The expression “Command and Control” has been employed often in recent years by many observers of the politico-military scene.' To a majority of these individuals the term has come to absorb the implications of the invention and development of modern electronic data processing. Let us therefore examine the theoretical atmosphere which surrounds the military leader’s command and control problem (in both its conventional and nuclear phases) in the age of the computer.
As many of us realize, the technical progress of our era has presented the commander of today with an extraordinarily different requirement for facts as compared to those necessary in preceding ages. The advent of the atomic weapon, the long-range missile, and the jet aircraft have, by their very nature, placed a tremendous emphasis upon the time element in the decision equation involving the command and control of forces.
The challenge that faces us is a panoramic one, and must be analyzed in toto, for it is this spectrum of conflict that gives rise to the variables in our requirements. It covers the area from the left pole of nuclear war, the “Megawar,” to the right pole of the Cold War, transcending such graduations of conflict as Korea and Lebanon, and including, of course, threats such as we experienced in Cuba last year.
If we furnish an arbitrary explanation of our national strategy, it might be defined as the utilization by a nation of its political, economic, military, and psychological resources, either in peace or war, to attain certain national objectives. Parallel to this basic thinking is the belief of the United States that war must adhere to reason, remaining the servant of national interests and ambitions, never attaining the position of an irrational master, and never becoming an instrument of suicidal absurdity.
Further developing our theory of war, we shall apply our hypothesis to the specific policies of the United States, and shall summarize the major politico-military objectives of this country as follows:
1. To deter any attack, whether conventional or nuclear, upon our territories, and upon those of our allies, and to defend these territories when and if they are attacked.
2. With the failure of deterrent action, to endeavor to contain over-all damage and to emerge, ultimately, the victor in the struggle, after the appropriate military action has been taken.
3. To assist in the strengthening of the Free World against the Communist menace and its plan for global domination.
The Soviet Union has, to use a strong word, perverted all traditional concepts of war and peace, making no distinction between the two in its protracted scheme for global supremacy. The basic explanation for this—in our terms —“unconventional” behavior is the “unusual” role played by Soviet ideology in their society. Within our democratic environment, our actions must justify our ideology, that is, we must uphold a prescribed set of principles in the formulating of policy, whether in war or in peace. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, by virtue of the dialectic, it is the ideology which invariably is revised to justify the action, that is, the Soviet Union may abrogate traditional principles if the current situation warrants it.
Whereas we are perhaps burdened with a dual rigidity, the Soviet Union is able to create policy for its march of expansion, and is perhaps therefore blessed with a dual flexibility. Again, we are over-simplifying, and are here telescoping 45 years of Soviet historiography into a few sentences.
Lenin himself, when the Bolsheviks attained power in late 1917, decided that socialism was equitable with anarchy, and he therefore allowed the workers and peasants to exercise control over factory and farm, with little or no supervision, either government or managerial. Shortly thereafter, during the civil war that followed the revolution, this policy proved to be ineffectual, and Lenin shifted his line to one of strict centralized control, entitling the program “War Communism.” When this, too, failed to bring economic stability, the “New Economic Policy” was instituted, and a semi-capitalistic system was allowed to function. Thus, within a period of approximately five years, the concept of socialism experienced a series of drastic metamorphoses, both in theory and in practice. In other words, the ideology was manipulated to justify the actions of the regime. This phenomenon still occurs today, as we know, most noticeably in the increasingly tense, dogmatic polemics between the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Another example of this type of maneuver was the support, by the Soviet Union, of the forces of Chiang Kai-shek against the weak Chinese Communist movement of the 1920s. At this time the new regime in Russia was searching for allies, to better her international economic and political status. A trade agreement had been negotiated with Germany at Rapallo in 1922, but little support could be found elsewhere. The German nation at this time was also an “outsider” on the international scene, being the protagonist of World War I, but the Soviets were desperate. To augment this tenuous international bond, the sabotage of another Communist movement was deemed both expedient and proper.
An example of Soviet abruptness and utter reversal of policy, assuming that there was any intention of abiding by the initial provisions, was the denial of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Stalinist Russia and this same Chiang Kai-shek in July of 1945. In less than six months after signing this pact, Stalin was arming the Chinese Communists against the Nationalists. What makes the Soviet Union interesting and enigmatic, and certainly dangerous, is the question as to whether there was any real intention of upholding the articles of this or any other treaty.
