Professional Notes, Notebook and Progress

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132 The Navy’s Submarine Monopoly

By Corwin A. Olds Commander, U. S. Navy

136 The Arctic Ocean

By Ned A. Ostenso

140 The Naval Aviator Speaks By W. F. Foster Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy

143 In Defense of The Russian Navy By C. P. Lemieux

146 Notebook

THE NAVY’S SUBMARINE MONOPOLY

The U. S. Navy has a virtual monopoly on the construction of submarines within this country. In the past this monopoly has been unchallenged, primarily because the submarine of bygone days had very little use­fulness for other than military missions.

Those days are gone forever. With the ad­vent of nuclear power, the marrying of nuclear power to the submarine and the resultant freeing of the vessel from the atmos­phere for days on end, the submarine has become a useful tool for scientific research. In the meantime the relative importance of science and the status of the civilian scientist in our society have been greatly magnified. The advancement of science has become a national objective. The use of scientific re­search to advance business has become an established procedure. The needs of both government and industry, and the benefits accruing to each from scientific research, have combined to form a situation in which scien­tific programs have one of the highest prior­ities in competition for government and private funds.

One of the general scientific programs re­ceiving increased attention is the exploration of the seas and the sea bottoms. Since the submarine is one of the best means of carrying observers to the depths of the sea, it is appar­ent that it is only a matter of time before government agencies and private industry challenge the Navy’s monopoly of this versa­tile vessel. Now is the time for the Navy to consider just how it will meet this challenge.

The challenge will probably be met in four steps: (1) the construction of small research submarines, privately sponsored; (2) the con­struction of larger submarines sponsored by civilian agencies of the government; (3) de­velopment of private industrial submarines of a medium size for specialized purposes; and (4) the evolution of full-scale underwater com­mercial enterprises and transport.

Small research submarines are already in existence. They include vessels such as Cousteau’s diving saucer and the Perry Cub- marine, capable of taking two men to moder­ate depths for several hours. Also included are small vehicles such as tractors to propel scuba divers. Other small vessels are not manned at all, but merely carry a television camera to permit guidance from the surface by means of a cable. The first phase of the challenge is already here.

The second phase of the challenge is emerg­ing now. Interest in larger submarines specifi­cally designed for scientific research is in­creasing, but the cost of vessels of this size and the uncertain application of the results in the immediate future, make it apparent that the development of this phase will depend upon the degree of support which can be found within the government. This support must not only include direct financial support, but also the willingness to experiment and to adopt new ideas. The price of progress is risk and an occasional failure. This means there must be some agency that is willing to accept risk and criticism to provide competition in this field to the Navy, and a desire on the part of the Navy to promote competition for the enrich­ment of ideas leading to improvement of sub­marine technology to our collective benefit.

Among those agencies having a direct in­terest in the sea and capable of providing competition to the Navy are: The National Science Foundation, in support of pure sci­ence; the Department of Interior, in the de­velopment of underwater (bottom) resources and in the safeguarding of commercial fish­eries; and the Department of Commerce, in the promotion of all commerce within the sea. Each of these agencies has already given some consideration to developing submarines espe­cially adapted to their particular needs. The initial cost of developing a seagoing research submarine is generally prohibitive to these agencies, however, unless special funding is obtained from Congress. In view of the present Navy monopoly this understandably has been difficult to obtain.

An alternate solution considered has been the possibility of obtaining a “surplus” Navy submarine for conversion. Because the conver­sion itself would cost money and the finished product would not likely be as suitable as a built-for-the-purpose research vessel, this solution is not the best. Nevertheless, it does represent a feasible initial solution and should be explored in further detail by the prospec­tive users. The USS Nautilus (SSN-571) would be the most logical submarine to convert to this use because of her age and her relatively large size, which would provide excellent laboratory space.

In addition to the physical difficulties in making a useful research submarine by con­version, there is also the problem of security classification. It is essential to our policy of co-operation in international scientific proj­ects that any research vessel be completely unclassified. Only by so doing will it be pos­sible to secure co-operation from other coun­tries in whose waters the vessel may be oper­ated. Consequently, even if the Nautilus were made available as the initial research vessel, a continuing program of using Navy submarines as they become obsolescent might not be practical.

Once the success of a “conventional” nu­clear research submarine had been demon­strated, the next logical step would be to build vehicles with operating characteristics tailored to specific research. The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, for example, has shown an interest in develop­ing a vessel capable of submerged tracking and observing of tuna fish through all phases of their life cycle. In order to do this, the vessel would have to be very maneuverable in both the horizontal and vertical planes. It would have to have a speed of at least 20 knots sub­merged and be capable of staying underwater for upwards of 60 days. It should be able to operate independently from a surface mother ship, should have sonar, and visual ob­servation windows. It should be small and require the minimum crew for operation of the boat so that the scientists on board could devote their time to their primary duties.

It appears that the technology to build such a vessel exists today, although it would be necessary to depart from standard Navy design to do so. For example, it would be necessary to capitalize on automatic controls much more than is now done. It would be necessary to alter the operating character­istics and fuel loading of the reactor for security, economy, and simplicity of opera­tion. While it would always be necessary to provide adequate safety devices and back-up systems to insure the ability to surface in the event of an emergency, it would be feasible and within the operational concept of the mission to eliminate many of the systems which give Navy submarines their superb reliability under combat conditions. The

scientific submarine would not have to have the capability of getting underway on short notice, of entering harbor on nuclear power, of “take home” diesel capacity, or of the same degree of quietness. In short, it would be de­signed around a different set of criteria from that which is used for Navy vessels and there­fore would be expected to exhibit different operating characteristics for the same size vessel and power plant.

The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Mines has an interest in developing the mineral resources on the ocean floor. In addi­tion to oil exploration, it is hoped to locate mineral deposits and to survey them for poten­tial mining. In order to accomplish this mis­sion, the submarine is not required to be fast or highly maneuverable. It must, however, have the ability to navigate precisely, to hover over a particular spot for a long period of time, and to recover samples by grabbing and by drilling cores. Further progress is hoped to lead to submarines which can bring in an oil well while submerged, or collect ore and ac­complish its initial concentration before ship­ping it back to a mill.

When these techniques of underwater oper­ations have been demonstrated, industry will look more closely at the feasibility of adapting submarines to commercial enterprises. One communications company has already given consideration to a submarine capable of serv­icing its transoceanic cables. These cables tend to break in two places—on the conti­nental shelf where trawlers snag them and at the lip of the shelf where they are strained by seaslides. A submarine capable of locating the cable visually, pulling the broken ends inside to be spliced while submerged, and then burying the cable in a shallow trench to pro­tect it from trawlers would save much time and labor over current procedures for repairs made from surface ships.

As technology improves, and economic estimates become more reliable, private indus­try will have more incentive to expand its underwater commerce into the less specialized applications. Submarine tankers have been studied for years and are feasible now except for the economics. Underwater ore carriers or cargo vessels fall into a similar category. Economics are a function of politics as well as technology, however, and a sudden change in our trade routes could make the economics of a submarine transport more favorable almost overnight.

