Carrier Employment Since 1950

At this time of international tensions that require large national investments for defense, at this time when technology makes possible a wide selection of complex, costly weapons, it is well, perhaps, to back off and look at the practical results recently achieved by any given major weapon under consideration. If it is true that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, then it is true that the proof of a weapon is in its employment. Let us examine, then, the employment in recent years of one of the Navy’s major weapons—the aircraft carrier.

The end of World War II found the Navy with an inventory of 24 Essex-class attack carriers commissioned or building, eight light carriers, 74 escort carriers, and three obsolete prewar carriers. Of the 111 carriers of all types used in the War, 11 were lost in combat, none of which were Essex-class. If the performance of carriers in World War II can be summarized in one sentence, it is this— carrier strike forces, Japanese as well as American, always defeated land-based air forces. The issue was in doubt only when there were carriers on both sides of the battle.

At the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, the Navy had seven attack carriers, four light carriers and four escort carriers in commission. Three of the attack carriers were of the 45,000-ton Midway-class— the Midway, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Coral Sea, CVBs 41-43, respectively—which had joined the Fleet between 1945 and 1947. The bulk of the force was in the Atlantic or Mediterranean; the Pacific Fleet included only three attack carriers and two escort carriers. The one Pacific Fleet attack carrier west of Pearl Harbor, USS Valley Forge (CV-45), was in the South China Sea on 26 June; on the 27th she was ordered to Korean waters. En route, she was diverted to make a show of force in the Taiwan Straits because of possible Chinese Communist invasion preparations. Operating in the Yellow Sea a few days later, she launched the first carrier strikes of the War on 3 and 4 July against Pyongyang, capital of North Korea and focal point of its western railroads. The Valley Forge was then ordered south to stand by to counter possible hostilities in the Taiwan Straits. Back in the Sea of Japan on 18 July, she supported the landings at Pohang. Remaining in the area for several days, she operated to the south and west of the peninsula with offensive missions against enemy troops and supply lines in support of the holding actions of American and South Korean ground forces.

The Valley Forge remained the only engaged carrier until the beginning of August when another Pacific Fleet attack carrier arrived. The build-up continued with two escort carriers whose ASW aircraft had been replaced by Marine squadrons and by the third Pacific fleet attack carrier—the USS Philippine Sea (CV-47)—which arrived in mid-September. The first Atlantic Fleet attack carrier—the USS Leyte (CV-32) arrived in early October. At this point, four of the seven attack carriers in operation at the beginning of the War were committed to Korean operations; the fifth and sixth were in the Mediterranean, and the seventh was operating in the Caribbean.

In the meantime, reinforcements were arriving from the United States, and an amphibious force was organized to land at Inchon, behind the front and halfway up the west coast. After delivering a capacity load of ammunition, 145 F-51s for the U. S. Air Force, and a number of radar vans, jeeps, and other material, from Alameda, California, to Yokosuka, Japan, the USS Boxer (CV-21) returned to Alameda for reloading and rejoined the forces in the Western Pacific just in time to Participate in the landing. Under cover of naval gunfire and sea-based aircraft from three attack carriers and two escort carriers, the landing force went ashore at Inchon on 15 September and pressed inland toward Seoul.

The fighting during this period, ranging as it did from the retreat to Pusan to the Inchon invasion, comprehended a number of interesting characteristics. The final North Korean drive to the Pusan perimeter resulted in the withdrawal of all Air Force fighter bombers to Japanese bases, and this reduced the payloads and loiter time available for close support. Carrier-based aircraft thereafter provided a substantial advantage in sortie rates, weapons, and time on station, but it proved difficult to exploit this. Even relatively modest numbers of aircraft tended to saturate the existing air control system (although targets were not lacking). Action reports of the period contain frequent complaints of the inability of the control system to absorb profitably naval close support missions.

Following the Inchon landings our forces moved rapidly toward the Yalu River. Victory appeared imminent, so the Boxer was permitted to return to the United States for her delayed overhaul. The Valley Forge was also ordered home on 21 November.

Chinese Communist forces from Manchuria attacked en masse on 26 November. In addition to throwing back the Eighth Army in the west, they succeeded in cutting off the Tenth Corps near the Chosin Reservoir. At this point, with land-based tactical air being pushed off advanced bases, the situation was critical; with only the Leyte and the Philippine Sea on the line, reinforcement was urgently required. The USS Princeton (CV-37), freshly out of mothballs and already on the way, arrived on 2 December. A fourth attack carrier having just arrived in San Diego on 1 December, embarked the Boxer Air Group and returned to action on 22 December in time to cover the last days of the evacuation. Marine Corps squadrons ashore, now without airfields, were used to fill empty deck spaces on three carriers offshore (two escort carriers and one light carrier) and continued their support missions. For 16 successive days, the surrounded Tenth Corps received on the order of 220 close support sorties a day with a record peak of 315 on one day at the height of the breakout. Each carrier-based sortie remained on station from one to 1.5 hours and made between five and nine attack passes. Over three-quarters of these sorties were provided by carriers, and it is unlikely that the Tenth Corps would have broken out to the coast without them. As a result of the severe losses inflicted on the Chinese by the Tenth Corps and tactical air, the subsequent evacuation of over 100,000 troops and their full equipment was accomplished with negligible loss.

