Our present “CVS Navy,” with its Carrier Antisubmarine Air Groups (CVSG), is a large and important “second segment” of the U. S. Navy’s carrier force. The history of this segmentation is an evolutionary story of the adaptation of specialized carrier aircraft and World War II carriers to the ASW mission, while newer and larger attack carriers developed with the coming of the jet age. Whether it will remain segmented will depend to a great extent on the future construction and employment of aircraft carriers, and to a lesser extent on the configuration of future carrier antisubmarine aircraft.
Carrier antisubmarine aviation has no problem defending its existence or its mission—a mission that is unmistakably naval. Its problems are material. The immediate problem is deficiency—the mid-range problem is antiquation—the long-range problem is replacement. It has been taken largely for granted within the Navy, although 40 per cent of the U. S. aircraft carriers presently in commission and operating are designated Antisubmarine Support Carriers.
What is the future of this large and important segment of naval aviation? The future existence of any naval combat segment depends simply on whether it is needed to perform a particular (or multiple) mission or task. How well it can perform its assigned mission or task depends upon the capability of the weapon systems employed and the efficiency with which these systems are employed. Combat organizations and weapon systems must change with progress, but the rule is: “The change must always better the performance of the whole.” The future of carrier antisubmarine aviation must be examined within this context.
As long as the manned aircraft, as an antisubmarine vehicle, has the highest available search rate, the best attack closing speed, and the capability for independent detection, localization, and attack, it cannot be tossed out of our bag of antisubmarine tricks. Antisubmarine warfare is and always will be a team effort, and one does not throw a star performer off the team unless one finds a new star to take his place.
The capabilities of the aircraft as an antisubmarine weapon system have grown, in general, with the technological advance since World War II. The application and refinement of airborne search/detection radar, magnetic anomoly sensors, low-frequency sound detection/analysis systems, passive electronic countermeasure equipment, explosive echo-ranging techniques, and helicopter dunking sonar have been the primary marks of advance for the aircraft in the tasks of detection and localization of submarines.
The attack/kill capability has been enhanced by the development of much improved air-to-underwater weapons such as the highspeed, active/passive homing torpedo and the nuclear depth-bomb—the most lethal antisubmarine weapon ever produced.
In effect, the development and application of airborne antisubmarine “black boxes” and weapons have proceeded about as rapidly as the state-of-the-arts would allow. This is not quite true of the airframes in which they are installed.
The present typical Carrier Antisubmarine Air Group includes two identical Air Antisubmarine Squadrons (VS), each equipped with ten fixed-wing S-2 Tracker aircraft; one Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron (HS) equipped with 14 to 16 SH-3 Sea King helicopters; one Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) detachment equipped with four fixed-wing EA-1 Skyraiders or E-l Tracers; and, on most extended deployments, one Aircraft Carrier Attack Squadron (VA) detachment of four A-4 Skyhawks (jets) for minimal anti-air warfare capability. The resulting aircraft “mix” operates with a relatively high compatibility and mission efficiency from the deck of an antisubmarine support carrier.
The introduction of the helicopter with its dunking sonar, and its subsequent development, has been the most notable evolution in the CVS Navy. The helicopter brought much needed sonar augmentation and flexibility to the antisubmarine hunter-killer groups, and its full range of utilization has not yet been realized. It has great promise for the immediate future and much potential for growth, especially for the application of towed sonar and the incorporation of additional sensors.
The SH-3 Sea King helicopter, only recently introduced to the Fleet, is an almost revolutionary improvement over its predecessor, the SH-34 Seahorse. Its dual turbine engines provide twin engine reliability and power to drive the huge airframe (in ASYV configuration) at speeds in the cruise range of the fixed-wing propeller aircraft of the air group. Its automatic stabilization, doppler navigation system, and automatic hovering coupler combine to produce the first true approach to a day-and-night, all-weather ASW helicopter. Its fuel capacity almost doubles the range and endurance of the older SH-34 (now replaced), and it can deliver all the air antisubmarine weapons except the aircraft rocket. It can be easily “cycled” on a mission time schedule compatible with the fixed-wing aircraft.
