The burgeoning technological development of the U. S. Navy has become the fascinating imperative of our time. Major breakthroughs in speed, power, and range of weapon systems occupy center stage; but, in the wings, disturbing side effects are sapping the human element. Unheeded, what are now symptoms may terminate in a malignancy of spirit which could undo the technological readiness of the Navy for war service.
Modern, industrially oriented, Navy management has engendered personnel doctrines which are often in direct conflict with the practical needs and nature of our mission. It is the intent of this essay to examine critically these doctrines as they pertain to the role and function of the petty officer. If it is true that unit effectiveness for war service still requires the petty officer to exercise his traditional function of carrying the chain of military responsibility and authority into the enlisted ranks, then corrective measures must be taken immediately. Almost uniformly, petty officers today think this is an interesting tradition, but a completely outmoded practice.
Beyond any dispute, a necessary accentuation of his technical specialty has changed both the role and status of the petty officer, including the chief, into that simply of a “rated” man. Our language, for example, describes an electronics technician as a third-class petty officer, but in reality we are talking about an electronics technician in pay grade E-4. He is third class for pay purposes, and the petty officer distinction does not describe his function but simply his rate.
The Book still asserts that the primary function of any petty officer is his military specialty; his technical specialty is secondary. There is a considerable gap between rhetoric and reality. The real considerations are whether this gap can—or should—be bridged in the Navy of today in which the great bulk of enlisted men are rated. The non-rated group has ceased to be a performance element in the practical operation. Men in this category are in a transitory status of intensive indoctrination and training. They become of actual value only when they enter the specialist ratings. The proportion of rated to non- rated is growing as technology dictates the need for more specialists, and competition with industry for skills dictates that rapid advancement in rate be provided to secure status, pay, and re-enlistment. In this race for technical achievement of weapon systems, the traditional function of the petty officer in developing the resources of the human spirit, as an indispensable element of military readiness, is being disregarded. We cannot turn back the clock, but we dare not abandon prematurely that which experience and tradition have taught us. Progress can never mean a cleavage with the past, for what happens tomorrow is invariably the result of what transpired yesterday or today.
The primary direction of the much publicized “leadership effort” of the Navy has been toward the petty officer. As a program effort, this may admit to a problem or it may simply express a sincere desire to re-emphasize and reinforce the traditional function of the petty officer. Unfortunately, however, it does not make much difference. The leadership effort has not yet achieved significant success because there has been insufficient recognition of the fact that the strength and vitality of the military enterprise lie in human resources outside the realm of money, mechanics, technical perfection, and efficiency. Our total experience to date reveals only a meager understanding of the resources of spirit which are inherent to military leadership.
A beautifully concise lesson of leadership is revealed in the Old Testament (Exodus 18:18). Jethro counselled Moses that in order to lead his tribe effectively he would have to select able men of high moral character and put them in charge of thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens of tribesmen. These subordinates would have to be taught the laws and trained in discipline. Then Moses would have to trust them to judge the small matters and bring only the great matters to him for judgment. These principles of organization, administration, and the delegation of responsibility and authority have changed little, if at all, in the centuries that followed. In the Navy, it is recognized in the chain of command extending through the line officer ranks and on down through the petty officer rates. The latter have the function of subalterns; they are the leaders of the fifties and tens in the enlisted organization.
Until the era ushered in by World War II, the organization and command relationships throughout the structure were just this simple and clear. There were many non-rated men, fewer petty officers, and still fewer line officers. Specialization of work had increased steadily with technological progress, but the military responsibility and authority of the line officer was still capable of delegation to a clearly defined and recognized petty officer group whose experience and maturity assured both adequate technical work supervision and military command. Leadership was taken for granted. It was the natural order of things. Now it is being questioned and restated. The effort today seems to be in the nature of a search for ways and means to lead as much as actual leadership of men.
