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"USS Bainbridge Is Not the Answer”
(See pages 36-43, January 1964 Proceedings)
Gerald E. Synhorst, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy (Engineer Officer, USS Bainbridge, DLGN-25)—Lieutenant Brandenburg’s article sharply questions our current destroyer construction policy. He has laid his finger firmly on our Navy’s biggest problem: What is to become of the conventional surface Navy? To stand still is to deteriorate; we must advance, but with what ships and in which direction?
Lieutenant Brandenburg makes several assertions concerning the Bainbridge. While she is not “the answer” to the surface warship or even the destroyer dilemma, she certainly supplies some valuable answers to both of these serious problems.
The Bainbridge is a dual-purpose “destroyer leader.” As a destroyer leader she is a bargain. The cost figure given in Lieutenant Brandenburg’s article is misleading. A far more accurate rule of thumb used by friend and foe of nuclear power alike, is that we can have two DI.GNs for the cost of three DLGs. This is possible in the infancy of our surface nuclear-propulsion program. Careful analysis has shown that the added dimension of endurance allowed by nuclear power is well worth the three for two ratio. Despite many a statement to the contrary, the nuclear destroyer can effectively be two places at once—at least she can fulfill more commitments because she can move faster in transit, because her propulsion system is far more reliable, and because of her independence from a fuel train.
Shorn of any public information officer’s glamorous press releases, the many Navy men who envisioned, designed, built, and operated the Bainbridge, need not be too ashamed. On the day she was commissioned, the Bainbridge was materially ready to deploy to any fleet duty. There was a brief period allotted to demonstration of her capabilities and for refresher training, but four months after commissioning the Bainbridge went to the Mediterranean on a normal deployment. Her first Mediterranean deployment was completed without a single material casualty report or a single upkeep period. The Bainbridge’s first scheduled upkeep period came a full nine months after commissioning and was in fact used for very minor typewriter and other portable equipment repairs. In refutation of Lieutenant Brandenburg’s charge of “elaborate systems that seldom work,” it is pointed out that to this date, aside from purposeful machinery derangement for training such as scrams, locked shaft, and the like, the Bainbridge has not had one second at sea during which she was not instantly able to develop maximum allowable shaft horsepower. Very similar statements can be made about her armament, radars, and sonar. In the Bainbridge everything works.
As a DLG, the Bainbridge is a bargain. If the ratio is really three for two as the Navy’s statisticians say it is, the Bainbridge can fulfill commitments at that ratio and come out ahead. No “child in a toy store” designed the Bainbridge. Nor was she subsequently operated to justify some haphazard arrangement of the “goodies” the shipbuilders put together. The Ship Characteristics Board wanted DLGs, not just the Bainbridge but an entire class of them. Except for a few deletions, the ship was delivered exactly as envisioned by the Ship Characteristics Board.
In the Bainbridge, the Ship Characteristics Board got what it asked for and more than it expected. The extreme reliability and readiness actually delivered could hardly have been predicted.
Lieutenant Brandenburg states, “The few ships we could afford to build of the Bain- bridge-class would never be of any true tactical significance ...” Now perhaps the problem has boiled down to whether or not we need DLGs at all. Has the entire series of DLs been a
waste because so small a number causes no loss of sleep among Soviet naval planners?
There are many ways to define a “cruiser.” In days past a “cruiser” as opposed to a destroyer was a ship which could be detached to go on independent missions. She had the fuel capacity and ancillary endurance. She had an armor belt to frustrate torpedos and antiaircraft batteries to protect her from aircraft. The Bainbndge too is equipped for independent missions. Of course the armor belt has been replaced by a first rate sonar and standoff ASW weapons. The anti-aircraft protection is more sophisticated, to keep pace with aircraft developments. No satisfactory yardstick has yet been set down to measure the value of the endurance and ancillary powers of a nuclear-powered DLG.
During her first deployment in the Mediterranean, the Bainbridge, as “a member of the team,” was able to make a considerable contribution to the impressive potency of the Sixth Fleet. Even in the relatively confined areas of the Mediterranean this Fleet is impressive because of its mobility. The Bain- bridge increased that mobility. Numerous examples might be given. Since she was always fueled, she was always ready. When she returned from an assignment she was still ready and could join with a force for renewed operations.
