The problem of recruiting worthwhile manpower is a perennial one in the Navy, and from time to time various experiments have been undertaken to overcome this difficulty. One of the most interesting, in the sense that it was a preview of some of the practices which are now routine, was that conducted by Secretary of the Navy, Samuel L. Southard, in 1828.
In his annual report for 1825, Southard called the attention of President John Quincy Adams to the problems encountered in recruiting seamen for the U. S. Navy. Shortages of men, he said, delayed the sailing of ships. The trouble was due in part to the higher wages and “stronger inducements” in the merchant service and “the temptations presented by other Governments. ...”
Southard felt that it was necessary for Congress to enact permanent regulations that would make the Navy more attractive, would stimulate recruiting, and would help to build a permanent force. He added:
... a system must be devised which will ensure voluntary enlistments sufficient to meet our increasing wants. Two of the features of this system will probably be, to admit more boys, in the character of apprentices, and to enlist robust and healthy landsmen in the interior, who will soon acquire the habits and skill of seamen, and form a most valuable portion of our force.
Southard’s unprecedented proposal to extend recruiting operations from the seaports to the interior of the country seems not to have been noticed by President Adams or Congress, and the shortages of seamen persisted.
In August 1827, the Navy Department issued an order to recruiting officers at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk to make “every exertion” to overcome the shortages so that the frigate Delaware could sail.
Meanwhile, Captain Jesse D. Elliott, U. S. Navy,* returned from a cruise in the frigate Cyane and visited his home in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Elliott was aware of the Navy’s recruiting problem, and on 5 September 1827, he wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy with a suggestion for overcoming the difficulty. In this letter he said that while traveling from Philadelphia to the Potomac,
. . . my attention was drawn to the great proportion of young and able bodyed men, not either imployed in cultivating the soil or engaged in mechanics, but who, when directed to the Navy: would not only prove beneficial to themselves but equaly to both the civil and military marine—the difficulty of obtaining men of a suitable and in sufficient number and quality to serve in the introductory grade, both in the merchant service and in the Navy, is sufficiently apparent to require a resort to the interior, which I am sure would not only prove agreeable to the inhabitants but equaly to the Navy—should this suggestion meet the approbation of the government and your intention to establish a chain of Rendezvous in the important towns in the Valley of Virginia Maryland and Pennsylvania [and] the government not have other service for me, I would with pleasure become the superin- tendant.
Southard replied on 11 September that a change in the existing recruiting arrangements was not “indispensable”, but, if it became so, “your views will be considered and probably adopted.”
In the spring of 1828, however, Southard decided to try the inland recruiting experiment. On 1 April, he placed Elliott in charge. Elliott was to proceed to Carlisle, Pennsylvania, secure the necessary quarters at the most reasonable terms, and “enlist healthy, able bodied men between 18 & 25 years of age as landsmen for General Service.” Boys between the ages of 15 and 17 could be entered. Lieutenants John B. Montgomery and William Inman, and Midshipmen H. J. Auchmuty and Thomas J. Harris would assist him. With Carlisle as his headquarters, Elliott was to extend the operation to the surrounding area. When a sufficient number of men were enlisted to make up a draft, they were to be put under the charge of competent officers, sent to Baltimore, and placed on board a receiving ship. The escort officers would then return to Carlisle for further duty. The Navy Department was to receive weekly statistics on recruiting and quarterly reports on expenses. The officers engaged in this service were to receive the same allowances given to those assigned to Naval Rendezvous in the seaport towns.
At Carlisle, Elliott was joined on 20 April by Lieutenants Inman and Montgomery. The two midshipmen arrived shortly thereafter. Montgomery was sent to Chambersburg, and Inman to Harrisburg to open recruiting offices.
When arrangements were completed at Chambersburg, Elliott recommended that Montgomery send his recruiting party to the neighboring towns and villages. He was cautioned against enlisting a minor unless he had the “full & free permission” of his guardians. Elliott also suggested that recruiters adopt “a mild and conciliatory course of conduct towards all persons with whom your official duties may bring you in contact.”
Near the end of April, Elliott wrote Southard that the kind and quality of recruits was “such as I have never yet seen employed in their grade in the Naval Service.” Furthermore, the experiment was giving employment to members of the indigent population who were preparing the uniforms and lodging for recruits.