The Soviet Union is not involved in a process of evolution as we understand the meaning of the term. In most cases, evolution implies an almost passive change. Quite the contrary is evident in the case of the Soviet Union, for in her the United States faces an active and aggressive power, one which will condone any means to serve its ends.
In the light of the above, the time element is of infinite consequence to a nation limited in its scope of action by its principles, a nation often politically and economically hamstrung by the interrelationship of prevalent theory and common practice. This is particularly true when we are dealing with an unpredictable adversary, and especially true when we compress this uncertainty into seconds, as we would be forced to do in the event of a surprise attack. We must be ready for any and all actions on the part of the Soviet Union. Crises, as history has shown us, may either explode, or may build up slowly. What we must recognize is that there will always be crises, and, of course, we must meet them as best we can.
There has been much speculation on just what our modus operandi would be if we actually had to mobilize our military resources to meet one of these crises, and many have wondered just how we would restrict the conflict to a conventional one. A near-perfect illustration of this is the deployment of U. S. naval forces on station for two months during the Cuban quarantine last year.
Here is the challenge in its most peremptory form, as posed by the Cold War side of the spectrum of conflict. It demonstrated an incident that entailed the use of conventional weapons, but it was also one in which the use of nuclear weapons might have been necessary. Our reaction had to be immediate and firm, if we were to achieve our purpose and uphold our principles. We could not delay this action, nor could we afford to delay our mobilization. We had to be in a position to strike with all possible speed.
Our political leaders had, in this case, established limited objectives, that is, the removal of all offensive armament from Cuban soil. The United States gathered the men and material necessary for the task. Initially, these forces had only to be of the type able to establish a quarantine in order to enforce our demands, but, in addition, it was mandatory that we possess the capability to conduct precise attacks which would destroy the armament if it was not removed. Power and policy were working hand in hand with responsibility.
The commander of the mission was the Commander-in-Chief of Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine units in the Atlantic Area, the Unified Command of CINCLANT. As one may readily surmise, CINCLANT faced the issue of command and control, with his forces deployed to all parts of the Caribbean. He had to take into account two key factors: the various methods of enemy attack—surface, sub-surface, and air; and the defense of our naval base at Guantanamo Bay.
All of the facets of a situation that called for the highly rational exercise of command and control were in evidence. It was vital that the correct decisions be made, for it was indeed possible that the affair could deteriorate into an all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Our planning first called for a priority selection of military targets in Cuba, targets that must be neutralized if we were to gain air superiority. For obvious reasons, the choice fell to conventional weaponry. Geographical and topographical considerations favored us, making the selection and allocation of these targets a relatively simple process. Adequate forces were immediately positioned and placed in an alert status.
The forces involved may roughly be broken down as follows:
1. The at-sea quarantine task force, which barred the further entrance of arms;
2. The at-sea striking force, which was poised to attack certain targets and to aid in the defense of Guantanamo Bay;
3. The defense forces at Guantanamo Bay;
4. The air forces in Florida, and the defense system for the protection of the southeastern United States;
5. The Amphibious Force, which might be employed against Cuban land defenses.
Since the nation-at-large was involved in the operation, our military forces around the world were placed at the ready, to preclude similar crises in Europe and the Far East. So the United States, like a naval vessel, went to “General Quarters,” with all of the tactical and organizational features of command and control being readied for conflict.
It is evident that one of the purposes of the Soviet Union in bringing about the challenge was the establishment of a well-armed Satellite nation in the Western Hemisphere. This effort reflected a breach with the past, in that nuclear weapons were invested on the soil of such a Satellite. This was gamble enough, but the fact that it was made so close to our territories increased the stakes immeasurably. Apparently, the Soviet Union was confident that the United States would vacillate in the assertion of its policies, thereby allowing solidification of the Cuban emplacements.
The retreat by the Soviet Union in the face of our positive action should not mislead us, but should further impress us with one truth. The alternating hot/cold policy of the U.S.S.R. is one of the primary tools of its long-range strategy. The Cuban situation also emphasizes one of the cardinal characteristics of the nuclear force: it can hover behind a political war, making itself felt without having to be employed. Now that the Soviets possess a significant nuclear capability, they can maneuver from a position of strength, using this capability as a shield for their conduct. Their nuclear force will remain an instrument of fear, but not action, until they believe that their capability has reached a decisive superiority.