Once it suddenly became necessary to shift the Fleet from one end of the Mediterranean to the other. The nuclear-powered carrier
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Enterprise (CVAN-65), escorted by the Bainbridge, was there two days before the rest of the Fleet. In the wide open operations area of the Seventh Fleet or in the Indian Ocean, the value of a ship such as the Bainbridge would be even more apparent.
Operations of a fast carrier task force against modern submarines and aircraft require ships with the dual capabilities of the Bainbridge. Fast carrier task force operations were no doubt a primary objective in the minds of the Ship Characteristics Board when the current series of DLGs was designed.
Lieutenant Brandenburg was correct in saying we need more ships. Who can contradict that? They are wearing out by tens; we are building by twos. How does he know, though, that the DLGNs are not worth the money spent for them? Has he really weighed the intricate values of a ship such as the Bainbridge to our nation’s defense?
All of us are guilty of demanding economy in that which is not in our ken. Each must perform his function and direct his organization first well and then as thriftily as he can. He must have faith that his fellow naval officer is doing the same. On the other hand, each of us must be unflagging in demanding better and better qualities in the hardware, men, and services we receive from others.
As an example, during the outset of operation of the pioneer nuclear-powered submarine Nautilus, many a capable submariner felt that the extreme cost had ruined the new construction program in submarines, then very small. Comparatively, the cost of the nuclear submarine was high; measured against the value of nuclear submarines to our national defense, it was a bargain. Now we have nuclear submarines in numbers. The nation still feels it was a bargain. Our submarine force is being rejuvenated, and it is stronger than ever. If we have a product we know is good, our very faith and enthusiasm will demonstrate its value and national defense will pay the price.
We must demand quality. Quality once attained speaks for itself. The Navy’s leadership, which decides which ships to build, and the Congressional committees which often dictate that more or fewer ships of a type are built, are keen analytical experts who have learned years ago how to sort out the chaff.
Lieutenant Brandenburg challenges our Navy’s new construction program as to type of ship. The ship he proposes is essentially a single-purpose, new-construction DE such as the Garcia-class (DE-1040), with nuclear power. Our Navy has maintained a continual development program in escort vessels. Of course, we could stop development and build a numerically larger class, although not to his specifications for cost and speed. There are
numerous difficulties and disadvantages:
1. The DE described is not suitable for operation with fast carrier task forces.
2. When we level off and build many ships of a class, as we did with the 2,200-ton destroyer in World War II, development necessarily slows or stops. Presently the submarine is in a period of rapid development. Never have we had a greater need for destroyer experimentation and development to keep pace. We have bought valuable time with the FRAM program.
3. If a DLG such as the Bainbridge has an adequate AAW ability and a reasonably modern ASW capability, how can we possibly split her in two, drive each half at 30 knots, and do it with each new specialized ship costing less
than half the cost of the Bainbridge? Of course, many functions would need be duplicated in each ship. In fact, given two ships at half the cost, the AAW capability, the ASW ability, and the speed would all suffer. On board maintenance and services would decline drastically as they do in smaller ships, and, of course, the more stable platform would be lost.
4. At present, we are heavily committed to active sonar in our ASW systems. To stay apace with submarine advances our transducers have grown larger and the power requirements have gone up. It is becoming more and more difficult to fit these units into a ship of under 4,000 tons and still get a suitable speed.
Lieutenant Brandenburg criticizes the reliability of equipment (“goodies”) in our new construction ships. Although this criticism unjustly hits the Bainbridge in the stomach of her pride, it is a fair criticism of our new construction program as a whole.
In general, our new construction ships have trouble getting to the Fleet after commissioning. Stated shipbuilding costs are actually increased considerably by months of shipyard work after commissioning. Often new construction ships are afloat for years before they are actually deployable. All the while, the 2,200-tonners are numerically holding the line in the Fleet although they are not always equipped in the best manner to meet their more modern adversaries.
