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"The Restless Mind”
®ee pages 65-69, August 1964 Proceedings) Lieutenant Commander J. A. Schmidt, • S. Naval Reserve-R—The article by Commander Travers asks “Why do we see or hear so few [Restless Minds] at the execution °f the planning/execution spectrum? o further asks “Are they gone—forever?” N°j they are still here and still want to be c^r<L but they have problems.
“erhaps the first problem that a junior of. ^Cr finds when he attempts to present an ea is a certain amount of automatic re- Uctance to new ideas on the part of his immediate superior. While this reluctance on . ® Part of the senior is not a desirable trait,
. ls stdl a fairly normal one and it is found ’a all walks of life, not just the Navy. There is e tendency to view the idea with suspicion °r brush it off as the view of an inexperienced rnan- In many cases there is validity to this aPPr°ach, as inexperienced persons often ° er. tdeas without being fully aware of all ^ e situation’s ramifications and actually add 0 the problem. At the same time, we must e aware of the fact that occasionally the outside, objective view is needed to clear up e problem. The new man is seeing the rest, not the trees, and may see things quite ulerently from his vantage point. The brush- °f an idea discourages the originator and it may be quite a while before he tries a^ain. By that time, he may well be in the „ ees himself and some of his initiative and reshness will have been lost. Further, if several of his suggestions have been eliminated before being tried, he then loses motiva- 10n> settles back, and becomes one of Com- ruander Travers’ “can do boys.”
There are some officers who will rise above all discouragement at this level. But they find themselves faced with another major obstacle: the chain of command. The chain is an absolute necessity in most cases, but I do not believe this is one of the areas where it best serves us. An idea submitted via the chain must, of course, be originated with the same superior who may have already brushed off the verbal suggestions made by the Restless Mind. Thus, there might be reluctance to put proposals in writing. The next part of the chain obstacle is time. It takes a lot of time to go through the chain, and the longer it takes to get an idea going the more it loses drive, appeal, and freshness. If an officer submits a suggestion and does not hear anything more for two or three months except that it has been forwarded with endorsements, he loses the zeal which prompted him to submit his suggestion. A man with a new idea wants an answer or a trial—not a void.
Commander Travers next asks “How can we encourage—and benefit from—the intermittent brainstorms that now slumber in so many naval officer minds?” I believe we can borrow an idea from the aviation branch of the Navy to solve this one. All pilots are familiar with the “Anymouse” form. This is a form on which suggestions, gripes, or compliments may be written and submitted either with or without signature. It is now used primarily for safety promotion although there are apparently no actual limits as to what may be submitted on it. The “Anymouse” form skips the chain of command. It can be sent directly to the “central clearing house,” the Naval Aviation Safety Center at Norfolk, where someone usually acts on it within a reasonable time. Answers to and suggestions from “Anymouse” are published monthly in Approach magazine, and suggestions or criticisms are forwarded to the controlling bureau or agency by the Center. Anymouse forms may also be submitted directly to the department concerned in a ship or station.
As mentioned above, the forms need not be signed. This is significant. In some cases an idea might well affect an immediate superior. In the Anymouse form it may be advanced for consideration without having personalities brought in.
A more general form of this type could be instituted for the Fleet. It would be quick, cheap, and easy to handle. It could be submitted via Navy mail directly to the bureau or office concerned. It would not need endorsements for forwarding.
In adopting a procedure of this type, I feel that Commander Travers’ Rule 1, “Teach the tools of articulation,” would be nice, but not a necessity. Plain, simple language would be all that is necessary to carry an idea to those concerned. It really does not make much difference if we say “Why not put some rough stuff on the steps on the gangway so they won’t be slippery when it rains” or “It is felt that the application of a material with a high coefficient of friction, such as sand and paint, to the steps of the gangway would reduce the incidence of slipping accidents in inclement weather.” Just state the problem and solution. Further, the use of this more liberal form would encourage the offering of ideas from our enlisted ranks, from those men who might not be getting the spelling lessons in the wardroom! There is a wealth of important suggestions available in these Restless Minds.
Opinions, suggestions, and criticisms submitted on this type of form can be evaluated on the merit of the argument rather than the rank or position of the writer. This is impor-
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
tant in that it helps to insure objectivity on the part of the reviewer. Keeping the Restless Mind anonymous could well be the key factor in the success of such a program.
