When one speaks of the Chinese Communist Navy, there is a tendency to think of sampans and small patrol boats. Although these small craft have their function on the China seas, the Red Chinese Navy is a more formidable force than is generally recognized. Admiral Arleigh Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Congressional Committee on Armed Services on 8 March 1961, that: “The Chinese Communist Navy is the largest wholly Asian naval force in the Far East . . . The Chinese Communist naval capabilities are primarily defensive, but the Navy does have a limited offensive capability.”
The Chinese Communist Navy was not always this potent a force. In fact, when the Chinese Communists gained control of the mainland, there was little or no navy left to the Communist forces. The major unit remaining was the ex-Nationalist cruiser Chungking, formerly HMS Aurora. Although virtually obsolete, this cruiser, and her six 6- inch guns, represented a threat to the Republic of China (Nationalists). To eliminate this threat, the Republic of China Air Force sank the Chungking at Hu-Lu-Tao less than a month after she became a Red Chinese ship.
With the Chungking sunk, the Chinese Communist Navy in 1950 consisted of ships whose crews had defected to the Communists or ships whose faulty machinery prevented them from getting underway and proceeding to Formosa before the Red Chinese armies took the coastal areas. What remained was a motley collection of ex-American, ex-British, and ex-Japanese patrol craft, amphibious types and a few minesweepers. All were World War II craft or older. The major units were nine ex-Japanese frigates which were in a complete state of disrepair. The Chinese Communist Navy, therefore, possessed little or no capability. Further, the personnel situation was deplorable since there was no nucleus of personnel with previous naval experience in the People’s Liberation Army. The only naval personnel were those who had defected from various segments of the Nationalist Navy.
There is no doubt that the government of the People’s Republic of China recognized that its navy was comprised of personnel who were former enemies. Understandably, then, the first commanders of the Chinese Communist Navy were army officers who had no maritime experience but who were chosen for their political dependability. These army officers and the few senior naval officers who had defected to the Communists could not fill the large gaps in the fields of experienced naval leadership and planning.
With these naval shortcomings, and with the urgent necessity to install governmental administration and to restore the economy to a country the size of mainland China, the Navy was given a low priority for funds and development. Little was done by the Nav)’ except for a “do-it-yourself’ program which included the salvaging, refloating, recommissioning, and renaming of the cruiser Chungking in late 1951. This may have been largely a face-saving gesture, since the cruiser never really became operational. Some efforts were made to overhaul a few of the smaller craft and to improve their operability. Also, to train young men as naval officers, the People’s Naval Academy was established. This Academy, as well as other training organizations, had strong Russian naval representation on its staff to provide the missing naval experience and knowledge.
The need for a navy had been recognized early in the growth of the People’s Republic of China. In September 1949, the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference resolved to modernize the army and to establish an air force and navy to insure an adequate defense. Despite this early recognition, however, the expansion of the Navy really did not begin until 1954- 1955. It can only be conjectured that the Chinese Communists believed that they had by then progressed sufficiently in economic development to warrant an increase in naval strength. Likewise, there must have been a viewpoint that the operational capability and the political stability of the Navy had developed sufficiently to absorb an expansion. About 1954, Soviet aid was increased by the outright transfer of some old Soviet Gordy- class destroyers, four S-class oceangoing submarines, four Shchuka-class medium-range submarines, and five M-class coastal submarines. Six Kronstadt and, possibly, six Artillerist-type subchasers, two T-43-class minesweepers, and 50 old motor torpedo boats were also given to Communist China. Of these outright transfers, all were of pre-World War II construction except four of the M-class submarines, the two minesweepers, and the six Kronstadts. By these transfers the Soviets were, in addition to reducing their old ship inventory, creating a southward extension of the Communist Far Eastern Fleet.
