Comment and Discussion

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"The Burden of Being Privileged”

(See pages 37-42, January 1965 Proceedings)

Commander William R. St. George, U. S. Navy (Former Commanding Officer, USS Van Voorhis, DE-1028)—I agree with Captain Cahill’s concern over the unenviable holding-on position in the crossing situation. As a working-level participant in the U. S. preparation for the Rules of the Road portion of the 1960 International Safety of Life at Sea Conference, I feel a few observations are in order to explain the efforts of that group. Also of value would be brief consideration of the work of the Conference itself.

At this Conference, the entire subject of the Rules of the Road was reviewed and brought up-to-date. While the crossing situation was discussed thoroughly, particularly in prelim­inary preparations in the United States, the only change made that will affect the crossing situation was the rewriting of Rule 22 to read as follows:

Every vessel which is directed by these Rules to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, so far as possible, take positive early action to comply with this obligation, and shall, if the circum­stances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other.

The italicized portion was added by the 1960 Conference. This change to the Rules will become effective on 1 September 1965.

While the change does not add any alterna­tives to the required actions of the holding-on vessel, it does spell out more directly and positively the duty of the giving-way vessel. This should eliminate any doubt in the mind of the master of the giving-way vessel that his merely holding course and speed, and relying on a slight bearing drift of the holding-on vessel, is not sufficient legally to meet his obligation.

Another change in the Rules adopted by the 1960 Conference provides for the permis­sive use of a white light to be synchronized with the whistle. This change should reduce the range limitation of the whistle as it now affects the 5-blast “shake-up” signal. Its effectiveness must, of course, depend upon its wide acceptance and installation even though it is not required by the new rules.

One may argue legitimately that this is not much consolation to the master of the hold­ing-on vessel as he observes the violator bear­ing down on him. A look at the background discussions and committee action in the United States, as well as the deliberations of a Navy International Rules of the Road Com­mittee, will show some of the difficulties and problems encountered.

During the course of these preparations, there were several proposals directed toward the solution of this problem. One proposal was to permit the holding-on vessel to take the avoiding action of turning right and parallel­ing the course of the giving-way vessel until the situation clarified. This proposal gave the holding-on vessel some freedom of action, but was objected to because it would be difficult

to specify at what range this action should be token. It would also remove from the hold- tog-on vessel the right of way and substitute ^a rather indefinite burden of turning for that °f holding-on. Most important, it would have the disadvantage of removing the predict­ability from the crossing situation, for the giving-way vessel could no longer rely on the holding-on vessel to hold on. After consider­able discussion, the sub-committee studying the Rules of the Road agreed that permitting the holding-on vessel to make a right turn Would only further complicate the problem and would, in fact, be more dangerous than the present Rules.

A second approach suggested was to create around the holding-on vessel, insofar as cir­cumstances permit, a zone of impenetrability by forbidding the giving-way vessel from ap­proaching within two miles of the holding-on vessel. It was thought that this would add another problem to the already agonizing wait of the holding-on vessel, that of deciding what to do when the giving-way vessel vio­lated the 2-mile zone. Another objection was that determination of the two miles would be difficult, as many ships do not have radar, and range determination would be difficult and confusing. After considerable discussion this proposal was rejected.

The sub-committee concluded that any changes adopted should not place an addi­tional burden on the giving-way vessel. For this reason, the final changes to Rule 22, quoted above, were the only provisions added for the crossing situation.

An interesting facet of the 1960 Conference was the attention devoted to the subject of the visibility of lights. This is particularly appro­priate in view of Captain Cahill’s recommen-

dation for increasing the range of visibility. Early in the U. S. deliberations, in processing the several opinions offered for increasing the range of visibility of side lights, it was dis­covered that to the light technicians the phrase “visible on a clear dark night” was not a sufficiently precise term upon which to design and build navigational lights. After extensive research, more definite terms were proposed by the United States, and these revised terms were incorporated in a recom­mendation to the 1960 Rules for further study by the Intergovernmental Maritime Con­sultative Organization.

