Farewell to "Spads"

The announcement in 1964 by the Secretary of Defense that A-1 (AD) Skyraiders would replace T-28s and B-26s in South Vietnam confirms the fact that the propeller-driven Skyraider, after 20 years of service, is still the world’s best close-air-support aircraft and the most versatile aircraft in today’s carrier air wing. Yet, the Skyraider, long since affectionately known as the “Spad,” is being forced into retirement, not because of a lack of capabilities, but simply because of age. No aircraft now in production or on the drawing board can replace it; nevertheless, it is being displaced in the carrier air wing by the A-6 Intruder, designed from the ground up as the Navy’s optimum nuclear weapons delivery aircraft. What a paradox it is that the Navy must retire its limited war aircraft without suitable replacement at a time when the future role of aircraft carriers, as reaffirmed by the Secretary of Defense, will be that of limited war, the very type of warfare for which “Spads” are best-suited and combat-proven.

Rugged, uncomplicated, and relatively inexpensive, the “Spad” was conceived during World War II as the optimum carrier-based fighter-bomber. The “Spad” was designed not only to outperform the best of the enemy’s propeller-driven fighters, but also to carry a bomb load equivalent to that of the B-17. First service deliveries were in June 1945, and so successful were the designers in meeting their objectives that today, two decades later, “Spad” squadrons are still operating in 12 of 15 attack carrier air wings. During this period, the old “Spad” has managed to stay on the varsity while five different types of jet attack aircraft have made the team, been benched, and have had their numbers retired from the carrier aircraft inventory. Its longevity on the first team of strike aircraft is tacit acknowledgement of the Navy’s continuing need for this type of aircraft.

The demise of the Skyraider became inevitable in 1957 when the decision was made to halt production. Until that time, seven series of ADs from the AD-1 to the AD-7, representing 3,180 aircraft, had been delivered to the Navy. Why was production stopped? In retrospect, the decision to retire the ADs was not based purely on considerations of military necessity.

The late 1950s saw many crash programs in weapon systems developments. The planners and operators seemed a few steps behind the scientists and engineers as the latter opened the doors to nuclear power, missile systems, electronic devices, ad infinitum. determined to stay abreast, naval aviation imposed demands which served to swell the technological tide. Naval aviators—planners and operators—insisted, and rightly so, on higher performance aircraft and larger carriers to accommodate them. Speed, high-altitude performance, and ultra-sophisticated weapons and detection systems became yardsticks by which all attack aircraft were measured and evaluated. The concept of an all-jet air group was crystallizing in the minds of the progressive thinkers with the emphasis being placed on jet propulsion—regardless of the mission requirements. The “go-modern” concept demanded the replacement of the slow propeller-driven Skyraider with something swifter despite the “but not on my watch” attitude of many of the carrier division commanders who were daily reminded of the Skyraider aircraft’s unique capabilities and versatility.

In the strategic sense, the 1957 era found naval aviation locking horns with the Strategic Air Command for equitable distribution of strategic targets. This was the “massive retaliation” period when enormous slices of the defense budget were going into the atomic weapons business and into the vehicles for their delivery. The Navy’s stake in the business was its justification for the carrier building program, at least one per year until all the Essex-class carriers were replaced. In order to stay in the race, the Navy then needed an all-weather, subsonic jet attack aircraft with a built-in nuclear-weapons delivery capability. The A-6 Intruder was to be the answer. Today, eight years later, 1957 planning is bearing fruit as A-6 squadrons form and as “Spad” squadrons retire either to the mothball farm at Litchfield Park, Arizona—or to South Vietnam.

Now, as we approach the readiness we had wished for in 1957, the Secretary of Defense has announced in the Fiscal Year 1965 Budget Hearings that “carriers will be relieved of their strategic alert nuclear war mission in fiscal year 1966.” In other words, Polaris and Minuteman have eclipsed the need for which A-6 Intruders were originally built. Ironically, at no time since their conception has there ever been a greater need for “Spads.”