The problem is not caused by the different types of equipment—we need their designed
capabilities. The problem, however, does revolve around this equipment in myriad ways: we are not technically competent enough; class A and B schools have not kept pace; shipyard test programs and procedures are archaic and stark relics of a good World War II shipbuilding program. Only small remnants of our shipyard test and inspection organizations remain. Contracts have been let and civilian vendors come in flocks; some are good, many are frauds. On many of our new construction ships, there is no one in uniform capable of passing engineering level judgment on what the technician tells him. Our division officers do not thoroughly understand their equipment. We have failed to maintain the technical bridge between leadership and the equipment we operate. On most of our destroyers our superb technicians are “fleeted up” to officer status and electronic material officer’s jobs; our graduate electrical engineers are administrators who seldom see a schematic diagram. In reality, our own black boxes have nearly destroyed us.
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This problem is with all of us. If we can answer it we will find a large part of Lieutenant Brandenburg’s lost answer. Of course, few of us individually could do better than the Ship Characteristics Board in deciding what type of ship to build and be right. All of us can strive to make these ships operate and help iron out the flaws.
When we build products that contribute materially to our nation’s defense our own pride will show our ships’ worth and perhaps we will be building fleets again.
No one who conceived, built, or operated the Bainbridge ever presumed to believe she was the answer to the Navy’s largest problem. A DLG was requested; a very good DLG was delivered. Everything in the Bainbridge has always operated. Perhaps the way in which this ship was built and commissioned should be studied more carefully by her critics.
The keen insight and clarity of thought displayed by Lieutenant Brandenburg cannot help but impress. This writer can only hope that he and more officers like him may spend their next tour of duty in the Bainbridge and perhaps there find part of their answer.
Eli T. Reich, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Director, Surface Missile System Project)— Lieutenant Brandenburg’s article was most interesting and provocative. It is heartening to see such professional intensity in a junior officer whether or not his theme is valid. In this case, Lieutenant Brandenburg is on solid ground in most respects, but he needs a tour of duty in Washington for orientation to governmental facts of life.
His main idea, many modest ships instead of a few utopian dreadnoughts, has many supporters among senior officers throughout the Navy. The Seahawk project, predicated on this theme, is intended to generate a large family of small ASW ships. But it is desired that these ships also have limited AAW capability. The air threat is just as probable and unpredictable as the submarine threat. No force at sea could be confident of either one problem or the other, so it would have to be prepared for both. Lieutenant Brandenburg’s specialized ships would have to travel in pairs. There is a compromise planned for Seahawk. Those ships will be designed to concentrate on the primary mission of ASW, but there will
be a limited AAW capability as well—other less important mission capabilities will be sacrificed to limit the size, cost, and manpower requirements.
Lieutenant Brandenburg demands that the Navy make a best estimate of the proper ratio of ASW to AAW destroyers for the future, cast it in brass, and proceed at best speed to deliver completely specialized ships in large numbers. This estimating process is a major effort in Washington, and the results are all but maddening. It is not possible to derive the answers with confidence, because the factors in the problem are “soft.” Further, to settle on any iron-clad course of action would be a clear signal for potential enemies to shift their emphasis accordingly. At the end of the proposed 10-year period we would find ourselves out on a limb, frantically trying to crawl back. Lieutenant Brandenburg’s method would be appropriate to planned aggression, but not to the U. S. position of continuing readiness for any contingency.
The call for nuclear power in all combatant ships is well appreciated. The Navy Department is overwhelmingly sold on the inherent virtue of nuclear power, and every possible effort is being made to bring this about. Cost is the obstacle. We have not been able to predict or promise a price which would make nuclear power acceptable to our cost-conscious government. Readers should not conclude that Washington sailors are dedicated to black oil as the best ship fuel.
Finally, Lieutenant Brandenburg is asking for utopia in “black boxes.” Reliability, maintainability, and operational effectiveness have always been the goals of the material bureaus, and the Navy is not ten years behind industry in techniques. Every new item of equipment absorbs enormous amounts of money in its development. We are paying industry to advance technology on our behalf. We do not dictate antique designs or brush aside new ideas. We want the latest and best, but we also want it proven before it is sent to the operating forces at sea.
Officers like Lieutenant Brandenburg are needed and wanted in the “front office.” His zest for progress and effectiveness would make him an asset to any Navy Department activity. Men with ideas and the ability to express them are precious. However, Lieutenant
Brandenburg would probably modify his article considerably if he had the experience of several years in the Pentagon or material bureaus of the Navy.