Perhaps the results of this study and other thought-producing proposals, such as those expressed by Captain Cahill, will lead to solu­tion of this most perplexing mariner’s di­lemma, the crossing situation.

Captain E. J. Newbould, U. S. Navy (Former Commanding Officer, USS Elokomin, AO-55; USS Ross, DD-563; and USS Tigrone, SSR-419)—Captain Cahill’s article adds up to a severe indictment of Rule 21. As he ob­serves correctly, it is interpreted by too many seamen as an inviolate rule, requiring a policy of fatal passivity to be borne grimly by a privileged vessel to the moment of disaster. Rule 21 in the revised International Rules of the Road retains the precise terminology of its predecessor in the current Rules. Hope for relief from “the burden of being privileged” by rewording Rule 21 is thus foreclosed to seamen for many years to come.

There has, however, been introduced the intriguing phrase in New Rule 22 that:

Every vessel which is directed by these Rules to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, so far as possible, take positive early action to comply with this obligation, and shall, if the circum­stances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other.

The clear intent of these new words is to place an added burden on the burdened vessel to cause her to do what she ought to do well in advance of when she must do it.

What effect this phrase will have on consci­entious, adult seamen who are required to answer for their negligence before the courts must await tests before the admiralty tribu­nals. It may be hoped, without much justifica­tion, that the courts will place the burden where it properly belongs—on the burdened vessel. All seamen would hail the decision which would place on the burdened vessel the same solemn sense of responsibility which now plagues the privileged vessel. Until that time comes, we have little choice but to sail with Rule 21 as it now exists and has been interpreted by the courts.

The question has been posed well: When does Rule 21 apply on the high seas? The answer is suggested by the author’s reference to Farwell’s The Rules of the Nautical Road- “haul off so early that a collision cannot pos­sibly ensue.” I agree fully with the author s adaptation of that phrase in his proposal that the “privileged” vessel must act when engaged in a steady bearing situation at long range with a “burdened” vessel evidencing no dis­position to do her duty. However, I disagree just as strongly with his substitution of an inflexible turn to the right for an inflexible policy of inaction.

As a matter of practice, nothing can clarify the crossing situation more rapidly or with more finesse, than a substantial turn to left—- with a minimum change of 30 degrees and with no hesitation to use a turn of 45 degrees or more. This turn to the left, made at a time when a collision between even two 20-knot ships would be mathematically impossible (approximately five miles) should both turn simultaneously toward one another, has a number of distinct advantages when properly employed.

First, during day or night, and especially at night, it tells the other vessel that she is no longer burdened in the time it takes to make the turn. A turn to the right of 10 degrees or 20 degrees, as recommended by Captain Cahill, tells the other vessel nothing. Indeed, in the Alleghany-Pomaron case cited in the article there is no assurance that a 10-degree or 20-degree turn to the right would have avoided the collision. For, as the Court said, “The contradiction in testimony as to what the actual bearing of the vessel was makes it impossible to demonstrate whether or not any change at all in the Pomaron’s course or speed was necessary to avoid collision.” On the other hand, had the Pomaron, the privileged vessel, which first sighted the Alleghany about 10 to 12 miles broad on her port bow, made a 30-degree left turn at five miles range, there is absolutely no question but that the ships would have passed safely.

A fundamental cause of collision, when the Alleghany and the Pomaron met and today, 50 years later, is not the legal wording of the Rules, nor the obtuseness of seamen, nor even the deliberate violation of the Rules. It is the helpless silence which envelops two strange ships on the high seas. The Stockholm-Andrea Doria case is an unhappy example in modern times. Here were two of the best-equipped ships on the high seas, and they collided with terrifying results. Yet, their only practical means of communication was through the indistinct moan of a ship’s whistle at crimi­nally short range. Had these two ships been able to speak to one another in a universally understood, instantaneous manner at reason­able distance, it is probable that the extent of the tragedy would have been reduced, if not entirely avoided. The introduction into the revised Rules of an optional whistle-co-ordi­nated light is a hesitant step in the right direc­tion, although valueless in fog. Meanwhile, on the high seas, in clear weather and at long range, we can best speak by a maneuver to the left.

