The Atlantic is there to stay. And, because of this geographic reality, no complicated reasoning of experts, no solemn declarations of politicians, nothing in the world will ever prevent a basic difference in the approach to military problems between Americans and Continental Europeans.
Between the Red Army and North America, there are 4,000 miles of deep water; between Europeans and the Russian bear, there is a barrier, in places, only one yard high—the Iron Curtain—which is obviously an overstatement in military language.
Quite naturally, in the nuclear age, the residents on the western side of the Atlantic focus their attention primarily on the direct threat to their national survival: the Soviet Union’s nuclear-tipped ICBM. No less naturally, the population living on the eastern side fears the Russian tanks at least as much as they fear attack from the sky overhead. Death can come on foot to Paris, but not to New York—nor to London.
No wonder, then, that the U. S. thinkers and policy makers concentrate their brainpower mainly on the problem of long-range bombardment; no wonder, too, that their Continental allies feel some uneasiness in witnessing the increasing Soviet capability in this same type of bombardment.
It might be interesting to dig a little deeper into this problem, and to look at the different U. S. “strategies” through critical European eyes. Perhaps, then, some middle of the road approach, satisfactory for all parties, could be found. Let us try to re-bridge the Atlantic.
As far as it can be understood in the esoteric and weighty books written by U. S. thinkers, there are two nuclear “strategies” currently being advocated: “Deterrence” and “Counterforce,” with such subdivisions and shades as “Minimum Deterrence,” “Finite Deterrence,” “First Strike Counterforce” and “Second Strike Counterforce.” These strategies can materialize in “Preventive” attack, or “Pre-emptive” attack.
Roughly speaking, this ponderous verbiage means, on the one hand, shoot the civilian (Minimum or Finite Deterrence), or, on the other hand, shoot the military (Counterforce). Shoot first, if you fear that your enemy is about to do so (Pre-emptive War). Shoot first, too, if you want to get rid of all your headaches by surprise (Preventive War). Or, lastly, absorb the first blow and shoot back with what is left (Second Strike).
All these solutions naturally pertain to the current favorite U. S. sport—long-range bombardment with H-bombs. The game requires a “targeting system” which puts “bull’s eyes” on all enemy cities, starting with the largest, then on military installations, starting with ICBM launching pads, etc. The targeting system is “perfected” with the increasing production of nuclear stockpiles, the proliferation of rockets, and other deadly hardware. At the limit of perfection one would reach a situation where every city in the world would be assigned one firing squad in some faraway underground silo, fighting boredom playing cards or drinking whisky or vodka, pending the order to push the button and execute the “sister city.” This is the first step, called Minimum Deterrence, since it is much cheaper and easier to kill civilians, swarming in metropolitan beehives, than the elusive and alert soldiers.
The second step, once the reciprocal destruction of the social fabric is thus assured, is an attempt to disarm the enemy by blowing up—Counterforce—his threatening rockets. To every known enemy launching pad are assigned several “sister” rockets, since a kill on a hardened silo 8,000 miles away is difficult to achieve. Assuming that the necessary ratio should be 3 to 1, which is ballistically optimistic, it would take 3,000 U. S. rockets to neutralize 1,000 Soviet rockets, 9,000 Soviet rockets to check the 3,000 U. S. rockets, 27,000 U. S. rockets for the 9,000 Soviet rockets, and so on indefinitely, to achieve a satisfactory counterbattery. And, bear in mind, we are not even considering the Polaris submarines. Naturally, the Soviet economy cannot afford such spiraling competition. Marshal Sokolovsky has made it crystal clear that the Soviet Union will satisfy itself with sitting ducks—U. S. civilians. The Reds will stick to “Countercity” strategy because they just cannot afford the cost of the Counterforce game in the long-range missile contest. Besides this lack of co-operation from the opponent, counterbattery has in itself such weaknesses that even the United States should be extremely careful in investing too much of its potential in such a tricky business. A not-too-distant-past Western experience—Dien Bien Phu—has shown the dangers of excessive confidence in counterbattery.
This famous and ill-fated French fortress had been built on the assumption that French counterbattery fire would silence the Communist artillery, even if the Viet Minh were able to bring heavy guns and ammunitions across hundreds of miles of impassable jungle and mountains. The French artillery commander had sworn that total control of the skies by the French Air Force plus superior Western techniques would easily offset the deadly threat of Communist guns on the fortress vital lifeline, the airfield.