Eugene M. Avallone, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Brandenburg has detailed the Navy’s dire need for an inexpensive nuclear-powered destroyer quite well. Freeing future task force destroyers of the frequent necessity for fueling is indeed an ultimate objective of the Navy. Beyond this point, his article is poorly organized, and his recommendations are based on poor knowledge of ship design and a definite lack of understanding of costs involved and different requirements for ASW and AAW weapons space. The problems which he believes can be overcome to achieve his fully-automated, nuclear-powered, mass-produced destroyer for 25 million dollars have been the subject of intense Navy studies for years. It is surprising that the Proceedings could allow an article with so many glaring errors to be published.
Consider first the author’s recommendation to build a nuclear-powered destroyer of 4,500 tons. Studies conducted by the Navy have revealed that a nuclear plant in a destroyer-size hull would only be capable of producing about 12,000 shaft horsepower, and be about twice as expensive as an oil-fired ship of the same dimensions. Consider the Navy’s Charles F. Adams-class (DDG-2) destroyers which are oil fired and have cost approximately 38 million dollars each. These same ships with nuclear power might cost about 76 million dollars. With only 12,000 horsepower, they would have the endurance of a nuclear plant at speeds below 20 knots. This is not acceptable, for a destroyer-type ship must be capable of at least 30 knots to meet her operational requirements.
Why does a destroyer need so much power? Above 15 knots, a surface ship must overcome wave resistance which the ship generates at higher speeds. In going from 25 knots to 30 knots, a Granny-class (DD-710) destroyer requires a doubling of power to overcome the increased wave resistance being generated. The author used the submarine as an example to support his arguments for a mass-produced destroyer costing 25 million dollars. He over-
looked an important item. When submerged, a submarine is not subjected to wave drag. Therefore the power-versus-speed curve for the submarine is not as steep as that for the destroyer; a submarine requires less power for higher speeds than does a destroyer. Therefore, a much smaller, and somewhat cheaper power plant is required for the nuclear submarine to achieve high sustained speeds. With present reactor technology, a 4,500-ton nuclear-powered destroyer capable of achieving 30 knots is not possible. Of course, when a reactor is developed to fit into a destroyer-size hull, and to propel it at 30 knots, one step in the author’s case will have been achieved. When this will happen is difficult to determine. In the meantime, Bainbridge-size “destroyers” are the smallest size available with nuclear power.
The second major area of criticism concerns the author’s statement that: “Elimination of unnecessary system redundancy and use of multi-purpose high-volume, data processing systems will minimize, or eliminate, the manual plotting and bookkeeping functions which are so wasteful of manpower.” Well stated indeed! The Navy has been working diligently to achieve such systems for quite some time. When we do achieve this automatic ship some time in the future who will maintain it? We are faced with a critical shortage of trained technicians in the Navy. The fact that the author’s ideas are in full agreement with present Navy planning does not overcome the many years of development work still left before the fully automated ship becomes a reality.
With the present high costs of nuclear ships, one Bainbridge may be worth three oil fired DDGs. But the Bainbridge is an all-purpose ship, which does not have to be refueled during operations, and which has a sustained speed of 30 knots. Consider also the reduction in costs as the second, third and subsequent ships are built. The DLGN-35 is expected to cost 135 million dollars. Will a third DLGN be cheaper? Savings in costs have been achieved by building many submarines of a class. If a cost in the neighborhood of 100 million dollars is achieved, will a DLGN class then be considered to be worthwhile? Yes—particularly if the total number of ships required by the Navy is reduced.
"Wanted: An Effective ASW Ship”
(See pages 106-108, July 1963, and pages 109-111 February 1964 Proceedings)
Theodore F. Driggers, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy (Fleet ASW School, San Diego)—I must take issue with Lieutenant Commander Martin. It is he who must face the facts, not Lieutenant Brandenburg. No one can deny his statement that the U. S. Navy is building guided-missile destroyers at a rapid rate (consistent with the large costs involved). However, the simple fact that we are so doing is not a valid justification in itself.
The fact is that the Royal Australian Navy is procuring DDGs primarily for an AAW capability. If one of them obtained a sonar contact, she would probably turn and run, because the Australian Navy could not afford to lose such a large investment.
The fact is the Royal Canadian Navy has cancelled its DDG program. They rightly determined 60 million dollars is too much for the capability returned.