Carrier operations in the remaining years of the Korean War emphasized sustained interdiction of the logistic net in the eastern half of Korea. When the Chinese undertook offensive ground action there were diversions to close air support and to airfield neutralization during the periodic Chinese efforts to regain air superiority. The fact that the front line was perpendicular to the coast line gave carrier aircraft shorter radii and therefore higher payloads and sortie rates for many interdiction and airfield targets. Throughout 1952 and 1953, about half of the Pacific Fleet carriers were maintained in Korean waters.

Of the 11 attack carriers which ultimately saw action in Korea, only four were in active status at the start of the War. The carrier force level rose during the three years of war from seven at the beginning to 18 at the end by reactivating ships from the Reserve Fleet inventory which had been created as a result of World War II.

The Korean Armistice went into effect in July 1953. Soon thereafter, the Communist effort was stepped up in Southeast Asia. In response, the Navy shifted the bulk of its Western Pacific carrier forces to the south. During the desperate battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, two attack carriers were standing by to intervene on behalf of the entrapped French and Vietnamese forces had a decision been made to do so.

The next major employment of attack carriers occurred in 1955, north of the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese Communists assaulted and seized one of the Tachen Islands. Of the nine attack carriers in the Pacific Fleet, five were quickly assembled off the Tachens to cover another amphibious evacuation. The commitment of this major naval force unmistakably indicated U. S. willingness to intervene, and the 1,800 sorties flown in a week also clearly demonstrated a capability to intervene effectively without recourse to nuclear weapons. The over-all posture of the carrier force at this time was as follows:

Active intervention in the Taiwan area was again necessary in 1958. The incident also involved coastal islands and was accompanied by renewed activity in the Straits, a build-up of forces on the Chinese mainland, and repeated announcements that Formosa would be “liberated.” The timing may have been influenced by the simultaneous involvement of U. S. naval forces in the Lebanon crisis in the Mediterranean. If this was an attempt by the Communists to catch U. S. naval forces off guard, it failed. In fact, an immediate move was made to improve the readiness posture in the Western Pacific by sailing the USS Lexington (CVA-16) (when, in October 1952, CVs and CVBs were officially designated as CVs, they became in name what they had been in fact—attack aircraft carriers) from San Diego on 17 July for that purpose.

On 15 July with the situation in Lebanon rapidly approaching the crisis state, President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded affirmatively to President Camille Chamoun’s appeal for intervention. At this time we had two attack carriers deployed in the Mediterranean out of a total of six in the Atlantic Fleet. Twelve hours after the President’s order was issued, these two carriers supported U. S. Marine Corps landings to seize the Beirut airport. U. S. Army troops were air-lifted into the Marine-held airport four days later, on 19 July. Clearances on over-flights and landing rights were required by several European, African, and Middle Eastern nations. Since these did not affect carrier operations, the Navy retained air support responsibility until 5 September.

Turning back to the Pacific, the Communists began shelling the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, off the Chinese mainland, on 23 August 1958, thus preventing the logistic support of Nationalist garrisons there. When the Seventh Fleet intervened, all the ingredients of all-out war were present.

The pattern of Fleet operations that developed concentrated the attack carrier task groups on an arc around Formosa with their activity designed to make the enemy fully aware of both their presence and their strength. Carrier aircraft covered surface units escorting Chinese Nationalist logistic forces in international waters en route to and from the island groups under fire. U. S. support helped to keep the islands from falling to the Communists.

On the day the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu began, we had 15 attack carriers on active duty and they were located as follows: Eastern Mediterranean (Lebanon area).

The situation again stabilized and the immediate threat of an over-water invasion subsided. Communist forces kept the issue alive, however. Unable to achieve control of Formosa Strait and the coastal water of the East China Sea, they turned with renewed effort to expand southward on the mainland. Without challenging the naval forces present, they waged war in Vietnam, in Laos, and on the borders of India. None of the countries in Southeast Asia escaped their persistent aggressiveness.

During this general period, the carrier forces had been undergoing a gradual change in character and capabilities. Four Forrestal- class attack carriers—the Forrestal, Saratoga, Ranger, and Independence, CVAs 59-62, respectively—joined the Fleet between October 1955 and January 1959. (Two improved Forrestal-class carriers—the Kitty Hawk, and the Constellation, CVAs 63 and 64, were commissioned in 1961, as was the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise (CVAN-65). In response to announced national policy, the emphasis on nuclear delivery capabilities grew steadily. Aircraft primarily designed for nuclear strikes, such as the A-3, were introduced in quantity. Efforts were made to develop improved weapons like Bullpup despite increasing pressure to economize on conventional capabilities.