This turned out to be a disastrous miscalculation. The Communists succeeded in emplacing and concealing their guns in such a way that both the French 155-mm. howitzers and the French Air Force were unable to destroy them during the battle. Moreover, thousands of tons of ammunition were wasted on Viet Minh “dummies,” so that this badly needed firepower was lacking when waves of infantry stormed the citadel. Faced with the collapse of his Counterforce plans, the French artillery commander committed suicide.
It is difficult to believe that an intercontinental counterbattery, across the Atlantic or the North Pole, would pay better dividends than the disappointing point-blank “battle of fires” at Dien Bien Phu, where the depth of the battlefield was only a few miles, and where the skies were in complete control of the friendly Air Force. The problem of target acquisition, 8,000 miles away, the difficulty of identification between live targets and dummies, the age-old principle of “economy of forces,” which must apply as well to nuclear forces, all weigh heavily against intercontinental Counterforce strategy from the purely military standpoint.
But this should not be the only point, because no one can say what techniques will arise ten years from now. There is another point.
To be sure, the idea of crippling the enemy by a blow on his arms—Counterforce against the ICBMs—instead of an attempt to kill him by a blow at his heart—Counter city strategy—is attractive at first glance. It is a shade below the horror of thermonuclear massacre, an attempt to return to the most traditional, civilized of wars—war between soldiers. But, regardless of feasibility, Counterforce seems to be wishful thinking.
First of all, it implies either that the United States will fire the first intercontinental volley, which U. S. policy-makers have consistently said they would not do, or that the Soviets would start the counterbattery game, which they keep saying they will not accept, and probably cannot actually accept, due to their numerical inferiority in rocketry. It is hard to believe, too, that U. S. leaders, firing second, would not retaliate in kind, but instead would or could satisfy themselves in blowing up only a few Red ICBMs to avenge the annihilation of New York!
Finally, one must bear in mind the tremendous advantage gained by the party shooting the first thermonuclear salvo.
This has led to the concept of Preventive (kill the bad guy when he is sleeping) or at least Pre-emptive (draw faster than he can) war, that everybody appears to reject on “humanitarian” grounds, but which cannot be buried very deep in the back of the minds of the people responsible for their nation’s survival. The military reward is too great. So loud, and so persuasive, are the arguments in favor of these concepts that, in time of high crisis, or maximum fear, or extreme nervous tension, all “humanitarian” considerations could be drowned out.
The evidence of an ICBM trajectory extending to the U.S.S.R. mainland, whatever its objective, would probably trigger Soviet ICBMs toward New York and Chicago and vice versa. The more effective the expected counterbattery, the more tempted would be the opponent threatened of losing his arms, to shoot directly, as rapidly as possible, at the other fellow’s heart. And, in terms of fallout, the results of the many ground bursts necessary to kill the ICBM would probably annihilate the cities as well as direct and deliberate hits. What would have happened, for instance, if the warning lights which once accidentally upset the U. S. Air Defense Command, had delivered their false but frightening message (ICBM coming) at the very time when the Russian Fleet was heading into the U. S. Navy blockade in front of Cuba? This underlines, incidentally, the dangers of perpetual rocket-rattling, and of the tight-rope on which humanity is riding in this age of intercontinental ballistic strategies.
For all these reasons, the “firebreak” in the spectrum of escalation that some pious people would like to drive between intercontinental Counterforce and Countercity strategies appears immaterial.
The escalation to maximum destruction would probably occur in a matter of minutes —perhaps before the first H-bomb exploded- no matter who fires first, if the I CBM is aimed at any target clearly in the Russian or U. S. heartland.
Like the French artillery commander’s counterbattery in Dien Bien Phu, intercontinental counterbattery—or Strategic Counterforce—with its enormous cost, is a fallacy which risks, without preventing total annihilation, the wasting in peacetime and in wartime of the nuclear potential we will need so badly to stop the Communist hordes when they come down to the plains.
A U. S. Counterforce strategy, however, is the only alternative to general suicide, the only form of defense thinkable in the nuclear age, as long as the possibility remains that the Soviet Union will not remain deterred from launching an ICBM. Needless to say, the United States must retain its clear-cut quantitative advantage in ICBMs over the Soviet Union. But this advantage does not justify the costly fallacy of a true Counterforce capability in the field of long-range bombardment. In this field, which is the “direct military approach” between the United States and the Soviet Union, a complete stalemate seems to have been reached. The two antagonists are not behaving as though they expect such a duel. If they did, would they not start moving New York or Moscow underground? Or move to the countryside? Or place much more urgent emphasis on Civil Defense?