The fact is the Soviet Union does not have an ASW problem. Effective countering of the Polaris submarine is an unsolvable problem for the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union does not depend on maritime commerce, and consequently does not have an escort problem in wartime. The Allies on the other hand, cannot wage a successful non-nuclear war without control of the seas. The Soviet Navy —with the notable exception of its submarine force—is strictly a defensive force to protect the homeland, a concept Russia has used throughout history. Therefore they are justified in construction of a general purpose destroyer with a limited ASW capability.
To the question “Is the HUK group still a valid organization?” the only answer is an unqualified yes. Lieutenant Commander Martin dismisses the conventional submarine with a shrug of his shoulders. A quick perusal of Jane's and a reasonable estimate of Soviet shipbuilding capabilities would show that, although the nuclear submarine is undoubtedly a problem, the predominant threat for several years to come will be the conventionally powered submarine.
Aircraft have become better ASW vehicles than have destroyers. The only advantages the destroyer enjoys are endurance and plotting/command facilities, and the latter advantage has all but disappeared with the advent of aircraft plotting facilities such as the ASN-30 and doppler radar navigation. Lieutenant Commander Martin attributes great technological advances to the submarine, but seems to forget that our aircraft have also made great strides in underwater detection, classification, and destruction of submarines. The facts are that ASW aircraft are essential to the support of convoys, amphibious operations, and strike groups, and that land-based patrol aircraft will not always be available in the numbers required. Thus the HUK group concept is still valid.
To say that the first indication of the presence of a nuclear (or any other) submarine is the explosion of a torpedo is a negative attitude to say the least. If our “Johnny-on-the- spot” ASW forces cannot find him before he shoots, how can they expect to find him after he shoots?
Lieutenant Commander Martin’s objection to the suggested training plan is the easy way out. All he is saying is that he cannot see a solution. The fact is a good ASW ship must think ASW, eat ASW, and sleep ASW. I suggest that Lieutenant Commander Martin take a really close look at the ASW readiness of the “general purpose” destroyers of his flotilla. What he finds might surprise him, if his evaluation is based on valid criteria—all too often such evaluations are not.
The only part of his commentary I can agree with is his placing quotation marks around the word “destroyers” in the last sentence. Our general purpose, 8,000-ton “destroyer” is a white elephant when it comes to ASW. Anyone who thinks these multi-million dollar ships will not be prime submarine targets is living in a dream world. History has proven that ASW is a war of attrition, and no evidence exists that conditions have changed. We need a cheap, simple, and specialized ASW ship that can be easily mass produced if the need arises. We do need
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^Better Things for Better Uvmg... thro ugh Chemistry j general purpose destroyers—I am not arguing against them—but in addition we sorely need specialized ASW ships.
The thinking embodied in this article is typical of the “general purpose” commanding officers of our “general purpose” destroyers, and is undoubtedly a major contributing factor to our present low state of ASW readiness.
William D. Hohmann, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy (Fleet ASW School, San Diego)— Lieutenant Commander Martin would have us fall in and count cadence as he leads us to a fantasy land of bigger and better destroyers. The continued construction of guided missile destroyers by the U. S. Navy does not mean that our destroyer program is unimpeachable, but rather that a closer look is required at the returns we can expect. The dependence on the bigger and better destroyer has done much to solve our ASW problems at the expense of our ASW effort. Past experience proves that not even two DDGs could provide as much screen protection as three of Lieutenant Brandenburg’s 25-million-dollar DEs.
As for following the lead of other navies in constructing DDGs, we must look behind the obvious as expounded by Lieutenant Commander Martin and find the need that prompted their action. No one will deny the need for AAW, least of all those who would plan for ASW operations. One has only to seek the true reason, the need for AAW defense, to understand the building decisions made by the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. They have not surrendered their single purpose ASW destroyer concept. They have only admitted to the need for an AAW vessel. The Canadians, for reasons of economy, have shelved their plans to build a DDG. It was not their intention, however, to replace their St. Laurent-class ships which are effective, single purpose vessels.
The Soviet Navy has a definite need for the AAW capability in destroyers. The Soviets must defend the heartland against strike aircraft and amphibious invasions. The United States, on the other hand, has missions from convoying merchantmen, carrying out amphibious landings, to protecting strike groups. In every operation, the U. S. Navy’s opponent, no matter where, is the high performance submarine. The submarine is not just one opponent in all these various operations, it is the primary opponent and must be met by effective ASW ships.