The Captain needed more officers to take the recruits to Baltimore, however, and he asked for another lieutenant and a midshipman. He also requested the services of two fifers and two drummers from the Marine Corps. Southard regretted that he could not furnish the musicians desired, but Lieutenant William S. Ogden and Midshipman John M. Berrien were sent to Carlisle to assist. Elliott next proposed that recruiting be extended to Hagerstown, Maryland. The Secretary, however, thought that the operation should be confined to the three designated cities.
Many of the recruits were quartered at Carlisle Barracks which then consisted of nine buildings, some of which were used to store tenting equipment and ammunition for cannons, while others served as stables for sheep and hogs. Urgent repairs were made on these latter buildings before they were turned over to the Navy.
As previously noted, Southard contemplated enlisting boys from 15 to 17 and men between the ages of 18 and 25. But Elliott’s instructions to Montgomery and the local newspaper advertisements broadened the age span for men from 17 to 29 years. Soon after the start of the project, Southard authorized the enlistment of boys as young as 14, with the consent of parents or guardian.
Originally, it was intended to carry on the Pennsylvania experiment in the same way as recruitment on the seacoast. The usual procedure at that time was to give each recruit two months pay, out of which sum he would equip himself for service. Landlords, proprietors of grog shops, and other parasitic types often attempted to separate the recruit from his advance pay. Sometimes a hapless young man was obliged to pawn his clothing for more money, reporting for duty virtually naked. Elliott was well aware of this unfortunate Practice, and was determined to prevent its establishment inland. Instead of two months Pay, therefore, each man was given only enough money to buy a uniform and to supply his minimum needs. The balance of his advance was promised to him upon his arrival at a Receiving Ship.
Putting the recruits in uniform as soon as Possible made them easily identifiable and minimized the possibilities of desertion. Upon Eeing accepted for service, each recruit was issued a shirt, a pair of trousers, a jacket, a black silk scarf, a hat, a pair of shoes, a blanket, and a bag. He was allowed to keep only those articles of civilian attire necessary for his comfort and cleanliness.
The Pennsylvania recruiting policies differed in another way from those on the sea- coast, where each recruit had to provide the name of a responsible person who would vouch for the recruit’s reporting for duty at the required time. No advance wages were Paid to a recruit who did not have his “Security.” Since Elliott did not give the usual advance wages, he did not require the use of a Security. In describing these arrangements to the Secretary, Elliott pointed out that the People in this region were of a type and character different from those on the seaboard. They acted “under a sense of moral obligation.” So, as a substitute for a Security, Elliott added to the articles of agreement, the recruits’ enlistment oath then used by the Army, and established another precedent.
Until they were ready to be sent to the sea- coast, the recruits, as mentioned before, were kept at Carlisle Barracks, or, in some instances, in the nearby towns. Since the recruits already were excellent rifle shots, Elliott gave them advanced rifle practice and also trained them in the use of a cannon borrowed from the Army. Elliott reported that he was able to feed them at a cost of $1.25 per man per week, a saving to the government of $.50 per week.
Early in May, the first detachment of 33 men under the command of Lieutenant Inman was ready. They were to walk to their destination, and Elliott estimated that the Journey would take three days. Accompanying the party was a wagon (hired at S3.00 per day) that presumably carried Lieutenant Inman, the baggage, and the food.
Near Baltimore, one of the recruits deserted and Lieutenant Inman, being unable to leave the other men, could not undertake a pursuit. The rest of the party arrived in good order. But, contrary to Elliott’s expectations, Captain John D. Henley, the Commander of the Baltimore Naval Rendezvous, sent Lieutenant Inman on to Norfolk with the recruits. This left Elliott shorthanded at a time when he needed all the officers assigned to him.
Southard, however, advised Captain Henley that in the future recruits bound for Norfolk should be placed in charge of an officer from the Baltimore station. Officers from the Carlisle Rendezvous were to return to Carlisle without delay. Meanwhile, Elliott’s recruits were sent from Norfolk to New York, where they joined the frigate Hudson.
By the time the first detachment had set out for Baltimore, 25 additional recruits from Harrisburg were at Carlisle awaiting orders. Elliott suggested to Southard that, since a large number of recruits were mechanics, they might be employed advantageously in the navy yards in place of men who did not like such work. And he again urged the establishment of a chain of recruiting stations from Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to Staunton, Virginia. Southard replied that the present arrangements were “merely an experiment,” and since there was no immediate need for more men, he was unwilling to extend the recruiting operations. But, “it will probably be done hereafter.”