I do not believe that suggestions via the chain of command should be discontinued. Instead, the adoption of the Anymouse form would make it possible for people who are otherwise too shy or opposed to submitting in the normal manner to promote their ideas. We would acquire reams of junk and gripe material to be sure, but the wheat that would emerge from the chaff would be well worth the trouble. To reap the harvest of the Restless Mind, we need only to make it easy to plant the seed.
Lieutenant Harold M. Ross, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—Commander Travers’ article was an interesting, stimulating, and valuable one. It was cleverly and simply written and accurately diagnosed a current Navy weakness, the scarcity of creative ideas reaching the planners from the operating forces.
The author’s insight was exceptionally keen when he analyzed the weakness not as a lack of original ideas, but as a failure to communicate those ideas to the proper responsible authorities. As he put it, there is a failure in “articulation.” Obviously, the Navy cannot attempt to correct flaws in our public school systems. But the Navy can act to remedy symptoms of this inarticulateness that appear in service contexts.
First, senior officers should, as much as possible, delegate responsibility for preparing letters and reports to junior officers. The only way to learn to express one’s self is to do so. It may seem easier to a department head or an executive officer to write a letter himself than to correct the poor grammar and clumsy syntax in a letter prepared by an ensign or jay-gee. But this is short-sighted thinking. If a junior officer’s writing style is poor now, it will seem even worse when he reaches a position of major responsibility. His superiors owe it to him and to the Navy to see that he gets the practice he needs.
Second, senior officers should make an effort to correct the expository style, grammar, and spelling of their subordinates. Criticism should be constructive and specific, and should include correct examples if neces-
SarY- The “I don’t like it; do it again,” Method of correction is both inefficient and needlessly annoying. Senior officers should not accept or transmit poorly-written official correspondence. But why accept mediocrity m any context? A superior should decline to nccept even memoranda and informal reports from his junior officers unless they are written ln clear and concise English.
Third, we should make use of existing opportunities to pass on recommendations and comments. As I recall, most torpedo firing rePorts, electronic countermeasure exercise ^ports, and similar documents have a section m the format for “remarks” or “recommendations.” Although these reports are submitted ln the name of the commanding officer in jnost cases, they are usually prepared by a Junior officer. The reports tend to be rather lengthy and when one comes to the “remarks” Section at the end there is a strong temptation simply to write “none.” To stimulate creative thought, commanders receiving these reports, and commanding officers in whose names they arc prepared, should insist that the originators Illake an effort to include constructive remarks, comments, observations, and recommendations whenever the format asks for them.
Finally, commanders should try to make their subordinates aware that the chain of command is supposed to be a two-way communications channel. The easy way out is to Just do as one is told. But when a junior officer does this he is evading part of his responsibil- tty. (In business he would be called a “yes man.”) An officer has to do what his superiors tell him to do. But if he can see a better way to do the same task, it is part of his duty to Pass this idea on to his seniors. To be effective, a leader must have a certain amount of “feed- hack” from the men he leads. Without it, he loses touch with the practical problems involved. Part of the junior officer’s responsibility is to give his superior this “feedback.” hut he will not do it unless his superior indicates positively that he wants it.
As Commander Travers points out, the restless minds with creative ideas are there. And the machinery to encourage and transmit these ideas already exists within naval organization and administrative practices. What remains is for senior officers to take positive steps to encourage constructive thought, to train their young officers to express these thoughts properly, and to insure that communication channels function the way in which they were designed.
"Destroyer Command:
Critical ASW Subsystem”
(See pages 36-43, July 1964 Proceedings)
Commander Joseph R. Morgan, U. S. Navy (Executive Officer, USS England, DLG- 22)—Lieutenant Brandenburg’s article speaks out in favor of increased specialization and perhaps the concept of the “well-rounded” line officer does need reappraisal. However, if anyone needs to be a “career-developed” line officer it is the destroyer commanding officer.
The modern destroyer is, of course, an ASW weapons system; but she is much more. The skipper of a modern destroyer should ideally be more knowledgeable in ASW than his ASW officer, better versed in seamanship than his first lieutenant, as skilled in engineering as his chief engineer, and he should know as much about 5-inch guns and missiles as does his weapons officer. Impossible, the author says, and most of us agree. Why then single out ASW—even recognizing the importance of this mission? Can anyone say that ASW knowledge is more important than the ability to handle a ship in a confined harbor with wind and current at work? Should a destroyer commanding officer know nothing about engineering? Lieutenant Brandenburg’s ASW specialist would concentrate on weapons and operations billets “rather than engineering billets.” I think the present type commanders would disagree. A great deal of concern is expressed over the lack of engineering experience of many destroyer skippers.