In addition to the development of mobile underwater vehicles, there is expected to be a parallel development of stationary submerged stations. First, there will be the small experi­mental stations housing three or four people for periods up to a month, such as Cousteau is now developing in Europe. Thereafter sta­tions will be developed to perform special missions. For example, after the mineral deposits under the sea have been explored, mapped, and recovered on a trial basis by sub­marine, the next logical step is to build a complete minehead operation in stationary chambers. Military missiles can be sunk in silos at sea much more easily than they can be emplaced on land, and these will in turn give rise to defense stations complete with tor­pedoes to protect them. Farther out will be the listening posts for intelligence and control stations for submerged traffic in much the same way that radar is used to search the skies for enemy attack and to control friendly air­craft movements. Underwater ranches for raising fish will become practical in some locations, and the servicing of all these sta­tions will give rise to still greater requirements for submarines.

The Navy simply is not big enough to handle development of these diverse projects, yet the pressure to begin building the second group of vehicles (research submarines and stations) is already manifesting itself.

The Navy’s primary responsibility is to maintain a combat Fleet. It is doubtful if it has any responsibility to develop any other type of submarine except those needed in direct support of the Fleet. Unfortunately, however, the naval monopoly on submarine construc­tion is already acting to the detriment of ex­perimental research submarine construction. In view of the current extreme emphasis on science, this impasse cannot continue much longer, and the Navy should be considering now what action it can and should take to en­courage a private submarine industry.

What can the Navy do? It can:

(1)    Make public a policy statement en­couraging other government agencies and private industry to invest in their own vessels for underseas research. This policy should clear the air for the Bureau of the Budget, Congress, and those agencies interested in moving ahead under the sea.

(2)    Offer technical assistance, including basic data from the David W. Taylor Model Basin. (The Department of Commerce now has the right to a percentage of the time avail­able at the model basin and so could develop basic hull data itself. It would seemingly be a waste of time, however, to repeat Navy ex-

periments on underwater hull forms.)

(3)    Make available, on a reimbursable basis, its facilities for training the crews of civilian submarines; and until such time as the Maritime Commission can make wide­spread dockside facilities available for nuclear boats, the Navy should provide these also.

(4)    In conjunction with the Coast Guard, assume responsibility for search and rescue in the event of submarine disaster.

(5)    Assume responsibility for the control of all underwater traffic, both for safety and for defense purposes.

There is no doubt that these actions would place additional responsibilities on the Navy until they could be taken over by other agencies. Yet the Navy stands to benefit in the long run from the increased numbers of per­sonnel working on submarine problems. The responsibility to control traffic would provide training for a rapidly expanding Navy in war­time. The increased traffic would in turn pro­vide many additional observers gathering intelligence on the movement of submarines of potential enemies.

THE ARCTIC OCEAN*

Since the earliest concepts of a spherical earth, inquiring man has speculated about the nature of the north polar region. As early as the 17th and 18th centuries, privately financed trapping and trading expeditions were making major discoveries in the far north.

Today, after centuries of exploration and with the advent of nuclear-powered sub­marines capable of submerged transits of the Arctic Ocean, more and more has been re­vealed about the nature of the Arctic Basin

* See also John Cadwalader, “Arctic Drift Sta­tions,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1963, p. 67.

and its waters. An accurate physiographic description of this region is, of course, of great importance to north polar naval operations.

The Arctic Ocean is unique among the oceans of the world in that a major portion of it consists of continental shelf. The shelf is not of uniform extent, being several times wider off the Eurasian coast than off the North American coast. Off Alaska and Greenland, the shelf is 100 to 200 kilometers wide, which can be considered a normal shelf width, whereas the East Siberian Shelf and the Bar­ents Sea and Kara Sea Shelves range from 500 to 1,700 kilometers in width. Scouring by continental glaciers could account for much of the micro-relief found on the Beaufort Sea Shelf and Chukchi Cap.

The continental slope begins at the usual depth of 200 meters, excepting off Greenland where the break occurs at approximately 300 meters, probably reflecting depression of the earth’s crust by ice loads. North of Alaska, the gradient of the continental slope ranges from one and a half degrees to four degrees, similar to the continental slopes in other oceans. Slopes as steep as 23 degrees have been reported north of Alaska, however. Sev­eral submarine valleys have been charted and undoubtedly more will be found. The largest of these, the St. Anna Trough, lying east of Franz Josef Land, is 180 kilometers wide and 500 kilometers long. These valleys, such as the one lying northwest of Point Barrow, Alaska, can serve as valuable submarine portals into the deep ocean basins.

In co-operation with the IGY oceanographic program, the Soviet vessels Ob and Lena com­pleted a detailed sounding survey of the northern Greenland Sea. The results of this survey disproved the existence of Nansen’s Sill which was believed to connect Greenland and Spitsbergen, impeding the flowage of water from the Atlantic into the Arctic Ocean. Rather, Nansen’s Sill is pierced by a trough, the Lena Trough, whose depth is in excess of

3,0            meters. Heezen and Ewing of the Lamont Geological Observatory, Columbia University, consider the discovery of this channel as supporting evidence for the con­tinuation of the mid-oceanic ridge system into the Arctic Ocean, the trough being the median rift valley. Their argument is attrac­tive, as an earthquake epicenter belt is super-

imposed upon the trough in a similar relation­ship to that already observed along the mid­Atlantic rift.

The name Nansen Swell is now applied to the eastern shoulder of “Nansen’s Sill” and the smaller western shoulder was named Ob Shoal. The continental shelf adjoining the northeastern coast of Greenland is dissected by numerous channels which appear to be glacially scoured valleys from a past glacial advance.

A magnetic survey off the Arctic coast of Alaska, supported by the Office of Naval Re­search, suggests the existence of a near-surface dyke or basement ridge striking at an angle of approximately 45 degrees to the margin of the continental shelf 180 kilometers north of Barrow. It would appear that this structure should form a topographic ridge extending from the edge of the shelf in the vicinity of 73° North, 157° West. It is curious that the strike and location of this ridge is in perfect agreement with a spur shown on a 1956 bathymetric chart compiled by the Defence Research Board of Canada from Soviet sources, yet it does not appear in the detailed soundings of the region in U. S. surveys.

Projecting northward from the Chukchi Shelf is a semi-detached piece of continental shelf called the Chukchi Cap, which Heezen and Ewing consider to be analogous to the well-known Flemish Cap off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The cap, 200 kilometers in diameter, rises abruptly from the floor of the ocean deep and has a truncated and dissected top, suggesting surf or glacial planation. A smaller but similar feature, the Northwind Seahigh, is located to the southeast of the Chukchi Cap.

The Canada Deep extends for approxi­mately 1,100 kilometers from the Beaufort Shelf to the Alpha Ridge. Echograms from the USS Nautilus (SSN-571) show the 3,940 meter-deep floor of the basin to be strikingly smooth, interrupted only in the northeast­ern portion by two sea knolls. Heezen and Ewing suggest that, as the submarine canyons dissecting the Beaufort Shelf are probably similar in origin to submarine canyons in gen­eral, abyssal plains should be found spread­ing out from the edge of the continental margin. Also, abyssal cones may occur on the floor of the ocean deeps off the mouths of the major arctic rivers, analogous to those of the Mississippi, Hudson, and Ganges Rivers. Gravity observations recently made from the Office of Naval Research’s ice island Arlis-II indicate that abyssal plains, formed by tur­bidity flows down the continental slopes, do indeed exist.