In 1960, a major short-term build-up of U. S. retaliatory capability was undertaken in response to Soviet pressure on Berlin. Among other emergency measures taken was a major increase in the degree to which the carrier force was committed to a nuclear retaliatory role. Most noticeable was the deployment of an additional carrier to the Mediterranean bringing the total there to three. This carrier and one of the three carriers in the Far East were loaded with air wings which consisted almost entirely of attack aircraft. This emergency posture was maintained from mid-1960 to mid-1961, and provided for overseas deployment of six of the 15 available carriers during most of the period. The protracted commitment placed a severe strain on Fleet resources.

During the spring of 1961, carriers were involved in readiness operations in the Caribbean and Western Atlantic, which did not receive public notice. This is an illustration of the discreet manner in which aircraft carriers can be employed.

A more recent crisis in which carriers participated involved Cuba. In October 1962, the late President John F. Kennedy demanded the removal of Soviet missiles clandestinely introduced into the island and took firm measures to back up his demand. The USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) and the USS Independence (CVA-62) played major roles in the Quarantine action and they, along with the Lexington, would have supported the landings in Cuba had the President made a decision to invade. The adaptability and flexibility of the sea-air team was demonstrated by reassigning the Lexington, on duty as the Naval Air Training carrier, temporarily to attack carrier duty with an Air Wing embarked from a carrier in overhaul. During the Quarantine, the Enterprise and the Independence were at sea for 49 and 41 consecutive days respectively without relief or in-port replenishment, and their air wings averaged 120 flights per day. Because of the possibility of Soviet moves elsewhere, for example against Turkey, the two attack carriers in the Mediterranean were maintained on station. Similar contingencies in the Pacific motivated the movement of a carrier to the Hawaiian area to reduce the time required to reinforce the three carriers already in the Western Pacific. The resulting posture is summarized below:

There were other crises and incidents in which attack carriers played important roles.

For almost three years following the 1948 break between Moscow and Belgrade there was a steady military build up in the East European Satellites. This was coupled with economic, ideological, and implied military pressure. In the politically critical spring of 1951, the United States suddenly doubled its Mediterranean Fleet by having the forces scheduled to relieve arrive about six weeks ahead of time and by retaining the forces due to be relieved for several weeks beyond their normal tour. In November, the United States formally committed itself to provide military assistance to Yugoslavia. A month later, a cruise by Marshal Tito in the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) further underscored this commitment and advertised the immediate availability of U. S. military power in the Mediterranean even though we were at the same time fighting a war in Korea.

During the Suez crisis in late October 1956, the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42) covered the evacuation by ship of 1,700 U. S. citizens from Israel and Egypt. Both Mediterranean carriers were kept at a high degree of readiness during this crisis.

In April 1957, Sixth Fleet units, including the USS Forrestal (CVA-59), were in the Eastern Mediterranean to support President Eisenhower’s warning against a threatened take-over of the government of Jordan by the Communists. This show of force was maintained for a week to emphasize U. S. determination that Jordan should remain independent.

In the summer of 1960, the USS Wasp (CVS-18) arrived off the Congo to help in the mass evacuation of Americans should that become necessary. She also delivered aviation gasoline to support the United Nations’ airlift of Congo forces.

In November 1961, at the request of Guatemala and Nicaragua, President Kennedy ordered a naval patrol of Central American waters to intercept and prevent any Communist-led invasion of those two countries from the sea. The USS Shangri-La (CVA-38) immediately initiated the patrol.

Pacific Fleet carriers covered the deployment of the Marines in Thailand in May 1962. This action, in response to the violation of the cease-fire in Laos, followed by major Pathet Lao successes, was designed to give a clear indication of U. S. intentions to defend Thailand, to place a precautionary impact on the situation in Laos, and to maintain positions for quick reaction in the event of a decision calling for further action.

A table of crises showing carrier force levels and inventory is given below:

Inventory includes those CVAs capable of operating all models of CVA aircraft existing in significant numbers in the aircraft inventory. Where force level exceeds inventory, in the table above, obsolete carriers with second line aircraft were included.

It is instructive to review the actual ways in which carriers have been used since 1950 with a view to comparing doctrine with practice. Since the demise of the Japanese Fleet and the appearance of nuclear weapons, carrier force doctrine (in common with many other force doctrines) had emphasized nuclear deterrence, with reduced emphasis on supporting amphibious operations, control of the sea, and showing the flag. All of these missions have continued to engage the Fleet, however. It is striking that amphibious evacuation has been encountered about as often and as importantly as amphibious assault. Perhaps it is natural that this role has been commonly overlooked. Few planners plan on disaster, and the recurrent occurrence of military and political reverses has been submerged by the generally successful results of the series of confrontations during the past decade.