With an emphasis on fast torpedo boats and submarines, the Chinese Communists gave themselves a tactical offensive power which could be used within close range of their bases. It further provided a highly mobile defense force in the case of attack on the littoral of China. This concept of defense of the homeland could be interpreted as a reflection of Soviet naval doctrine. Since Soviet naval advisors were at almost all command levels and many Chinese Communist naval officers were being sent to the Soviet Union for training, such a reflection was to be expected. It has been estimated that as early as 1954 there were 1,500 to 2,000 Soviet naval advisors attached at nearly all levels of the Chinese Communist Navy. Included were Soviet advisory missions which were located at the naval headquarters at Peiping, as well as at the headquarters of each of the three fleet commands, the North, East, and South China Fleets located in the Tsingtao area, Shanghai, and Canton, respectively.
With the amount of aid and influence that the Soviets provided, there was some speculation in the mid-1950s that there would be a combined Sino-Soviet Pacific naval command. However, there has been no indication that this command was ever formed.
Soviet aid did not stop with provision of old warships and technical naval advice. In 1956, the Soviets began assisting the Chinese Communists in the construction of several of the latest Soviet warship types, including long- range submarines. The first Riga-class destroyer escort was launched from the Hutung Shipyard, Shanghai, in April 1956. The launching of the second of this class from the same yard came in September 1956. Two more followed with the last being completed in 1957, bringing the Riga-class total to four. Also, in 1956 the Chinese Communists began building W-class submarines at the Kiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai, and possibly at Wuchang Shipyard, although the latter yard may not have started construction until 1957. Other ships, all of Russian design, built by the Chinese included Kronstadt-class subchasers, T-43-class minesweepers, and P-6- type motor torpedo boats. All of these ships were of a Soviet Navy design of 1950 or later. The speed with which the program was undertaken and the speed with which launchings were made, considering the low state of the Chinese shipbuilding industry, leads one to believe that, in addition to extensive Soviet technical aid, the Chinese were receiving the components for these construction programs in large sections. Certainly for the larger types of ships, sectional construction must have been involved.
In general, ships were Soviet design but a few reflected Chinese Communist design. The Shanghai-class motor gunboats first appeared in 1959 and were building at a rate of about five a year. Another type is the Swatow-class patrol boat built or converted in yards at Dairen, Canton, and Shanghai. This latter class of boats has a P-6 motor torpedo boat hull but mounts no torpedo tubes. Neither type of boat has been seen in the Soviet Navy even though the hull of the Swatow is of Soviet design.
In view of the avowed intention of Chinese Communist leaders to “liberate Taiwan,” landing craft should have been in a pre-eminent position in the building program. There were some 50 landing ships and craft which were left by the Nationalists. Mostly ex- U. S., World War II craft, these ships represent a substantial lift capability. Added to this, the Communists can requisition several thousand motor-powered junks for additional lift capabilities. Despite this existing potential and the lack of confirmation of new construction landing craft, it can be surmised that the Chinese Communists have already built, or will build, new landing craft to replace the over-age units.
The tempo of the growth of Chinese Communist naval power began to slow with the aggravation of the Peiping-Moscow ideological dispute. By 1960, the naval construction program had lessened considerably, and also during the same year, there was a sudden withdrawal of Soviet technicians and advisors. Their withdrawal deprived the Chinese Communists not only of shipbuilding advice, but also removed the major source of experienced naval advice available to the higher ranking Chinese Communist naval officers. These withdrawals eliminated any plans for a combined Sino-Soviet Pacific naval command. Basically, no combined command would have been acceptable with the ill feeling existing between Peiping and Moscow. What is probably more realistic is that Red China would be the weaker partner in such a command and would be subordinate to Soviet authority in combined command matters. In view of the traditional resentment of the Chinese to foreign influence in their affairs, such an arrangement would hardly be palatable to the Communist leaders in Peiping who fought for so many years with little or no assistance from the Soviet Union.
We have seen the growing power of the Chinese Communist Navy suddenly blunted by the cessation of Soviet aid. We should now measure China’s attributes or weaknesses in becoming a maritime power.
