The United States has possessed a powerful two-ocean Navy since World War II, but unfortunately mankind does not live on a two-ocean world. East of Africa and west of Australia lies the third largest body of water in the world—the Indian Ocean. This area is currently characterized by a power vacuum. Eventually either the Free World or the Sino-Soviet bloc will fill that vacuum.
Our nation needs a strategy that will negate Communist influence over nations bordering the Indian Ocean. A specific course of action to support such a strategy is for the United States to construct, by nuclear means when feasible, a canal through the Isthmus of Kra. Such a canal would improve U. S. naval reaction posture for contingencies in the Indian Ocean; such a canal would enhance the American image through the peaceful use of atomic energy. It would also benefit all nations engaged in maritime commerce.
The idea of building a canal across the Kra Isthmus is not new. The Japanese were interested in the project prior to World War II as a means of avoiding the British naval base at Singapore. After the occupation of that stronghold by Japanese forces in 1942, however, their need for a Kra canal diminished, and the project died a natural death.
The idea of using atomic energy for canal construction is relatively new—new enough not to have been attempted, yet old enough to have been considered and studied in some detail. Scientists and engineers were quick to realize the potential application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but such practical application of nuclear weapons as a commercial explosive must await development of a relatively “clean bomb.” This will one day be a reality. There are only a few remaining areas in the world where construction of a canal with nuclear explosives would be both feasible and suitable. The Isthmus of Panama is one such area, the Kra Isthmus another. A canal already exists in Panama. Thus it would seem logical first to build a Kra canal before providing world shipping with a second Panama canal. There are also political and psychological advantages to be gained by constructing the world’s first atomic-conceived, sea-level canal in an area where U. S. interests are not quite so obvious as in Panama.
Although Major George Fielding Eliot was not advocating construction of a Kra Isthmus canal, he was presenting an excellent argument for it when he wrote: “Our Indian Ocean strategy cannot be founded, as was the British, by American presence on its shores, but rather by American access when and as required. ...” This can best be illustrated by comparison of the approximate nautical miles between Manila, Philippine Islands, and Calcutta, India:
via Sunda Strait..................... 3,718
via Straits of Malacca............. 2,979
via Kra Isthmus (proposed) ... 2,300
The Kra Isthmus route improves access time to the Indian Ocean by almost three days for a 10-knot convoy as compared to the Malacca route. Comparison with the Sunda route is, naturally, even more favorable.
Shortened sea distances and improved naval reaction times are not the only considerations favoring the Kra Isthmus route over either the Straits of Malacca or Sunda Strait. The political alignment of the nation dominating these waterways must also be taken into account. Integration of Soviet armament into Indonesian military forces, during recent years, has been viewed with apprehension by the United States. It is possible that, if prevailing conditions in Indonesia do not change drastically, Western sea power domination of the Straits of Malacca and the Sunda Strait may soon end.
The preoccupation of the Soviet Union with Indonesia must, at least in part, be associated with these strategic waterways. A canal through the Kra Isthmus would degrade the current strategic value of the Straits of Malacca and Sunda Strait. Perhaps some of the Soviet interest in Indonesia would diminish in the process.
The 1963 visit to Indonesia by the Soviet Minister of Defense R. Y. Malinovsky, coincided with rumors that the Soviet Union was helping Indonesia build naval and air bases in the Natuna Islands. These islands are located in the South China Sea about 300 miles from Singapore. They are well situated to control the flow of maritime traffic through the Straits of Malacca, which are at least partially Indonesian territorial waters. Perhaps Indonesia might later decide that the passage of American warships through the Straits of Malacca is a violation of Indonesian “neutrality.” Indonesia’s denying the Straits of Malacca to the United States sounds a bit ludicrous at first. A few years ago, however, the thought of Cuban jets attacking American ships off the Florida coast would have been equally ludicrous. A few years before that, no one would have considered creditable the idea that Arabs would be controlling the Suez Canal.
The Isthmus of Kra, part of Thailand, is a narrow strip of land joining the Malayan Peninsula to Southeast Asia. Initially, it would be appropriate to examine the political alignment of its landowner nation. Thailand is unique in Southeast Asia; it was never a European colony. This may account in part for its politically stable government. Since World War II, Thailand’s foreign policies have generally paralleled those of the United States. Thailand is a strong supporter of the United Nations and was one of the first to offer armed forces to the U. N. Command during the Korean War. The nation is probably the most enthusiastic member-nation of SEATO and is strongly anti-Communist. Thailand has consistently voted against seating Communist China in the U. N. and stands solidly with the West against the Soviet Union in the Cold War. In fact, the main point of contention between Thailand and the United States concerns refusal of the United States to take more aggressive action against Communists in Laos and Cambodia. Because of resultant economic advantages, it is a fair assumption that Thailand would agree to construction of a Kra Isthmus canal. It is also a fair assumption that Thailand’s alignment with the United States would be strengthened after completion of such a project.