It is quite apparent that, when a limited- war situation arises in the future, we will again go on the alert, mobilizing our military around the world and covering the entire spectrum of conflict in doing so. There will be many such instances as the Cuban crisis, instances that may demand the precise delivery of conventional weapons on military objectives. In order for the Unified Commander to exploit the capability for such delivery, he must have the full current picture available to him, all the time, in targets, in forces deployed, and so forth. AH considerations within the over-all operational concept, from intelligence data to logistic requirements, must be at his fingertips. From the USS Enterprise, a ship which incorporates the latest in command and control equipment including modern computers, CINCLANT possessed the necessary implements for the conduct of the mission. The Striking Force was never in doubt as to its orders and objectives, nor did it lack the information required to carry out these orders.
And now to the Megawar itself. At this extreme, one notes the sundry nuclear weapons systems that, due to the nature of the forces involved, would cover entire continents and oceans. Since our present national systems are, with the exception of Polaris, entirely based in the United States, they are rather vulnerable to surprise attack. Time is therefore essential to our survival, and the problem of the commander and his decisions increases in inverse proportion to the amount of time available. We have spent billions of dollars for warning systems to obviate destruction of our fixed-based forces. Since we now rely upon the micro-second, computers and high-capacity communications are a necessity. As in all data-processing equipment, the results are a function of the inputs. These inputs depend upon the sensors at our disposal, such as BMEWS. The only real solution, then, is the application of systems that eliminate the advantage of surprise attack. One such system is a reliable data-processing and communications net to ensure the flow of information required to make intelligent decisions for the control of the surviving forces. In a Megawar, it is the inevitability of retaliation that determines the final outcome. Couple this certainty that the enemy will be hurt with the realization on his part that mere surprise or chance will neither conquer us nor negate our ability to destory him, and we have the basis of our national deterrent policy.
Vast areas of the world are now patrolled by our Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, all segments of the unified command structure. Of necessity, these possess a multitude of weapons systems, each of which has a diversity of guaranteed or probable success against certain actions of enemy forces. If the Unified Commander is to make prudent decisions as to how to deploy his forces, once he has been directed to do so by the President, it is clear that the grease pencil and the status board must be replaced by modern data- processing equipment. The compulsory feature of this situation is that the commander must constantly and carefully monitor the planned programs inserted into this equipment. Unless this is done, incorrect solutions will result, thereby leading to an erroneous decision. For example, if a weapons system with a kill probability of 18 per cent and an accuracy of 2,000 yards is available, and 50 per cent and 400 feet are inserted instead of the proper figures, the information provided will be useless. Of course, many more sophisticated examples are available. What is important is that the worth of high-speed computing equipment is directly proportional to the validity of the information it utilizes.
Let us now view the problem from a concentrated field of interest, the Navy, and consider the many circumstances under which the Navy would act across the spectrum of conflict. The offensive capability of the modern Navy is represented by, and based upon, the attack carrier striking force. The outcome on land and sea still rests with that in the air. We are familiar with the formations of World War II, and their design to meet, and repel, the enemy air and sub-surface threat. The scientific aggrandizement of the last 15 years has forced these methods into obsolescence. Two inventions have been responsible for this: the fission or fusion bombs or missiles and the jet aircraft. The alliance of the latter with the air-to-surface missile has made time the crucial factor in the survival equation, and the firepower of modern atomic weapons has caused the dispersed disposition to become standard operating policy.
Formations covering an area equal to the state of Georgia are now commonplace. Speeds of aircraft—now Mach 2 plus for bombers—accentuate the time factor. Weapons such as' Sidewinder and Sparrow, surface- to-air missiles such as Terrier, and like developments, have introduced an additional permutation into the equation providing the solution. New tools of command, such as the Naval Tactical Data System now being placed into fleet service, are increasingly required.
Finally, there is the ever-present human element. Frequently overlooked by the commander of military forces today is the requirement that he have a thorough technical knowledge of the weapons systems under his control. The absence of such knowledge may mean defeat instead of victory. The leaders who emerged victorious from conflicts in the past were expert in their profession. But today, as never before, professional excellence is demanded of the commander of naval forces. Due to the complexities of politico-military decisions, the nature of the weapons systems, and the strides made in data analysis, the requirement for knowledge has multiplied to an almost inestimable degree, covering nuclear physics, electronics propulsion, and digital and analog computers.
And so intelligence and communications appear to be but mere aids, however essential. Only when merged with a thorough technical comprehension on the part of the commander, may these aids bring about an accurate decision in an atmosphere of time-compression. It goes without saying that information about the enemy is important, but only the proper utilization of this data by a highly-trained commander will determine the critical issues of the modern military engagement.