The year 1964 will be noteworthy in the annals of the Royal Navy not only as the year in which the historic Board of Admiralty was replaced by the Admiralty Board of the Defence Council of the Ministry of Defence, but also because never before in peacetime has so much been accomplished by so few ships. As troubles multiplied in British Guiana, Cyprus, Aden, East Africa, Zanzibar, and Borneo, what Captain John Lichfield, M.P., Royal Navy (Retired), described in Parliament as “the thin blue line of the Royal Navy” was stretched tauter and tauter around the world. This statement was later confirmed by the former Minister of Defence (Royal Navy) Earl Jellicoe, on his return from a visit to ships and establishments in the Middle East and Far East, in July, and it is the purpose of this study to show why it is that today the Royal Navy is at full stretch.
The British Government decided in 1957 that the time had come “to revise not merely the size, but the whole character of the defence plan” and the belief was expressed that Britain had been bearing a disproportionately large share of the total burden of Western defence. As a result, a Five Year Defence Plan was evolved in which retrenchment was the order of the day. The Royal Navy, whose role in total war was seen as “uncertain” and whose other functions seemed to have been overlooked, bore its full share of the cuts imposed on the Armed Forces. Its personnel strength on 1 April of that year was 102,700— excluding 9,600 National Servicemen and 3,700 Women’s Royal Naval Service personnel (W.R.N.S.)—and the operational Fleet comprised 163 ships. It was believed that economies could be effected by replacing existing ships with a reduced number of more modern ones and by scrapping a considerable number of ships in reserve, but the first of these premises was to prove impracticable.
The Admiralty had to some extent anticipated the government’s wishes by closing down certain shore establishments and reducing the strength of the Reserves, but the new policy called for greater reductions, with the result that some 200 officers were prematurely retired and the engagements of a number of ratings were terminated. As far as the Fleet itself was concerned, it was decided to abandon the idea of maintaining squadrons of ships on various stations throughout the world and to achieve greater mobility by the formation of a number of task groups centered on the air power of the carrier, one of these groups being stationed in the Indian Ocean. The main theme of the government’s policy was economy, and since the future trend of events could not be discerned, naval policy was left, for the time being at any rate, in the lap of the gods.
The following year, 1958, the threat posed by “Russia’s formidable submarine force” engaged the government’s attention, and it was decided “to concentrate the efforts of the Royal Navy to an increasing extent on the antisubmarine role.” As a result, increased orders for ASW frigates were placed. At the same time, the intention “to maintain a balanced all-purpose fleet of appreciable strength” east of Suez was reaffirmed. The composition of this fleet was given as “one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, and a number of destroyers, frigates and smaller vessels.” It was also stated that a converted carrier equipped to accommodate a commando of Royal Marines would shortly be deployed in the area (but due to delays of one kind and another, HMS Bulwark did not reach the station for another two years).
The year 1959 was a year of stock-taking, in which the progress made with the Government’s Five Year Defence Plan was examined. It was disclosed that since it began, the manpower of the Royal Navy had been reduced by 15,000 (a figure which included 7,300 National Servicemen) and on 1 April of that year the active strength was given as 95,800— excluding 2,200 National Servicemen and 3,600 members of the W.R.N.S. The target figure set for 1962, when the last of National Servicemen would have been discharged on the termination of conscription, was 88,000. There was, therefore, still some way to go, but there seems to have been no inkling of the difficulties which lay ahead as a result of the rapid decline of naval manpower.
In 1960, it was stated that “the Government’s broad defence policy has undergone no major change,” but, in 1961, although the target figure for the strength of the Royal Navy remained unchanged, a more objective line was taken in a restatement of the government’s defence policy, which included the following: “In this we must recognize that many of our most important responsibilities are not concerned with the direct deterrence of all-out global war, but rather with the checking of small outbreaks which could grow into nuclear war by accident or design.” With this reversal of the priorities, the several roles of the Royal Navy became clearer, and in the statement accompanying the 1961/1962 Navy Estimates, an attempt was made to define them, of which the following are but brief summaries:
In Peacetime, to maintain stability and security, to deter trouble-makers, and to show the flag. In Limited and Brush-fire Wars, to deploy military power quickly and effectively when trouble occurs, to provide air cover for operations until air bases can be established, and to be capable of operating a balanced fleet able to meet threats from the air, the surface, and under the sea. In Global War, to form an integral part of the combined naval forces of the West.