Later on the same day, Southard ordered Elliot to send the next draft of recruits to Philadelphia. They would then be sent forward to man the sloop Vandalia, soon to be launched in New York.
On 24 May, Elliott wrote Southard that 21 men were walking to Philadelphia under the command of Lieutenants Montgomery and Ogden. This time each officer was mounted on a horse. If any man attempted to desert, one officer could pursue him while the other remained with the party.
The recruits arrived in Philadelphia on the morning of 28 May, and were delivered to Commodore William Bainbridge on board a receiving ship. At this point, Montgomery found himself in an awkward situation.
It will be remembered that, in Carlisle, recruits were given only the bare amount of money necessary to outfit them for their journey. They were promised the remainder of their advance wages when they reached the seaboard. Now, Bainbridge refused to allow Montgomery to pay the men. He told Montgomery that if recruits had been sent to him from New York, or any other station, with only one suit of clothing, he would have sent them back. Montgomery explained his dilemma to the men who reportedly accepted the situation with good humor. Montgomery also notified Elliott.
Elliott was furious and wrote a prompt letter to the Secretary of the Navy explaining the local circumstances which made it advisable to depart from the established practice. He added:
Good faith is essential to success of every undertaking, public or private—In public transactions, its violation is inexcusable. Entertaining those opinions, you will judge of my suprise & mortification to hear of Com Bainbridge interposing objections to the fulfillment of our solemn engagements, and finding fault with the condition of men, who . . . marched on foot one hundred & fifty miles & presented themselves at the receiving ship without a murmur or complaint.
By the time Southard received this news, the recruits had been transferred to New York. Southard at once ordered Commodore Isaac Chauncey at that port to pay each man the balance of the advance wages due him.
The Philadelphia experience doubtless prompted Elliott to suggest to Southard that Baltimore be made the port of delivery for all future recruits since it was 50 miles closer to Carlisle. If, however, public convenience required that men be sent to Philadelphia, he would endeavor to get the men to go there cheerfully “not withstanding the cold and icy welcome which awaits them.” The Secretary approved Elliott’s recommendations, and the Captain was ordered to send all future recruits to Baltimore.
As Southard had previously ordered, Elliott confined his activities to Carlisle, Harrisburg, and Chambersburg, with occasional visits to neighboring villages within eight or ten miles. To prevent any complaints about his taking men needed locally, Elliott kept recruiters away from the immediate neighborhoods of private manufacturing plants and the public works of the state. Arrangements were made to pay the local doctors $2.00 for their examination of every man accepted for service. This made it possible for the doctors to act as local agents whether a naval officer was present or not. Nevertheless, Elliott wanted to have an officer constantly on duty at each of the various stations.
No official weekly reports had yet been sent to the Secretary, and Elliott explained that the delay was due in part to the absence of some officers, and to his system of giving only partial advances in pay to the recruits. Until all the officers had returned to Carlisle and the data was at hand, Elliott could only give an interim report. This was that as of 24 May, 64 men had been enlisted. All but nine of these had been sent forward, and those remaining were employed as musicians and recruiting assistants. Despite the absence of official returns, the Secretary had enough information about, or faith in, the experiment so that, on 23 May, he issued an order to the recruiting officers at Charlestown, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk not to enlist any more landsmen or boys.
Everywhere Elliott went, he found all classes of people expressing their approval of the recruiting experiment as beneficial both to the individual and the area. Nevertheless, he felt it would help the cause if the recruits could be told at the outset in what ship, and under which commander they would serve. For, while people in the region were “not conversant with the technicalities of the Navy, they have a pretty accurate knowledge of the characters of the officers, & are not without preferences as to those under whom they would wish to be employed.” Southard replied that it was not always practical to name the vessels and the commanders. As an example, he mentioned that a frigate and sloop-of- war destined for the Brazilian squadron, and two sloops-of-war for the Mediterranean had no commanders designated for them as yet.
Meanwhile, Southard himself was busy with other matters. In response to a resolution of the Senate to report on the difficulties encountered in enlisting seamen for the Navy, the Secretary wrote a long reply. In it, he pinpointed the causes and suggested remedies. He thought that the appropriate remedy was to increase the number of native-born Americans in the ranks of the naval and merchant service. To attain this goal, Southard proposed five steps, including the enlistment of landsmen from the interior regions of the country; placing a larger number of them between 18 and 25 years of age on board our ships; giving the Navy the legal authority to enlist, with the written consent of their parents, boys between the ages of 13 and 16 who would serve until they were 21 years; and enacting legislation requiring merchant ships to carry at least one boy between 14 and 18 years of age for every hundred tons of cargo. By this long-range program, Southard hoped to raise a body of men who could qualify for the ranks of ordinary seaman and seaman. Southard estimated that the plan for enlisting landsmen in inland areas would give the Navy an annual increase of 300 to 500 good men who would remain in the Service. And he believed that, if his program were enacted, it would not only fill the Navy with American citizens, but would save the government $150,000 annually.