There are some obvious shortcomings of the SH-3, which are the result of unnecessary design deficiency. The power plant and rotor system are capable of propelling the aircraft at an operational speed about 25 per cent higher than the “red line” speed of the ASW configured airframe. In fact, an SH-3 with a “cleaned-up” airframe has exceeded 200 knots. The obvious potential airspeed range is not being exploited. The airframe was apparently optimized for its airlift and commercial potential. It could have been much better designed for better carrier-deck handling and operations as well as for greater “dash” speeds.
The obsolescent fixed-wing EA-1 Skyraider probably will be replaced eventually by the E-1 Tracer as it in turn is replaced on the CVAs by the turbo-prop E-2 Hawkeye.
The AEW aircraft operate essentially as an extension of the CVS Combat Information Center and provide automatic relay services, expanded radar coverage for ASW and AEW, and, in many instances, direct air control for other aircraft. They are a vital link in the present control, co-ordination, and communication system for hunter-killer group operations. Neither aircraft was designed for optimized ASW operations, but each has been adapted to the mission.
It is hardly appropriate or necessary to discuss here the A-4 Skyhawk mission in the CVS role. It is sufficient to note that its addition to the CVS air group signifies an awareness of a significant area of vulnerability in the HUK group composition. The A-4 is an attack aircraft adapted to provide a minimal anti-air capability to the CVS; otherwise, the CVS has no air defense but its own five-inch guns and whatever protection may be provided by its destroyers and forces external to the group.
The fixed-wing carrier antisubmarine aircraft really came of age in the last decade with the advent of the twin reciprocating- engine S-2 Tracker. This aircraft was distinctive as the first complete carrier-based system —an integrated system for independently finding, localizing, and killing a submarine under day-and-night, all-weather conditions. It is still distinctive in this respect, and it is still operating, but the growth of its equipment has surpassed the growth of the airframe—the vehicle proper—which, in fact, is basically the same as ten years ago. It now has no more growth potential.
The application of turbo-prop engine development has unfortunately by-passed the fixed-wing antisubmarine carrier aircraft to date. This omission has contributed to the delay in satisfying an urgent need in air ASW. The carrier antisubmarine aircraft should have the maximum available search/attack speed that is compatible with its necessary low altitude, slow speed maneuverability and long loiter time. Two well established ASW principles support this premise: The search rate of any antisubmarine vehicle should be maximized for any given search/detection system; and time-late to contact/datum should be minimized for any given localization/attack system, regardless of the means of initial detection.
Preoccupation with the development of combined ASW doctrine and the techniques for best using the airborne systems in hand— both of which have advanced substantially— have probably contributed to the lack of concern over the needed quantum jump in vehicle performance. Some aviators, who were intimately involved in ASW, have denied to the writer that there is a requirement for more speed in the antisubmarine aircraft. This delusion can be attributed to the inappropriate comparison of aircraft and submarine speeds—an entirely erroneous step in logic.
The author calls the SH-3 Sea King "the first true approach to a day-and-night, all-weather ASW helicopter,” but he points out that it is not without its shortcomings.
This lack of attention to aircraft performance must certainly be rectified for the future. The way should be clear. There is technically no barrier (short of the budget) to a progressive design for an advanced carrier antisubmarine aircraft, powered by turbine engines, that will provide a great increase in available performance.
It is then reasonable to expect that the configuration of the next generation of aircraft should at least include: refinements of the various subsystems which have proved their value in search/detection/localization/classification/attack; an airframe designed for broad-range performance; and, finally, multiple turbo-prop or jet engines for optimized high speed and loiter speed—hence, increased search rate and decreased time-late.
It is possible that these characteristics will be combined in a single design such as a VTOL aircraft. The aircraft’s cost effectiveness could possibly be increased if they were. The possibilities for basing and employing this vehicle could cover a much wider spectrum than we are able to realize today.