The Kuwait crisis in the summer of 1961 provided an excellent example of the type of operation envisaged as a limited or brush-fire conflict and showed clearly that the concept of a balanced force centered on the carrier, though excellent in theory, was unworkable unless ships remained within tactical supporting distance of each other. To ensure this in an immense area such as that spanned by the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, it was evident that two such forces would be necessary to deal with possible trouble occurring simultaneously at the extremities of the command, but this was and remains beyond the capacity of the Navy’s resources.
In 1962, the Five Year Defence Plan having run its course, a thorough reappraisal was made of Britain’s defence policy, in which “the ability to assure free movement by sea at the right time and place” was stated to be “of fundamental importance to these islands” and the need for “a balanced and versatile fleet capable of bringing force to bear under the sea, on the surface and in the air” was emphasized. The statement continued: “By the use of task forces with a significant amphibious capability, seaborne military and air power can be exerted wherever our interests require
it, to preserve or if necessary to restore peace.” But despite these brave words the diminution of the Navy continued. On 1 April 1962, its strength had fallen to 86,500, exclusive of Boys and W.R.N.S., i.e., 1,500 below the figure set by the government. No official explanation has been given for this lapse which appears to have been due to a variety of causes, amongst which a short-fall in the number of recruits played a part, but by and large it is clear that the brakes had not been applied soon enough and the machine continued to run on past the finishing line.
In 1963, following the conclusion of the Nassau Agreement between the British and U. S. governments, it was announced that the Royal Navy was to be entrusted with the important additional task of creating and operating a force of Polaris-armed nuclear- powered submarines, which would eventually supersede Britain’s “V” bombers as “an independent contribution to the long-range strategic deterrent forces of the Western Alliance.” Although during the four previous years only a passing reference had been made to the Russian submarine threat, this was now brought to the fore, and the Navy’s primary role “to safeguard our own merchant fleet and to contribute to worldwide trade by deterring and frustrating interference with the peaceful movement of merchant shipping” was proclaimed. In fact, that year, in presenting the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons, the Civil Lord, Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing, went out of his way to depict in clear and unmistakable terms the growing strength of Russian sea power in both the naval and commercial fields. He also warned that the initiation of the Polaris submarine program would necessitate some increase in the Navy’s personnel strength, which on 1 April that year had taken a slight upward turn and stood at 87,700—still 300 below the fixed minimum. The improvement continued, and by 1 April 1964 the figure stood at 89,800. A further increase of 2,300 is forecast for 1965. But the extra commitment which the Royal Navy is called upon to face, coupled with a belated realization that new ships require more men to man them than the ones they replace, because of the great technological advances which were made in recent years, has resulted in an extremely taut manpower situation.
Let us now examine the changes which have taken place in the composition of the British fleet as a result of the wavering policy outlined above. The following table shows the active ships in each category for the years
|
1957 |
1964 |
Aircraft Carriers |
4 |
4 |
Commando Ships |
— |
2 |
Cruisers |
8 |
2 |
Missile-armed Destroyers |
— |
4 |
Destroyers |
27 |
13 |
Frigates |
26 |
37 |
Submarines |
41 |
37 |
Minesweepers |
27 |
37 |
Landing Vessels |
6 |
7 |
Coastal Craft |
24 |
— |
Total |
163 |
143 |
It would appear at first sight that, apart from paying off the 24 coastal craft in commission in 1957, there had been little change in the composition of the active Fleet, despite, as we have seen, a 15 per cent reduction in manpower. But a closer look reveals that the 1964 Fleet packs a much more powerful punch than the one of seven years ago, and contains a large number of ships that have only been completed within the period under review.
Carr ins. It has been stated officially that carriers will continue to form the backbone of the Royal Navy throughout the 1970s. The four ships of this category now in service are:
HMS Eagle, 44,100 tons—Refitted, modernized, and returned to service in 1964 at an estimated cost of £30,000,000. She can operate the latest types of aircraft and carries Seacat close-range missiles.
HMS Ark Royal, 43,340 tons—Completed in 1955 and refitted in 1961. She is not as up-to- date as the Eagle, but can operate modern aircraft.
HMS Victorious, 30,530 tons—Rebuilt and thoroughly modernized between 1950 and 1958 at a cost of £20,000,000, she underwent a long refit in 1962. It has been stated that she will have to be replaced by about 1972.
HMS Centaur, 22,000 tons—A small carrier nearing the end of her life. Not modernized, she is pinch-hitting for the new small carrier HMS Hermes, which is now undergoing refit.