About this time, the newspapers took notice of the Pennsylvania experiment. In Philadelphia, The Daily Chronicle was pleased with the project and reported that:
The recruits have already been numerous —and of a character far better entitled to confidence than that of many who have been picked up, on the sea-board, for the naval service. Drunkards and idlers are rejected.
It is certainly a novel idea, to seek even landsmen and ordinary seamen, in the interior of the country, among the sons of our respectable farmers, most of whom, probably have never seen a ship or dipped their feet in the water of the ocean. But they are good stuff, and, we doubt not, many among these youths, will soon learn to “hand, reef, and steer,” as well as the best. . . .
The success of the experiment seems to be unquestionable. If such numbers enlist when the canals, the coal mines, and the approaching harvest, offer abundant sources of employment, many more may be expected in those seasons when work is worse paid, and less easily procured. These proofs of the inclination of our people to this service are highly gratifying, and give strong assurances that the glory of our navy is not destined to diminish.
The recruits continued to respond to approaches of Elliott and his officers. The difficulties of merging the men recruited at Chambersburg with those enlisted at Harrisburg and Carlisle led Elliott to try a new arrangement whereby the detachments met at Gettysburg and continued on to Baltimore. On 16 June, 27 recruits under the charge of Midshipmen Harris and Berrien were transported to Baltimore by way of Gettysburg.
Five days later, Elliott wrote to Southard that by the middle of the next month he would have about another 30 men ready to send. He suggested that since the recruits passed through many small towns on their way to the seacoast, it would be possible to send an advance party along the route to enlist men and send them with the main detachment.
But for the present, Elliott was apprehensive that too much zeal in recruiting might lessen the popularity of the Navy. This was particularly true now that the harvest season was approaching. For this reason, Elliott directed his officers to slow down their activity.
Nevertheless, by the first of July, Elliott had a total of 33 men from his three depots which he sent forward to Baltimore via Gettysburg. On the morning of 7 July, another detachment of 26 men and boys under Midshipman Berrien followed.
By this time, the Navy had all the landsmen and boys it could use for a while, and Southard ordered Elliott to close the Rendezvous until further notice. The Captain put a notice to this effect in the newspapers, but found that he could not close down as quickly as ordered. Some men who had heard about the recruiting depot had traveled from as far as 150 miles away to enlist. Under the circumstances Elliott did not feel he could turn them away.
Yet, soon it was necessary to end all the exceptions. The continued appeal of the Navy led Elliott to recommend that those wishing to enlist, and especially those who had come from a distance, might be enrolled with the understanding that when the Rendezvous opened again, they would have the first preference. Until that time they would receive no pay or subsistence. The Navy Department does not appear to have authorized this arrangement, but some similar message was probably given to the prospective recruits.
The closing down of operations gave Elliott an opportunity to review the experiment. Considering that out of all the recruits who enlisted, only one had been rejected on physical grounds, Elliott wondered if the expense of hiring doctors might not be dispensed with in the future. It was true, of course, that the doctors had rendered very useful service as agents and promoted the success of enlistments. Still, Elliott wanted to apply the money spent for medical examinations to pay for additional musicians.
On the matter of sending recruits to the seacoast, Elliott pointed out that while the usual costs of transportation were about $7.00 per man, he was able to deliver his recruits at the cost of about $2.00 each.
The Captain’s concern that the popularity of the naval service be maintained, led him to take special care to see that no suspicious or undesirable types were enlisted. If such a man escaped this scrutiny, was enlisted, and subsequently deserted, Elliott was not inclined to make any great effort to find him, on the assumption that the Navy was probably better off without him. By September, however, Elliott felt obliged to report that there were several deserters lurking about in the vicinity of Carlisle and other places. The reward usually offered on the seacoast for the capture of deserters would not be sufficient in this case to pay the cost of arresting such men and taking them to Baltimore. If the Department was interested in apprehending these men, Elliott advocated that it pay enough to make the task attractive to someone who would do the job privately.