Secondly, during day or night, the left turn toward a crossing vessel 45 degrees or less on the port bow at long range, adds the bearing rate change of your swinging ship to her bearing rate change and establishes a rapid conclusion to the developing situation. A turn to the right of 10 degrees or 20 degrees, if the collision does not occur, results in an agoniz­ing stretch-out of the very situation we are so anxious to avoid. Further, a turn to the left, while it closes the range temporarily, insures a much wider passage of the ships when success­fully concluded than does the right turn.

Finally, a turn to the left made in sufficient time by a ship which is heading inevitably into a privileged status, and made before the Rules are yet applicable (as Captain Cahill’s turn to the right), is not violating the Rules but abetting their purpose by taking action to prevent the likelihood of collision.

Appropriate safeguards in the use of the left turn will recommend themselves to the accomplished seaman. Suppose that the ship on the port bow does her duty early in keeping with the revised Rules and turns to the right at the same moment my ship turns to the left? On the exceedingly rare occasions when this does occur, a head-and-head situation may be developing for which clear rules are available. In these exceptional cases, one can continue the turn or take other action as the circum­stances demand. Since this maneuver to the left must be executed with skill, promptness, and coolness, it should be performed well in advance of any such intention of action on the part of the other ship. It should be limited to those situations where the other vessel is approximately 45 degrees or less on one’s port bow and well outside the range where the combined speeds of the vessels would preclude further action to avoid collision. It is obvi­ously limited to areas where sea room is avail­able for both ships, and in clear weather.

Another objection might be: “We must be able to predict the action of the other vessel. If you are going to turn left, in violation of common practice, confusion will result.” My answer to this is the same as Captain Cahill’s —you cannot count on the other ship now. If she is asleep, a turn to the left will go unob­served; if she is alert, you need only be more so, and make your turn before she does, in which case, she will sail on, to the relief of all hands. In any event, I cannot see how this objection can have much validity. The fact is that the burdened vessel’s action, for example, is completely unpredictable. She is currently authorized to slow, stop, reverse, turn right, or turn left.

The maneuver to the left on the high seas by a ship otherwise destined to become priv­ileged, burdened with all the stern duty which that status entails, has much to commend it. Of a certainty, it will appeal to any mariner who chafes under the dead hand of inaction laid on his “privileged” ship.

"Persuading the U-Boats”

(See pages 52-59, December 1964 Proceedings)

Carl Strohmeyer (Former Lieutenant, German Navy)—I think that the effect these propaganda broadcasts had upon the Ger­man Navy has been grossly exaggerated.

It was in general forbidden—and I think rightly so—to tune in to foreign broadcasts. Of course, this does not refer to certain Ger­man counterintelligence agencies which, by their nature, analyzed these transmissions.

Of all branches of the German armed forces, the German Navy was the most con­servative, consisting mainly of volunteers due to the extensive and specialized training. This, by necessity, formed a high level of education and morale which hardly fell, even toward the very end of the war. Even if some personnel listened to these broadcasts, the psychological effect upon the morale and behaviour of the men of the German Navy was not noticeable. It is a gross mistake to think otherwise.

Of course, the English tried the same sort of propaganda broadcasts under the German name Soldaten-Sender Calais (soldier station Calais) with perhaps a little more success, as they tried to camouflage their broadcasts as a German military station without showing a trace of an accent. This was not the case with “Fregatten-Kapitdn Robert Lee Norden.”

Germany did the same thing with broad­casts by a Britisher (“Lord Haw Haw” who was executed after the war).

I may add that your drawing on pages 52-53 is quite reminiscent of the wartime propaganda (medals for war gallantry were not worn on sweaters).

Captain Roland E. Krause, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As I read this article, I had a feeling of sadness that the Germans, our cur­rent allies, had proved so weak that two of their most famous U-boat commanders, then- Lieutenant Karl Doenitz and Lieutenant Commander Otto Kretschmer, had sur­rendered rather than fight to the finish (in the terms of the broadcast) and that the U-boats began to show white flags of surrender in­stead of fighting to the finish. But fortunately for us today, it was not so.