Fifteen years ago, jet aircraft were considered the unconventional aircraft in the air group mix. Today “Spads” claim this distinction—not only because they are propeller driven, but because they are combat proven. Commenting on the “Spad’s” effectiveness in a combat environment—Korea—Rear Admiral John M. Hoskins, U. S. Navy, Commander, Carrier Task Force 77, in Korea, said: “I am convinced that the Douglas Skyraider is the best and most effective close support airplane in the world today.”

Striking with deadly payloads from the USS Valley Forge (CV-45), AD Skyraiders blasted targets in Korea on 3 July 1950 just three days after the start of the Korean War. Their performance throughout that conflict can best be summed up by a typical narrative of a one-day operation, issued as a press release from the USS Essex (CV-9).

It is the morning of August 29, 1952, shortly before 0800. Aboard the USS Essex with Task Force 77 off the coast of North Korea, the thunderous roar of revved-up aircraft fills the air. The ship turns into the wind, and one by one big blue AD Skyraiders roll down the deck, climb skyward, rendezvous with Boxer aircraft, and head westward to their target— Pyongyang, capitol and most heavily-defended city of North Korea.

Some of the Skyraiders are carrying two 2,000-lb. blockbusters; others wear a string of smaller bombs stretching from wingtip to wingtip. They are joined by jets for flak suppression and Corsairs for supplemental punch. But there is no doubt about it, the Skyraider is the “Big Gun” of the Essex.

The destruction caused on August 29 by the Navy planes is now a matter of history. The part played by the Douglas Skyraiders was the same “Big Gun” role they have played throughout the Korean War. They have consistently delivered the major weight of bombs in Navy strikes and have done so with pinpoint accuracy.

Since the Korean War, A-1 squadrons on board our 15 attack carriers have been on the line ready to perform in every Cold War situation where naval power has been brought to bear—Lebanon, Suez, Matsu, Quemoy, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and most recently, Southeast Asia. If troops had been landed in any of these situations, as they were in Lebanon, the A-1 would have proved the most effective airborne weapons system in support of the landing force.

In looking to the future, the possibility of carrier task forces supporting counter-insurgency operations is very real. Whether it be Haiti or South Vietnam or any other place, the thoughts expressed by Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert concerning the employment of propeller-driven aircraft (in South Vietnam) would apply. Their effectiveness, he said, in the counter-insurgency environment where the problem is not air superiority but an elusive enemy; their adaptability to operations in underdeveloped areas are reasons why propeller driven aircraft are being used instead of modern jet aircraft.

The Secretary of Defense went a step further. Commenting on charges that U. S. pilots were flying obsolete and structurally unfit aircraft in Vietnam, Mr. McNamara allowed that [propeller aircraft] “were chosen in relation to the enemy threat—and their effectiveness in relation to the operational requirements.” Truer words were never spoken. The “Spads” which replace the B-26s and T-28s will be operating in a combat environment for which they are ideally suited—notwithstanding the irony of having to de-mothball many of them, old as they are, and of having to recondition them at NAS Alameda in order to put them back on the firing line. The point is, they are the best aircraft we have for the job that has to be done.