A smaller deep, the Beaufort Deep, under­lies the Beaufort Sea and is separated from the main Canada Deep by a broad sill rising 350 meters above the abyssal plain. Because of the shallow and still uncertain separation of the Canada and Beaufort Deeps, it is sug­gested that the name Canada Deep apply to both (i.e. the Beaufort Deep is part of the larger Canada Deep). Heezen and Ewing refer to a peninsula-like segment of continen­tal crust projecting from the vicinity of Banks Island westward into the Beaufort Deep, as the Beaufort Plateau.

Aeromagnetic profiles over the northwest­ern portion of the Canada Deep (taken during the Office of Naval Research’s Project Arctic Basin) indicate a somewhat shallower and more irregular ocean floor than was previ­ously indicated. No sounding data is available and the isobaths in Figure 1 (next page) were interpolated. Scientific station Alpha was established just to the north. However, the region was traversed by the Nautilus in 1958. In describing the soundings from this cruise, Dietz and Shumway, of the U. S. Navy Elec­tronics Laboratory, state that the profile across the southern portion of the Canada Deep shows no topographic interruptions, but two sea knolls were crossed in the northern por­tion. Unfortunately, they did not describe the location, elevation, or areal extent of these features. The 1956 bathymetric chart com­piled by the Defence Research Board of Can­ada, also shows two rises in the floor of the deep within this area. One rise is defined by a

2,0           meter isobath and the second has a 1,500 meter isobath. It is curious to note that the most recently available Soviet bathy­metric chart omits these features.

The Alpha Ridge lies on the North Amer­ican side of and sub-parallel to the Lomonosov Ridge. It ascends to a minimum depth of about 1,400 meters and is approximately 900 kilometers long and varies considerably in width. The ridge is joined to the continental shelf at either end by broad triangular pla-

teaus. Seismic dip information and bathy­metric profiles across the crest of the ridge show rugged topography suggesting that this is an area of fault blocks.

On either side of the Alpha Ridge, the sea floor drops off gradually to the abyssal plains but does not merge smoothly into the deep ocean floor. Instead, the flanks of the ridge are terminated abruptly by escarpments about 600 meters high which presumably mark major faults. The flanks contain rela­tively large undulations whose relief is as much as 1,000 meters.

There is no evidence of seismic activity or volcanism associated with the Alpha Ridge. Heezen and Ewing point out that the physiog­raphy as well as the crustal structure of the rise is closely similar to that observed in the oceanic rises of the Atlantic.

The Lomonosov Ridge extends 1,800 kil­ometers from the continental shelf north of

Ellesmere Island to the continental shelf north of the New Siberian Islands. The depth of the ridge summit appears to be fairly uniform be­tween 900 and 1,450 meters, the maximum depth reported being about 1,650 meters. The shallowest recorded depth along the central part of the ridge is 954 meters and the average relief of the ridge from 60 to 200 kilometers. The Nautilus’ traverse showed the flanks of the ridge to be slightly convex upward. The south flank slopes here at an angle of 13 de­grees whereas the north flank is less steep, with the region shallower than 3,850 meters being steeper than the deeper portion. The summit was 26 kilometers wide at the traverse crossing and appeared remarkably flat with the suggestion of truncation to a depth of 1,400 meters below the present sea level.

Between the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha Ridge, the low ridge, Marvin Ridge, extends into the Makarov Deep. The three ridges are aseismic and join together in the vicinity of 88° North, 90° West where they form a broad shelf.

The track of the Nautilus is shown as passing over the Marvin Ridge, yet this feature, well documented by the drift of the research sta­tion T-3, does not appear in the soundings.

The Makarov Deep is enclosed by the Lomonosov Ridge, the Alpha Ridge, and the Marvin Ridge. Echograms from the Nautilus show its floor to be completely featureless and flat at 4,030 meters, or 120 meters deeper than the Canada Deep. The Soviet oceanog­raphers Gordienko and Laktionov report depths of over 4,000 meters in the Makarov Deep, yet their chart shows no 4,000-meter isobath. The extreme flatness of its floor and abrupt contact with the Lomonosov Ridge and Alpha Ridge suggest that the deep has been a catch-basin for a considerable thickness of sediment. This conclusion is further sub­stantiated by aeromagnetic data from the recent Project Arctic Basin.

Soviet investigators contoured the basin on the European side of the Lomonosov Ridge as a single deep which they call the “Nansen Deep.” As previously mentioned, however, Heezen and Ewing have given strong evidence for extending the mid-oceanic ridge across the Arctic Ocean, dividing this deep into two sub-basins. They named the deep adjacent to the Lomonosov Ridge the Eurasia Basin, and the deep adjoining the Barents and Kara Shelves the Fram Basin. In constructing the bathymetric chart shown in Figure 1, it was possible to preserve Heezen and Ewing’s divi­sion of the “Nansen Deep” without violating known soundings. In view of the strong argu­ments favoring such a division by the global ridge system, this pattern of contouring was elected. New aeromagnetic data recently ob­tained from Project Arctic Basin II flights have further substantiated the continuation °f the mid-Atlantic ridge into the Arctic Ocean.

The North Pole is located close to the con­tact of the Eurasia Deep and Lomonosov Ridge. Soundings from the Nautilus showed the water depth at the pole to be 4,200 meters. From T-3, a sounding of 4,300 meters was obtained at the Pole, and a depth of 4,290 meters at 88° 54' North 20° West was re­ported from the Soviet station NP-1. Correct­ing the Nautilus’ sounding to the Kawahara sound transmission tables gives a depth of 4,290 which then brings the three values into agreement.

The Nautilus’ sounding profile shows the floor of the Eurasia Deep to be, like the other abyssal plains, strikingly flat and featureless. The floor of the deep appears to slope gently southward, however, being 410 meters deeper at the mid-oceanic ridge than along its con­tact with the Lomonosov Ridge. Dietz and Shumway suggest that this depression of the floor may be the result of crustal flexure in response to the loading effect of the mid­oceanic ridge, similar to that observed with the Hawaiian Ridge.

The mid-ocean ridge in the Arctic Basin is too poorly defined by soundings to permit any certainty regarding its topographic char­acter. Heezen and Ewing give a detailed description of the mid-Atlantic Ridge, and if the “mid-Arctic Ridge” is a continuation of the same system, as it appears to be, then their topographic character should be sim­ilar. The most salient feature of the mid­Atlantic Ridge is the rift valley which forms a deep cleft along the axis of the ridge. Rift mountains rise to an elevation of 900 to 2,700 meters above the valley floor. The rift moun­tains, in turn, are flanked by high, fractured plateaus. The rift valley and mountain system is generally less than 200 kilometers in width with the valley itself varying in width from 40 kilometers to 150 kilometers.

Both the Nautilus and the USS Skate (SSN- 578) have traversed the mid-oceanic ridge province. Their echograms show the region to be one of jagged topography containing continuous strings of peaks of various size and having a maximum relief of about 1,000 meters. Dietz and Shumway in describing these echograms refer to this physiographic province as the “Region of Seamounts.” From the soundings profiles, one cannot tell if the peaks are conical seamounts or cross sections of ridges. They point out the similarity of the echo profile in this region to those obtained when passing over the mid-Atlantic Ridge. They conclude that the “Region of Sea­mounts” is a continuation of the mid-Atlantic Ridge, and thus at least some of the peaks shown in the echograms are undoubtedly cross sections of ridges.