Just as the commanding officer of a destroyer should know the capabilities and limitations of ASW aircraft, so he should know all about our own and potential enemy fighters and bombers. His air controllers must know this in order to make intercepts. If he cannot properly employ his DASH or ASROG without more detailed knowledge of ASW than he now has, how can he engage high- performance aircraft without knowing more about his missile systems?
The destroyer commanding officer should know his ship—engines, weapons, fire control
systems, and officers and men. He must be able to appreciate the problems of his throttle- man when he orders all engines back full from ahead standard. He should understand his forecastle’s difficulties in hooking on to a buoy. He must realize what the men in his fueling detail face when they struggle to get the hose into the trunk on a dark night. More important, he must realize that his responsibilities are great, that he must be cautious when necessary, that at times he must be patient when he wants to be dashing.
I agree that there probably will be need for an ASW specialist. Perhaps there is need for one now. But his place is not in command of today’s destroyer.
R. G. Hubbard—Lieutenant Brandenburg is to be commended for his thought-provoking treatment of a timely subject, destroyer command. However, he falls short of convincing this “untrained observer” that the officer ASW specialist is the solution to a critical problem which he has failed to prove exists.
It would seem that his prospective destroyer captain who asked for a three-hour briefing in ASW before assuming command is the exception rather than the rule. If the average prospective captain does in fact expect to be briefed in a few hours, then the author has publicized a critical problem.
The solution he advocates is, at best, shortsighted in an operational sense. It would create an elite corps of perhaps one-fourth of the destroyer force officer strength. From an officer’s first tour at sea he would become slated for command or condemned to ancillary billets with the expectation of early retirement. Such specialization as advocated by Lieutenant Brandenburg could provide commanders who are expert in ASW, but would demoralize the other destroyer force officers to the point of seriously jeopardizing operational readiness.
Further, there seems to be no recognition given to the necessity of training officers for any billet higher or broader than destroyer command. An officer who has progressed through the author’s program could command competently an ASW task group, but n°t much else.
, The conception of command as a subsystem !s ln itself dangerous because it equates the tttdividual assigned to the specific command t° a particular weapons subsystem which is esigned to perform only one function ad ,nfinitum. Specialization is the easy solution to Personnel problems, but it is seldom the best s°lution when all relevant factors have been
considered.
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Commander, Anti-Submarine War- are Force, Pacific Fleet)—It was with a great heal of interest that I read Lieutenant Brandenburg's article.
As commander of the ASW forces in the acific, it has been my job to ride many defoyers and see the performance of many °thers. The solution to his problem is really n°t too complex. We have learned in other vehicles such as patrol aircraft that personnel ^ability of the crew can make the difference between success and failure in ASW. We have n° real stability of personnel in destroyers.*
The heart and soul of the article is in the author’s words: “As long as the commanding officer has the authority to make overriding, final decisions in combat, he has the concomitant responsibility to understand everything that is going on in and around his ship.” ^ is my experience that most commanding officers are usually much less expert than their subordinates. We are putting many millions °f dollars into the development of specialized equipment and tools to prosecute the ASW job. It appears, from where I sit, we are not put- ttng the same effort in the specialization and the education of our people to this most difficult task. In the last analysis it always gets down to people.
There is no substitute for the two words follow me” whether it is in ASW operations, strike operations, or any Navy task. If the destroyer commanding officer is not thoroughly competent to do his job, it will do little good to have the best equipment in the world.
I close by repeating what Lieutenant
* See S. Dombroff, “A Case for Stabilized Crews in Destroyers,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1963, p. 76.
Brandenburg has said: “In any combat system, command is the controlling subsystem.” This is the critical value which really determines the effectiveness of the whole system.
" 'Satisfactory’ Not Enough”
(See pages 82-87, July 1964 Proceedings)
First Sergeant John C. Nelson, U. S. Marine Corps—I think Captain Say’s article will be of interest to many younger officers who are assigned tasks such as defense counsel or trial counsel on courts-martial and often accomplish them in a haphazard manner. I am sure Commander Carlson will forever be remembered in a favorable way by the Japanese people who knew Mr. Tokuchi Tada and also by those who were- aware of the problems the War Crimes Commission faced.