To set the record straight, Doenitz and Kretschmer “surrendered” in 1918 and 1941, respectively, only to the extent that they did not resist being fished out of the water after their boats had been sunk.

If operational U-boats showed the white flag it was a rarity. In fact, a submarine has little chance to hoist any kind of a flag in action.

One might expect that even without psy­chological warfare, the morale of the U-boat crewmen would decline when they began suf­fering terrible losses in the spring and summer of 1943. If such was the case, it was not appar­ent to Commander U-boats, who recorded in his diary during August 1943: “Even though the situation for U-boat warfare is very serious and strained, the commanding officers and crews remain keen and determined. This has been shown particularly in the attitude of the crews of boats sunk, when their chances of being rescued at first seemed hopeless.” Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, in his History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, states, “He [Doenitz] managed to main­tain high morale in his U-boat crews to the very end, in spite of heavy losses.” In a final summary, he says, “There is no reason to suppose that they would not have fought on in a losing campaign if the defeat of the German Army had not brought collapse and surrender. Their morale was unimpaired to the bitter end. ...”

As the author has pointed out, it is difficult to evaluate accurately the benefits accruing from psychological warfare. Evidently, the gain was not great, and it must be remem­bered that the Norden broadcasts were only one phase of this warfare. But any such effort is worthwhile provided the benefits are commensurate with the cost. In this case, the output was small in respect to manpower employed, but more important than this was the release of information to the enemy. We give a quid pro quo, hoping that what we give will be returned to us with interest.

"The Tall Ships Race”

(See pages 82-105, December 1964 Proceedings)

Charles Rosner—As an old school ship graduate, I was greatly interested in this article. I must point out, however, that the Spanish Juan Sebastian de Elcano is not a bar- kentine as stated, but a topsail schooner.

"Our Nation’s Shipyards”

(See pages 34-45, November 1964,

and pages 162-163, March 1965 Proceedings)

Commander R. C. Austin, SC, U. S. Navy (Systems Design Officer, Bureau of Sup­plies and Accounts)—Commander Meyer’s ex­cellent article regarding the conflict between private and naval shipyards did not mention an advantage given to private shipyards by the Navy itself. This advantage is provided for ^ln the ship construction contracts which cite performance specifications for hull, mechani­cal, and electrical components such as pumps, motors, blowers, valves, and the like.

As a result of these performance specifica­tions, the private shipbuilder is permitted to install any component he desires, as long as it meets performance specifications. Sup­posedly, this practice provides the Navy with ^a ship at a lower cost. What has been forgot­ten, however, is the increase in the ensuing support costs incurred by the Navy in at­tempting to maintain the resulting wide variety of components over the life of these ships. Configuration control under this prac­tice is practically nonexistent.

The problem of determining bills of mate­rial for these components in a shipboard allowance of repair parts for the ship is a task that almost defies solution under the current ship construction contracts. In de­veloping second echelon support for these non-standard configurations, even within a ship class, there is at best only a rough ap­proximation of requirements.

The extent of this lack of standardization is illustrated by the fact that 35 per cent of the hull, mechanical, and electrical components cataloged and supported by the Navy supply system applies to two hulls or less. Approxi­mately 45 per cent of the 185,000 hull, mechanical, and electrical components sup­ported by the Navy has been installed in ships built within the last five years. It would appear that this percentage is far greater than the percentage of the Fleet that has been built within the last five years.

These figures indicate that while ships constructed at private shipyards may have allowed construction economies, they have also resulted in configuration difficulties rather than configuration control. The over­all economies obtained may be debatable

ENTER THE FORUM

Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.

when the cost of establishing support for the components is considered.

Several type commands have attempted to alleviate this situation. They have asked for and received hull, mechanical, and elec­trical component configuration listings for the ships within their command. When a de­fective component requires replacement in a specific ship, the command specifies that the replacement component be one that can be used in a number of ships within the com­mand. This is a rather lamentable method by which to achieve standardized configurations of ships; it is akin to locking the barn door after the disappearance of the horse.