There is good reason for uncertainty. Albert Einstein in his later years expressed the opinion that perfection of means and confusion of goals seem to characterize our age. In the U. S. Navy, rapid advancement of men to specialty ratings and concomitant petty officer designation has reversed the enlisted pyramid. There are now few non-rated and many petty officers. As a group, the petty officers do not possess the experience, judgment, and military skills necessary to perform their traditional function. Men advance to a higher technical status as a reward for successful periodic demonstration of technical skill, largely as the result of performance in a written examination. Unfortunately, they do not necessarily advance to higher military status as a reward for superior performance in conformity with set standards of military excellence. This is wrong, and the perceptive petty officer today senses it without in all cases being able to identify the causes. For lack of something new, the petty officer system is being used to place men in specialized roles at successive paygrades so that increasing status can be used to measure successful career advancement. The speed of such advancement can be controlled administratively to enhance the career prospects for men needed in highly specialized “critical” ratings, and thus induce men to re-enlist. There is no denial, or even any valid criticism of such personnel administration—so great is the need. Technical complexity, training cost and time, and severe competition for the skilled technician by private industry dictate unusual measures. The point is, however, that no useful purpose is served and, indeed, much harm is done by using the blanket designation of petty officer to meet the technical need. We maneuver the men concerned into the position where they must be “all things to all men.” The scope of responsibilities exceeds a reasonable reach of achievement. These practices have diluted the prestige and consequently the military effectiveness of the petty officer.
It is naive to suppose that modern petty officers can be all things to all men; yet consider our present aptitude testing system. By precept we believe that tests scores will determine whether a man should be a steward, mechanic or electronics technician. Regardless of the particular aptitude demonstrated, however, we assume all men have an equal potential for leadership. Modern psychologists recognize that not all men have either the capability or the desire to be leaders of men, especially in the inspirational sense of military command. A great number of men by reason of our national cultural environment, aptitudes, and persuasions are better suited for primary technical roles. Like the Romans who built statues for the worship of unknown gods, to preclude possible offending, we cover the whole enlisted field in the hope that unknown leaders may thereby be found. In reality, no scores on tests of intelligence, mechanical aptitude, or personality have proved successful in the prediction of superior combat performance and effective military leadership. The only reliable judgments have been the opinions of group members observing each other in a realistic social context, such as a training platoon. When we make leadership everybody’s business, it becomes nobody’s business.
There is today a general uncertainty and frustration among enlisted men, and among officers too, as to which among the many petty officers are to be given the traditional recognition. Age and service experience play unusual roles. For example, the youthful senior of a fast moving “critical” rating often exhibits embarrassment when he compares the sum total of his qualifications as a petty officer with those of an older, more experienced junior in a slow moving “non-critical” rating. The very fact of critical versus non-critical, when applied in context to the function of the petty officer, raises fluctuating and inconsistent standards which seemingly do not weigh dedication, excellence of performance, and the high caliber of the man himself in the determination of selection for advancement to higher petty officer rate. Too often the individual enlisted man’s evaluation is simply “wanted” versus “not wanted.”
Prestige and respect have a great deal to do with how effectively authority can be used to discharge military responsibility. Juniors and seniors among the enlisted men know what The Book says, and they know equally well that The Book is not followed. No one has demonstrated that the customs, traditions, and regulations which make up the petty officers’ responsibility and authority are wrong or not needed—far worse, they are often ignored to the point of contempt. Obedience of lawful authority should be all- embracing. The regulations state that an enlisted man should obey a petty officer. If he does not and is not punished or otherwise corrected, even though the petty officer himself is not concerned, why then is it a greater offense to disregard the orders of a commissioned officer? Just where can one safely draw a line between which obedience to authority should be enforced and should not be enforced. The answer, of course, is that such a line cannot be drawn. No discipline can exist without obedience to any and all lawful authority. The organizational and command needs for enlisted petty officer leadership in the traditional sense have not changed; in fact, they are emphasized by present experience. This suggests that we have already fallen back. We must regroup. The problems are capable of solution by intelligently applied leadership, but we must go beyond the garden variety that merely exhorts men to greater efficiency in a technical effort.
The size of the U. S. Navy in terms of men, facilities, equipment, and expenditure of funds dictates efficient management. The employment of management methods applicable to the effective use of men, money, materials, and supervisory techniques to achieve high standards of performance in step with technological progress, requires dynamic leadership. Such leadership may simply be defined as technical leadership. It is largely concerned with tangible things. Along the spectrum of values and ideas, technical leadership expresses the relation of men to products, and its effectiveness, even in the naval service, can be measured with great accuracy by contemporary industrial methods.