Construction of the Kra canal need not be a bilateral arrangement between the United States and Thailand. This concept, however, does have considerable merit. Thailand owns the real estate; we possess the technology. On the other hand, there are some advantages to be gained from multilateral sponsorship of the Kra canal. United Nations participation in the project might help to ensure perpetual international concern for the canal after its completion. Such concern should reduce or eliminate sticky entanglements similar to those experienced over the Suez and Panama Canals. Also, the expense of a Kra canal could be financed with a loan from the World Bank if the project were undertaken in the name of the United Nations.
On 29 March 1963, from its headquarters in Bangkok, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) updated the Kra Canal picture by reporting that “ECAFE has thus far had no connection with any of the plans for the construction of Kra Isthmus canal, but the Thai Government has recently been negotiating about such a possibility with a Japanese commercial concern. ...”
Thailand has acknowledged the desirability of a Kra canal for many years. During the reign of King Rama VI (1910-1925), negotiations were supposedly undertaken with a French concessionaire for the purpose of digging the canal. However, the Thai foreign advisers ultimately did not sanction these negotiations. Immediately prior to World War II, London newspapers were full of stories of the “Kra Legend” concerning Japanese efforts to dig a canal through the Isthmus. These stories were based on rumors, however, since no actual construction was ever commenced. At that time, the difficulties of pushing a canal through the 33 miles of rock, swamp, and jungle were considered too formidable. Actually the Isthmus is only about 15 miles wide from Khlong Chumphon river in the east to the Pakchan River in the west. Both rivers, however, would have required dredging as neither could be navigated by ocean-going ships. The maximum elevation along this route is only 230 feet at a pass in the center of the Isthmus.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) is currently engaged in determining the feasibility of engineering projects similar to the Kra canal. The over-all program for testing peaceful applications of thermonuclear energy is named Plowshare. In 1963, the AEC released photos and information on Project Sedan, which is part of the Plowshare program. Project Sedan called for exploding a 100-kiloton hydrogen bomb 635 feet below the surface of the Nevada desert. This detonation left a crater 320 feet deep and 1,280 feet in diameter. In only three seconds, 7.5 million cubic yards of earth weighing 12 million tons were moved. Intense radioactivity was confined to the immediate area, and workers were able to return to the crater’s lip within five days.
This ability to move huge quantities of earth without experiencing large amounts of radioactivity made project Sedan an outstanding success. Based on this success, AEC scientists envision a bright future for the peaceful uses of thermonuclear energy. They have estimated that harbors and canals can be built in about one-half the time and for about one-third the cost required by conventional methods. The AEC reported to Congress that they would be able to undertake major earth-moving jobs in about ten years.
This article cannot present detailed engineering considerations for constructing an Isthmus canal. However, such a canal proposal must be supported with more substantiation than vague references to nuclear power potentials. Literature on nuclear-explosive canal construction techniques is sparse; there is even less background on the construction of a Kra Isthmus canal. When the two subjects are combined, however, there is complete absence of any information.
From 13 to 15 May 1959, the second Plowshare symposium was held at San Francisco, California. At that time certain thought- provoking engineering studies were presented, among which was a treatise on the “Excavation of a Sea-Level Ship Canal.” These studies were subsequently published by the AEC, and a brief of this material will be used as a supporting argument for the feasibility of constructing a Kra Isthmus canal. One study presented by L. J. Vortman of the Sandia Corporation, a private research organization, concerned itself solely with Panama Canal considerations. However, the Isthmus of Kra is similar to the Isthmus of Panama in size, environment, geological make-up, and climate. Therefore, it is reasoned that Mr. Vort- man’s material is sufficiently compatible for the purpose intended.
A definite requirement exists to compare nuclear excavation with conventional methods in order to comprehend properly relative advantages and disadvantages. One inevitable comparison must be total cost. For this purpose, the following AEC-furnished information on the cost of nuclear explosive devices is pertinent. An explosion which provides: (a) a few kilotons (fission) costs one-half a million dollars; (b) a few tens of kilotons (fission) costs three-quarters of a million dollars; or (c) several megatons (5 per cent fission; 95 per cent fusion) costs one million dollars.
These service charges could be reduced by the AEC if a large number of devices were required. Therefore, the above should be considered maximum prices; any cost deviation would be a reduction. From the above AEC- quoted service charges, some rough calculations can be made immediately. Since it requires one kiloton of energy to excavate about 100,000 cubic yards of earth, it would cost about five dollars per yard for a project using kiloton devices, but only 1 cent/yard for a project using megaton devices. Strictly from a cost consideration, it thus appears that nuclear energy will be competitive with chemical explosives, especially when it is used for enormous excavation projects such as a canal.