It was not possible to contour the Fram Deep as the large lenticular basin shown by Heezen and Ewing without violating credible data. Rather, the Fram Deep appears to have an irregular outline and is the smallest of the four deeps, being 950 kilometers in length and 350 kilometers wide. It is also the deepest of the abyssal basins, extending to 5,180 meters. Adjacent to the deepest part of the depression, a sub-oceanic mountain rises to within 730 meters of the sea surface. In a distance of 80 kilometers, there is a 4,450 meter change in bottom elevation. Another seamount, 400 kilometers, north of Spitsbergen, rises over

3,0           meters above the 4,000-meter-deep abyssal floor. Little is known about the Fram Deep; the scant information available sug­gests that its character may be complex.

The structure of the Arctic Ocean Basin is seen to be complex indeed. Within its bound­aries are depressions of truly oceanic depth, yet nearly half the area is composed of shal­low shelves and mountain ridges which ap­pear to be continental in character. Perhaps the Arctic “Ocean” should be considered four “oceans”: the Canada, Makarov, Eurasia, and Fram Oceans.

THE NAVAL AVIATOR SPEAKS

The naval aviator speaks in a tongue that is both colorful and unique. There is no dictionary that lists all of the many words and phrases he uses. More often than not they are “Greek” to the outsider. Some phrases are en­during while others are transitory. Yet, at any given time, naval aviators understand each other perfectly. There are no written guide­lines, but the language of the naval aviator tends to avoid terms and phrases which carry a connotation of “civilian” origin. Similarly, naval aviators avoid a goodly portion of the lingo of their sister service, the U. S. Air

Force. Term usage is sometimes sectional, and naval aviators with the Pacific Fleet may dis­play minor variations from the language used by Atlantic Fleet aviators. These gentlemen do not stay in one place for too long, however, and, having to speak a common language in discussing their profession, the geographical barriers are vague or easily overcome.

One of the most permanent expressions sired by naval aviators is black shoe. The term was coined long ago, in reference to non­aviator officers, when naval aviators began wearing green working uniforms with brown shoes. With the advent of the khaki uniform, identification of the non-aviator by shoe color has faded into antiquity, but the expression remains. The term is more good-natured than malicious in its use. Because of a remote derogatory implication, however, attempts have been made to discourage its use. The same attempts have been directed at the use of the term “can” in reference to a destroyer. So far, neither attempt has achieved any notable success.

As the antithesis of black shoe, the phrase airdate has come into use as a black shoe ref­erence to aviators. It does not quite measure up in linguistic stature, however, since in this context it is not original. Airdate was originally a term used by non-flying enlisted personnel in reference to enlisted air-crew­men. Its application to naval aviators by non-flying officers is a relatively recent de­fensive measure.

In the pursuit of his specialty, the naval aviator wears a flight suit, checks the fight schedule, and files a flight plan. But when he flies, he is not on a flight, he is out on a hop, or he is airborne, or he is in the blue (one USAF term which has gained acceptance in naval aviation). When he is operating on land, like other aviators, he takes off in his air­craft; but when operating from an aircraft carrier, he launches. To the Navy man, a deck is something one walks upon. But to the naval aviator, the deck is where he lands his aircraft. In departing from the aircraft parking area, he literally pulls the chocks. Figuratively, how­ever, this term is used to indicate a desire to terminate a static condition and get moving, as in, “let’s pull the chocks and hit the club for a brew.” Seaplane aviators use a variation which, because of their particular occupation, is more nautical: “let’s go over the side” (i.e., off the seawall and into the water).

A naval aviator making touch-and-go practice landings is bouncing (land or carrier- based aircraft) or doing some splash-and-dash (seaplane types). Ashore, the naval aviator may land his aircraft, but on board ship, he comes aboard and traps (arrested landing). If, when trapping, the aircraft hook fails to catch a wire (arresting gear or, more correctly, a cross-deck pendant) it is a bolter, and the pilot goes around for another try. In ye olden days before the bolter and the angled-deck carrier, missing the wires meant going into the fence (barrier or barricade). The barricade is still around for emergency use, but for the benefit of the younger set, things are not the same as they were in the “old” Navy.

To the naval aviator, his carrier is the boat. This expression, more than once, has cha­grined the true black shoe, who is raised to be­lieve it is not a boat unless it can be hoisted on board a ship. However, it is an endearing rather than a derogatory term. More than once the boat has become an extremely per­sonal thing representing the one place the aviator can terminate his immediate flying endeavors without getting wet.

While circling the boat to come aboard, the aviator dogs (orbits) awaiting charlie (the signal to land). With the advent of the present phonetic alphabet, the aviator’s signal is delta. But the aviator will still report that he is dogging. Bingo is that fuel state at which the pilot must either come aboard or divert (to another carrier or landing field). Of course, if another aircraft, configured as an aerial tanker, is available, the pilot can plug in for a drink. The tanker’s aerial fueling rig is a buddy store. When ready to land, the naval aviator may drop the gear and pop his flaps and speed brake. He is then dirty (he has not, however, “dumped the garbage”) and ready to come aboard. If the weather is good and the sea reasonably calm, he will probably make a normal trap. In adverse weather, particularly with a rough sea state, he makes an approach to the great tilting airdrome. Personnel idly watching the recovery of aircraft on board a carrier do so from one of the upper levels of the island (superstructure), referred to as vulture's row. Some observing personnel may literally be vultures, hoping to catch a glimpse of something more exciting than a normal trap. A tailhook pilot on vulture's row, however, is never observing solely for a chance vicari­ous thrill. He knows no carrier landing is ever “normal” until it is safely completed. With appropriate comment and body eng­lish, he is subconsciously helping each one of his compatriots to come aboard safely.

About the only discernible criteria for de­velopment of naval aviator lingo is that it be “natural.” Generally, it originates within the brown shoe establishment, but occasionally outside origin is accepted. And, after having just established that point, it should be men­tioned that even an “accepted” term can vary in meaning within the organization. To a multi-engine aircraft pilot, for example, the term single-engine means a situation bordering on an emergency. To the single-engine aircraft pilot, however, the term carries proud and superior professional overtones of his specialty.

The naval aviator is both inconsistent and fickle in the creation and use of his language. A rescue destroyer for a carrier may be a plane guard; the air operations officer may order “pilots, man your planes"-, and there may follow a four -plane launch. But gen­erally, the sophisticated naval aviator does not fly a plane, he flies an aircraft. The fine dis­tinction in the use of plane and aircraft ad­mittedly is not too clear, nor, to the naval aviator too important. Most certainly, his aircraft is never a ship, a term which for some unaccountable reason is used by civilians and Air Force personnel.