To place the subject in perspective and to evaluate the need for the “Spad” in today’s carrier air wing, we must examine certain facts. First, the purpose of an attack aircraft is to carry the war to the enemy; to deliver appropriate ammunition on appropriate enemy targets. But, to do this, the attack aircraft must be “available” to fly. “Spad” squadrons historically enjoy the highest availability while flying the greatest number of hours of any squadron in the air wing. Secondly, the attack aircraft, per se, should have a “built-in” weapons carrying flexibility in order to be able to destroy any type of target —hard or soft, stationary or moving, sea-based or land target. No aircraft ever built is more versatile in this regard than the Skyraider whose spectrum of usable weapons ranges from bullets to nuclear bombs. Thirdly, the effectiveness of the attack aircraft over the target depends on the performance characteristics of the aircraft and the skill of the highly trained attack pilot. The Skyraider has the unique capability of flying at low air speeds, which allows the pilot sufficient time for target acquisition and for effective weapons delivery. In close air support work, target acquisition and bombing accuracy are so critical that the tide of battle is often determined by the effectiveness of the aircraft overhead. Electronic, computerized weapons systems notwithstanding, no substitute has yet been found to replace the eyes of the pilot for close air support work. Finally, the attack aircraft should be able to sustain at least a moderate degree of battle damage. The survivability factor is extremely important when the success of the operation depends on the re-cycling of a limited number of strike aircraft as would always be the case in a conventional war or in a counter-insurgency operation. The Skyraider, with its protective armor plating, self-sealing gas tank, and rugged power plant has proven its ability to survive. Jet aircraft, not so endowed, must rely on speed for self-defense.

“Simplicity,” one of the factors listed in the U S. Navy’s “Principles of War,” is surely a virtue that belongs to the relatively uncomplicated Skyraider. Training personnel to maintain it and pilots to fly it are relatively simple tasks in comparison to the training required for the maintenance and operation of modern jet attack aircraft. Systems simplicity minimizes in-flight aborts and increases the probability of the aircraft reaching the target with all systems “go.” Some of our most modern jet aircraft have reached such a degree of complexity that successful missions, now more than ever before, hinge on properly functioning electronic tubes, transistors and computers; on the employment of civilian technical representatives; and on the availability of spare parts in such numbers and varieties that one wonders how supply officers in carriers maintain their sanity, much less their inventories. The problem was brought into focus by Captain Carl O. Holmquist, U. S. Navy, who pointed out that the A-6 has about 11,500 electron tubes, transistors and diodes, representing almost half the cost of the aircraft.* For sustained combat operations, the difference between simplicity and complexity might mean the difference between an aircraft strike and a hangar-bay full of “duds.”

Versatility is another virtue in time of war. All bets must be covered when a carrier task force moves into unfriendly waters; the bets become the air wing’s tasks. The wide range of tasks which can be accomplished effectively by “Spads” include nuclear and conventional strikes, close air support, ASW patrol, search and armed reconnaissance, in-flight refueling, aerial mining, depth charging, message drops, logistic support, helicopter escort and a host of lesser support tasks. The “Spad’s” claim as the world’s most versatile aircraft can be justified, as can its undisputed claim to the world’s record for single engine aircraft with the greatest ordnance load-carrying capability—11,944 pounds, a typical Korean bomb load, including three 2,000-pound bombs, six 500-pounders, and six 250-pounders. “Spads” are not dependent on catapults for launch or electronic emissions for return. Both are plus factors in time of war.

Surely the greatest loss to the air wing’s readiness posture through the phasing out of the A-1 will be felt in the close-air-support mission. This is readily admitted by jet attack pilots. The endurance capability of the “Spad” to loiter on station, and its ability to carry heavy ordnance loads, delivered from a steady gunnery and dive-bombing platform, are unique advantages. The endurance factor and thus “on station” availability is a luxury afforded only to those propeller-driven aircraft with power plants that burn gasoline. The concern of the landing force commander at the prospect of losing Skyraider support should be no less than his concern for the declining number of rifle barrels in our surface combatants about which much has recently been written.

The survivability factor assumes great dimensions in limited warfare. Korea is a case in point. Carrier aircraft, limited in numbers, must have a high probability of returning safely. Can we compare the survival probability of the slower propeller-driven aircraft to the swifter jets? Not really, because our present-day jet attack aircraft have only on rare occasions been exposed to enemy fire, and a valid measurement of sorties flown versus aircraft losses is not available. In one reported instance during the Korean War, a Skyraider from the USS Philippine Sea (CVA-47) returned from a strike with over 200 flak holes in the airframe, some of which were as large as 18 inches in diameter. One such hole in the pressurized “wet” wing of a jet aircraft might well spell disaster. Although propeller-driven aircraft might be more vulnerable to sporadic small arms fire because they fly lower and slower, jets, on the other hand, might be more vulnerable to heat-seeking or radar-controlled missiles because they fly higher and radiate more heat. Such speculations can and will be argued by the experts and the computers, but the final answers to the survivability problem will come only as a result of exposure to the enemy.