To pursue canal-cost comparisons, it is necessary to ascertain the cost of conventional construction methods. A 1947 U. S. government study estimated 2.5 billion dollars as the cost of converting the present Panama Canal to a sea-level canal. It also estimated the cost of constructing a new sea-level canal in the Isthmus of Panama along various routes. The 59-mile-long Sasardi-Morti version of the Caledonia route was of particular interest. It had a maximum elevation of 1,100 feet and would require 1.9 billion cubic yards of excavation for a sea-level canal. The estimated cost for this conventional construction project was 5.1 billion dollars, based on the 1947 purchasing power of the dollar (to give a basis for a later price comparison with nuclear construction costs for a similar canal).
Although several routes were thought suitable for atomic construction, the Sandia Corporation considered the Sasardi-Morti version of the Caledonia route the best for nuclear-excavation techniques. One consideration for this choice was the 100-mile separation from the population concentration around the present Panama Canal. The Sasardi-Morti route, as envisioned in 1947, would follow valley bottoms and require only a minimum of excavation.
Using nuclear techniques, the Panama Canal could be easily straightened. Channel dimensions used for the Sandia Corporation study are 600 feet in width and 60 feet in depth. These dimensions actually represent a bonus in channel depth over present Panama Canal dimensions, a bonus inherent with nuclear excavation techniques.
There are fundamental and unique considerations relating to the possible future use of nuclear explosives for canal construction. For instance, if nuclear explosives are used to construct a canal, it must be a sea-level canal rather than one with locks. Lock-type canal construction methods are not compatible with the basic concepts of atomic excavation procedures for two reasons: a canal constructed by nuclear means would be too deep and too wide for locks; and the nuclear detonations would shatter underlying rock foundation, thereby precluding their use as support for the locks. In conventional excavation work, the purpose of explosives is to loosen the earth to facilitate its later removal by mechanical means. This removal is what takes most of the time, energy, and money. If comparable- strength nuclear explosives were simply substituted for chemical explosives, without a change of methodology, no benefits would accrue. Excavation by nuclear means, however, would allow for instantaneous and simultaneous removal operations. The blast that loosens the earth also removes it from the excavation area. It is this consideration that makes excavation by nuclear means so attractive when compared with conventional excavation methods. Obviously, the atom can best be employed only on big projects, and the bigger the better.
Digging a canal with nuclear detonations can eventually be accomplished by two different methods. The first is by a large number of small, “clean” bombs—let us call this the “minimum total yield” method; the second method is by a lesser number of larger, “dirtier” bombs—let us call this the “low total cost” method. These two techniques are diametrically opposed to one another, as can be seen by the following comparison:
Minimum Total Yield |
|
Low Total Cost |
High |
Cost |
Low |
Low |
Yield |
High |
High |
Per cent of fission |
Low |
Minimum |
Blast problem |
Maximum |
An IBM 704 computer was used to determine excavation costs of the minimum total yield method for the Sasardi-Morti route. Charges were spaced so that a channel without noticeable cusps would be formed. Results of these computations were as follows:
Total yield |
42 MT |
Total number of devices |
651 |
Total length of placement shafts |
119,250 ft. |
AEC charges for devices |
505 million dollars |
Cost of placement shafts $300/ft. |
36 million dollars |
Total cost |
541 million dollars |
This figure of 541 million dollars is for excavation only. To obtain the total cost for the entire construction project, many other factors must be considered. This can be done by taking ancillary figures from the 1947 survey and modifying them to fit the current situation. When this is done, it is possible to make a cost comparison between conventional and nuclear techniques. The comparison indicates a savings of over three billion dollars on a five-billion-dollar-project when nuclear excavation techniques are used.
This enormous savings is realized primarily on the cost of excavation, which for conventional methods was 3.325 billion dollars as compared to the nuclear excavation cost of 541 million dollars. This is a savings of 84 per cent for excavation alone. For cleaning, harbor improvements, flood control, power, highways, tunnels, utilities, sanitation, medical operating facilities, and townsites, 1.2 billion dollars was estimated for both conventional and nuclear methods. Adding engineering and overhead costs brings the grand total to 5.1 billion dollars for conventional methods as compared to 2.1 billion dollars for nuclear methods.
In many respects, atomic excavation techniques promise some surprising and seemingly contradictory results. As we have seen, often it is more expensive to construct a narrow canal than a wide one, because of the relative inexpensiveness of large-yield devices compared to low-yield ones. It is characteristic of nuclear explosives that large projects produce the greatest savings. As previously stated, the excavation cost for the proposed 59-mile Sasardi-Morti route would be 541 million dollars for a 600-foot-wide channel. To decrease this channel to a width of 500 feet, the excavation cost would increase to 567 million dollars. To increase the channel to a width of 700 feet, the excavation cost would decrease to 513 million dollars.