No, apparently these two giants agree on one point: the best defense—the only defense thinkable—is the maintenance of a gigantic offensive capability, an unprecedented retaliatory capacity which is supposed, in itself, to prevent the enemy from resorting to the long-range shooting game. This extraordinary confidence in the unlikelihood of intercontinental exchange, this extraordinary solidarity of hostile societies living exposed, naked, under the apocalyptic and reciprocal threat, are they not the best guarantee of peace, and of limitation of eventual wars, by all means? Are they not the guarantee, after all, that the military games would probably stop short of The International Shooting Contest? (In other words, if you want thermonuclear peace, prepare for thermonuclear war.) This does not mean, unfortunately, that there are no other ways of waging wars, and the indirect approach begun by the Soviets around the world 40 years ago is one of the examples against which the Free World is just beginning to react. Nor does this mean that the Soviets would not think of using another form of indirect approach against the United States which would not unleash the American ICBMs. An indirect approach would be very direct for U. S. allies in continental Europe, and its success would throw the European strength into the Communist camp and give the Soviets victory.
Here lies, with the core of the NATO problems, the field in which a U. S. Counterforce strategy could and should be applied.
Checkmated in the long-range shooting game by the clear-cut U. S. advantage in ICBMs; checkmated on the seas by the Free World navies; checkmated—we hope—in their subversive envelopment by an improving Western unity and economy, now the last Soviet possible indirect approach (as seen from the United States) has to be checkmated by a U. S. strategy applied against the force which, unlike the ICBM, has been for years the main headache of the U. S. allies—the Red Army along the Iron Curtain.
It is time for U. S. thinkers to focus their attention a little more on close combat, a little less on long-range shooting. Cuba has blown up Khrushchev’s rocket bluff. The U. S. mainland will be secure from direct hits as long as the present retaliatory advantage is maintained. It would be unwise to waste an excess of potential to achieve a splendid illusory Counterforce capability. With a nuclear combat power ever increasing, the Counterforce strategy has to be devoted to the task of blocking the last wide-open avenue of approach to the Red ambitions—the plains of northern Europe.
For all the reasons explained above, unlike the “long-range shooting game,” the tactical use of nuclear weapons against soldiers would not result automatically in reciprocal execution of the thermonuclear hostages, the cities. Here the responsibility of shooting farther can be left to the enemy, the global U. S. superiority will guarantee that the Soviets will avoid “geographical” escalation and suffer retaliation in kind. The devil of escalation must be exorcised. And the numerical advantage in Western tactical warheads would deter the Soviets from starting the close combat game. Nuclear firepower has such an advantage over ground movement that offense is practically impossible. The Soviets could not hope to breach the nuclear shield along the Iron Curtain. They know it so well that they try to agitate perpetually the scarecrow of escalation to convince the United States that a Davy Crockett would unleash automatically retaliation by I CBM. This is a psychological maneuver to neutralize Western tactical combat power and in so doing, to keep open the U.S.S.R. avenue of approach, and widen the rift in Allied ranks. This is mere bluff, as the rocket rattling about Cuba was mere bluff. No loud attack would ever occur, because it would not succeed, if it were to be met by a certain nuclear barrage. The only point is to convince the U. S. policy makers, their Allies, and the Russians, that there can be and will be a nuclear barrage, a kind of impassable minefield protecting Western Europe.
This move, which, unlike the suicidal ICBM, would be at the same time credible deterrence and effective defense, can only be achieved if the soldiers guarding the Fence get the right to use the weapons they possess. Only then the soldiers would have the necessary confidence in their weapons; only then would they devise the proper tactical doctrine; only then the Soviets could not risk the “poker- stroke,” only then the Allies could no longer doubt the U. S. determination.
Of course, it will be argued that nuclear weapons should be controlled by civilians. This is obviously true for H-bombs, and for all the offensive hardware of long-range bombardment which involves annihilation for civilians. This should not apply to the weapons of the front line troops who have the permanent mission of defending the Fence but have not yet the permission to shoot anything but peanuts! To those who fear that a general will fire an Honest John, or a major his Davy Crockett, through stupidity, foolishness or accident, the following question should be asked: “How many wars have resulted from such causes?”
