The Navy has long been suffering from shell shock as a result of the technological explosion of the past few decades. The most obvious symptom of this psychosomatic condition is our almost frantic reliance on new devices and procedures, the great majority of Which are still on the drawing board, or which have not even been tested—let alone proven—except under very limited, controlled conditions. Since reliance now on something that does not yet exist is unrealistic to the point of insanity, we must consider this problem in terms of real and present danger, as well as a mental aberration to be treated. As it is the aberration that has caused the problem, we Should discuss it first.
When the mushroom cloud dispersed over Hiroshima, it was obvious that the first atom bomb had left not only proximate destruction but also that it was, possibly, the harbinger of the ultimate annihilation of the human race and the literal pulverization of the face of the earth. No sensible person could stand undaunted, nor completely fearless in the face of a future in which "the end of the World" might cease to be a figure of speech.
Necessary adjustment to such a monstrous Concept must take place on many and various levels. Manifestations of the degree and kind of adjustment on a personal, national, and world-wide basis are still to be found in almost every publication 19 years after Hiroshima. This is the way we live.
There are hysterical demonstrations by the lunatic fringe and riots by peace marchers. Some of the clergy preach the imminent second coming of Christ, and altruistic motion Picture producers attempt to profit from fear. Speeches are made at the United Nations Which represent great nations as quivering With apprehension because of the omnipresent threat of nuclear annihilation. Other nations rattle their reactors. There are individuals, even eminent philosophers, who say that any Way of life is preferable to nuclear death. There are disarmament plans and conferences. Apparently the Sword of Damocles has been superseded by the scatter gun.
The smoke had not cleared after that first atom bomb drop when the cry arose that war itself must now be considered obsolete; it had become too dangerous because now it included everybody. There was an additional cry that armies and navies, as previously conceived and constituted, were similarly outdated, because nuclear energy had revolutionized the whole picture.
Time has proven both theses partially right and partially wrong. Admittedly, war is too dangerous for humanity, but, unfortunately, this fact has not made it a thing of the past. And, although nuclear energy has revolutionized the whole picture, armies and navies in the traditional sense, are by no means superannuated. From Hiroshima until today, the world has continued to engage in the same old garden variety of hot wars on a small scale. With nuclear warfare push-button close, its employment to date has served only as window dressing for the global Cold War.
Thus, 19 years after the War itself and our World War II Navy became "obsolete" in the opinions of some, both war and the U. S. Navy look substantially as they did then. Both are potentially radically different. Indeed, on the drawing board, the whole picture has changed; however, in practice it has not changed vastly. Nuclear and missile ships are still in such a minority as to be considered curiosities. Although we have computer systems that stagger imagination and although we train men to use them, they are not yet installed to any significant degree.
A graphic example of the disparity of the situation was shown in the Thresher catastrophe. The USS Thresher (SSN-593), was off the drawing board, down the ways, and in action, slicing through the depths of the ocean. Below the surface, she represented the ultimate that man has so far achieved in a nuclear-powered submarine. Whereas, the USS Skylark (ASR-2o), above, a rescue-salvage ship, could neither 81rescue nor salvage. She was acting as a communications link and, although communications equipment is in existence that would have served, it just did not happen to be in the Skylark. She communicated with the Thresher by voice-modulated sonar through hydrophones attached to her hull. She had no tape recorder to preserve messages. The message she finally sent concerning the Thresher's disappearance was not greatly different in procedure from the dots and dashes used by the Titanic's radio operator 52 years ago. Although the Thresher could not have been physically assisted at the time by a rescue and salvage ship of remotely comparable design, she and the Navy certainly could have benefited from far-more advanced communication techniques. This is not second guessing. It is merely one instance where the equipment in existence was not properly utilized.
A perfect example of this deplorable lack of utilization of what we have, is the nether land in which conventional gunnery now exists. When President John F. Kennedy made the decision to interdict all shipping bound for Cuba, carrying cargoes of offensive weapons, this country witnessed the anachronism of plain, old destroyers firing plain, old, 5-inch 38-caliber projectiles implementing the President’s order. In this Space-Jet-Nu- clear Age, if it had been necessary to effect Marine landings, the gunfire support would have been equally prosaic and passe. Obvious as it was that gunnery in the most traditional sense still constituted all that we had to meet certain exigencies, the downgrading of conventional gunnery continued apace. Even as our conventional ships with conventional guns executed a conventional blockade, plans were expedited to consolidate the U. S. Fleet Gunnery School at San Diego with the U. S. Fleet Training Center there. In the letter proposing this change to the CNO, it was stated that “the decision to consolidate . . . has been taken in the face of knowledge that the elimination of FLEGUNSCOL SDIEGO . . . may have the effect of degrading emphasis on Fleet gunnery.”
