Comment and Discussion

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America’s Built-in Peace Corps

E. L. Murname, Lieutenant (j.g.), U. S

Coast Guard.------ Over seven hundred million

people have been drawn under the dark cloak of Communism since the end of World War II without the use of one of the lethal weapons that we Americans consider paramount for our national defense. Yet, this nation is not thoroughly convinced that it is fighting a new and different kind of warfare which our his­tory books do not record. This is the kind of war in which a small but determined element can twist the presence of our weapons and troops in a foreign land from a defense force into a threatening force, and where an Ameri­can serviceman can be depicted, not as a symbol of freedom, but as a threatening agent of imperialism.

Recognizing the true enemy, President Kennedy launched a new army of devoted patriotic young men and women under the banner of the Peace Corps. Their course of instruction was founded in our history of individual capitalistic freedom, but the teach­ing methods duplicated those of the adversary which have been successfully employed for years against us in subtle subversive words in many dialects. The Peace Corps uses the languages of Africa, Asia and South America and true humility while speaking with right­eousness to all the social strata. In the past, communications by foreign service officers have, to a large extent, been restricted to the aristocracy of a country.

Throughout all the fine works of literature that have given insight into the dynamics of our image abroad, i.e., the Ugly American or the Reluctant Ally, there arises one great issue that all the smaller nations of the globe are

presently in the process of deciding: whether to proclaim neutrality or align with one of the two great powers of diverse political philos­ophy. To this moment, the sought-after solu­tion has not been found, for we need Peace Corps representatives in every land where our 1,500,000 Americans are stationed.

A part of the answer is found in the millions of fine representatives our nation now has serving in the military. If our military leaders and servicemen can first recognize the enemy and his tactics and then utilize the best talents of each and every available man through care­fully selected duty assignments to those areas where they can do the most good, we will be employing good management techniques and utilizing our national manpower and defense budget.

Personnel assignment is the most critical element in producing a good working relation­ship with a host nation. Most nations jealously guard their language and customs. Realizing that our country’s greatness stems from the blending of every race and religion, now is the time to reverse the flow, for there are countless numbers of American servicemen who would welcome the chance to serve in a country with which he is familiar by birth, language, studies or inquisitiveness. Our services hold the key to

ENTER THE FORUM

Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.

proper assignment on the data cards that fill the files in BuPers. The push of a button could trigger the names of thousands of potential ambassadors for troubled areas. To­day, countless requests for a particular area assignment are discarded even though the man in question is born of a particular heritage and his wife is from that country. The eight man’s very presence in the right country would be helping to win the Cold War.

The military base abroad, while perform­ing its other functions, can serve as a source of cultural growth by having the community as ^a part of the advisory board to the Command­ing Officer and opening the gates to the peo­ple for lectures, instruction in U. S. university extension courses, selected plays and sporting events. Many locations provide opportunities for our men to study at local schools and uni­versities and attend educational and social events if the Commanding Officer would make the desire known to local leaders. Most bases can serve a country directly by fulfilling basic humanitarian needs: supplying drugs, utiliz­ing ships and planes for rescue work, ex­changes with the local country’s militia, guarding international distress frequencies, or serving as a natural disaster control center.

No longer in these days of questionable peace do our tanks, planes, and missiles sta­tioned on foreign shores always stand in the mind of that nation as a symbol of our great­ness, but only as an invitation to be a target in the event of all-out war. Those qualities which make an ally ready to sacrifice home­land and life are not found in machines but in intangible words and beliefs such as free­dom, valor, brotherhood of nations, and honor. The serviceman having coffee in town is in effect more important today than the machine that he operates, the plane which he flies, or the rocket he can launch at the base.

Today, we are spending more money for national peacetime defense than at any other time in our history, yet a rocket on the moon may not be as effective as a handshake by the right GI. The small nations of the world today are waiting to hear a unanimous “We need you” instead of the familiar “You need us.” The question remains, will this old force, America’s built-in peace corps, take the field of battle in time?

"The Paper War—Quo Vadis?”