Despite a valiant and costly attempt to prolong the life of the existing carriers, the need to replace them by new ones could no longer be burked, and at the end of July 1963 it was announced that approval had been given for a new ship to be built to replace the Victorious. As the Ark Royal is expected to reach the end of her useful life at about the same time, unless a second carrier is ordered, Britain will have only three operational carriers from about 1972 onwards. This will put an end to the policy adopted in 1963, of maintaining two carriers east of Suez.
Allied with the problem of carrier replacement is that of the aircraft they carry. Although for some six years the British aircraft industry has been submitting plans for a replacement of the Fleet Air Arm’s obsolescent Sea Vixen fighter, the Government avoided taking a decision on the matter until it could no longer do so, by which time it had become so urgent that the only solution was to place an order in the United States for an unspecified number of McDonnell Phantom II fighters. Although this is probably the finest aircraft of its type in service today, it will present problems in take-off, handling, and stowage, because of the smaller size of British carriers, and it is doubtful that the smaller carriers will be able to operate it. Fortunately, in the Buccaneer, the Royal Navy has an attack aircraft of great versatility which has only recently come into service. It is understood that specifications have been drawn up for a highly sophisticated aircraft with variable wing geometry as a successor to the Buccaneer, but no decision has been taken to initiate prototype production.
There is an over-all shortage of helicopters, because the development of this type of aircraft has lagged, due to failure to appreciate the highly important part helicopters would be called upon to play both in an ASW role as well as in operations such as are proceeding in the jungles of Borneo.
Assault Ships. Although an increase in Britain’s amphibious capability will be noted, events have shown that it is not yet adequate for the tasks required of it. Of the two commando ships in service, only one is normally on station east of Suez. The deficiency will be to some extent remedied when the first of the two assault ships (LPD) building comes into service in 1966. The leisurely pace of construction of these ships has been the subject of unfavorable comment in the press.
Cruisers. The decrease in the number of cruisers in commission from eight to two is an indication that gun-armed vessels of this category are no longer a tactical requirement. It is questionable whether it was sound to complete the three new cruisers of the Lion class at a cost of some £43,000,000, since one of them has had to be paid off, due to a shortage of technical ratings, and the other two are to be converted to carry troops, for which purpose the after 6-inch gun turret will have to be removed, leaving each ship with one twin 6-inch turret forward.
Destroyers. The most important acquisition during the period under review has been the four missile-armed, “County”-class destroyers, which joined the Fleet in 1962 and 1963. Although classed as destroyers, they correspond to the frigates of the U. S. Navy, and are the first ships in the Royal Navy to carry long- range ship-to-air missiles. Two more of these ships are under construction and two more have been ordered. They have a complement of 440, or twice that of an ordinary destroyer.
Of the 13 ships listed as destroyers, only nine retain their original equipment, the other four having been converted to radar picket ships. No new destroyers proper have been built in Britain since the last of the Daring class was completed in 1954. New construction has been mainly concentrated on the completion of antisubmarine vessels of about 2,000 tons, classed as frigates.
Frigates. This program began with the laying down of 12 ships of the Blackwood class rated as “utility” ships, and these were followed by six of the Whitby class, which, because of their higher speed and better equipment, were known as “quality” ships. These last proved highly successful in every way and a repeat order for nine, known as the Rothesay class, was put in hand. All these are primarily ASW ships. Meanwhile, orders also were placed for the seven vessels of the “Tribal” class, which are designated “general purpose” frigates, that is, they are equipped to function equally well in an ASW, AAW, or aircraft direction role. The ships of this class were the first, other than coastal craft, to be fitted with a gas turbine in addition to steam propulsion. After some early teething troubles had been overcome. they proved very successful ships. Overlapping the “Tribal” program is that of the 13 ships of the Leander class, four of which have been completed. These are improved Whitby- class vessels but, like the “Tribals,” equipped for general duties, and they carry a new type of long-range radar, Seacat close-range AAW missiles, improved sonar equipment, and a lightweight ASW helicopter. However, the complement of the new ships is 262 officers and men, compared with 152 for the Whitby class and 200 for the Rothesay class. Mention must also be made of the eight diesel-driven AAW frigates built between 1955 and 1960, in which the advantages of the long endurance possible with this form of propulsion were exploited. Altogether, in the period under review, 32 new frigates have been commissioned, and 14 destroyers have been converted to fast ASW frigates, but not all the last named are in commission. In fact, despite all the uncertainty surrounding the Navy’s future role, the Admiralty very commendably ensured that its ASW capabilities would not be impaired.