There is no navy in the world whose commitments are more numerous or varied than ours. It is here, in the area of fulfilling commitments that Lieutenant Commander Martin strikes at the heart of the issue under consideration. In order to appreciate the problem, one need only picture the limited numbers of overworked, undermanned, “can do” destroyers, belching black smoke as they pound from one trouble spot to the next. We ust do not have enough ships.
While it is true that during peacetime we have fewer active ships available, it will also be true that during wartime we will have fewer active ships available, especially if we continue to build DLGs at 74 million dollars per copy. If we were to build the smaller, cheaper, package destroyers that Lieutenant Brandenburg offers, there would be more ships to handle the many commitments assigned to our surface forces.
Contrary to what Lieutenant Commander Martin says, we now employ destroyers in specialized duty with HUK groups. We have found this to be very effective not only in the historical past—namely the successful ASW forces of Admiral Sir Max Horton and Captain Frederick Walker—but also in our present operations, in home and foreign waters. Scheduling problems notwithstanding, I am sure we will continue to utilize this employment of destroyers because it has proven to be worthwhile.
Any attempt to invalidate the HUK group concept is not only erroneous, but dangerous, and could lead to the downfall of the most potent ASW forces ever to sortie. The day of the classic “Seek and Destroy” HUK group is gone. It is the safe and timely arrival of a supported merchant convoy, an escorted amphibious invasion group, or a protected strike group that is the mission of the ASW Support Group today.
The support group at sea will have to fight the ASW battle much in the way that Lieutenant Commander Martin would deny. To believe that the Soviet submariner, or any submariner, will not do everything that Lieutenant Commander Martin disavows is to believe heresy. A submariner will do anything he thinks he can get away with—just ask one!
We must not lose sight that our primary ASW opponent is, and will be for the predictable future, the diesel-electric submarine, not the nuclear submarine. Both can be beaten by effective ASW forces composed of ships and aircraft in adequate numbers. A Leahy-class DLG-frigate, no matter how capable and flexible, can only be in one place at one time—while three of Lieutenant Brandenburg’s 24-million-dollar destroyers could be in three places at one time.
Seymour Dombroff, Captain, U. S. Navy (Staff, ASW Force Atlantic)—Lieutenant Commander Martin devotes a considerable portion of his letter to developing the thesis that HUK groups are no longer effective in antisubmarine warfare. He thereby joins the ranks of those who see specific types of ASW forces now operational as either panaceas or as millstones in our ASW effort. In this connection, the pages of the Proceedings have carried brief arguments for nuclear SSKs and sonar equipped carriers, and commentary against destroyers.
The fact of the matter is that our best ASW effort continues to be a team effort. Each team member—patrol aircraft, SSK or HUK group—has unique capabilities which can be effectively brought to bear, either in concert with those of other forces, or by themselves, in a particular operational situation.
The problem with antisubmarine warfare is that no one can predict the precise manner in which it will be fought. Lieutenant Commander Martin addresses himself to the HUK group vis-a-vis protection of a convoy. But what about protection of a carrier striking force, or defense of an amphibious objective area, or countering a submarine-launched missile threat? Who envisioned the submarine aspects of our naval operations in the Cuban operation in 1962?
To relate the capabilities of a HUK group of World War II to a contemporary ASW unit such as Task Group Alfa would be roughly analogous to making a comparison between World War II submarines and those of today. The modern HUK group possesses an arsenal of vehicles, sensors, and weapons which were
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The path to more effective ASW is to improve what we have and to increase our forces; it is not by eliminating any member of the team.
One Staff Too Many?
Jack O. Johnson, Captain, U. S. Naval Reserve—It is said that no man can serve two masters. In somewhat the same vein, should a top executive have two staffs?
The organization for National Defense is clearly defined by law, at least in the upper echelons. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense. The important roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not degrade the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of Defense as the top executive in the entire structure of the armed forces of the United States.
The Secretary of Defense must have a top- notch staff to assist him in making decisions, as does every high-level executive in business and industry. The increasing complexity of science and technology, as well as the larger role of the government in business, has made the “staff technique” of greater necessity than ever before. More use of staff support, however, still requires a top executive to exercise his best judgment regarding good or poor staff work.