The risk of “degrading” Fleet gunnery at any time seems nothing short of reckless, even catastrophic, but especially so in the face of the Cuban blockade when no one knew from moment to moment what the ramifications of this U. S. action would be. In the 3 August 1963 edition of the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal and Register, it was reported that in a “ . . . reverse twist, guns have replaced some missiles aboard new guided missile frigate Belknap." The article continued: “Missile to gun modifications resulted in large part from lessons learned during Cuban crisis. Navy discovered there were missions for which it needed old-fashioned guns, rather than missiles.” The strange expression “Navy discovered” is rather appalling when one remembers the extensive testing the same gun(s) got in World War II and the Korean War, and particularly when that “old-fashioned” gun is, even today, the Navy’s most common weapon.
Another peculiarity of the consolidation of the Fleet Gunnery School is that prior to Korea it had already been part of the larger Fleet Training Center. And the decision at that time to establish the Gunnery School as a separate command was based on the wartime need of gunnery emphasis. Thus, experience gave way to expediency.
The majority of ships in the U. S. Navy have guns and nothing else now. Yet, these guns are generally treated as exhibits more appropriate to the floors of maritime museums than the decks of ships. Although, in most cases, they constitute the only weapon available, it is assumed in certain quarters that they are no longer of prime importance and that training in their use can be what is euphemistically called “degraded.”
Should anyone question whether conventional gunnery has been degraded during the past few years, or since the Navy took on the new-development complex, the following examples have been observed. They are not listed in any order of priority or importance, nor are they, in any way, inclusive.
(1) Reviews of Readiness Reports from certain Type Commanders show plainly that gunnery performance, both surface and antiaircraft, continues to be of concern. Yet few positive steps are taken by these same Type Commanders or seniors to whom the reports are submitted to correct the situation. This indifference—a harsh word, but what else can it be called—continues in the face of the now proven fact (Lebanon, Suez, Cuba, etc.) that short of Armageddon, conventional gunnery readiness is an absolute necessity.
(2) Owing to expediency, the Bureau of Naval Personnel does not always provide qualified gunnery officer reliefs, and commanding officers must of necessity assign inexperienced officers to gunnery duties. The hypothetical question, “Why didn’t the CO have an officer ready to fleet-up?” can all too frequently be answered by saying that the officer scheduled and trained for the billet, was ordered to postgraduate, submarine or electronics school the week before. Should BuPers be unofficially queried on this situation, the answer would be the standard, “There were no qualified officers available. It is an unfortunate situation, but the ship will have to send the inexperienced officer to school for the required training.” With Fleet operations as they are, plus the requirement of having to double up responsibilities and duties among the other officers while the trainee is gone, this personnel situation often results in the untrained officer remaining on board and “making-do.” There is also the excuse that, “Nobody is shooting at us right now.”
(3) The situation with regard to enlisted personnel is not reassuring, either. Some destroyers have only a second class petty officer as their senior fire control technician. It is no wonder that equipment becomes inoperative, considering the magnitude of the petty officer’s responsibility, the number of gun fire control systems on board, and the multitudinous requirements for daily, weekly, and monthly tests. Also, both conventionally trained fire controlmen and gunner’s mates are being transferred (recruited) into newly established rates in missiles and missile systems, in alarming numbers. Combined with the fact that the present input to the conventional GM and FT rates has dwindled, a situation now exists where there are not only fewer men left to maintain guns and fire control systems, but the experience pool, so vital to meet emergency demands, is growing dangerously shallow.
(4) There is a reduction in the Fleet of actual firing, exemplified by the fact that annual training ammunition allowances are not being fully expended. Only a few years ago, gunnery and commanding officers were involved in almost constant schemes to stretch their ammunition allowances. Fairly widespread, too, is the tendency now to forget that guns are on board, except for those few days during the training cycle when it is mandatory to complete the pitifully few gunnery exercises. It is not unusual for a ship to go through an entire six months’ deployment without firing a round. Many reasons for this have been offered, and lack of services has been chief among them. Whereas this is no doubt valid in many cases—for gunnery services are increasingly difficult to obtain, another related factor in de-emphasis— several questions come to mind. What has happened to the ingenious gunnery-minded personnel of a few years past, when OTCs set up regular inter-ship competition in order to determine which ship was “fastest-on-the- draw” against an unannounced air burst? Where are the enterprising commanding officers who required the gunnery department to include in the readiness-for-sea reports the fact that the ship had a surface target constructed and on board? Although this object was oftentimes ugly and awkward to handle, it was carried to be used at every opportunity for surface gunnery practice. Today, shipboard construction of targets is not necessary, for several successful targets have been developed that can be carried on board. The instances when they are used, however, as compared with the old home-made targets, are minimal.
(5) The incorporation of various guided missiles and missile systems into certain Fleet units are revolutionary developments in naval warfare and should be welcomed to their degree of appropriateness. When discussion of them excludes any reliance whatsoever on the conventional armament already installed on the overwhelming majority of our ships, however, the talk becomes dangerous. Within the past few years, everyone has been inundated by reports of fantastic new weapons with increasingly greater capabilities. These reports have emanated from the Navy Department, from Madison Avenue advertising men, from radio and television commentators, and from newspaper and magazine columnists throughout the country. This has had an adverse effect, because it has lulled personnel into a dangerous complacency about letting George the robot do it. Conventional gunnery is purported to be as archaic as sail on combatant ships. Missiles, many of which are still in the planning stage and others which are still untried, are advocated as the nautical panacea.
