If the line officer’s raison d'être is the effective employment of weapons at sea against the enemy, and if the Navy’s primary mission today is antisubmarine warfare, it follows that a substantial number of our destroyer officers should be ASW experts. They are not.
In the average ASW destroyer today, the commanding officer has only a vague idea of the tactical capabilities and limitations of his ASW weapons. He has a passing acquaintance with oceanography, but is at a loss to discuss its implications regarding sonar performance much beyond the level of layer depth. He knows there are tactical procedures for co-ordinating his ship’s operations with those of ASW aircraft, but he is not sure which ones apply to which type of aircraft. He knows that ASW aircraft sometimes employ sonobuoys, but he does not know the characteristics of the more common types, or at what distances his ship’s noise is likely to interfere with them. He is aware that enemy submarines probably have electronic intercept equipment, but is uncertain as to the range at which an enemy submarine could detect his ship’s electronic emissions. He knows neither the launch geometry required by his ASW torpedoes nor their acquisition ranges. He knows that ASW helicopters have dipping sonars, but is not familiar with their capabilities relative to his own ship’s sonar; and so it goes—on and on and on.
A great danger exists in that this condition is not readily discernible by the untrained peacetime observer. Being ill-experienced in ASW in peacetime, the commanding officer depends upon his Operadons, Weapons and ASW Officers to keep him tactically informed on a demand basis. He relies on being able to confer with these subordinates whenever the situation warrants. And sure enough, before each ASW exercise in which his ship is involved, the captain meets with his officers to discuss the problem at hand, and to decide on the best way to approach it. The tactical publications are researched and probable courses of action decided upon in advance. Matters requiring detailed information not readily available on board ship are simulated, as are many tactical procedures which the ship, of course, would actually carry out in wartime. The “first team” is carefully briefed, since they will conduct the exercise. Every step of the exercise is carefully planned in advance, often to the point of dictating target course, speed, and depth in order to insure that contact is generated “in the interest of maximum training.” When he is satisfied that all will go according to schedule, the captain turns the show over to his Exec who will control the ship from CIC during the exercise. During the exercise, the captain acts as nothing more than a safety observer, concentrating on avoiding collisions with other ships rather than on the tactical problem at hand. This is a dangerously self-delusive practice, because, in these peacetime exercises, the captain knows in advance the shape of the exercise and the expected sequence of events. This knowledge gives him a false sense of control over the tactical situation, contributing to the mistaken belief that he understands what is going on in antisubmarine warfare.
In combat, where he would be forced to exercise personal direction over the actions of his ship, the captain will discover that there is not sufficient time for consultation with his officers; he alone—and quickly—must come up with specific details of tactics and weapons employment; he must have a comprehensive understanding of sonar target classification techniques, probable submarine evasive maneuvers and defensive gambits, and all the other bits and pieces of the puzzle that he was never required to be able to assemble in peacetime exercises. To put it bluntly, he may find that the technicalities of ASW warfare are far beyond his grasp.
One might well wonder how such an officer could ever be ordered to command a destroyer when he is not capable of fighting his ship. The point is that being ordered to command a destroyer has little to do with his ability to fight the ship, but rather results from his having completed a “career rounding” apprenticeship in a variety of billets.
Despite the enormous gravity and complexity of the situation in antisubmarine warfare, we consistently seem to disregard the staggering volume of data which must be continuously assimilated and understood by anyone who hopes to keep abreast of the art. We still expect officers to become ASW experts during their one or two tours in ASW prior to reaching the rank of commander. It would be bad enough even if these tours of duty were consecutive, but in the interests of “career rounding,” tours in ASW are generally separated by tours in fields remote from ASW. It is small wonder that today’s destroyer captain is so poorly equipped to carry out his primary mission; he is a product of a system which seems to have been designed to prevent him from becoming an expert at anything, let alone antisubmarine warfare.
The criticality of the commanding officer’s lack of ASW knowledge becomes most apparent when we examine the ASW destroyer as a weapons system, in which the hardware subsystems are controlled by the human subsystems. The human subsystem structure takes the diagrammatic form of a pyramid with the commanding officer, the control subsystem, at the top of the pyramid. This weapons system is continuously receiving and analyzing information upon which decisions are based and action is taken as appropriate. In this system we find that decisions are generally made at the lowest possible levels in order to expedite the decision-making process. But we also find that as the potential gravity of a decision increases, the tendency is for it to be made at higher levels. Time permitting, decision makers at one level will usually consult with appropriate lower levels so as to have the most accurate data at hand upon which to base the decision. As the time available for making a decision decreases, so also does the opportunity for consultation with lower levels. At some point, particularly in combat, the time available for consultation approaches zero; this means that at each level, those making decisions must have been properly programmed with all necessary data beforehand, if a correct decision is to be expected. If such decisions are made at the command level in combat, it follows that the combat performance of the entire destroyer weapon system depends on the reliability of the command subsystem, reliability being defined as the probability that a system or subsystem will perform correctly when called upon to do so.