Probably the most varied inconsistencies and some of the richest color are found in the names by which the naval aviator will refer to the various aircraft he flies. Some names are naturals; others, like Topsy, “just growed.” There is no one creation agency, and no poll is taken. Aircraft names once accepted in naval aviation circles, however, magically come into general usage. Each naval aircraft has an official letter-number designation and a man­ufacturer-invented “popular” name. But if it were ever officially decreed by what name naval aviators would refer to a given aircraft, it is a good bet that all naval aviators would avoid the name like a plague. The up-shot is that if the naval aviator doesn’t like the “official” name, he will invent one of his own.

An example of this is the North American

T-28 trainer. The T-28 had been in service about a year when its manufacturer decided it needed a “popular” name. A Navy-wide publicity program began with the manufac­turer offering a suitable prize for an appropri­ate name for this trainer. On completion of this program, the prize was awarded for the name “Trojan.” It did not “sell.” To this day, the T-28 is just that, or occasionally, just the 28.

During World War II, the N2S “Cadet” became universally known as the Yellow Peril. The standard postwar Navy trainer, the SNJ “Texan” had a raft of names. Some were highly uncomplimentary, but none were “Texan.” The J-Bird or just plain J has a sentimental place in the heart of many naval aviators.

Also on the sentimental side, perhaps no Navy aircraft earned a more affectionate place in the heart of many a naval aviator than the F4U “Corsair.” The aircraft was alternately referred to, not only as “Corsair,” but as the 4U, the U-bird, the hose nose, and the hog. All, however, were used with the utmost respect and pride by those who flew the outstanding F4U.

The F7U “Cutlass,” a latter-day product of the same manufacturer, came under the gun for a linguistic barb. The aircraft never became too popular because of its perform­ance characteristics. “Cutlass” eventually became Gutless.

The AD “Skyraider” is another highly- respected aircraft in naval aviation circles, probably because it has the same enduring longevity as the F4U as an operational air­craft. Few, if any, aviators call it “Skyraider” —at least not in conversing among them­selves. It is just plain AD. In some circles it is referred to as the Bathtub. Among the older vintage pilots, it is still referred to as the Able Dog or just the Dog—from the now defunct phonetic alphabet (somehow Alpha Delta doesn’t carry the same connotation for this reliable work horse of naval aviation). The Dog and Hog both did yeoman service in the Korean War.

The Navy version of the World War II B-24 “Liberator” bomber (the PB4Y-2) was tabbed as the “Privateer” by its manufac­turer. To the naval aviator, however, the natural was 4Y square. The enduring SNB utility trainer is the Beech, the Bugsmasher, the Slow Navy Bomber, and even the twin- engined Messerschmidt. But there are a few, even among naval aviators, who would recog­nize even the venerable SNB by its “popular” name, the “Navigator.”

The manufacturer tabbed the manta ray­shaped F4D with the most appropriate name, “Skyray,” but the naval aviator calls it the Ford, in phonetic translation of the letter- number-letter designation. The F2H “Ban­shee” was twisted into Banjo, yet for the FI IF, Tiger has been perfectly acceptable. The A4D Skyhawk, the world’s smallest jet bomber, is the Tinker Toy, the wrap-around-bomber, or just plain A4D. The F9F-2 and -5 “Panther” series suffered when a civilian newspaper some-

where coined the name into “Panther-jet.” From that point on these aircraft were called the Deuce and the Five. The “Cougar” (F9F-8, -8T) gained somewhat greater accept­ance than “Panther,” but most naval aviators still preferred Dash-Eight and Eight-Tee. The ASW aircraft S2F became another phonetic alphabet aberration: Stoof. The AEW version of the same aircraft, the WF-2 inherited prob­ably the most colorful (and unexplainable) name: Willie Fudd.

So the lingo goes on, and new aircraft, as they are introduced, will have to meet the uncertain rules in the determination of the names naval aviators will apply. The A2F, a new jet attack aircraft now joining the Fleet, may or may not be accepted by its “popular” name “Intruder.” The F4H “Phantom” label has not had too much trouble to date, but current reference to Phantom Phylers and the 4FI Club may be evidence of things to come. The A 3D “Skywarrior,” tagged by non-A3D aviators with the uncomplimentary title Drut or the pseudo-German Grossenbomber, is being replaced by the A3J “Vigilante.” One hard landing on board the USS Enterprise CVAN-65, with a resulting collapsed nose gear, and the term Fragilante was heard. However, it is too early to give credence to that name.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the Navy recently shifted to the U. S. Air Force aircraft designation system. The venerable SNB is no more. Now it is a rather uncolorful C-45. The Eight-Tee (F9F-8T) is now a TF-9J. That durable Dog, the AD, is an A-l (which its pilots claim aptly describes its quality).

In helicopters, the easily pronounceable HUK. and HUS have become the H-43 and H-34—more efficient, perhaps, but short on color. The true clarity of the new designation system is best summed up by pointing out that the F4H-1 “Phantom” is now the F4B—the designation of an old bi-wing Navy fighter circa 1930. An enlarged photo of that old bird with a cautioning caption “F4B is friendly—don’t shoot!” recently appeared on the air intelligence bulletin board of a CVA.

How many generations of naval aviators it will require before the new designation sys­tem is fully accepted is a moot point. There is no doubt, however, that an ever-growing colorful lingo will continue as part of naval aviation as long as that business exists.

By C. P. Lemieux,

Head, Russian Division,

U. S. Naval Academy

IN DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY

Although the Soviet Navy is definitely a l\. junior branch of the armed services and is assigned a purely supporting role in Marxist strategy, one can observe a concerted at­tempt in Soviet military periodicals to defend and fortify the image of the the Soviet Fleet. Thus, when the New York Herald Tribune published an article on 31 July 1962 on the character and mission of the Soviet Navy, the Soviet publication Krasnaya £vegda de­voted two five-column articles in the midst of the Nikolayev space flight news denouncing the “American Falsifiers of Naval History.” Since no one in the Soviet Union outside of a handful of specialists reads the New York Herald Tribune, and since no objections were presented to the American editors, it must be assumed that the historical section of the Soviet Navy continues to be particularly con­cerned about educating its own public as to the history and traditions of Russian seamen.

The author of the Red Star articles is Ad­miral of the Fleet I. S. Isakov, one of the two flag officers holding this rank during World War II. Like his contemporary, Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetzov, Admiral Isakov dropped out of sight after the War and returned to public notice about a dozen years later as the editor of the monumental Soviet Naval Atlas, which gives the official Communist view of naval warfare in history. The signature of such a prominent figure in the World War II military hierarchy cannot but lend prestige and authority to the Red Star rebuttals.

Admiral Isakov characterizes the recent Western interest in the Soviet Fleet as part of the lobbying and debates for increased mili­tary budgets in these countries. “Until recent years the press organs of the so-called ‘Great Naval Powers’ almost completely ignored topics related to the problems of developing

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the Soviet Navy, leaving this area to special­ized naval and military periodicals.”

He continues, “The crude and heedless lying continued up to the time when a num­ber of Soviet scientific achievements placed our country in one of the first places in the world of energy (including atomic), rocket design, and other areas. This forced the American imperialists to revise their thinking about the armed might of the Soviet Union.” The oversimplification of Russian naval history draws Isakov’s fire: “Passing over Chesma and the victories of Ushakov and Senyavin in the Mediterranean, or Greig at Navarino, as well as many others, the news­paper (Herald Tribune) begins its historical tour with the battle of Sinope, which it calls the opening of a new era in warfare.”