Solutions do exist for this problem. Under one solution, shipbuilding contracts could continue to be issued with performance specifications. However, appended to the contract would be a listing, or listings in various sequences, of the currently established, supported, and acceptable components within the Navy. Automatic data processing tech­niques exist whereby performance ratings of established components could be matched to performance specifications called for in the ship design. The shipbuilder would be re­quired to select components for installation in the ship from the list appended to the contract. If the shipbuilder should desire to substitute a component not on the list which meets or exceeds the performance specifica­tion, he could request approval and cite reasons for his request, such as more eco­nomical operation or more durability. Per­formance specifications not matched by an established component or components would be filled or installed at the discretion of the shipbuilder, as is done today.

This technique would permit a greater degree of standardization within the Fleet, with attendant improvement in material support. It would also permit the Navy to select those components that have been proven trouble free in active use as measured by failure report analysis and the Standard Navy Maintenance Program and Material Management Program. Permitting the ship­builder to recommend substitutions, properly justified, would eliminate the tendency to freeze technological development.

This solution would also provide the Navy with the opportunity to buy ships from private shipyards as it does from a Navy shipyard; in a buyer’s market rather than a seller’s.

"Crisis in Leadership”

(See pages 44-51, July 1964 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Robert M. Lee, CEC, U. S. Naval Reserve—Every facet of our lives is becoming compartmentalized, analyzed, and subjected to varying stimuli to adjust and modify it.

Nowhere has this been done more amply than in the U. S. Navy. Take a long look at the scores of manuals, regulations, and in­structions emanating from every echelon of Navy command. Every situation that has occurred is covered somewhere in the maze of paper. Every officer has faced this dilemma— to adhere to the “book” or to act on indi­vidual initiative. If he chooses the latter, he faces censure or kudos, depending on the outcome of the particular matter.

Leadership had been isolated as an im­portant and controllable quality and had been researched fairly thoroughly. Then came General Order 21 and its flurry of programs and requirements. And about the same time came the Cordiner Report on pay and in­centives. Effectiveness of a peacetime com­mand was clouded by re-enlistment rates, disciplinary action rates, advancement rates, and the like. It was an administrator’s heaven or hell, depending on one’s position.

Captain Lathrop has decried the loss of prestige of the petty officer. But what of the commissioned officer? What is his part in this crisis? The problem found in the enlisted structure exists in the officer structure as well. We have become so wedded to the “book” that our actions in regard to the enlisted structure have become stilted and less meaningful than they used to be.

Every aspect of enlisted promotion is cov­ered in the instructions, manuals, courses, and regulations; the officers’ part in deter­mination of advancement has become one of the rubber stamp. If the courses, factors, and exams have all been written and properly entered, which commanding officer can turn down a man for promotion on the basis of “feeling?” This is particularly true when the commanding officer must keep in mind the factors on which he is being measured.

As Captain Lathrop pointed out, we have developed a “belt system of promotion, and, seemingly, it works very well. We “put in” a recruit with good intelligence and several years later we turn out a chief petty officer who is technically proficient in rate but may be completely lacking as a leader of men. In his service record is a complete file of 971s attesting to his proficiency and readi­ness to accept the responsibilities of a higher rate, all signed by his commanding officer and a promotion board.

These officers were not and are not in­competent in adjudging leadership—they simply weighed their many responsibilities and chose the course that is popular and guaranteed to produce higher re-enlistment rates and better morale. They necessarily have devalued the ability to lead men in battle as a criterion for promotion.

Psychologists will not claim infallibility for written exam scores as a measure of a man, particularly for personality traits—one of which is leadership.

Only one effective test can be made for leadership—involving an individual in a situation that calls for leadership.