(See pages 34-41, May 1962, and pages 104-109, October 1962 Proceedings)

John E. Withrow, Jr., Lieutenant, U. S.

Navy.------- 1 have read with great interest

Lieutenant Commander Strong’s article. I have also followed with equal interest the comments ensuing from the publication of this article. However, my purpose in writing is not specifically to join this discussion or to express either concurrent or divergent opinions. It is basically to urge that you do not let this issue fade away. In my opinion, you have in this issue a golden opportunity to do more to up­hold the principles of the U. S. Naval Insti­tute and to better our Navy than in any other problem raised in recent years.

The particulars of the paper war are only the outward manifestations of a far more serious evil. We are fast losing our mobility, our ability to adjust, to think and to act swiftly and surely. This cannot and will not be changed easily. A few individualistic Commanding Officers and Flag Officers, by becoming mav­ericks and bucking the paper work routine, will not solve the problem. The mutilation of machine forms, no matter how enticing, will not break the system. Nor will study groups or task forces have much effect other than to generate their addition to the paper work load. No, nothing less than the concentrated attention of every person in or associated with the Navy is needed even to begin to make a dent in this burgeoning problem. Each one must ensure in his own mind that this report, or this form, or this letter is essential, be he originator or addressee. Admittedly we cannot begin overnight by refusing to answer corre­spondence because of doubts concerning use­fulness, but we could start by making such doubts known in our replies. We can also return the spoken word to its proper place and reduce the flood of memorandums and notes that strikes one dumb.

We can and should take such concrete steps as have been suggested, for example, removing the Administrative Inspection from its present equivalency to a Battle Readiness Inspection. Type Commander and Fleet Training Group check-off fists should be pared to the bone and should be oriented toward producing a uniform standard of

battle readiness rather than an atmosphere wherein the presence of a certain publication on the shelf is more important than whether anyone has bothered to read it. Bureaus and major commands should evaluate thoroughly their recurring reports requirements and honestly delete or consolidate where possible. Requesting procedures, be they for material, money or men, should be streamlined with an eye to producing the desired results in the shortest possible time and with the least amount of paper work. When a responsible officer makes a statement of fact, it should be accepted and not require backing up with reams and reams of supporting figures, docu­ments and corroborative evidence.

Last, but far from least, the fact that there is a problem must be kept alive. It cannot be solved overnight and without an effort this tiny spark of insurgency can die away, smoth­ered by the paper work avalanche rather than igniting and destroying it. Herein lies the challenge and the opportunity of the Institute. Keep the ball rolling; we will do our part.

"ASW—New Concepts”

(See pages 104-106, June 1962 Proceedings)

W. F. Charter, Lieutenant Commander,

Royal Navy.------- 1 agree wholeheartedly with

Major Wilson that the time is ripe for a radical change of course in at least one approach to the ASW problem—his.

His article champions the use of surveil­lance and hunter helicopters patrolling areas along the “sea lanes” of the world in the sup­port of shipping threatened by possible sub­marine attack.

The foolhardiness of this type of operation was learned at terrible cost on two occasions during the last 50 years—from 1914 to 1917 by the Royal Navy, and from December 1941 to July 1942 by the U. S. Navy. During both these periods, the “sea lanes” were being patrolled and the ships using them were being slaughtered—572 of them during the latter period—a world record for such losses, which prompted the late Fleet Admiral Ernest J- King, then the Chief of Naval Operations, to write, “the so-called patrol and hunting operations have time and again proved futile. No system of patrol will give security to un­escorted vessels. We must get every ship that

sails the seas under constant close protection.”

I believe that those words, written in mid- 1942, are, if anything, even truer today than they were then. The depths of the oceans offer the best hiding place in the world, and the chances of even the finest ASW forces locating the modern submarine who is bent on evasion are slender, at best.

The area of highest submarine probability is normally in the immediate vicinity of the target, and it is there that Major Wilson’s helicopters must be employed. If the enemy submarine is not in this area, then he poses no threat to the shipping in question and is achieving our mission for us, which, let us never forget, is “to deny the enemy the effec­tive use of his submarines.”