The classic World War II role of the carrier—the gaining and exploiting of air superiority in a local area until forward land- based air could assume the function—has not been exercised in the recent past primarily because such a challenge was declined by the opponents. However, the potential vulnerability of airlifted forces which was inferentially demonstrated in the 1961 Laotian crisis implies that the air superiority mission of the carrier may recur with increasing importance. A new but related role has emerged since 1950 which provides cover for the arrival of airlifted troops and deploying land-based aircraft. In Lebanon, this mission was only an extension of the basic purpose of amphibious operations. But in the 1961 Laotian crisis, the potentially chaotic ground situation at the terminal airfields made troop commanders conscious of the importance of having close air support available immediately upon landing. Similarly, the proximity of the airlift route to Chinese airfields indicated the desirability of carrier-based fighter escort.

A final characteristic of the past decade and a half can also be noted. This was the tendency of crises to occur in the Taiwan Straits coincidentally with the commitment of U. S. forces elsewhere. This happened several times during the Korean War, perhaps for diversionary purposes, and the Quemoy- Matsu crisis appears to have been a test of U. S. ability to respond while major forces were committed in the Middle East.

It is interesting to note that although the carrier force is relatively slow moving in comparison with modern aircraft, carriers have been on the scene early in the development of most major crises. This appears to result from one of the salient characteristics of the force. Although it moves in an assault configuration, essentially ready for maximum effort air operations, it can be moved as ostentatiously or as discreetly as desired. One thing in common about most of these crises is the manner in which carrier forces have been moved toward the trouble spots, as they were in Lebanon, Quemoy-Matsu, and Cuba, on the most tenuous strategic warning and prior to national political decisions. They have also moved in the face of substantial enemy threats as was the case both in Korea and during the Taiwan crises.

Looking back over the last 15 years, what have the attack carriers’ missions been and what have their particularly useful characteristics been? The missions can be summarized as follows:

• Provide air cover for amphibious landings, as in Inchon, Lebanon, and potentially in Cuba.

• Provide close air support for ground forces as in Korea.

• Provide U. S. military presence, as during the Dominican Republic crisis, the Tachens evacuation, the Quemoy-Matsu and Lebanon crises.

• Provide air cover and ground support for amphibious evacuations as at Hungnam.

• Provide air cover for deployment of troops and land-based air as in Korea, Lebanon, and, more recently, Thailand.

• Prepare to conduct blockade, search and attack, as was done off Cuba, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

• Contribute to the alert strategic forces for general war.

The particularly useful characteristics of attack carriers have been that they move in an assault configuration prepared, as they were in the Inchon and Lebanon landings, the Tachens and Hungnam evacuations, and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, to take control of the air against air opposition. As pointed out previously, they move easily to trouble spots on the basis of even tenuous strategic warnings. Lebanon, Quemoy-Matsu, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic are examples. Top level decisions to move naval forces prior to commitment have not been required because they were operating in international waters. Because they operate in international waters, permission from a foreign country has never been necessary to proceed to the scene of a crisis, whereas U. S. land-based planes en route to Lebanon and the Congo required overflight clearances, sometimes a time-consuming requirement.

The aircraft carrier is sovereign U. S. territory. The carriers have proven themselves to be initially self-sustaining and readily replenishable at sea during all of the crises in which they have played a role. In these crises they have not had to depend on prepositioned base facilities, supplies, etc., since overseas replenishment has been made at sea from an underway replenishment group. Carrier’s launch and recovery areas have proven as extensive as international waters; for example, a show of force over the Taiwan Straits and a few days later a strike from the Yellow Sea against Pyongyang. Tactically, carriers have been able, as in the Tachens evacuation and the Quemoy-Matsu crises, to concentrate as a single force to obtain desirable odds.

The records show that attack carrier force levels rose from a low of seven at the beginning of Korea to 18 at the end by recommissioning from the inventory created by World War II; force levels subsequently ranged from 19 in 1956, to 14 in 1960, to 15 at the present time. The average number of active carriers has been slightly more than 15.

Secondly, in the Far East, a maximum deployment of five carriers has been recurrent; in the Mediterranean, three have been used with additional carriers pushed forward in the Eastern Atlantic; and in the Caribbean, three have been called out.

This history, covering a decade and a half, suggests the following conclusions about attack carriers:

• They have typically been on the scene when needed

• They have been directly involved in the majority of post-World War II crises.

• They have been ideally suited for the projection overseas of U. S. military power either discreetly or ostentatiously.

• They have been adaptable to a wide range of missions.

• Carriers have always been used advantageously by the United States; it is difficult for me to conceive of accomplishing the same