However, the Soviet Admiral is contemp­tuous of the term “massacre of Sinope” (“the perpetuation of a silly figure of speech in­vented by the discomfited French and British”), and the insinuation that the Rus­sians lacked a spirit of innovation: “Can one forget how the cutters of young Lieutenant Commander S. O. Makarov, using torpedoes for the first time in history, drove the Turkish battleships from the Black Sea?”

Returning to this theme of the Russians as innovators, Isakov states that, prior to the 1914 conflict, the British put in a rush order for 1,000 spherical mines from the Russians, who were considered the leaders in this field. “The Americans, learning of this, hastened to buy models of all the Russian mines and sweeping devices. They also invited Russian instructors to train their seamen. They ob­tained drawings and new seaplanes of the M-5 type, and later the M-9, built by D. P. Grigorovitch and considered the best. In preceding years the ‘Makarov’ cap on armor­piercing shells had been adopted for big caliber shells of all navies. After it was learned that the first Russian dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol class (laid down in 1909) were to have triple turrets with 12-inch guns (looked upon with skepticism by the British and Ger­mans), the Americans took over the Russian innovation in new battleships of the Oklahoma class (1912) and the Nevada. Later the Amer­icans took over the large range finders in the after sections of these turrets, rendering them autonomous in the event the main fire-control

station was knocked out,” he continues.

“Many such examples could be cited. Of course not all Russian innovations were ac­cepted, and on one occasion the U.S.A. passed up a good one. As soon as the world’s leading navies noted the possibilities of the projected squadron leader Novik, a transition vessel between the ‘mine-carriers’ (torpedoes) and light cruisers and the fastest and most powerful unit of its time, they began to con­struct similar squadron leaders. To the British Navy goes the priority for the name ‘de­stroyer,’ but the idea came from Russia. Turbine mechanisms and oil-fired engines were no problem for the American ship builders, but they did not understand the further evolution of the Russian Noviks adapted to the new conditions of naval war­fare, and continued to mass produce up to 100 squadron leaders with four torpedo ap­paratus and only three guns per side. [1]

“At the height of the revolutionary ac­tivities in 1917, the Revel yards produced and sent into action against the Germans the Izyaslav and the Avtroil, with a five-gun salvo per side and only two torpedo ap­paratuses. If we review from the present 45- year point of vantage the destroyers and leaders of all navies, it can be seen that the re­duction of torpedo tubes in favor of gun in­stallations began with the Russian prototype Izyaslav, which performed well in World War II under the name Karl Marx.”

Admiral Isakov’s final comments are de­voted to the World War II operations. Here, he states, the main naval task was to support the flanks of the Soviet land forces which bore the full weight of the German attack and ultimately broke the back of the Nazi ad­vance. During this time, says Isakov, the So­viet Fleet did prevent landings on the flanks of the Soviet forces and cut off the supplies of nickel and iron ores from Sweden. What is more, says the Soviet Admiral, the Soviet counterattack which finally liberated the countries of Eastern Europe was greatly hindered on the Danube by the American mines. Later, it is claimed, Soviet operations were similarly hindered in landings at the

Korean ports of Seisin and Rassin where mines had been sowed by U. S. B-29s.

To conclude his defense of Russian initia­tive and inventiveness, the Admiral ends: “One of the most significant changes of re­cent years was the commissioning of (Soviet) atomic submarines firing rockets from a sub­merged position, as was demonstrated on the eve of the U.S.S.R. Navy Day.”

While we can understand the purpose of Admiral Isakov’s article in Krasnaya Pyezjla, it is evident that he is guilty of the same over­simplification that “amazes” him in the American newspaper article. However, in the case of the Soviet Admiral it was not ignor­ance, but rather a careful selection of data that is responsible for invalid assumptions on the part of the reader.

The foremost naval representative of a great nation should be more careful of his arguments if he expects to maintain his honor as an historian. He should not, for example, make vague references to maintaining the integrity of extensive coastlines that were never in danger of attack. This creates by implication a picture of powerful Soviet naval forces which did not exist. The interruption of ore traffic in the Baltic does not seem (from the German records) to have been very serious, and here again the Admiral is conveniently vague.

As the Soviet Admiral states, and we should know from the work of many Russian refugee engineers who found freedom and oppor­tunity in America, there is a high degree of inventiveness in the Russian technician. Still, it is idle to speak of “American falsifiers of naval history,” if a journalistic essay fails to give a complete picture within the limits of time and space imposed by a daily, metro­politan paper. Judging by the date, 31 July, the journalist had about two days to research and write a short article concerning Soviet Navy Day. Assuming that Admiral Isakov noticed the article shortly after it appeared, he had nearly two weeks in which to prepare his 8,000-word essay on “Amerikanskie Falsi- fikatori Morskoi Istorii.”

If there is a good deal of misinformation about the Soviet Navy, it is not necessarily owing to any willful distortion by serious students of history, but rather to the scanty information available from the Soviet Union.

Notebook

U. S. Navy

H British Crew To Man U. S. Ship (Albert Sehlstedt, Jr., in the Baltimore Sun, 28 Febru­ary 1964): American officials today said British sailors will be the first crewmen assigned to the internationally manned de­stroyer, U.S.S. Biddle.

The United States will use the Biddle to demonstrate the practicality of operating a warship with crews from several countries.

Mixed crews from nations of the Western alliance have been proposed for a fleet of sur­face ships armed with Polaris missiles, weapons now carried by U. S. submarines.

The first British sailors will go aboard the Biddle in June, according to current plans. The total British contingent will ultimately num­ber 26, including two officers.

Crewmen from other nations, including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey, will be assigned to the 4,500-ton de­stroyer in subsequent months.

Germany is expected to have the largest number of sailors from any of the European countries. About 45 Germans will be assigned to the crew.

No single country, except the United States, will contribute more than 20 per cent of the total crew. The Biddle's present complement consists of 18 officers and 316 men.

The Biddle is a guided missile destroyer equipped with Tartar surface-to-air missiles and the anti-submarine weapon, ASROC.

However, the destroyer is not a prototype or test model of ships that would make up the proposed surface fleet, officials pointed out today [27 February].

The destroyer is basically more complicated than the merchant-type ships that would make up the international surface fleet, generally called the multilateral force, or MLF for short.

International manning of the Biddle will, nevertheless, highlight the problems that might come up when men from a number of countries try to work together aboard a single vessel.

Language is not expected to be a serious problem. All the crewmen should be able to speak enough English to be effective members of the ship’s company.

By December of this year, the Biddle will be sailing with crewmen from all of the na­tions that have expressed an interest in the exercise.

The vessel will operate mainly in American waters but will also spend four to six months in the Mediterranean, Government officials said.

Plans for the proposed multilateral force are now being studied by an international group in Paris and a subordinate military group in Washington.

The Paris group could have its study com­pleted this spring, after agreeing upon the basic elements of an international surface fleet.

s Rota Will be Polaris Sub Base (Navy Times, 4 March 1964): Eight Polaris subs will be based at Rota, Spain, on the southern Atlantic coast within easy reach of the Medi­terranean, the Navy has confirmed.