The technical area is, however, only a part. The spirit of a service organization, devoted to readiness for war service, must be developed and directed. The development of spirit is largely an inspirational matter. Men have to be inspired to do their best work, and the climate of excellence within a framework of personal and unit discipline is only achieved through spiritual and moral responses. Leadership of this type is strongly personal and is applied directly to the ethical and inspirational dimensions of the tasks facing naval command in achieving effectiveness for war service. The true measurement of success in such leadership is readily found in the mental and physical readiness of the individual in a military unit. Again, along the spectrum of values and ideas, inspirational military leadership expresses the relation of men to purpose. Where the technical role is material and quantitative, and deals with tangible things, the inspirational role is spiritual and qualitative, and deals with intangible ideas.
These two great avenues of leadership, technical and inspirational, express form. Each form is, however, conditioned by the manner of its expression. The U. S. Navy is representative of the military power of a democratic society. Yet, the service function is, of necessity, not democratic but authoritarian. This should not seem unusual. Private institutions whether commercial, industrial or philanthropic are almost uniformly authoritarian in their expressions of leadership to achieve stated goals. Even public institutions are authoritarian in the manner of their operation, as witness law enforcement generally. Only in areas such as the selection of public officials, the making of law by legislatures, and referendum prerogatives of the public, is the democratic process readily apparent. Yet, because the military services are a public function, the egalitarian persuasion of the public seems uniformly to press for a more democratic approach in military command. This trend is accelerated today because the educational levels of enlisted men and officers generally are coming closer together. There is no recognized social distinction based either on birth or education which delineates the officer and enlisted levels as clearly as it did in the American past, or as clearly as it does today, for example, in the British Navy. There is quite a natural tendency to expect the exercise of human relations and understanding in achieving maximum performance. Were it not for the exigency of war, the question might be moot. But, it takes time, training and inspiration to achieve that state of discipline where men will unquestioningly obey orders, and greater effort in this regard is required today than in the past.
The leadership of the Navy must concern itself primarily with the broad authoritarian exercise of technical supervision and inspirational guidance. The role of the officer is fairly clear, but that of the petty officer is muddy indeed. The officer is structured in a cognizable chain of command relationship. If he is of the line, his primary concern is command, and as a secondary role he exercises supervision within a technical specialty. The petty officer is not so fortunate. He is a casualty of technological progress, industrial competition for talent, and cultural emphasis of material, efficiency-type values.
A reform must be devised which does not sacrifice the concept and strength of the basic military structure to the concept of industrial “efficiency” so worshipped in our time. “Petty officer” by tradition and common sense describes a function—not just a rate. This function is the exercise of a military specialty, vital to fighting the ship. He is the enlisted military leader. Technical skills are vitally needed, but not clothed in the traditional military responsibility and authority of the petty officer. Only so many line officers are required to structure the naval organization, and only so many petty officers carrying the line function into the enlisted structure are needed. Essential technical skills should be manifested by a rated specialist whose primary role is technical. As he advances in rate, his role of leadership should be expressed in technical supervision, not in military inspiration or direction. Technicians and specialists should wear a different insignia, and their level of status should not be determined by a device for military leadership.
A relatively simple reform is available which imposes little change in basic organization of units of the U. S. Navy, either afloat or ashore; involves no additional expenditure of funds; and requires no significant change of training methods. Yet, it is believed the reform would greatly strengthen the military integrity of the Navy. The basic plan would structure the naval organization below the officer level into three enlisted groups: petty officer, pay grades E-6 through E-9; rated specialist, pay grades E-4 through E-9; and non-rated apprentice, pay grades E-l through E-3. The designation of petty officer would be on the basis of qualification and demonstrated ability as a leader of men. The man himself would have the opportunity to choose whether to compete for the petty officer designation and undertake the additional training in military leadership so that he could discharge additional responsibilities, or whether to continue in his role of specialist. It is realistic to consider that a ratio of only one petty officer for every 12 enlisted men, rated and non-rated, need be maintained to assure effectiveness of the military group for war service. The number to be designated within each specialty rating is small and should be highly selective.