Thus far, only the minimum-yield method has been discussed. For completeness, a brief consideration of the low-cost method should be made. Larger bombs require deeper shafts. The cost of these shafts is one of the limiting factors for the low-cost method. For the Sasardi-Morti route, if no device was used with a yield smaller than 200 kilotons, the excavation cost would be 239 million dollars. If no yield smaller than 4,000 kilotons was employed, the excavation costs would be reduced to 87 million dollars. These costs compare very favorably to the 541 million dollars for the minimum-yield method where the smallest device is 10 kilotons. It is apparent that appreciable savings can be realized if the low-cost method is used. It should be remembered, however, that there are very few locations where such large yields could be detonated. Also, the low-cost method would produce an irregular canal with cusps instead of the smooth one produced by the minimum-yield method. There is no compulsion to use either the low-cost method or the minimum-yield method exclusive of one another. The Sandia Corporation, which computed all the previous cost factors, considered only the extremes for the purpose of emphasis. A practical engineer would undoubtedly use some compromise between the two that would depend on local conditions.
The Sandia study on the excavation of a sea-level ship canal indicates a promising future for nuclear techniques. There is no known reason why, in ten to 20 years time, these nuclear techniques could not be employed in the Kra Isthmus as well as in the Isthmus of Panama. The cost figures for the Sasardi-Morti route should be applicable by analogy to a similar route across the Kra Isthmus. The main difference between the two is that the Kra route should be significantly cheaper (even considering added transportation costs owing to its remoteness from the United States), since the distance across the Kra Isthmus is less than across the Isthmus of Panama, and the maximum elevation is considerably less.
The proposed Kra canal deserves careful and detailed study by the U. S. Government. Like most proposals of such magnitude, it is blessed with obvious advantages and cursed with inherent disadvantages. Let us summarize these negative and positive aspects.
Nays. Foremost among the apparent negative considerations is the cost of initial construction, which would require long-term financing by either the World Bank or the United States. There might be a time lag before revenue from tolls would make the canal sufficiently profitable to commence repayment of construction costs. In a project of this proportion, financial considerations must always be paramount.
Possible diplomatic repercussions closely follow the financial considerations in importance. Great Britain has objected to a Kra canal in the past as a threat to Singapore’s commerce, and although she has lost all of her Malayan colonies, she might still object. Without doubt, both the Soviet Union and Indonesia would also protest a Kra canal, since it would reduce the importance of both the Straits of Malacca and Sunda Strait. An additional political consideration must be Thailand itself. A valuable Isthmus canal within its borders would increase Thailand’s attractiveness as a target for Communist conquest. Also to be considered are the consequences of U. S. participation; instituted on a no-strings-attached basis, it could serve as an incentive for the Republic of Panama to make even greater demands concerning the Panama Canal. There might be as much political and diplomatic pressure against a Kra canal as there would be favoring it. Naturally, these pressures would come from sources promoting their own self-interests and would have to be weighed against U. S. national interests.
Technical difficulties should also be considered. Although Project Plowshare indicated the feasibility of constructing an isthmus canal by nuclear techniques, there is no practical engineering experience in this field and none will exist until it is done for the first time—several years hence at the earliest. Serious mistakes might occur that could have frightening consequences. In addition to the nuclear aspects, there is the adverse tropical climate of the Kra Isthmus, similar to that experienced when constructing the Panama Canal. There would be many technical problems which would have to be considered as challenges, not as barriers.
Yeas. The primary importance of the proposed Kra canal is its strategic significance for improving the military posture of the United States. This would be accomplished by enhancing the Seventh Fleet’s capability to react speedily to contingencies in the Indian Ocean. The shortened distance through the Kra Isthmus would improve time and space factors. The potentially unfriendly waters of the Straits of Malacca and Sunda Strait could be bypassed when and if desired. Greater freedom of action would be allowed by increasing the options of routes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Soviet naval strategy relating to the world’s strategic waterways would require modification.
On the diplomatic front, improved relations between Thailand and the United States could be expected. U. S. prestige would be enhanced by this peaceful application of atomic energies; Soviet engineering prestige would be degraded by comparison.
Economic considerations favor such a project as the Kra canal. It is a type of aid that can be furnished on a loan rather than a grant basis, since revenue from tolls would eventually pay for the canal. Finally, techniques learned while constructing the Kra canal could be refined to reduce the cost of building another canal through Central America or possible canals elsewhere.
In today’s complex world, there is no sharp delineation between military strategy, international politics, and economic competition between nations. Actions taken to further our national interests must be a blend of all these essential ingredients. The proposal to construct a Kra Isthmus canal by nuclear techniques contains all essential military, economic, and political ingredients. It is a dynamic concept worthy of full consideration by the Naval Establishment.