(6) A last example (although the list is virtually limitless) of gunnery de-emphasis is that there is, incredibly, no training ashore on the West Coast, and thus for the entire Pacific Fleet area, on the 5-inch/54 rapid fire gun. This gun is relatively new, having been developed after World War II. It did not see action in the Korean War, but it has been coming into the Fleet in increasing numbers, especially in the last few years. Advanced loading and firing methods have resulted in a gun with an extremely high rate of fire. Although the gun is available and was authorized by the CNO for West Coast training purposes in 1956, appropriation of foundation funds has been delayed year after year. Even though the amount required is minuscule compared to the way millions, and even billions, of dollars are bandied about these days, the net result is that the great number of officers and men attached to ships with this gun installed, and those who will be ordered to these ships at a later date, lack training facilities ashore.
Conventional gunnery has been and is continuing to be de-emphasized in spite of overwhelming evidence, evidence that the naval gun still has superiority in such vital areas as gunfire support, against high speed, low altitude aircraft, and against surface targets.
In the January 1963 issue of the Proceedings devoted solely to the forecasting of the Navy of the 1970’s, it was stated, in effect, that the Marines will still be landing on the beaches and,
Marine infantry will get fire support from ships’ guns, rockets, guided missiles, attack aircraft, and artillery. Offshore the Navy will provide neutralization and destruction fires on landing beaches and adjacent areas—to clear helicopter approach routes and landing zones inland—and general support fires, up to the maximum ranges at which our combat forces will operate.1
Except for the inclusion of “guided missiles,” which at this writing are definitely on the drawing board, the authors might well be describing operations in the 1940s at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Okinawa. This is not to detract from their very interesting report, but rather to point out that we must continue to stress the value of, and maintain our proficiency in, the naval gun. Vice Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., U. S. Navy, has said,
The diminishing gunfire support capability of our new naval ships poses the second more important problem [the first was that of maintaining adequate command ships]. As guided missiles replace guns on most of our cruisers and destroyers, we find that the fire support capability of our striking force is on the decline. Guns have an all weather capability, accuracy, reliability and penetrating power not found in missiles or in close air tactical support. As more and more emphasis is placed on amphibious operations, the problem of fire support becomes more acute.2
Today, the naval gun receives its greatest attacks from critics in the area of air defense, or anti-air warfare. The attackers, ranging from those operational planners who almost completely ignore the gun’s existence, to the top Navy echelons, who allocate all available money and research solely to missile development, say in effect, “In the air problem today, the naval gun has outlived its usefulness.”
It is not intended here to assign false values, or to over-value the naval gun. Nor is it advocated that the gun should be used in place of all surface-to-air missiles. Rather, the contention is that since guns are our most numerous, and our proven, weapon, they should be viewed in a proper perspective. As Admiral Claude Ricketts recently said in a San Diego speech, it would
... be naive to provide an enemy with a single package to counter—we must present him with many problems that require him to attempt to counter them all.3
New developments may result in the naval gun disappearing from the scene, as some long range, high level planning has intimated, but the gun has not gone yet. It is not oversimplification to say that conventional gunnery must once again become a vital and integral part of anti-air and anti-surface warfare planning. Gunnery readiness does not come in bits and pieces nor only in prescribed seasons. Readiness is a total condition conscientiously maintained at all times.
The ability and will to fight a war is a state of mind before it becomes an actuality, and there is an element singularly corrosive to the spirit in the reiteration of the idea that the great majority of our ships and armaments are obsolete. There can be nothing substantially reassuring nor inspiring to a man thinking consciously or subconsciously that he is spending his time playing old-fashioned war games. Thus, the worst result of de-emphasizing what we have and exalting what we will have is the psychological result.
In fact, motivation cannot fail to dwindle and finally to die. Some of the leadership and morale problems from which the Navy suffers must inevitably stem from this feeling of futility, the fact that unless a man is in one of the new programs, or new ships, he must feel that he is treading water.
That these feelings of futility do not result from an accurate appraisal of conditions has no bearing on their existence. If a man is convinced that what he has does not apply, he cannot use it in any positive spirit. It cannot be denied that the conventional naval gun would be totally ineffective under certain conceivable conditions. It is also true that, in all likelihood, the World War II destroyer that mounted the gun would be militarily no better than Noah’s Ark. If one must be degraded, so must the other.
Other sets of conditions, however, are more within the realm of probability than the above. What we have can and does serve very well in the world as it exists at present. But our Navy-of-the-future is of no more use to us at this moment than one of Caesar’s triremes; it is as unrealistic to live in the future as it would be to live in the past. Rather, the necessity is for us to use to its maximum advantage what is available here and now. There must be no downgrading of effort and no invidious comparisons, for there can be no Navy-of-the- future if we do not hold the line with what we now have. There is no security today in what we may have tomorrow.
1. See John H. Saxten and Louis G. Ditta, “The Marine Corps of 1973,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1963, p. 113.
2. See John S. McCain, Jr., “Amphibious Warfare During the Next Decade,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1963, p. 105.
3. See San Diego Union, 18 August 1963.