Finally, it is time that this cry that “de­stroyers are the real workhorses of ASW” was put into correct perspective. It is true in the sense that the destroyer’s endurance on task is equalled only by that of the SSK, a relative newcomer to the field of ASW vehicles; but let us not read into this the assumption that the destroyer’s contribution to the ASW battle is necessarily greater in detection, classifica­tion, localization and killing power than that of any other ASW vehicle.

In modern ASW, the relative merits and capabilities of ships, aircraft, and submarines are seldom considered individually but are regarded as being complementary to each other, and emphasis is invariably placed on teamwork and the skillful co-ordination of all available forces into a unified combat team. While the destroyer, the helicopter, the VS and VP aircraft, and the SSK each in them­selves present a very real threat to the enemy submarine, it is only when these different types can be successfully married together into a single, well-trained team that their full Potential will be realized.

L. D. Caney, Captain, U. S. Navy.-------------

Major Wilson’s interesting comments are bound to evoke discussion among destroyer- men everywhere during this 60th year of de­stroyers. His suggestion, that it is time to con­sider a sharp reduction in the number of our destroyers, has undoubtedly raised a lot of eyebrows and should not go unanswered.

Destroyers have always been in the thick of the ASW job, but not even our strongest de­stroyer advocates have ever suggested that the destroyer is, or ever has been, or ever will be the final answer to the submarine threat. Throughout modern naval history our supe­riority on the seas has always rested in our possessing a balanced Navy. To balance means to keep in proper proportion. If we have a balanced Navy, we do not stake its present and future performance on a single weapon, or ship type, or strategy. Determin­ing the “proper” balance is, of course, one of the toughest tasks with which our planners are faced. The balance will never be static, and, in fact, is in a continuing state of transi­tion, as witness the phase-out of the battleship, airship, and long-range gun, and the introduc­tion of missile ships and Polaris submarines in the past decade.

Because the proper balance of forces is so absolutely vital to the strength of the Navy, we must ever be on our guard against the paro­chial view, the promotion of weapons, con­cepts, or ship types primarily because we may have a vested interest in them, or because “this is the way we have always done it,” or because of prejudices, or for just plain old nostalgia. All of us have an obligation to pro­pose changes to that balance whenever we have firm and well supported convictions which we believe would improve the balance. But we can expect disastrous consequences if the balance is upset as a result of overzealous loyalty to one component, or as a result of widespread misunderstandings. Thus, we all must have a fundamental knowledge of the roles and functions of each of the components making up our naval fighting strength.

Force is the only thing this country has which is truly respected by our enemies. We have in our destroyers a useful, effective force, whether it be for diplomacy, ASW, blockade, protection of attack carriers and fast am­phibious forces, or whatever the requirements, including the dual conventional and atomic capability. We can place our destroyers al­most anywhere on the surface of the seas and they can do a respectable job against any force which may oppose them on the surface, above the surface or under the surface. No other ship type can fill this need in the num­bers required.

With respect to Major Wilson’s proposal to have merchant or service types with helicopter

detachments take over destroyer ASW tasks, I would like to ask who will then defend these ships? The proposal sounds excellent as an emergency wartime measure, but merchant ships are built for commerce, not to fight the enemy. That is the Navy’s job.

With respect to the suggestion that we place more emphasis on antisubmarine sub­marines, I think most naval officers would agree that this is being done at an ever in­creasing pace. But the submarine, too, has her limitations in ASW. She lacks the eyes of the aircraft and the co-ordinating capability of the surface ship. Even more importantly, she presents a tremendous identification problem for our own forces when employed unre­stricted in unlimited areas against enemy submarines. This is of great significance to the maritime nations of the Free World which of necessity must exploit the surface of the oceans to bind and strengthen the alliance. We know that the submarine is extremely effective and useful in many roles and applica­tions, but limited in others; and because of this the Navy must have balanced forces.