Surely, the human subsystem is the vital component in any combat system. Yet, paradoxically, the human subsystem is not accorded the same developmental emphasis as are our hardware subsystems. Hardware is carefully engineered, specialized and perfected to a high degree so as to effect maximum performance reliability and efficiency. On the other hand, the human subsystem is treated as a general-purpose module, theoretically capable of functioning with high and equal efficiency in any hardware environment. The combination of a highly specialized hardware subsystem and a general purpose human subsystem results in a system with performance limited not by hardware capabilities but by the human understanding of those capabilities. No human subsystem is capable of being “programmed” to control at peak efficiency the broad spectrum of weapons which are used in the various fields of modern naval warfare.
Human subsystems are programmed in two general ways, by experience and by formal training. The former requires much more time than does the latter. While neither is adequate in itself, the two in combination result in the ideal program—providing maximum latitude of adaptation and response in widely varying tactical situations. The fabulous complexity of modern warfare demands that each hardware subsystem be controlled by a human subsystem which has been specifically “programmed” for the task. Since all of our ASW strategy and tactics are founded on the presumption that our hardware subsystems will perform as designed when called upon, it would be foolhardy to depend on such performance in the knowledge that the controlling human subsystem is not adequately “programmed” to employ the hardware to the extent of its designed capabilities. Yet this is precisely the course we are setting with our current officer career planning policies.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel believes that development of a line officer who is qualified to lead and command must be its primary consideration. Yet, this stated philosophy is the very antithesis of the “careerrounding” concept actually employed by BuPers in the effort to accomplish its aforesaid objective.
Prior to 1941, it was relatively simple for an officer to become well indoctrinated in all branches of naval warfare. The state of the art remained essentially constant for many years; techniques, once learned, were applicable for a long time. It was not uncommon for an officer to serve in varied billets in aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, oilers, and supply ships, finding that, upon ultimately assuming command of a destroyer, everything he had learned during the preceding years was still current and useful. Nothing had changed. But, with the advent of war in 1941, the scope and complexity of naval operations began increasing at a great rate; they have continued to do so with no evident slackening of pace. Today, the spectrum of naval warfare is so broad and complex that it is impossible for an officer to become proficient in any one branch, such as antisubmarine warfare, during his brief and intermittent exposures incident to his “career rounding.” The line officer who qualifies as “well-rounded” today is seldom expert at anything, and he is certainly many years of hard work and study short of being an ASW expert.
As a case in point, let us consider a naval commander, with 16 years of service, who has orders to command of a destroyer. He had served in a destroyer for two years when he was an ensign, and he followed this tour with four years in minesweepers. Next came a two- year Pentagon tour in OpNav communications, after which his “career development” was furthered by a two-year tour in a fleet oiler. When he came ashore again, he was a lieutenant commander, with orders to BuPers, where he then spent two years working on active-duty naval reserve problems. When he next went to sea, it was as Exec in a destroyer. Two years later, he was ordered back to BuPers, this time to process officer applications for postgraduate schools. At the end of his two-year tour in this billet, he was promoted to commander and, his career at a suitable stage of “rounding,” was ordered to command a destroyer.
This commander is then observed presenting himself at the nearest Fleet ASW School, announcing that he is soon to command a destroyer, and requesting a three-hour briefing in ASW so that he may be brought up to date! Little does he realize that while his career was being “rounded,” ASW was passing him by. During his briefing, the commander learns how little he knows about ASW and, when he departs for his ship, it is with the fervent hope that his junior officers know the score, because he is not going to be able to learn all he needs to know during his command tour.
Since the commander was last in a destroyer, new weapons have been devised and perfected. Many new search and classification systems have become available, along with large numbers of new tactics for their use. Besides the perennial radar and sonar, there are systems such as JEZEBEL, JULIE, DASH, ASROC, SUBROC, homing torpedoes, nuclear depth charges, helicopters with sonar. NTDS, sonar signal processors, VDS, SNIFFER, MAD, and many more which he must understand, but with which he is unfamiliar. In a step long overdue, the science of oceanography has been brought into action, along with highspeed computers to sift and collate the mountains of data collected. The battle against the submarine has become a nightmarishly complex business in which the submarine’s principal advantage is stealth and its chief ally the capricious ocean. Arrayed against the submarine is the most massive and expensive operation ever conceived by man to combat a single weapon system.