My specific interest in this article is that there seems to be a mistake in the description of the assault on Peleliu. To quote, “With not more than 10,000 troops, including a contingent from their Navy, the Japanese gave one Army division and three Marine divisions one of the most costly jobs of the war.”
I participated in the Palau Islands operation and can only recall one Marine division being committed to this operation.
The assault on Peleliu was made by the First Marine Division with the 81st Division, U. S. Army, held in floating reserve. Eight days after D-day, one regiment of the 81st Division was landed on Peleliu to assist the Marines Editor.
"Patrol Guerrilla Motor Boats”
(See pages 70-79, April 1964, and pages 107-109, July 1964 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Burton B. Fagan, U. S. Naval Reserve—The image of the reactionary admiral fighting the application of new technology being advocated by a young junior officer seems to be reversed in Lieutenant Hoffman’s comments on Rear Admiral Harllee’s article.
Being interested, both as a reserve naval officer and an engineer, in the possibilities of exploiting the already extensive technology of submerged-foil hydrofoils, I would like in turn to comment on Lieutenant Hoffman’s remarks.
Hydrofoils are useful to the Navy for a few very simple reasons:
They allow high speed in rough seas without imposing so much strain on personnel that they cannot effectively perform their military duties.
They furnish a stable platform in a rough sea for gunnery, missile guidance, and even visual identification of other craft. For example, when the 40-foot commercial hydrofoil Enterprise encountered eight-foot to ten- foot waves in the Straits of Florida, roll and pitch never exceeded five degrees.
Vertical or heave accelerations in a hydrofoil can be held well below one G where a displacement craft will experience five to ten Gs at similar speeds and sea states.
These advantages are particularly useful in the small craft that might be assigned to counter-insurgency tasks. In such operations, the noises of the propulsion gas turbines are of high frequency and attenuate quickly with distance. The exhaust, being ducted astern, would project a minimum of noise energy over the bow to warn the enemy. Tactics for such missions would dictate coming down off the foils far enough from shore to prevent audio detection and proceeding on the hull with well-silenced displacement engines. Good tactics can compensate for the noise problem.
A hydrofoil on the drawing boards that would land a party of 25 men stands only 13 feet out of the water, while the conning tower of a submarine lying awash is more than twice that height. So the hydrofoil should not have prohibitive silhouette problems.
Many PT boat losses to aircraft in World War II were ascribed to the craft’s highly visible and persistent wake. A hydrofoil is essentially wakeless, thus minimizing visibility from the air.
On the subject of supply and resupply, the Viet Gong would be interested to learn that a craft that can carry a payload of 10,000 pounds at 50 knots is too small to resupply a guerrilla band. This is the equivalent of about 1,650 coolies tramping at three m.p.h.through the jungle, each carrying 7 5 pounds. Such a supply line has amply demonstrated its trouble making ability.
Supply capability of a vehicle can be expressed in ton-miles per unit of time. The 50- knot capability of the hydrofoil makes possible a large number of trips in a given time and thus provides a large cargo moving capability-
For gunfire support the gyro-stabilized deck of a hydrofoil is an excellent platform for sighting, missile guidance, and surveillance. Guns of 20-mm. and 50-caliber are simple to mount and should be very effective. A 3,200 pound, 40-mm. gun exists that would mount nicely on a 50-ton to 80-ton hydrofoil.
Missiles such as the Redeye, Shillelagh, Tow, and Bullpup; recoilless rifles; and spin- stabilized rockets could be adapted to provide lightweight, high-potency firepower for hy-
drofoils. For shore bombardment and surface target fire, the Shillelagh would give an 80- ton hydrofoil the projectile power of a 5-inch- gtin destroyer. With practical modification, the Bullpup missile would give the 80-ton fraft the projectile power approaching a 16- tnch gun.
Heavy guns are no longer necessary to put a large quantity of explosives precisely on a target.
In off-shore patrolling a good figure of aterit for naval craft is the area patrolled or the possible targets checked per unit of time. Increased speed capabilities lead directly to ^creased patrol capabilities no matter what the classification and identification scheme Used, from a sweep with binoculars to putting a search party on board.