Granting that we cannot eliminate the manned aircraft from the ASW team of the future, neither can we substitute land-based maritime air for the specialized employment of sea-based air. Vice Admiral John S. Thach, while serving as Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, made the following statement:
The aircraft carrier entered the ASW arena to spearhead offensive actions against submarines anywhere in the ocean. Today the carrier task force enables us to cover an area of suspicion with a variety of equipment, skills, and air ASW techniques. This ability to intensify our effort promptly in an area . . . is proving to be the most effective method yet available for this purpose.
Land-based maritime air, although it is a major arm of the ASW forces, cannot be as responsive in intensity as sea-based air to the rapidly changing tactical requirements of a concentrated offensive antisubmarine battle in the far reaches of the ocean. It cannot react with the low-altitude maneuverability and flexibility that is inherent in the smaller carrier aircraft—qualities that are so necessary to cope with the high density traffic and rapid, co-ordinated action with ships and other aircraft on a high-speed datum. It is designed for the long-haul mission, for which it is well equipped. The relatively smaller, simpler, and more maneuverable carrier aircraft must be the in-fighter on the team. The need for sea-based aircraft will not disappear; if anything, it will increase as the threat increases.
What then will be the “sea base” of the future for the antisubmarine aircraft? The many advantages of the carrier as a tactical air weapon systems base are becoming ever more valuable to the nation. It carries its own sovereignty with it; it can be employed the world over in graduated strength without any flow of gold; and, in concert with its aircraft and other task force units, it can control ocean and air space where and when needed. It will probably be around for a long time, and it will probably still be the most efficient sea base available for antisubmarine air.
An examination of recent history will reveal how frequently and how effectively both the attack carrier and the antisubmarine carrier have been employed in a variety of hot and Cold War actions. But how long will we live with the present two classes of carriers? What will happen when the Essex-class CVS dies of old age in the not-too-distant future? There are three possible solutions: the CVA will absorb the air antisubmarine mission and aircraft; some of the present CVAs will be redesignated as CVSs; or new CVSs will be constructed. None of these may occur if the antisubmarine aircraft are based elsewhere, but the first seems the most likely on the basis of cost alone.
In any case, the requirement of sea-based antisubmarine air for offensive action against submarines will continue to be with us, and it must be answered. The enemy battle fleet we are faced with is a submarine fleet primarily —a sea monster that is steadily growing more lethal in character—with growing missile and nuclear capability. No matter how well we are prepared to pulverize its bases in the event of general war, we must be able to deal with it on any scale of conflict where the Navy has always had to deal with an enemy “battle fleet”—at sea. We shall not be able to do this without an offensive posture nor without the employment of sea-based air antisubmarine forces.
Present trends may usually be taken as indicators of future possibilities, and it is now common knowledge that the “semi-fixed” deployments of attack carriers in the strategic alert role are on the decline as Polaris submarines increase in numbers. This will result in renewed flexibility and expanded mobility for the bulk of our attack carriers. Eventually none of them will need to be tied so inflexibly to a geographic range arc like the ball of a pendulum.
We are not presently building another nuclear-powered carrier, but the march of nuclear propulsion to sea will be as inevitable as was once the march of steam. New construction carriers should, and probably will, become all nuclear-powered in the future.
These trends and the increasing emphasis on cost-effectiveness may combine to lead us toward the all-purpose carrier—a sea base optimized for anti-air, anti-surface, and antisubmarine offensive action. If this occurs, the advanced ASW aircraft, in one or more configurations, will be aboard. Its proportion of the embarked air wing would depend upon what is produced in the next generation of aircraft and the optimum “mix” for the multiple mission at any given time.
We can now depict what may become a typical operational portrait: A nuclear-propelled carrier task group, roving the oceans wide and free of “fuel fetters,” not only capable of defending itself against air, surface, and sub-surface attack, but also capable of engaging in powerful offensive action against the land enemy and his undersea battle fleet.
If the words of an authority in both carrier aviation and ASW may be taken prophetically, to quote Vice Admiral Thach again,
“I see a continually expanding role for carrier based aircraft in future ASW action at sea ”