The answer is: “None.”
How many rifle shots, how many 105-mm. artillery rounds have been fired at the Soviets since World War II? Would nuclear weapons be handled less carefully? Would not G-2 be able to see the difference between a lost Russian patrol and a full-scale attack? Are professional soldiers that stupid? And if an accident or a nuclear incident should occur on the front line, resulting from a mistake or a deliberate Soviet “probe,” would Khrushchev blow up New York—and Moscow—to revenge a patrol or a tank company? And vice versa? How many wars resulted from T.N.T. explosions of this kind? Would nuclear war be less serious?
Such risks, even if they exist, cannot compare with possible Soviet miscalculation; they do not compare either with the disastrous state of minds of Western tacticians who cannot and will not build a nuclear tactical doctrine on the question mark of hypothetically authorized weapons. They do not compare; mainly, with the nightmare of the Continental European: somewhere between the Red Army and the Atlantic, there should be somebody delegated the power to release nuclear weapons; the Efficiency of deterrence being expressed by the formula E = PW2, in which the factor W (Will) is even more important than the factor P (Power). The Russians must know that between them and the Atlantic, between them and the victory, the factor W is not going to be nil.
One manifestation of the factor of “Will” has been the proliferation of “independent” nuclear forces. Under conditions whereby the chief partner would not even authorize his own soldiers to shoot at the common enemy for the common sake, such an outcome was clearly inevitable. Europe cannot forever tolerate the Russian rocket-rattling, and consent to play the role of underdog in the Western Alliance.
It must be understood, once and for all, that no true Atlantic partnership, no surrender of “nationalism” will ever happen as long as the leader sets the contrary example, and sticks to such obviously nationalistic dinosaurs as the useless and obsolete MacMahon Act. A few practical deeds in this field would speak much louder than grand verbal designs. As long as direct Russian threat to Europe remains an indirect approach to America—i.e., as long as the Grand Design (the Atlantic Community) is not achieved—- the Continental Europeans must possess (with or without help from the United States) the means of deterring by themselves the Red rocket blackmail (which means Countercity strategy for a long time to come). God helps him who helps himself.
It is time to focus U. S. strategic thinking on problems of European Defense which command all the others. “Indirect” Soviet approaches should now be the main concern in the formulation of U. S. national strategy. The “direct” threat is checkmated.
In Europe, a tactical nuclear defense can offer the middle of the road solution between general massacre and prohibitive mass armies of the past.
Only the armies in the field can apply a true Counterforce because, unlike the long- range shooting apparatus, the front line troops always find the military target; they search for it in offense or it comes to them in defense. The depth of the nuclear battlefield should not exceed the limits of possible discrimination between civilians and military targets. This depth is probably more than enough to crush ground movements and the offense. This point should be carefully studied, because the firebreak between war and suicide might be found to lie here.
No ICBM, no Polaris, no Multilateral Force will be able to fire effectively at military targets, which are not “sitting ducks,” hundreds or thousands miles away. They will shoot according to the maps: airfields, road networks, factories, maybe true or false launching pads; they will create fallout; they will kill civilians one way or another, and will trigger immediately the general holocaust. They are bound to remain psychological weapons, therefore, weapons necessary for deterrence, not weapons for war. The shortcomings of “target acquisition” are here to stay. The only possible Counterforce is tactical in nature.
Then, it is up to the land forces, to the tacticians, to raise their voices which have been silenced for the last 15 years by the thunder of intercontinental rockets. They must come up with the doctrinal solution to tactical nuclear war, and, particularly, nuclear defense. As far as the offense is concerned, it must be feared that even if a successful land attack around the Soviet Bloc were feasible, the Communist leaders, rather than surrender, would trigger ICBMs and bury the planet along with their dreams. Hitler would have done so.
Thus, it is in the field of economic and psychological warfare, in the “fourth dimension of war,” that the united West has to think “offense” in the protracted conflict. Our economic advantage should now be the sword of the West: the ICBM deterrent for long-range shooting and the tactical nuclear warfare for close combat should now become the shield.
This seems to be the only strategy able to strengthen the shaky unity of the West, checkmate the Communists from all directions, convince them to give up their fantastic dreams of world conquest, and bring—slowly but surely—an end to our nightmares.