Already at Rota is the submarine tender Proteus, which had been at the only other European Polaris sub base, Holy Loch, Scot­land. Capt. David Bell, commander of the Polaris squadron at Holy Loch, confirmed the Proteus transfer.

Rota will serve as a maintenance and sup­ply base as well as for transfer of blue and gold crews, which alternate on deployments.

Capt. Philip A. Beshany is in command of the 1200-man Rota unit, Submarine Squad­ron 16. Seabees already are on the scene building a new breakwater.

Holy Loch, however, will continue to serve as the base for three more U. S. missile subs which have been assigned to the NATO com­mand and which are on station in the Medi­terranean. Under the agreement, the NATO subs will not be permitted to be repaired or replenished at Rota.

The Rota decision means, high sources say, that Spain has escaped any reprisals in the form of loss of U. S. aid for its trade with Cuba. Last year Spain received some $30 million aid. Talks are now under way in Havana and Madrid for a swap of Spanish fishing boats for Cuban sugar.

Spanish sources said discontinuance of U. S. aid would be regarded as a violation of the agreement signed Sept. 26, 1963, for five years permitting the U. S. to establish a base in Spain.

s Trieste Gets Facelifting (Undersea Tech­nology, February 1964): The bathyscaph Trieste has recently undergone an overhaul that is expected to give it more maneuverabil­ity. Trieste II, as the renovated vessel is called, has kept the same sphere that hung below the old hull, and much of the original equipment, but has gained a hydromatically improved float. The sphere has been moved further for­ward for improved vision, and faired into the hull 13 feet aft of the bow.

The new shape, with a decreased draft from 18^ feet to 12) feet, has increased the vessel’s towable speed from 4 to 10 knots. Other rea­sons for the new float were:

•     The old float was 10 years old and deterio­rating

•     Reduce the need for SCUBA divers and shorten equipment repair time by making virtually all equipment accessible from top­side

•     Provide additional battery space to in­crease capacity from 60 kWh to 115 kWh.

Both sonars and the TV system have been updated by the manufacturers to optimize reliable performance. The old propulsion sys­tem is still being used, but new motors have been ordered for April delivery. The new units will be 10 hp with a 50% efficiency in­stead of the present 20% efficient 3 hp motors.

The “weakest link” in the system, accord­ing to LCdr. Don Keach, Officer in Charge of the Trieste, is the “lack of a manipulator”. The problem is adapting off-the-shelf equip­ment for the deep ocean environment. Salin­ity, pressure, temperature, humidity, size, weight and power requirements are important factors which must be considered.

The first dive was early February. A series of test and scientific dives will continue through March in the Pacific, then the Trieste II will transfer to the Atlantic for sum­mer operations in the same general area of the Thresher site. Keach emphasized that the sum­mer work would be “primarily scientific in nature.” He explained that through last year’s operations, the oceanographic com­munity has “developed for the first time an area of the deep ocean where concerted, in­tensive and extensive measurements have been taken. By using Trieste, additional parameters can be closely measured and monitored. This area can then be a well de­fined segment of ocean whose total character­istics can be studied as they vary in time, space, and subject. This can be a terrific boon to all marine scientists.”

Other U. S. Services

0 Dozen 2,000-M.P.H. Jets Pass Tests

(Jack Raymond in The New York Times, 2 March 1964): The United States has de­veloped 11 or 12 of the phenomenal A-ll jet fighters, and all have passed many difficult tests, Senator Richard B. Russell said today [1 March].

The Georgia Democrat, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, gave this additional information about the 2,000-mile- an-hour aircraft, which was a secret for five years.

President Johnson ended the secrecy at his news conference yesterday. He said he had revealed the plane “to permit the orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our military and commercial programs.”

Senator Russell said that while tests of the experimental craft were continuing the proto­type was nearly ready for acceptance by the Air Force as a warplane.

He spoke on the Columbia Broadcasting System’s radio and television program “Face the Nation.”

Meanwhile, defense officials stressed that commercial applications of the new long-range interceptor were expected to develop from the metallurgical and engineering “break­throughs” rather than the conversion of the aircraft or its design.

President Johnson is scheduled to make public tomorrow a report by Eugene R. Black and Stanley de J. Osborne on the Administra­tion’s plans for a supersonic transport plane.

The A-l 1 is credited with a cruising altitude of more than 70,000 feet. Its range is measured in “thousands of miles.”

The U-2 reconaissance plane, which, like the A-ll, was manufactured by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, is understood to be capable of cruising at 90,000 feet. Its esti­mated speed is less than 500 miles an hour.

The F-106 and F-4C fighter can go 1,600 miles an hour over short distances.

Mr. Johnson noted yesterday that the per­formance of the long, rocket-shaped A-ll, which apparently is powered by two Pratt & Whitney engines, “far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today.”

His decision to make public the existence of the plane, which was initiated in 1959 under the Eisenhower Administration, caught many informed persons by surprise. The President admonished those associated with the pro­gram to refrain from talking about it.

New arguments were expected to arise over the future of the Air Force. The Administra­tion is now in a controversy with Air Force leaders and majorities in Congress over the merits of substantial investments in new manned planes. It is being charged with over­reliance on long-range ballistic missiles.

Three major issues appeared to be taking shape. The first was why the Air Force had been fighting for a new IMI, or Improved Manned Interceptor, when it already had the A-ll.

Senator Russell said today he did not know why the Air Force had sought $40 million to push the development of an IMI.

Because of his knowledge of the existence of the A-ll, he said, he led the successful Senate opposition to the IMI in the military authorization bill last week.

But that did not explain why his Demo­cratic colleague from Georgia, Representative Carl Vinson, who presumably was also in­formed of the A-ll program, had successfully fought to include $40 million for the IMI in the House bill. Mr. Vinson heads the House Armed Services Committee.

The second issue was whether the Adminis­tration would be willing to produce the A-l 1 for military operations.

In testimony before Congress in January, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stressed his interest in the development of manned interceptors to cope with a possible future threat of Soviet long-range bombers, as distinguished from the Soviet missile capa­bility.

“But until we can better discern the char­acter of the future manned bomber threat and determine the proper balance among the three basic elements of our defense posture; i.e., defense against manned bombers, defense against ICBMs and submarine-launched mis­siles, and civil defense, it would be premature to make a choice,” he said.

Recalling that statement, Air Force sup­porters questioned whether Mr. McNamara would regard an order to produce the A-ll any less premature than a decision to produce other types of interceptor.

According to one explanation of Air Force pressure for the IMI its uniformed leaders had sought to gain a commitment for production of the A-ll all along, but had had no other way of campaigning for that objective openly.

The third issue concerned the announced breakthrough in the use of titanium.

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A reason given by the Defense Department

in turning down the Boeing Aircraft Com­pany’s proposal for the TFX plane was the suggested use of titanium. Mr. McNamara, saying the use of that metal was risky, gave the controversial contract to the General Dynamics Corporation.

Officials sought to head off criticism in the light of President Johnson’s praise of the use of titanium for the A-l 1.

Their chief explanation was that knowledge of the metal’s limitations obtained in the A-l 1 program had made it possible to evaluate its use in the TFX, and to decide against it.

Foreign

s British Lay Keel for Polaris Sub (Flora Lewis in The Washington Post, 27 February 1964): The keel of Britain’s first Polaris sub­marine was laid today [26 February] at Bar­row-in-Furness.