Coastline. With a coastline extending from the Yalu River in the north to the northern border of North Vietnam in the south, the Chinese Communists have a very long coast to protect. Characterized by shallow waters, innumerable islands, harbors, and inlets, this coast is very nearly ideal for both offensive and defensive mining. To the north there are many major seaports, including the port of Shanghai. In the south lies the port of Canton and various small ports including those on the island of Hainan. With this distribution of ports and with its long archipelagic coast, the defense of the China mainland is particularly well suited for the use of motor torpedo boats and fast gunboats. The shallow coastal waters, however, are less than ideal for submarine operations.
Industrial Capacity. The industrial capacity of the People’s Republic of China is not well adapted to support a shipping industry or a navy. With the withdrawal of Soviet aid, the major source of support was denied to the maritime and shipbuilding industries. No doubt some of the needed items could be provided by Chinese industries, but these industries are supplying needs in other fields which have a higher priority in the Chinese Communist economy. If the shipbuilding industry were given a high enough priority in the overall economy, it could build modern ships to replace the older units of the Chinese Communist Navy. Without this priority and without some technical help from the Soviet Union or other outside source, the capability to build warships will remain limited.
Another factor to be considered is the petroleum industry. Communist China’s petroleum reserves and its oil production are low despite intensive efforts to develop new oil fields and to improve production. Although its oil consumption rate per capita is one of the world’s lowest, Communist China must import about 40 per cent of its oil each year from Russia in order to meet basic requirements. Without this yearly import, it would be virtually impossible to operate its navy successfully.
Psychological Attitude. Communist China is a nation which has gained its position as a world power primarily through the strength of its army. From a naval viewpoint, the best reflection of this attitude was the assignment of army officers to high naval commands. In the initial stages of development of Communist China, this is understandable, but as a continuing policy it represents a weakness in the naval structure. Even the ideologies of the army wavered, however, when its leaders became overly interested in modernization. Sometime during 1958 or 1959, top military leaders met with top-level party members, and the military was told to pay more attention to party ideologies. It must be assumed that this policy applied equally to the naval leaders. Party loyalty remains the top requirement—over professional aptitude, experience, and leadership ability.
Naval Bases. The headquarters of the three fleets have already been mentioned. Other naval bases or facilities include Port Arthur, Dairen, Choushan, Foochow, Swatow, Whampoa, and Yulin. Some of these ports were former Russian, German, British, or Chinese Nationalist naval bases, which permitted the Chinese Communists to take over existing facilities. Additionally, there are smaller bases with varying facilities situated along the coast of mainland China which gave the Navy an adequate number of bases available for operations along the entire coast.
With its vast reservoir of manpower, the People’s Republic of China can present 50,000-man naval strength, providing more recruits for its marching and gun crews for its four Gordy-class destroyers. But technicians, particularly mariners, will be harder to come by. And expansion will be the more difficult Sino-Soviet relations are no longer as cordial today as when the festive shipboard scene at right occurred.
Naval Strength. The long-range offensive strength of the Communist Chinese Navy lies primarily in its 25 to 30 submarines, of which at least 17 are of the Soviet W-class built in China. These submarines are stationed in the Yellow Sea area and apparently remain close to their bases. The coastal defense strength lies in the fleet of 140 motor torpedo boats, numerous fast motor gunboats, and 24 Kronstadt-class submarine chasers. These units are highly mobile, shallow-draft ships which can utilize the irregularities of the coastline to conceal their movements from enemy forces' The major surface forces consist only of four obsolete Gordy-class destroyers and four Riga-class destroyer escorts. This shortage of large escort units certainly represents a weakness in the Communist Chinese Navy. There have been rumors that the Soviets would strengthen the surface forces by providing an old cruiser to the Communist Chinese. There is no indication that this has been done, however, and certainly the political relations between Peiping and Moscow do not augur such a transfer at present.