Leadership is an illusive quality and, de­pending on the situation, different members of a group will take the position of leader at different times. Today, most Navy men have both technical and military responsibilities. Some of the general quarters assignments are geared to the man’s technical specialty; many are not. A Seabee for example, may be an equipment operator and have as his mili­tary assignment the position of automatic rifleman in a fire team; an electrician first class who is expert at electrical maintenance finds himself as a squad leader of three fire teams. Suppose these men joined the Navy only to learn a trade and gain skill in it. They are now the leaders of bands of men. Maybe they have what it takes as leaders of military men, and maybe they do not.

Captain Lathrop’s solution would differen­tiate between the petty officer and the tech­nical specialist. I wish wholeheartedly that it would work, but experience in other en­deavors where similar solutions have been tried finds it wanting. Perhaps it is just the nature of man, but the technical specialist is seldom content to offer profound advice on

the “best” way to solve a problem; he wants power too, and never so badly as when the organization is arranged so that he can not attain it. Offering pay grade step to E-9 to the technical specialist will not buy off his frustration if he answers for direction and supervision to an E-7 or an E-6 petty officer.

This raises the question concerning physical identification of the petty officer. Would dif­ferent uniforms be involved? Would the technical specialists in E-7 to E-9 ratings stay as white hats so the petty officers could have a distinctive chief-petty-officer-type uniform? It has been my experience that the elimina­tion of all stripes and chevrons does not hamper the leadership situation; in fact, 1 believe it is enhanced. The real leader does not require a suit of armor replete with braid, plumes, and jingling medals, and no man hkes to give deference to a suit, but he will give it gladly to the leader inside.

Some of the best leaders are not those who Would choose leadership, but rather have been “forced” into the position by their desire to see a thing done correctly. And if such a solution were implemented, would it not fall into the same pattern as we now have? How are these “leader types” to be chosen? By a score on written exams or as they should have been chosen from the outset?

What of the commissioned officer system? Is it better and why? The fitness report and selection board system has been defended through many trials. Its secret of success is the comprehensive evaluation of subordi­nates by an experienced leader. Because of the rank pyramid, the petty officers are usually evaluated by junior officers who may not be accurate judges of leadership qualities. In fact, most of them need a bit of aging in inter­personal relationships before they themselves become leaders—if they are ever going to be.

But whatever system is used, isn’t it a question of officers choosing those who should lead and then accepting the responsibility for their choice? A measure of the success of a leader is his choice of subordinates and his use of those so chosen. Those who are chosen should, as Captain Lathrop recommends, be given every assistance to develop further their lead­ership ability.

Then what becomes of the man who is al­ready elevated to the leadership position but who has not worked out? With the military system, the man who has precedence has the right and the privilege to lead. Moreover, he has the obligation to do so.

What is needed is some flexibility within a command to use the best leaders without destroying the precedence system and with­out taking away from the individual man what he has rightfully earned. Perhaps the solution lies in establishing a system of per­manent rate and pay grade based on the highest held, but using a temporary rate merited in the particular command. This solution also has its disadvantages, but other services have used a somewhat similar system.

Whatever the solution, it will be difficult. But the problem is very real, and some sim­plification is needed. We have fractionated and re-fractionated since World War I, and each time increased the problem.

Regardless of the system, the individual commissioned officer is the key: He must have the guts to keep the primary mission in mind—first and foremost. It would also help if his commanding officer and the seniors on up shared this belief and set the example. Otherwise, the administrators will hold sway and paper push-ups will be the order.

Quartermaster Second Class Richard L. Hobbie, U. S. Navy—Captain Lathrop raises many good points which are foremost in the minds of petty officers today. However, he has failed to trace the blame to its true source. The petty officers themselves have given their leadership away bit by bit. They have allowed non-rated men a freer hand in the manage­ment of things, and by doing so they have diluted their own authority.

Often a college graduate will enter the en­listed ranks at age 22 or 23 and find himself being told what to do by a 20-year-old second class petty officer. The new arrival is often more mature and subtly usurps the leadership role. He has not had the practical experience in his rating, yet he may very well be bet­ter able to handle himself and others. The younger petty officer finds himself following his subordinates rather than leading them, and once he has started, he loses a little more control each day and is soon useless as a leader.