The man who has advanced as a technical specialist from E-4 through E-6 must first want to undertake the additional responsibilities, must want to exercise military leadership of the inspirational type as his primary role, and must be qualified to undertake his role by his previous performance of duty, his experience, character, and mental and physical capability. He must be the man who can influence the group. Although he will continue to have a secondary role as a technical specialist, he will be identified primarily with a highly select military group. Those specialists who do not desire such a career, or who are not selected for petty officers, will continue in their careers to the level of E-9. At the higher levels, these men will function in the primary role of technical/supervisory type leadership.
It can readily be seen that each skill, each function, is essential in today’s expensive and highly technological Navy. The senior enlisted specialist will carry the policy, training, direction, and supervision of the complex technical structure into the enlisted ranks from the officer corps. The senior petty officer, on the other hand, will carry out military policy and training, and will share in the command of the enlisted structure.
There is one rating that of necessity must be considered as within the petty officer structure even though designation as petty officer would not come until pay grade E-6. This is that of boatswain’s mate. At the very outset, when a man in this calling becomes a striker he is pointed toward military leadership. In fact, his is the only rating today for which the qualification “leadership” is stated in the U. S. Navy Occupational Handbook. In addition, this is the rating which traditionally has carried the military function of the line officer into the enlisted ranks. It is only required to consider the boatswain’s mate as an apprentice petty officer as he advances towards pay grade E-6. At this level, however, he must, unlike the specialist, qualify for petty officer or fail of advancement. To become a boatswain petty officer is his one goal. The designation of “mate” in the apprentice role might seem anomalous. This is not significant, however, since the tradition the word carries is important and should be perpetuated.
It is not believed that any other rating in the proposed reform should carry the designation “mate.” As a matter of precedence and seniority among the petty officer ratings, the present delineation is entirely satisfactory, with the exception that command at sea should devolve in succession through each level of the boatswain petty officer before it passes to the senior quartermaster petty officer, then senior radarman petty officer and so on down the list. The reason lies clearly in the fact that the sum total of the boatswain’s experience would better qualify him to command, even at the E-6 level. This is not a new consideration; it was traditional in the U. S. Navy up until 1948.
It is essential that the reform be accompanied by the establishment of a Petty Officer School of the duration of the present “B” school for technical ratings. Successful completion of this school would be mandatory for designation as a petty officer. Significant savings in manpower could be achieved by the consolidation of the many existing petty officer and chief petty officer schools, now in existence throughout the Navy, at central locations. The facilities and environment at the Great Lakes and San Diego Naval Training Centers are ideal for this purpose. These ought to be prestige schools offering only the finest in facilities, equipment, and instructor personnel. It would be desirable that a minimum time in service and time served in sea duty be established to qualify the prospective petty officer for admission, so that the efforts of a high-quality school could be directed to a mature, experienced man. It is not unrealistic to require a minimum of 52 months of total service for this purpose, of which 24 months should be spent in sea duty assignments.
It is indisputable that every program, every plan, every “reform” of the Navy must meet one immutable criterion. Does it contribute to combat readiness? Does it increase effectiveness for war service? The proposed reform will go far in solving current personnel problems that are impeding the achievement of combat readiness in both the operating forces of the Navy and the Shore Establishment.
First and foremost, it will restore the traditional prestige and authority of the petty officer as a vital functionary in military command. The military integrity of the naval service will be significantly improved.
A very important consideration of the public image of the Navy and the recognition afforded Navy men in the community generally is presented in the prestige role. Every time one refers to “enlisted men” of the Navy he is dealing mainly with petty officers. They are greater in number than non-rated men and the proportion of petty officers to the whole enlisted group is growing.
In this light, the recent Navy Department interest in ways and means to increase the prestige of the Navy man and his family in the civilian community was largely directed towards increasing the prestige of the petty officer. It perhaps assumes too much, but the inference is one of trouble and as this essay treats: it is another trouble which involves the petty officer.