The remaining naval units include about 50 amphibious craft, over 300 service craft, and 20 or more minesweepers. These last certainly represent another shortcoming of the Navy which has such a long and easily mineable coast to protect. Recognition of this deficiency has been evidenced only by the sporadic minesweeper construction program which has been “on again-off again” in Communist Chinese shipyards.
Leadership remains a problem in the Navy. In the early years the Soviet advisors provided the necessary guidance to the Communist Chinese naval leaders. And, in the intervening years since 1950, there should have been some improved leadership. In 1958, the ability of small units to engage in combat certainly evidenced some leadership capability. With the departure of the Soviet advisors in 1960, however, the operational capability of the Chinese Communist Navy apparently declined. It is, therefore, a moot point whether its leadership has also declined.
There are about 50,000 men in the Chinese Communist Navy. As with any navy, there is a need for a higher type of recruit to handle the complex machinery of a warship, particularly in the case of submarines. Communist China with its vast reservoir of manpower can provide the numbers needed by the Navy. Not being an industrial nation, however, the quality of recruits must leave something to be desired. Even the government has taken some recognition of this problem in its enactment of the conscription law of 1955. By this law, navy conscripts are required to serve five years as opposed to four for the air force and three for the army.
The Chinese peasant is adapting himself to the industrialization of Communist China, but the submarine force of Red China does not seem to be taking to deep water with the same alacrity. Submarine forces are traditionally silent about their operations, and the Chinese Communists are equally so. It appears, however, that the submarine fleet has remained in the Yellow Sea area which, because of its relatively shallow depth, is not particularly suited to submarine operations. And, again, as in other segments of the Navy, the loss of Soviet advisors has undoubtedly hampered, if not severely restricted, the development of the submarine force. It can only be deduced that the operational readiness of the submarine force is not high.
Merchant Marine. The merchant fleet of the People’s Republic of China is small by world standards, having only about 150 ships totaling just over half a million gross tons prior to the loss of the freighter Leap Forward, on 2 May 1963. Although in the number of ships Communist China compares favorably with merchant marines of such nations as Poland and Turkey, the Chinese Communists do not ply the seas in the manner of the other merchant fleets of the world. Perhaps this can be attributed to political or diplomatic reasons, but the sinking of the Leap Forward while transiting the Yellow Sea would indicate other basic maritime problems such as navigational shortcomings.
A fleet may have modern ships manned by sufficient numbers of personnel, but if the state of personnel training is low and if the ships cannot operate, the fleet is only a toothless shark. The Communist Chinese Navy is a shark with some teeth as indicated by its performance in battle which is the final test of operational readiness.
Since 1954, there have been several surface engagements between the Chinese Communist naval units and those of the Republic of China. The high point of these sea battles occurred in August and September of 1958 during the blockade of Quemoy. With the conflicting reports of the successes and failures of both sides, it would serve no purpose to tabulate a box score of the sinkings of each navy. It does appear that the Communist Chinese Navy lost many small craft, but it did inflict serious damage, including sinkings, on major naval units of the Republic of China.
As early as 1954, the Chinese Communist Navy demonstrated the capability of advanced torpedo tactics with motor torpedo boats. The proof lay in a successful night torpedo attack and sinking, in November 1954, of the ROC destroyer escort Taiping (ex-USS Decker). This attack was pressed home after the Communist Chinese torpedo boat had been taken under fire by the ROC warship. Again, in January 1955, a ROC motor gunboat was torpedoed and sunk. Other brushes between naval units of motor-torpedo-boat and patrol-boat size continued sporadically in the following years. The most extensive series of sea battles occurred in 1958 when the Chinese Communists bombarded and attempted to blockade the island of Quemoy in August and September. Naval units moved south from the Shanghai area to the Formosa Straits area. There were even reports of the Riga-class destroyer escorts steaming south in September to reinforce the naval units in the Straits area. The Communists, however, never committed any units larger than gunboats or motor torpedo boats in these battles. In general, attacks were made at night although there were some instances of daylight action. These daylight actions were incidental to other missions, such as picking up downed Communist Chinese airmen after air battles over the Straits. In the night actions, the Communists had apparently decided to shift attack tactics to surface fire because there is no report of a torpedo attack. This decision could reflect an appreciation for the problems of a torpedo attack against shallow-draft resupply ships, or it could reflect a withdrawal of trained torpedomen to man the growing submarine fleet. Whatever the reason, the basic means of attack were 37-mm-guns using tracer fire. The Chinese Communist Navy attacked suddenly and successfully on many occasions. When their forces suffered losses or damages, they were capable of retiring, regrouping, and reattacking. These forces had strong support available fromChinese Communist air forces and artillery if the area. During the engagements, however the Chinese Communist Navy was usually on its own. The attempted blockade was only partially achieved before it was withdrawn.