Perhaps the destroyer commanding officer would be better off if new ASW systems and techniques simply replaced old ones, leaving an essentially constant number to be studied and understood. Unfortunately for him, quite the contrary is true. Each new system or technique is usually based on a newly discovered physical phenomenon, or on a new data processing system, or on a new electronic innovation. And the new systems are added to the older ones, increasing the total number available, thus creating new and more complicated combinations and permutations of equipments to be fitted together into a coherent pattern of tactics. Instead of the one dramatic ASW breakthrough we constantly dream about, we have an ever-increasing number of devices and processes, each designed to take advantage of some previously unknown facet of the ocean, or a recently observed weakness of the submarine, or an operational feature of a new weapon, or various combinations of all of these. Barring the development of the magic “black box” which will solve once and for all the problem of finding, classifying, and destroying submarines, we shall have to continue exploiting each new avenue as it is opened up. This means that our ASW devices will become more subtle and complicated as they are concentrated more intensively on smaller and smaller areas of the problem. Our techniques will necessarily become more involved as they are developed to integrate the newer equipment which comes along. The net effect of all this is an over-all annual increase in the body of available data, equipment, procedures, and techniques which must be absorbed and understood by those who operate at sea against the submarine.
The more we learn about the ocean in which the submarine lurks, the more apparent it becomes that ASW is no longer reducible to a few simple thumb rules and a handful of tactics. The ocean is an exceedingly complex medium, well suited for submarines in hiding. Any given search for a submarine will yield thousands, perhaps millions, of clues and miscellaneous items of data. All of this must be studied, processed, weighed, evaluated constantly day in and day out by the people on the scene, in the destroyers. This is obviously no job for amateurs. Today’s weapons and sensors are unbelievably complex by the standards of 1945, and the indications are that the situation in the future will be the same, relative to today’s standards. Not only does the destroyer captain have the massive problem of merely knowing how each weapon system and sensor operates, what makes it tick, but he is also confronted by the staggering task of fitting weapons and sensors together in the best combinations to meet the needs of various tactical situations which may be thrust upon him at any time with no advance notice.
No matter how thoroughly our sensors probe for indications of the enemy’s presence, no matter how ready our complex weapon systems stand to destroy the enemy when he is detected, nothing can happen until command decides to attack. When the destroyer commanding officer is seeking to engage, or has engaged, an enemy submarine, he and he alone will be the final authority on how he uses the equipment at his disposal, and how he fights his ship. But in order to do these things, he must thoroughly understand his equipment. He must understand the principles of operation, the strong points and weaknesses of each weapon.
If he is to demand top performance from his hardware and crew, he must know just what constitutes top performance. He must know what kinds of data his sensors can provide, and with what reliability. He must know the realistic limits and abilities of his weapons. He must know how to weigh sensor information and to infer tactical intelligence from it. He must know just when to bring his weapons into action for maximum effect. He must understand in detail the enemy’s capabilities and limitations, his strengths and weaknesses, his tactical history, and probable courses of action. He must be ready to play the waiting game for hours or even days, to outwit the submariner at his own game. The commanding officer carries the awesome responsibility for making combat decisions which may result in the loss of his ship and crew. Such responsibility demands that the destroyer commanding officer be the most capable ASW officer in the ship, more expert than any of his subordinates. If he is not, then he is in the position of being unable to qualitatively and objectively fight his ship to her fullest potential. As long as the commanding officer has the authority to make overriding, final decisions in combat, he has the concomitant responsibility to understand everything that is going on in and around his ship. A commanding officer who is less expert than his subordinates can only slow down the combat reflexes of his ship, or worse, thwart them completely by making rash, ill-informed decisions. There is no alternative but for the destroyer commanding officer to be a de facto ASW expert.
Unfortunately, one does not become an ASW expert via the simple expedient of receiving orders to command a destroyer. He must be an expert prior to taking command! The body of available ASW knowledge grows constantly and is already so immense that no newcomer can hope to master even a small part of it in a year or two. The only way to cope with the situation is to grow right along with the data year by year, as it accumulates; learning, sifting, discarding, collecting, collating, understanding on a day-to-day basis, remaining constantly abreast of the state of the art. Antisubmarine warfare is ever changing. Yet much depends today upon knowing which weapons and tactics worked well in the past, and which did not and why. Likewise, much depends on being able to correlate the experience and knowledge of the past with the information and hypotheses of today in order to understand the weapons and tactics of tomorrow. The day of the full-time ASW specialist is at hand. No longer is it either reasonable or possible to expect the “well- rounded,” general-background line officer to be capable of exercising intelligent destroyer command in antisubmarine warfare. The complexity of the art and the grave importance of our having an effective ASW surface force demand officer specialization in antisubmarine warfare on a long-term basis. It should have been apparent to us long ago that stabilized, experienced specialists would be essential for an effective surface ASW program. As for the feasibility of officer specialization in an operational field such as antisubmarine warfare, such a program would be at least as practical as the officer specialization programs in naval aviation, and in the submarine force. In each of these areas, the minimum acceptable level of proficiency demands full-time specialization. The same should be true of the ASW surface forces, today and in the foreseeable future.
