strengthening national will than would a large steel plant presented to the ruling oligarchy. A program of low interest housing loans direct to individuals might have a much more favorable effect on the will of a nation than gifts of surplus foods that often fail to reach the hungry. Such programs possibly might be administered through regional organizations such as the Organization of American States without causing resistance in the name of national sovereignty.
This is not to suggest that a simple conversion of aid programs to schemes for social justice will provide the necessary power to stop Communist advances. The phasing of various types of aid must be planned according to the particular requirements of a region. Where the challenge makes use of external or internal armed force, it must be countered immediately by force, and the will to do this must be found in the existing society.
Massive military aid may be essential in such cases to provide the immediate capability to resist, but ambiguous results should be expected. Communist military advances might be blunted, but a strong military elite might be created that could cause a weakening of the over-all will of the people to oppose Communism. If such massive military aid continues unchanged, an undesirable spiral could result in which each increment of force supplied by the United States resulted in an increment of increased will on the side of the Communists. It would be possible for the relative rates of increase to be such that an increase of U. S. military aid would actually serve to increase the effective power of the Communists.
Certainly this does not mean that military aid should be withdrawn. Instead, socioeconomic aid must be meshed with military aid in such a way that the immediate capability to resist remains, while the will of the people as a whole is strengthened in favor of a free, constitutional society. Perhaps the West has been handicapped by its quite proper abhorrence of propaganda. Mass communications can be used for purposes of education—examining all sides of the issues— as well as for propaganda that seeks to form a totalitarian world. As the Soviet Union is reputed to have placed a small television set in every log cabin for propaganda, so perhaps should the United States place a TV set in every grass hut for education in the meaning of freedom.
Negotiations in the War of Wills. Those who see modern negotiations as a process of reducing tensions by diplomatic trading are overlooking the inherent instability of the war of wills. Since the slightest failure of will creates effective power for the opponent, and since negotiations are one of the chief fields for the development and expression of will, a spirit of compromise at the conference table may result in a loss of power. You may try to soothe your rival with pleasant words, but you must not retreat from declared objectives unless you are willing to surrender them.
Before the war of wills began, a nation could conduct negotiations knowing that concessions offered would take effect only if an agreement was reached on a quid pro quo basis, but today, an offer of reciprocal concessions may lead to unilateral concessions. To prevent Communist acquisition of Berlin, the West must have the will to use whatever force is necessary. If the United States should offer to trade Western rights in Berlin in exchange for recognition by the Soviet Union of United Nations authority over that city, the fact of the offer would soon be released to the world, and its impact would be to establish the idea that a Western withdrawal from Berlin was a definite possibility. And since it is highly unlikely that a nation would risk mutual destruction for something it is considering giving up anyway, a continual rising pressure on Berlin from the East would probably result in the desired Western withdrawal without concessions of any kind by the Soviet Union.
It should be remembered, however, that an offer to negotiate is not necessarily an offer of concession. Negotiations can serve as a demonstration of will rather than an occasion for a weakening of will. An offer to negotiate may be necessary, but the West must approach the conference table with firm determination to maintain its position. If Soviet leaders should feel that a mutual agreement is desirable, they will readily offer concessions, since they recognize that, unlike the Soviet Union, the West is not seeking to advance through military pressure. But they would never accept mutual agreements if they had any hope that the West might be pressured into unilateral concessions.
The Strength of Will. It need hardly be pointed out that, in the long run, strength of will is chiefly determined by the values of the people, and that these in turn depend on the moral fibre of the nation. Those who fail to make the difficult judgments as to right and wrong must suffer to live by the judgments of others. The choice is between submitting all life to the interests and values of some world tyranny, on the one hand, and defending to the death, if necessary, the right to human dignity and a voice in political control, on the other.
In the war of wills, we have a choice between surrender, which means at least slavery and at worst death, or effective defense, which carries a high probability of success and with it freedom. It is not a choice between “Red or dead,” but between slavery and freedom. Of course, any choice between action and inaction seems to promise safety to the timid through inaction. If there is any reasonably certain lesson from history, however, it is that inaction caused by timidity in the face of an aggressor who relies on psychological warfare and intimidation is a sure road to ruin.
1. See A. Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, January 1959, p. 211.