If remaining on station for long periods of tlrne, a hydrofoil can go down on her hull and uiaintain station on the same basis as any °ther craft. In addition, the foils and struts act as effective roll and pitch dampers even '''hen she is lying dead in the water. At eight to ten knots the control system “straps down” 'he deck for a level ride even in rough seas. A good deal of heave motion may be experienced, but this will not be too troublesome "uth a level deck. Experience with an eight- ton, 40-foot, 40-knot commercial craft indicates that a useful hydrofoil gunboat of approximately the same size could be constructed. A military payload of about 4,000 pounds could be carried.
Two 400-horsepower gas turbines could tlrive a 14-ton, 42-foot hydrofoil gunboat at 5b knots with a military payload of about 7,000 pounds.
Referring again to the commercial development, more than 200 hours of flight time before Coast Guard approval produced no electronic control system failures, no control surface failures, no foil or strut failures, and only °ne hydraulic system failure, this due to an tnstallation error. Thus reliability of existing hydrofoil components is excellent.
The technology exists to provide the operat- lng forces with small, reliable, inexpensive, high-speed, high-firepower counter-insurgency craft. The Navy should, in my opinion, explore the capabilities of such small, inexpensive hydrofoils as well as the large ones now under construction and being evaluated.
We have been far too slow in adapting hydrofoils as a countermeasure to Communist-inspired guerrilla activities.
"What’s Behind the Russian Mask?”
(See pages 26-33, September 1963, and pages 108110, March 1964 Proceedings)
Captain James S. Dearth, U. S. Naval Reserve—Dr. Lerche is not alone in considering the Communists “irrational.” Competent medical men familiar with Communism have said that continuing re-evaluation and redefinition of ideology by the Communists has progressed to the point where it is no longer reconcilable with reality, yet that their theoretical concepts are far more convincing to them than are the facts.
Theoretical concepts so strongly held have a great deal to teach us. Our problem of making sense of the enemy doctrine proceeds from our refusal to take it seriously enough to give it the thorough study it warrants. For the basic philosophy of the Communists, “dialectical materialism,” forms an entirely different framework of logic than that of our Aristotelian brand. It is as different as Boolean algebra is from our familiar high school version. That, coupled with their “Aesopian” language, has indeed baffled and embarrassed the United States. But the fault is ours, not theirs, for they have poured out torrents of words explaining their ideas, their doctrines, and their intentions.
Major General J. F. C. Fuller has reminded us that Clausewitz stressed that “the most decisive act of judgment which a statesman and general exercises is rightly to understand . . . the war in which he engages, not to take it for something, or to wish to make it something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be.” Rear Admiral John D. Hayes has pointed out that the present crop of “experts” writing on strategy and defense in the nuclear age appear to have been the main casualities of the Cuban crisis in that they completely failed to foresee what actually did happen and completely failed to provide any guide for action in handling it.
The United States finds itself under attack by an enemy whose motive for hostility is not any practical grievance or limited aspiration, but rather the basic will to destroy the order
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of life in the United States in order to make room for a Communist world.
What we need to do, as the sophisticates say these days, is to “restructure the problem.” In his truly remarkable first two paragraphs Dr. Lerche has presented to us a series of alternatives. If we were to remove the “or” and examine each of the questions individually they would look like this:
1. Is the Soviet Union a phenomenon unique in international relations?
2. Is it a state among states?
3. Can the United States count on the Soviet Union to act like a government run by rational men?
4. Must Washington concentrate on defending itself against fanaticism, recklessness, and violence?
5. Does Moscow have a “foreign policy” in the ordinary sense?
6. Is the Kremlin engaged in nothing more (less?) than a global revolutionary conspiracy?
If one removes the word “recklessness” from question four, the answer to every one of these questions must be yes. The Soviets are
not reckless; that is one of the basic sins—- “adventurism” or endangering the revolution.
One must go back into history to see why the answers to all these questions must be yes. The Soviet Union is not simply a country with a one-party government; it is a country that has been captured by an international conspiracy which is using the Russian people and resources as a power base from which to conquer the world. This fact was affirmed on 25 October 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized power from the Kerensky government; again on 6 January 1918, when they dissolved the Constituent Assembly by force of arms; and was given concrete organization with the formation of the Comintern on 2 March 1919. The Second Comintern Congress adopted Lenin’s “21 points” which became binding on the Communist parties throughout the world. Principally, they demanded a rigid subordination to Moscow, strict discipline, a vigorous fight against social democratic ideas, and active propaganda in the labor unions and armies. With the necessary dialectical twists and turns allowed for, this is the organization that has existed to this day. With the party leadership controlling both the apparent form and actions of the government of the Soviet Union, and exercising control and direction of the Communist parties in several non-Communist countries, this disciplined military organization has conquered more than one- third of the world.