We already have the foundation of an ASW surface specialist program in the Destroyer School at Newport, Rhode Island. Officers entering this school have had approximately two years’ experience in destroyers, and on graduation they are qualified to fill destroyer department head billets. This school provides an ideal source from which to select officers who will specialize in surface antisubmarine warfare. Following graduation from destroyer school, the ASW specialist could embark immediately on his ASW career, serving in various ASW billets afloat and ashore, while accumulating the vast store of detailed knowledge and experience required when he achieves command. An interesting side effect of the ASW specialist system is that it would permit the assignment of specialists to periodic tours with afloat staffs. Officers currently assigned to such billets have had, in most cases, only a brief recent exposure to antisubmarine warfare prior to the staff assignment, and, at present, they do not bring a suitable depth of ASW experience and talent with them. The assignment of ASW surface specialists to afloat staffs would provide a pool of officers with reliable, coherent experience which would be of great value in the planning of ASW operations. Men with such experience would also help us to avoid many of the errors and omissions which result from the specious assumptions, so prevalent in today’s operations, regarding ASW equipment capabilities. In addition to staff billets, the ASW surface specialist would have available to him a complete range of responsibility opportunities, from head of department to command, during his sea tours in destroyers. Ideally, the ASW specialist would be assigned to operations and weapons billets rather than engineering billets.
Upon assignment to destroyer command, the ASW specialist would be in a far better position than his present-day counterpart, for not only would he be an expert in the field, but so also would his Exec, and Operations officer, and weapons and ASW officers, all of whom are in various stages of learning and experience, but ASW specialists every one!
Under the ASW specialist concept, each ASW destroyer should have at least four specialists aboard, each fully conversant with the present state of the art and having accumulated training and experience proportional to his rank prior to reporting aboard. This means that no longer would it be necessary to continue expending much training time and effort to bring a replacement officer up to the level of the officer he relieved, only to begin again when he is detached in turn. There would be a history of experience available among the specialists, with the greatest experience vested in the captain, and tapering downward through the Exec and other officers. No longer would the captain be in the unenviable position of knowing less about ASW than most of his junior officers. No longer would the captain have to worry about training the new Operations officer who has not had any significant ASW experience, because there would not be such a person. No longer would the captain have to worry about taking his ship into combat against the submarine, because he would have officers under him who are experts, who could function very effectively under the captain’s own expert direction in combat. And most important of all, the captain would actually be able to exercise that expert ASW combat direction. He would be capable of making rapid, correct decisions based on his own knowledge and experience, confident that if he makes a wrong decision it would not be for lack of ASW knowledge or experience. How many destroyer captains can claim such confidence today?
Certainly, such a program of officer specialization in antisubmarine warfare will not be accomplished without some attendant administrative problems. For example, there will be the immediate question of how to meet the “career needs” of the line officer who is not an ASW specialist. Yet, the submarine and aviation programs have had no adverse effects upon the careers of non-submariners and non-aviators. And, furthermore, just what is a “career need”? More of this “career rounding” business? It would be refreshing, and perhaps even profitable, to consider the long-range continuum for a change; it is time to set aside arbitrary considerations of what types of diversified experience are necessary to “optimum” career patterns and to start seeking the most practical means to accomplish the Navy’s primary mission—ASW. Administrative convenience must not be allowed to blind us to operational necessity.
If the specialization of officers in antisubmarine warfare should result in the reduction of numbers of officers available in the pipeline to the point where it would become necessary to institute specialization in fields such as anti-air warfare, amphibious warfare, logistic support, and mine warfare, this should not be a deterrent. The odds are that each of these fields is in need of specialists, as well as the ASW field. But let us not lose sight of the problem. The only real threat to our free use of the seas is vested in the Communist bloc submarine force. Our only hope of thwarting that threat rests with our ASW forces, whose combat effectiveness will be a direct function of the degree of operational knowledge and experience we are able to preserve among their officers. We already have available a high degree of specialized ASW knowledge and experience in our ASW submariners and our ASW aviators. But there remains a dangerous gap in the knowledge and experience of our ASW destroyer officers. We should heed well the words of former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George W. Anderson:
There is another alarming peril found in a modern fallacy that computers, or economics, or numbers of weapons win wars. Alone, they do not! . . . Our nation will defy every lesson of history if we think that stockpiles of weapons or the decision of computers win wars. Man, his wits, and his will are still the key to war and peace, victory and defeat.
In any combat system, command is the controlling subsystem, the critical subsystem which determines how effective the whole system will be in combat. Our surface ASW forces are in serious jeopardy in this respect. Our ASW destroyers can not be successful in war against the submarine unless and until they are commanded by ASW experts, supported at key levels by ASW specialists. The problem is clear, the solution at hand. To delay is to court disaster.