A man creates to a great extent his own prestige. His pride in his profession, the image of that profession which he helps to create, and his confidence in the success or expectation of success of the mission or goals of the organization with which he is associated all tend to increase his prestige. Prestige for one man is something which exists in the mind of another; but any man, including the Navy man, must first believe that he is entitled to prestige, that his profession is entitled to it. If the petty officer has no confidence in his role, if his environment is one of frustration and insecurity, if his morale is low and especially if he communicates these feelings to the community, then his prestige will suffer. The first step then is to restore the sense of prestige to the petty officer himself. More money is not the only thing that motivates men to give their best performance. Men want recognition of their contribution in terms of respect, essentiality, and often in greater responsibility and authority. In the case of the specialist, his prestige should be founded in his technical skill and important supervisory role of using and maintaining highly complex instruments of modern war.
The Navy desperately needs men of high intellectual gifts to service and man the ever- increasing technology of weapon systems. It must create an environment wherein the man so gifted will sense an attractive career. All of the present frustrations and anxiety pertain to the specialist in critical ratings just as they do to those in non-critical ratings. The Navy cannot hope to match the wage offer of industry, and the sum total of all wage and other material benefits only bring a parity with the average earner. The only thing the Navy can positively offer is the military environment as distinguished from an industrial one. Properly understood and practiced, the Navy way of life has broad personal rewards that are not material in nature, such as the spirit of being a shipmate and the camaraderie of service. The goal is national and the stakes are high. The expanding technology draws first priority on the time, talent, energies, and other resources of the nation.
The specialist has a unique role to be played in the modern Navy. But first this role must be defined. He has to be accepted as a vital partner by his shipmates. No amount of incentive pay or proficiency pay is going to foster a desire to re-enlist on his part, when industry beseeches his skill, unless he can picture himself in a role which not only is important but recognized as important and satisfying to himself as a person. It is a paramount essential to the effective running of an efficient organization that everyone knows what is expected of him, understands the other man’s viewpoint, and feels that while the team members may argue, there is still a team. The reform desired places the specialist in a role at par with the military petty officer, requiring the highest performance of technical leadership. Such a role permits his self identification with a growing professional elite. Under these circumstances, a far greater proportion of the technical specialists could be expected to re-enlist.
The reform will also tend to accomplish what several studies in the past have urged: that the distinction between the hierarchies in the military caste system be less sharply drawn in order to reduce irritations. The intent being, of course, to bring the military structure more in conformance with the social hierarchies of the American society. The creation of the well-defined authoritative petty officer group, coexistent with a similarly well-defined senior specialist group would go far toward achieving this goal, but not at the expense of sacrificing military strength and integrity. The specialist would service the military situation; the petty officer would participate in the military situation. Both groups would be more closely identified with the command and specialty roles of the line officer. The reform would provide clear channels for naval leadership which must manifest itself successfully in both the technical/supervisory/management area and the inspirational/military/command area. The latter area has been relegated to a secondary role in past years in spite of directives, regulations and traditions to the contrary.
Those men who do have the capacity and desire to manifest military leadership as distinct from a technical performance must be given a clear career motivation. Informed judgments must be available to insure their selection as they mature in performance and experience. We have been and are now in danger of creating only a professional technical elite of service prominence. Such an elite is fine if it helps to produce esprit de corps, but a balancing professional military elite of at least equivalence in recognition would certainly seem to be in order for a fighting force.
A final advantage exists which is far more subtle than all the foregoing, but possibly of greater long range value in increasing effectiveness for war service. It lies in the competitive role of the petty officer in relation to the junior line officer directly, and indirectly to line officers generally. The identification and military integrity of the petty officer group, skilled in military leadership, will serve as a clear standard below which the performance of the line officer may not falter. It is perhaps best recognized as a perpetual goad to line officer performance. Such a clear standard is not perceptible today with the dilution of military integrity and decreased military performance within the broad field of all rated enlisted men.
The present situation of the U. S. Navy petty officer must be faced squarely and honestly. It can no longer be taken for granted and treated to leadership which deals with symptoms of malignancy and not causes. We may have to go to war again someday and, in that moment of truth, the military integrity of the naval service will be brilliantly exposed as either frightening or reassuring.
“And now the old ships and their men are gone; the new ships and the new men, many of them bearing the old auspicious names, have taken up their watch on the stern and impartial sea, which offers no opportunities but to those who know how to grasp them with a ready and an undaunted heart.” Who but Joseph Conrad could have stated the case for leadership in such compelling terms?