The United States has four fighting fleets— the First and Seventh in the Pacific and the Second and Sixth in the Atlantic. Visualize for a moment these Fleets stripped of all de­stroyers. About half their fighting strength would be wiped out. It would be like reducing the Marine Corps to a few tank battalions and air groups. Is this the kind of balanced fleet we really want?

"Operations in Restricted Waters”

(See pages 23-33, June 1962, Proceedings)

Paul Mitchell, Brooklyn, N. Y.-------------- 1

have read a number of articles now on the necessity of the U. S. Navy developing a pro­gram for restricted water operations. I agree that, based on our prospective enemies, any future conflict will demand such operations. However, almost all the authors of these arti­cles seem to feel that the United States is un­prepared in this area and that some sort of a crash program should be initiated. What the thinking regarding such operations is in naval planning circles, I have no way of knowing, but as for materiel and personnel, the United States appears to be far ahead of any of our potential enemies. The raw materials for a successful small boat program not only seem

to be available in abundance, but for the most part they are developed and maintained at no cost to the defense budget.

The Coast Guard’s current small boat re­placement program has developed many designs which, though intended primarily for search and rescue operations in shallow water, should be easily adapted to restricted water military operations. Private enterprise also presents itself as an almost endless source of materiel in this field. The numerous mass- production boat companies and small yards that have sprung up to accommodate the small boat boom in the United States have de­veloped such a variety of hull and engine de­signs and equipment peculiar to small boats that the United States has no equal in this field. Certainly by far our biggest asset is the thousands of small boats now in private ownership but readily available for certain military operations in an emergency.

Boats, however, no matter how many or how good, mean nothing without capable mariners to man them. Here again the United States is in an enviable position. The bulk of the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve have had extensive training and experience in small boat operations. Add to this the Power Squadron, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and the several million other amateur yachtsmen in this country, and you have quite an exten­sive and skilled personnel pool from which to draw.

Assuming then that the men, the materiel, and the production facilities are available, one might ask if there is any small boat thinking in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Plans for the mobilization and utilization of this “reserve” fleet should be in readiness for a national emergency. The issue seems to be not one of adding another burden to an al­ready stretched budget, but the proper ex­ploitation of existing resources.

"Lone Carrier . . . Fact or Fancy?”

(See pages 49-55, April 1962, Proceedings)

S. Dombroff, Captain, U. S. Navy.^ Commander Vito’s article was mistitled. It should have read “Lone Carrier ... a Fact.” In actuality, there are problems that beset an airplane carrier operating alone that are not amenable to easy solution with our current state of knowledge. The article does attempt

to treat the limitations of the concept of inde­pendent operations, but it takes careful read­ing to appraise these shortcomings.

There is no question but that a nuclear power plant enhances the primary mission of a carrier by freeing her from dependence of an external source for fuel for the propulsion plant and enlarging the capacity for carrying aircraft fuel. But replenishment requirements for the embarked aircraft still tie the nuclear carrier to some external source of resupply. As a matter of fact, any of our steam-powered attack carriers have a potential for relatively sustained independent operations. From a purely offensive standpoint, however, the fea­sibility of single operations is unchallenged.

But the capstone of independent operations is the ability of the carrier to defend herself. There is little reason for solitary prowling, other than an increased defense against detec­tion and attack. It is my contention that a lone carrier is extremely vulnerable to the military forces which are available today. Obviously, security considerations preclude a detailed discussion of weapons and their effectiveness, but some general statements may be sufficient.

The submarine threat is particularly perti­nent. Commander Vito proposes to cope with this menace by placing a long range sonar in the bow of the carrier and an unspecified number of ASW aircraft on the flight deck. This follows a historic pattern. Naval com­batant ship development tends to install ad­ditional capabilities in proven types. The resultant hybrids have more often than not worked out unhappily.

To quote Commander Vito: “Deep under her forefoot, the ship’s sonar is in constant op­eration. In conjunctionwith the searches main­tained by the S2F-3 Tracker, the ship is made the focus of an area in which no submarine ean remain undetected and unattacked.”