It is not hard to agree with most of Dr. Lerche’s comments on how to evaluate and analyze motivations of normal states; but I cannot concur with his basic thesis that the Soviet Union is just another state. Nor can I concur that its policy is mysterious or impenetrable. In fact the exact opposite is true. The beauty of it from the viewpoint of the United States is that Communist doctrine is so inflexible that it is perfectly predictable. Everything done by the Communists since World War II has been precisely as they have told us they intended to do it.
A third point of disagreement lies with Dr. Lerche’s claim that Moscow must “respond” to environmental changes and cannot “initiate” them. The Cuban affair of October 1962, was certainly “initiated” by the Kremlin introducing missiles into Cuba, certainly a “provocation” in any sense of the term with which I am familiar. With the majority of the world made up of have-nots, opportunities for stirring up trouble are so numerous hey have to compete for priority.
What possible relationship to the Soviet’s physical security can be represented by Cuba? What is there “for the catching” that tempts p Soviet to “fish in troubled waters” so 'verse as Korea, the Middle East, Laos, and he Congo? Surely even a “normal” state Would have some coherent plan. To call this opportunism pure and simple” is nonsense. And to state that “No overt expansionist attempt beyond its security periphery has ever een judged by Soviet leadership to be worth 111 °re than a modest effort,” with the Cuban affair right before our eyes, is simply to fly ln the face of the facts.
i-*r- Lerche might ponder some words of
Lenin:
It is necessary to resort to special maneuvers capable of accelerating our victory over capitalist countries. We must: In order to placate the deaf-mutes, proclaim the (fictional) separation of our government and governmental institutions (the Council of Peoples’ Commissars, etc.) from the Party and Politburo and, in particular, from the Comintern, declaring these latter agencies to be independent Political groups which are tolerated on the territory of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The deaf-mutes will believe it.
And who are the “deaf-mutes”? In Lenin’s Words, “The so-called cultured elements of western Europe and America are incapable °f comprehending the present state of affairs and the actual balance of forces; these elements must be recognized as deaf-mutes and trcated accordingly.”
The fundamental fact that at the root of vvestern and Communist differences lies a totally irreconcilable interpretation of the asic philosophical nature of man, can lead to P° other conclusion than that our civilization l? facing its terminal challenge. That the Rus- S1an dream of a Third Rome has been grafted °nto the Communist vision of a universal s°ctety merely accents the finality of the strug- gie. That the Communists can impose an °rdered society is not at issue; it is almost certain that they cannot build a civilization
based on human values—for they deny them.
I believe we cannot consider that the Soviet Union is a “normal” state in any sense of the word, but that its motivations and intentions are crystal clear and can be predicted and forecast precisely from Communist doctrine. Since the differences between East and West are completely irreconcilable, it is the Communists’ purpose to utterly and forever destroy Western civilization. Therefore, the Western response must be in kind; to remove the threat by destroying it.
For this reason, the United States cannot treat Russia as just another state, dealing with it, trading with it. As the only power capable of opposing it, the United States is its target, and as such must use every means possible of destroying not Russia, but Communist power wherever it exists.
First Cosmonaut Is a Naval Aviator
Captain W. C. Chapman, U. S. Navy— While the Soviets gave unusual emphasis to naval aviation in connection with the celebration of their 26 July Navy Day a statement in Krasnaya Zvezda (“Red Star”) 18 July that Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, the first human to return safely from space, came from the ranks of Soviet Navy pilots certainly deserves attention. The author of the statement was the putative head of Soviet naval aviation, Lieutenant General of Aviation I. I. Borzov. He also noted that the winner of the first Hero of the Soviet Union medal, A. V. Lia- pidevskii, was similarly a Navy pilot. (Lia- pidevskii received the award for Arctic rescue flights to the steamer Cheliuskin in 1934.)
Previous official statements in regard to Gagarin have been in agreement that he graduated from the Orenburg Aviation School, winning his wings in 1957, but there had been no previous announcement of his duty prior to entering the space program.
Another link with Gargarin’s past came when the July issue of Morskoi Spornik, the journal of the Soviet Navy, stated that he formerly had served in the Northern Fleet.
Naval aviators will certainly take some pride from the coincidence that Navymen Gagarin and Alan Shepard each took first place in his country’s man-in-space program.
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