These actions indicate that the Chinese Communists had increased their emphasis on naval training and had reached a point of operational readiness which permitted the Navy to engage its units successfully in combat and to realize a degree of success. In February 1959, Peiping claimed that the Chinese Communist Navy sank a ROC gunboat near Hai- tan Island and took some prisoners. In September of the same year, ROC artillery drove off Communist small craft approaching the island of Quemoy. Similar clashes have continued through the years with a definite slowdown of Communist Chinese aggressiveness. Although the Chinese Communist Navy still continues to patrol its coast, there has been a definite lowering of its operational readiness.
The Chinese Communist Navy now has leaders of limited experience who no longer have the support of Soviet advisors. All units of the Navy are heavily dependent on foreign technical and logistic support, particularly for imported petroleum products. These deficiencies limit the ability of the Fleet to operate freely.
Lacking a strong surface force, its offshore offensive power rests with its large and heretofore effective motor torpedo boat fleet. The long-range offensive power is contained in the yet unproven submarine fleet which has a capability for both torpedo attack and minelaying. There is a capability for coastal minelaying, but there are only limited minesweeping capabilities. Finally, there exists some amphibious lift capability.
The withdrawal of Soviet aid as a result of the Sino-Soviet rift has virtually decimated the naval ship construction program; contributed to the lowering of over-all operational readiness; eliminated for the present any plans for modernization of older units; and probably contributed to some degradation of morale and confidence in naval personnel.
What lies ahead? If there were to be a reconciliation in the Peiping-Moscow rift and Soviet naval aid were to be renewed, the operational readiness and the modernization of the Chinese Communist Navy would improve in direct proportion to the amount of aid received. It is probably more realistic to consider that the Navy will operate as it is doing today—without Soviet help. The lack of experienced leaders and the limited opportunity for experience at sea will continue until the national economy can support a navy. Likewise, the quality of the recruit will remain low until industrialization and education have improved on the national scale. And, finally, the expansion and modernization of the Navy must wait until the government and the economy permit a reawakening of the shipbuilding industry. There will be some new construction of small craft and possibly some minesweepers. And with time the repair capability should improve. New construction units held up by the departure of the Soviets will be completed and fitted out.
Future operations will be limited, with the major effort being directed toward the improved readiness of the motor torpedo/fast gunboat fleet and the submarine fleet. The fast coastal units will continue to be involved in skirmishes with the ROC Navy. The submarines, however, will probably remain not too far from the Tsingtao-Port Arthur area, but training activity should increase. Possibly some of the submarines will be deployed to the South China Sea area if a high state of operational readiness is achieved. However, the problems of getting past the ROC Navy and the problem of logistic support in the south makes such a deployment difficult.
In conclusion it can be said that the Chinese Communist Navy does not pose an immediate threat to a strong modern navy. It does remain the largest wholly Asian naval force in the Far East, possessing a significant submarine force, a good capability for coastal defense, and a limited offensive capability. However, if the Chinese Communists do not take early steps to improve their operational readiness and to modernize or replace older ships, their Navy may be overtaken by growing Asian navies such as that of Indonesia.