To put it mildly, the submariners and the ASW task forces might take exception to this statement! Regardless of the range potential of the sonar installed, there are water condi­tions encountered where the effective sonar range is less than a few thousand yards (this does not mean that sonar is of no value in a carrier). And speed alone is not nearly as effective a defense against high performance submarines as it was during World War II.

When an officer from a nuclear submarine was queried as to the effect of increased target speed, he responded, “I can get a check on my solution faster.” Couple a high-speed subma­rine with a long-range torpedo and you have a dangerous threat indeed.

Defense against guided missiles is another sore spot. Even if we assume that an effective (85 per cent probability of kill), anti-guided missile weapon system can be installed in a carrier, can we ensure that all of the system components will be on the line 100 per cent of the time? There will be no back-up weapon in the immediate area to provide support to the carrier if her complex weapon systems are down for repair.

The prospect of having in one naval ship, be it aircraft carrier or submarine, a capability of executing a multitude of complex tasks, is inviting. However, there is also something to be said for dispersing these capabilities among several ships. It may be wiser to put our eggs in more than one basket.

James L. Gore, Lieutenant (j.g.), U. S.

Naval Reserve.------- The basic idea expressed

by Commander Vito is extremely interesting and there is no doubt that the necessity of employing surface escort ships to operate with the Enterprise deserves command considera­tion. It is obvious that the strongest argument for “lone” operation is the cruising limitations that non-nuclear-powered escorts would put on the atomic carrier. The defensive protec­tion available to the Enterprise will be the main obstacle which will have to be surmounted before such a decision would be given the go- ahead. As far as defense from surface and air threats are concerned, the inclusion of F4H, A2F and W2F aircraft in an embarked air group should provide an adequate defensive

capability.                                                      ,

In consideration of an antisubmarine de­fense, however, it is my opinion that utiliza­tion of VS and HS aircraft, combined with shipboard sonar, would not offer a high enough level of protection against enemy nuclear submarines. A possible solution to this prob­lem, which would still preserve the strong points in favor of Commander Vito’s employ­ment of the CVAN, would be to assign a nuclear submarine (SSNK) of our own to operate with the CVAN. This subsurface

companion would not compromise the C VAN’s ability to roam the seas at high speed, would not provide any additional surface radar con­tact possibility by enemy forces, nor necessi­tate any large amount of supplies to be carried by the CVAN for replenishment of the SSNK which would accompany her.

There are also some extra benefits to be derived from this combination beside the fact that the SSNK would be capable of excellent ASW defense. For night operations the SSNK would be available to supplement helicopters for pilot rescue operations although she would not have to operate in the standard plane guard position. Also, the CVAN would not have to carry the necessary support equip­ment or replacement parts for two extra air­craft types. In my opinion, the CVAN/SSNK combination would be an excellent one.

"Flags of Convenience”

(See pages 76-87, February 1962 Proceedings)

R. Hailey, Captain U. S. Navy.—Captain Dye’s article is a carefully detailed and ex­cellently presented summary of a serious problem facing our national planners.

The flag of convenience arrangement is recognized as essential for effective control of U. S.-owned ships under foreign flags; at the same time it is economical and convenient for U. S.-shipowners and provides valuable reve­nue for the Panamanian and Liberian gov­ernments. However, it is opposed by the U. S. seamen’s unions which need jobs for members.

The recent attempts of the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the National Maritime Union (NMU) to or­ganize stevedores in Panama and the Canal Zone appears to be a step associated with the organizing of crews on flag of convenience ships. Additionally, opposition to flags of con­venience also comes from European ship­owners who resent competition with their own national merchant marines.

Panama and Liberia are currently the only two important flag-of-convenience countries. It is estimated that 40 per cent of all Pana­manian flag ships are owned by U. S. capital. At one time, Greek owners had many Pana­manian flagships owned by Panamanian cor­porations, and Liberian flag ships also owned by Panamanian corporations.