Submarines. It is impossible not to criticize the Admiralty’s dilatoriness in adopting nuclear power for submarine propulsion, which is said to have been due to the government’s insistence that electrical power stations ashore must have first priority in this field. Be that as it may, much valuable experience has been lost and, were it not for the generous assistance of the United States, HMS Dreadnought, Britain’s first nuclear-powered attack submarine, would not be at sea today. The lack of experience is doubly unfortunate now that it has been decided to build five ballistic missile submarines, since in order to adhere to the schedule laid down, work has to proceed at high speed, and it is necessary to acquire in a matter of months know-how gained by the United States over a period of years. Without U. S. co-operation, Britain’s task would prove insuperable. Meanwhile, during the past seven years, 21 conventionally-powered submarines have been built in the United Kingdom, eight of the Porpoise class and 13 of the Oberon class. All these vessels have a greatly improved underwater speed and the ability to operate submerged for long periods using the snort. But they cannot compare with their nuclear-powered counterparts in the U. S. Navy.
Minesweepers. Although not apparent from the above table, a large number of minesweepers have been built during the last few years, but only a portion of these are kept in full commission, the remainder being in reserve at various ports at home and abroad where they are likely to be required in an emergency. There are 96 ships of the Coastal or “Ton” class (346 tons) and 64 of the Inshore or “Ham” class (120 tons).
Landing Ships. Apart from the two assault ships previously mentioned and the proposed conversion of the three Lion-class cruisers, nothing has been done to improve the landing vessel capacity of the Fleet. As a result, the Army has contracted for the construction of a number of logistic landing ships to meet its requirement for fast oceangoing troop and vehicle carriers to replace the existing fleet of obsolescent LSTs. Now that all three services are under one Ministry, possibly this anomalous state of affairs will be rectified.
Coastal Forces. Perhaps the most regrettable of the changes which have taken place in the composition of the Fleet was the decision taken in 1957 to close down the Coastal Forces command and place all but three of its vessels in reserve. The value of these craft in operations such as those now being undertaken in the Far East cannot be overstated. Moreover, it would appear that armed with rocket-type missiles there is an important future for these vessels, which are cheap to build and economical to operate.
Fleet Support. Only a brief mention can be made of the considerable expansion achieved during the last few years in the Royal Navy’s Fleet Support or Logistic Force. With the gradual disappearance of overseas bases, the need to make use of replenishment at sea has become an important factor in naval operations. But in the Royal Navy, these ships are not manned by naval personnel, as in the U. S. Navy, and therefore this expansion has not affected the manpower figure of the Navy, although the cost of their construction is a charge on the Navy vote.
There is a touch of irony in the fact that despite a policy of retrenchment during the first five of the last seven years, the net expenditure on the Royal Navy has risen from £316,000,000 in 1957 to £496,000,000 in 1964. Part of the increase is, of course, attributable to the Polaris submarine program, but the rest reflects the increased cost of maintaining a Fleet, the size of which cannot be reduced if commitments are to be met. The Royal Navy operates under a system by which ships spend not more than one year away from the United Kingdom. Hence, when operations are in progress in an area situated 8,000 miles away, a great deal of time is spent on passage to and fro. Also, the area of operations is so great that ships spend much of their time at sea anyhow. For example, in 1964, the carrier Centaur steamed 50,000 miles, most of it at high speed, during her first six months after leaving England. Other ships have logged distances during an interval of time which before World War II would have seemed fantastic. The large amount of sea time is also reflected in the amount of fuel consumed, and this adds to the running costs and maintenance problems. The expedient of recommissioning ships abroad using air transport has been resorted to, and this year, for the first time, a Royal Navy fleet carrier exchanged crews at Singapore.
However, the primary cause of the manpower stringency which exists in the Royal Navy today is due to the retrenchment policy referred to earlier, and also to that of attempting to replace existing ships by newly constructed ones which, as we have seen, calls for a steady increase in manpower if the same number of ships is to be kept in commission. The impact of the Polaris submarine program has placed a further strain on an already overextended personnel figure, especially in the higher technical categories, which were in short supply before it started.
It is obvious, therefore, that the MLF program, whatever its merits or demerits, has placed the British Government in a quandary, because the necessary personnel could only be made available by reducing the size of the Fleet, which, as we have seen, is already at full stretch, and is likely to remain so until the newly emergent nations of the world have gained somewhat in strength and stability.