During the early days of the National Security Act of 1947, the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, relied to a great extent upon the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist him in reaching important military decisions. During subsequent years, the trend has been for the Secretary to build up a separate staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, referred to as the OSD staff. The Department of Defense telephone directory indicates by its listing—more than 450 entries—that the OSD staff has become substantially large. Thus the Secretary of Defense receives staff support from two bodies: the Joint Staff and the OSD staff. This unique circumstance has no known equal in business or industry.
No doubt the present Secretary of Defense has considered this situation but has not yet reached a firm decision. In a speech last year, he discussed the tough job of decision-making and made a passing reference to this issue by saying:
It is only in the third area, the problem of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of our military establishment, that controversy has developed. Not that there was much disagreement about the need; for years everyone who has thought seriously about the DOD has felt that major improvements were needed. . . . Thus, there was a national consensus that reforms were in order. ... No single speech can do justice to the full complexity of defense decision-making. . . . We are interested in saving money, in alleviating economic hardships from base closings and the like, in sound military-civilian relations, in the whole range of issues which tend to dominate the headlines.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff report to the Secretary of Defense, and, by law, a Joint Staff not to exceed 400 officers from the military services is authorized to assist the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary. It goes without saying that almost every recommendation the Joint Chiefs submit to Mr. McNamara has been carefully considered by the
Joint Staff. On the basis of such a recommendation, the Secretary has the capability of reaching an immediate decision, unless he wishes the matter to be considered also by the OSD staff.
The OSD staff, so it is believed, has grown to increased stature and prestige under the present administration. The large roles played by Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) have been well publicized. Perhaps responsible persons in the administration can point to solid and logical reasons why the OSD staff has assumed larger importance, while that of the Joint Staff has appeared simultaneously to decline.
The two staffs do not have altogether duplicative functions. However, it is publicly known that the same matter or business frequently is studied by both staffs, with different resulting recommendations reaching the Secretary. Such a system may have some elements of merit, especially in peacetime when time is “not of the essence” and when care must be taken for a thorough appraisal of the issue at hand.
Criticism in this area is a favorite Pentagon pastime. Some point to the tendency of the Joint Staff to water down its recommendations to the lowest common denominator—to reach a compromise recommendation on which all the services can agree. Others speak “down their noses” at the bright young men in OSD who are supposedly adept at military matters without ever having donned a uniform or fired a weapon in combat.
Having spent two years in the Joint Staff, I can assert with assurance that this body is a most important one in supporting National Defense. Likewise, one can also conclude there is highly effective work being performed in the OSD staff, which is composed of civilian and military elements. Assume for the moment that these two staffs, individually considered, are of great worth. The fundamental question remains as to whether a two- staff system at this high level is best for the
Department of Defense and for the nation.
The two-staff system is not an ideal solution for the following reasons: (1) it is not economical, particularly the duplicative aspects, such as the manpower and personnel function; (2) processing of wartime problems would require excessive time, particularly when they are considered tandem-wise by the two staffs; (3) petty differences and jealousies result between certain elements of the two staffs; (4) such a system tends to prevent close and harmonious teamwork between various military and civilian elements throughout the Department of Defense; (5) the Secretary increases his problem of maintaining high morale throughout the Armed Forces, as it appears that he is constantly weighing the “military” judgment against the “civilian” judgment; and (6) the results furnish grist for Congressional criticism and among the public at large.
The Department of Defense for the foreseeable future will be composed of numerous uniformed and civilian personnel. The expanding frontiers of science and technology, with various military applications, demand the assistance of bright young men from our institutions of higher learning who for various reasons do not enter active military duty. Also, U. S. casualties in the jungles and rice paddies of South Vietnam are evidence that we still need the man who will carry a rifle in defense of our nation and its vital interests. All of this calls for the closest possible teamwork between various organizations and assigned personnel.
Two possible solutions appear available to correct the deficiences of the two-staff sys- stem: eliminate either the Joint Staff or the OSD staff, or meld the two into one group.
The latter alternative can be accomplished, and should be brought to fruition as soon as possible. It will bring greater economy, improve efficiency, develop team spirit, increase morale, and assist the Secretary in the difficult job of decision-making.
The cure will be painful, but it will be worth it to get rid of the illness.
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