During the past few years, however, Greece has adopted a policy of building up her own merchant marine at the expense of the flag-of- convenience countries. In the late 1950’s large numbers of Greek-owned ships were transferred from Panamanian to Greek registry. By the end of 1959 the Greek mer­chant marine approached 3,000,000 gross tons, the highest in that country’s shipping history. In 1959 Greece was fourteenth among nations engaged in world shipping; by 1961 she had risen to sixth. During this same period Panama dropped from eighth to twelfth and Liberia from third to fourth place. The figures are as follows:

Greek shipping between 1955 and 1960 was rapid; Greece celebrated the registration of the 1,000th ship on the Greek Register of Shipping in October 1960. Today the total capacity of the fleet is nearly five times the 1955 level and substantially more than three times larger than that of the pre-1939 Greek merchant marine.

This significant expansion is due to the in­creased rate at which Greek ships, which previously were registered under flags of con­venience, have been repatriated, and to the registration of new ships. The rate of repatria­tion was greatest in 1960 when 246 ships (2,105,895 gross tons) were transferred to the Greek flag, compared with 52 ships (389,648 gross tons) transferred in 1958.

Political and economic stability in Greece for the past few years has encouraged the in­vestment of shipping capital in Greek flag ships. Other specific measures, such as pre­ferred mortgage and new maritime laws, have been introduced to attract Greek-owned ships, previously operated under foreign flags, back to Greek registration. The London Times on 6 October 1960 noted that “the voting of suitable legislation and the internal stability of

Greece have created the miracle of the re­patriation of Greek vessels.”

The Greek-owned merchant fleet (flying the Greek and foreign flags) holds third place in the world, after the American and British- owned merchant fleets, with 1,751 ships total­ing 14,470,000 gross tons in the fall of 1960. The greater proportion of this total consists of ships of postwar construction. The figures quoted are taken from Greek government sources and from Lloyd’s.

At times U. S.-imposed restrictions against trade with Communist countries have worked to the disadvantage of foreign owners of flags- of-convenience ships. The New York Times reported in November 1960 the cancelling of the Liberian registry of the 24,830 deadweight ton tanker Perseus for delivering Soviet crude oil to Cuba. Albert J. Rudick, Deputy Com­missioner of Maritime Affairs for the Republic of Liberia, said “it was stricken from the registry because Liberian laws and regulations were violated. One of the regulations stipulates that vessels dealing with Communist countries ⁿeed prior approval before entering such trades.” In a like manner, Panama’s Decree 631 of 18 August 1951, which prohibits Panama-flag ships from trading with Chinese Gommunist countries, has been enforced in ^spite of protests from shipowners.

A further look at the Perseus case shows some of the implications of the changing aspects of flags-of-convenience registry. The Perseus was owned by the Panamanian corporation Sociedad Transoceanic Canopus S.A., and registered under Liberian flag at the time of the cancellation of her flag-of-convenience registry. Three months before cancellation, application had been made for transfer to Greek registry, and, as of March 1962, she was reported to be under Greek registry. Nine other ships of this company’s fleets have also been transferred to Greek registry, eight from Liberian and one from Panamanian registry. A minor owner of Perseus, a U. S. citizen, is one of the world’s major shipowners. Other ships in which he has interests have been em­ployed to carry Soviet cargoes under charter.

The figures I have used for flags-of-con- venience shipping are taken from Lloyd’s Statistical Tables. The information contained in this letter is presented as supplementary information to Captain Dye’s excellent and comprehensive presentation of a problem of significance to the Navy and nation.

"New Steering Gear for Subs”

(See pages 149-150, June 1962, Proceedings)

Norman Polmar.------ The article was a

good description of the CONALOG display (not steering) system. After CONALOG was installed in the Shark in 1961, the ship steamed across the Atlantic and operated with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The set functioned perfectly and drew high praise from the Shark's officers and enlisted men. Upon the submarine’s return to the United States, CONALOG was removed and re-

The experimental CONALOG (Contact

Analog) display is not a steering system, but a submarine navigational aid which provides a course and speed-of-advance "picture.”