The living conditions in the Navy do not allow the necessary gulf to develop between the petty officer and his non-rated men. In the other services, junior non-commissioned officers live together, separated from their seniors, and the strong personalities lead within the lower rates. In the Navy, first class petty officers through seaman apprentices share the same berthing and messing facil­ities. The work load is often as equally divided, further lessening the prestige so necessary to effective leadership. A solution, of course, would be to give the petty officers a separate living space and mess, but the question arises as to where the line should be drawn.

In many ships first and second class petty officers have head-of-the-mess-line privileges and other benefits, while third class petty officers fall in with the non-rated men. In op­erations and engineering departments, a third class petty officer often does the same job as a seaman at slightly higher pay. Possibly, the Navy should drop the third class petty officer designation from E-4s and revert them to a completely non-rated status. Possibly only career-designated personnel should be ad­vanced to E-5, thus thinning out the “short timers” in the second class petty officer rates who are just drifting toward their discharge date with the least possible effort. It is logical to expect that a person who has decided to make a career of the Navy will be more in­clined to exert his leadership.

Even if all of Captain Lathrop’s sugges­tions are not adopted, his high-quality leader­ship schools merit strong consideration. Many petty officers in today’s Navy are not too sure of what to do; they do what they hope is right and often find that it is wrong. All too often, petty officers avoid pressing their authority for fear of becoming unpopular. No leader in the military can do his job effec­tively without hurting someone’s feelings from time to time.

A great improvement could be brought about by giving the petty officer more en­couragement to take the initiative in per­forming routine work. People thrive on being able to remember that the job was done a little bit better, faster, or easier, because they thought out a different method of doing it. The petty officer rates are filled with leaders who are continually hindered by the com­placency with the status quo within the Navy-

It is time for someone to generate some action toward improving the esprit de corps of the petty officers in today’s Navy.

The Naval Aviator—A Reassessment

Lieutenant John O. Williams, Jr., U. S- Navy (Naval aviator)—The U. S. Navy cur­rently has a shortage of naval aviators. Despite this situation, most naval aviators are forced to retire after 20 years of service as thrice-passed-over lieutenant commanders- Relatively few naval aviators reach senior rank and no naval aviator below the rank of commander can hold the title “commanding officer.”

The latter situation is significant because naval aviators are also line officers. Slightly more than half of the line officers of the U. S. Navy are naval aviators.

In other areas of the Navy and in the Army and Marine Corps, officers of almost every rank, can hold commanding officer billets.

For example, both an aviation squadron and a ground battalion are normally com­manded by 0-5s. In the squadron this is the only level on which command is exercised. In the battalion, however, command is also exercised on the company level. In recent years, squadron command has become the exclusive property of commanders; it ap­pears that the day of the lieutenant com­mander heading a squadron is over. In the Army, a company commander is normally a captain, but often a senior first lieutenant. The battalion commander is normally a

* The January 1965 issue of The Officer Personnel Newsletter, published by the Bureau of Naval Person­nel, states: “At this time there is a need for 778 lieutenants and 1,582 lieutenant (junior grade) and ensign pilots. At the present time these jobs are either filled by lieutenant commanders or lieutenants, or not filled at all by flying officers. In some instances the shortage is relieved by the assignment of non-flying officers to the aeronautical organization, and naval aviation observers are beginning to fill a substantial number of billets such as CIC aboard ships and ground instructor in the training command. In the past these billets have been filled with pilots, thus more aviators will be available to return to cockpit billets. All programs, and in particular the ASW/AEW pro­grams, have tended to become more and more rank heavy in recent months. This tendency is causing un­derstandable concern among junior lieutenant com­manders.”-—Editor.

Barrett Gallagher

Naval aviation is in need of more naval aviators and less line officers. Individuals such as these aviators in the USS Randolph (CVS-15) can no longer be expected to answer both needs according to a contrib­utor to the forum. A bold solution is offered in the writer’s reassessment of naval aviators.