The ship, to be named the Resolution, is due to start patrols in 1968, with four more nu­clear subs scheduled to come into service at six-month intervals afterwards.

The decision to build a fleet of five ships instead of four was announced in Parliament by Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft.

Thorneycroft also announced that Britian will buy American planes for the army and navy. The army will get a new helicopter. The choice is to be made next week between the Hiller and the Bell, a joint American-Italian helicopter, and then Britain will contract to buy 50 and manufacture another 100 under license.

The British navy is to have the Phantom, a carrier-based fighter produced by the Mc­Donnell Aircraft Corporation of St. Louis. Thorneycroft did not give details about the purchase plans, but the order is expected to be for 50 planes.

Labor opposition spokesman Dennis Healey bitterly attacked the government for this decision, and for the failure to announce an order for Britain’s PI 154, a vertical takeoff attack and interceptor plane.

Thorneycroft said he had given authority for a development contract, but that a pro­duction order had to await further research.

The foreign purchases and delay in placing orders for other new planes here will be a “disastrous blow” to the British aircraft in­dustry, Healey said. British firms, he said, were “disgusted and appalled” at the govern­ment’s decisions.

Healey attacked the defense policy all down the line, saying it showed that the government had “bitten off more than it can chew” and was “ducking decisions so another govern­ment a year from now will have to face them.”

He cited Defense Secretary Robert Mc­Namara’s presentation to Congress of United States policy as a model in no way paralleled by Britain’s latest defense white paper. What Britain has to do, he argued, is to choose among military aims, weapons and services because it “is no longer possible to do every­thing.”

He did not cast any new light, however, on just what a Labor government’s decision would be about the agreed purchase of Polaris missiles to mount on the nuclear submarines.

The opposition had made clear it would re­negotiate the Nassau Polaris agreement and abandon an independent deterrent for Britain. But it has never said flatly that it would refuse to buy the missiles as a possible contribution to some alliance force, and it has indicated it would continue construction of the subs, pos­sibly for hunter-tracker duty without missiles.

Thorneycroft advanced the government argument for the need of a British nuclear force, though he hinted that it might be abandoned in the future.

“The world may change,” he said. “The Atlantic Alliance might grow and a more united Europe develop.” But this has not happened yet, he said, and it would be a “desperate improvidence,” and “extraordi­nary renunciation” to abandon British nuclear plans now.

The national nuclear argument, which has

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been raging fiercely here for years, now seems to be narrowing below the surface of party polemics. Virtually all of the serious news­papers, the church and other prominent groups have come out against maintaining a national deterrent.

The Economist recently printed two care­fully reasoned articles for and against the British deterrent, and they added up to a dis­agreement only on when Britain should give it up, not whether. Thorneycroft’s hints and some private remarks from Conservatives in­dicated that a future Tory government might agree with that analysis.

Except for fringe groups of ban-the- bombers, all arguments from all sides on Britain’s policy explicitly endorse the main­tenance of a strong American deterrent as a shield for Britain, with the ultimate decision reserved to Washington.

s Canada Orders 3 U. K. Submarines

(London Times, 14 January 1964): Three Oberon class submarines to be acquired by the Royal Canadian Navy will all be built at Chatham. Lord Jellicoe, First Lord of the Admiralty, gave this news yesterday when he visited Chatham dockyard on a tour of naval depots and instillations.

He explained that in order to meet the Canadian wish to have such a submarine in service soon, the Onyx, which is being built at Chatham for the Royal Navy, will be made available to Canada. The next two sub­marines will be built in the same yard for technical and administrative reasons.

The Onyx, which was laid down in Sep­tember 1962, is to be launched next month and is scheduled for completion in September next year. To make up the number of such boats for the Royal Navy, the place of the Onyx will be taken by a submarine to be built by Cammel Laird, of Birkenhead.

Some changes in the Oberons to be built for Canada will include the installation of Canadian communications equipment and the enlargement of deicing and air-condition­ing systems to meet extremes of climate en­countered in Canadian operating areas.

The popularity of the Oberon class is re­flected by the fact that the Australian Govern­ment have also declared their intention of ordering two more of these boats in the United Kingdom provided that satisfactory arrange­ments for price and delivery can be made.

s Chinese Cut Back Air Operations:

(Seymour Topping in The New York Times, 1 March 1964): The Chinese Communist Air Force has cut back severely on its operational and training flights.

The reduction apparently stems from shortages of jet fuel and replacement parts for aging combat aircraft. Both deficiencies are attributed by analysts here to the discontinua­tion of Soviet military aid.

Although the Chinese Communist Army is regarded as capable of effective operations in such neighboring countries as North Vietnam, observers believe that the air force is no longer able to provide good cover against the modern planes of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza­tion.

Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan and patrolling units of the U. S. Seventh Fleet have noted a gradual cutback in coastal flights by Chinese Communist planes. Ob­servers on the mainland have seen jet fighters and bombers massed on airfields but little evidence of large-scale training in the air.

The quality of air personnel is believed to have declined because of inadequate training.

According to one report, shipments of jet fuel to Communist China from the Soviet Union were reduced by 50 per cent in the 1962-63 period.

Soviet export figures for 1963 are not ex­pected to become available until July. Statis­tics for 1962 showed that kerosene shipments to Communist China, presumably of the high- quality type needed for jet fuel, totaled 488 million metric tons. This was a decrease of 24,000 metric tons over the preceding year. A metric ton is equivalent to 2,204 pounds.

It is possible that Peking is attempting to conserve on jet fuel consumption, either to build up a war reserve or simply to avoid expending limited foreign exchange.

The Chinese Communists have been trying to produce jet fuel and high-grade lubricants at a refinery in Lanchow that was supplied under the Soviet aid program.

According to military estimates, the Chi­nese Communist Air Force has grounded or dismantled about 500 aircraft since Moscow stopped supplying replacement parts, prob­ably about 1960. About 200 planes are be­lieved to have been grounded in 1963.

Peking has about 2,300 combat aircraft remaining—1,700 are said to be jet types.

In numbers of planes, the Chinese Com­munist Air Force is still one of the largest in the world, but its Soviet-made fighters and bombers are outdated in comparison with types Moscow is supplying other countries.

There is no indication that Communist China will be able to produce advanced mil­itary aircraft soon, or that it will be able to obtain them from abroad.

Liu Shao-Chi, the Chinese Communist chief of state, was reported during his visit to Indonesia last spring to have inquired about the possibility of obtaining jet fuel and spare parts for MIG jet fighters. The Indonesian Air Force has been equipped with Soviet planes.

Most of the Chinese Communist fighters are of the MIG-15 type, which was first shown in the Soviet Union in 1949, and the MIG-17, a 1954 model. The Chinese forces also include about 60 to 80 supersonic MIG-19s, which were brought out in 1955.

The MIG-21, which Moscow displayed for the first time in 1961, is now standard equip­ment in the Soviet Air Force. It is comparable to the fighter aircraft of Western powers.

Communist China is estimated to have about seven surface-to-air missile bases, and about 300 Ilyushin-28 twin-jet tactical bombers. These bombers were standard models in the Soviet Air Force in 1950.

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