The average cost of the Skyraider when in Production was $285,000; the cost of the A-6 is approximately 14,000,000. In the “bang-for-the-buck” comparison the difference in terms of bomb loads carried would be 123,000 Pounds for the “Spads,” 15,000 pounds for the A-6. Wars cost money; losses can be anticipated. Is it practical to haul rocks in sports cars when a fleet of trucks can do the same job far more cheaply?

As convincing as the arguments may be, however, the Skyraider is definitely going out of business. The A-7A, programmed for delivery to the Fleet in the fall of 1966, will be the subsonic, jet attack replacement for the Navy’s other light attack aircraft, the A-4E Skyhawk. Built around an existing Navy airframe (F-8E Crusader), the A-7A will have some noteworthy capabilities, among them almost twice the range of the A-4E and a substantially greater conventional weapons playload.” Special consideration is being given to the maintenance problem: the contract requires the builder to guarantee a level of less than 12 man-hours of direct maintenance for every hour of A-7A flying time. Although this is a noted improvement over the Crusader, which averages an estimated 16 maintenance hours per flying hour, the figures hardly compare with those of the “Spads.” The A-7A will never adequately replace the “Spad,” because, relatively speaking, it lacks the necessary air support capabilities—the ability to loiter, the ability to slow down, the ability to sustain damage.

The Navy’s COIN (Counter-insurgency) Aircraft* will be an interesting aircraft, incorporating many of the refinements needed to supplant the “Spads,” but it will hardly be the replacement for the “Spad.” Its primary missions will include armed reconnaissance, close air support, visual reconnaissance, and ferrying. Secondary missions are cargo and personnel transport. As long as the Navy has operable flight decks, no requirement exists for the COIN’s STOL (short field take-off and landing) capability, at least, not in the Air Wing. The COIN, with its turbo propulsion, limited ordnance payload and troop-carrying capabilities will be a useful weapon somewhere in the spectrum between the armed helicopter and the “Spad.” It will be very suitable for employment ashore and possibly for operations from escort-type carriers if such carriers also transport Marine landing teams. The COIN has no place in the attack carrier wing, neither now nor in the foreseeable future.

Although the A-7A and the COIN will add significantly to the readiness of the Fleet, the most glaring deficiency in the aircraft inventory has not been solved—a suitable replacement for the “Spad.” Many of our most respected aviators have proffered the idea of reopening the “Spad” production line. If it means moving backwards to move forward, so be it, they argue.

In general, the specifications for the “Spad” replacement must provide for a turbo propulsion plant to permit a higher speed range, a rugged airframe, a minimum of eight hours endurance at low altitude, a reliable weapons system, a comparable ordnance payload capability, and finally, tricycle landing gear. It is believed that all specifications could be met at a cost less than the A-7A and slightly more than the COIN.

And so we bid farewell to “Spads”; they have served us well; they will be missed. When the air shows are over and the next fight begins, perhaps only then will the realization hit home that we have retired without satisfactory replacement a remarkably effective weapons system.

A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1950, Lieutenant Commander McFall was designated a naval aviator in 1952 and, since then, has served in five operational A-1 squadrons—VAs 175, 105, 15, 75, and 65. He has served as an instructor in the Basic Training Command in 1954 and as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to CNABTRA, DEPCINCLANFLT, and to the Superintendent, U. S. Naval Academy on successive tours. He attended the U. S. Naval War College in 1961-62. He is presently assigned to Attack Squadron 43.