Elliott also suggested that if the recruiting stations were to be reopened, the number of officers assigned to them should be increased. Since the duty was easy, invalid officers might be used. If the Department saw fit to give him other duties, Elliott stipulated that his successor be an officer who had served abroad, or in a dock yard, or naval station. Presumably, such officers would be in a better position to deal with American recruits and answer questions about service afloat.
During this period of suspended activity, Elliott was not without his problems. From the very beginning, it was customary to allow the recruits to make an allotment from their monthly pay for their parents or dependents. The somewhat irregular procedures used by the Pennsylvania recruiters prevailed in the case of some of the allotments. Southard was finally obliged to write Elliott that if it would not be too inconvenient for the parties concerned, it would be better for the men not to make out allotment tickets until they went on board some vessel, where it could be done in proper form.
Trouble arose among the recruits being kept at Carlisle. While in a drunken state, a ringleader induced the recruits to commit some “outrage” on the man in charge of their barracks. Elliott found the ringleader and gave him “a moderate chastisement for the offense.” To prevent a recurrence of such actions, Elliott decided to send the recruits to the coast. On 26 July, therefore, the remaining recruits were sent to Baltimore under Midshipman Berrien.
There was also trouble on other fronts. A recruit who had entered near the end of April made an application to the Navy Department for his discharge on the grounds that he was enlisted while intoxicated. The Department wrote Elliott for an explanation. Elliott turned to Lieutenant Inman who had enlisted the man at Harrisburg. Inman replied that no one had been enlisted while under the influence of alcohol. Presumably this reply was satisfactory, but other complaints followed which centered on the recruiting activities in Chambersburg. The Navy Department wrote Elliott that “almost daily applications are made for the discharge of men on the grounds that they were drunk when entered.”
Late in September, Elliott reminded Southard that the harvesting season would soon be over, and the most favorable time for recruiting would be at hand. Already, several persons in Harrisburg and Carlisle were waiting for the opportunity to enlist. If the service still needed men, Elliott had no doubt that its wants could be supplied in a short time. And if the recruiting stations were to be reopened, Elliott urged that Hagerstown, Maryland, be substituted in place of Chambersburg. The local situation in Chambers- burg and its distance from the Potomac contributed to limiting the success of recruiting there. Finally, before operations could commence again, the Captain needed another midshipman to replace Harris, who had been ordered to other duty.
But the experiment was at an end. Except for Elliott, all the officers on Pennsylvania recruiting duty were assigned elsewhere. A year later, in September 1829, Elliott himself was given the command of the U. S. naval force in the West Indies.
An Army source says that the last naval recruits left Carlisle Barracks in November 1828, but it would seem that the operation had ended by early October. When the last of the Navy departed, Carlisle Barracks was left in an abandoned state.
So ended a unique experiment in naval recruiting. It seems reasonable to conclude that it was a success. Why was it not continued? The answer lies partly in the Navy’s need to assimilate the untrained recruits before enlisting others. By the time the value of these men could be measured, other circumstances had changed the outlook of the Navy Department. In the fall of 1828, Andrew Jackson was elected as President. When his administration took over in the spring of 1829, the new Secretary of the Navy, John Branch, faced problems more serious than that of recruiting. And before he had solved them, he himself was a casualty of changing political forces.
In suggesting that the future strength of the Navy lay inland, among the farmers, mechanics, and plain people of the country, Secretary Southard and Captain Elliott expressed a sentiment reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson’s belief that the true guardians of democracy were among the rural population of the nation. This faith in the people at the grass roots of the Republic was soon given wider publicity in connection with the election and the presidency of Andrew Jackson. The era of the common man was at hand, and in a limited way the Carlisle experiment was the Navy’s preview of it.
With his appreciation of local needs and sentiments, and by his use of newspaper advertisements, local assistance, martial music and distinctive uniforms, Captain Elliott showed that he had a good sense of public relations. He and his little band of inland recruiters were the advance guard of an organization which, in the 20th century, would reach into virtually every city and village in America to build the Navy and the future.
* Elliott was a veteran of the War of 1812. As commander of the Niagara in the Battle of Lake Erie, he had not distinguished himself. Subsequently, he became the bitter enemy of Oliver Hazard Perry. Elliott and his friend James Barron were both publicly involved in a tangled series of personal disputes with Perry and also with Stephen Decatur. Barron’s quarrel with Decatur eventually led to the famous duel in which Decatur was killed.