When World War II began, the Royal Navy had 57 submarines, based in China, Malta, and home waters. These craft were manned by 350 officers and 2,800 ratings bringing, with the crews of their attendant mobile depot ships, the strength of the submarine branch to 5,150—less than 4 per cent of the Navy. The achievements of this small group are probably best understood by considering submarine operations in the various geographic areas.
Before the commencement of hostilities in September 1939, submarines were sailed to Heligoland Bight, and stationed to complete the patrol line between Scotland and Norway beyond the range of the Coastal Command aircraft. Even this early move was too late to intercept the outward bound pocket battleships Graf Spee and Deutschland with their supply tankers. By the middle of September 1939, the patrols were moved from the Scot- land-Norway line to the Skaggerak. Sturgeon carried out the first successful attack by sinking an antisubmarine trawler off Heligoland, and on 4 December, Salmon sank U-36 in the first submarine-versus-submarine attack of the war.
The shadow of international law hangs over all these early operations in northern waters. Commanding officers were required to stop and search suspicious merchant vessels, and to respect the neutrality of all the Scandinavian countries. Salmon had to allow the German liner Bremen to pass 2,000 yards away because of this policy, although she was in fact being used as a troopship. She was compensated by a successful attack on the cruisers Leipzig and Nürnberg; the former was put out of action for over a year, and thereafter used only for training; Nürnberg was out of action until the following May.
At the end of 1939, the Flotillas were reorganized. Nine of the S-class in the 1st and 2nd Flotillas formed the new 3rd in home waters, and four O- and R-classes split off from the 4th to form the 8th Flotilla in the East Indies. The Home Flotillas were strengthened by the new constructions, and by the return from Freetown of the River-class boats Severn and Clyde. These had been carrying out cruiser duties in the South Atlantic. Their fruitless, needle-in-a-haystack search for commerce raiders was a regrettable example of the misuse of specialist ships. They also embarrassed our own forces in the event of U- boat reports in their vicinity.
From January to March 1940, the routine patrols continued in enemy-held waters. Antisubmarine opposition increased, and an appreciable force of enemy patrol craft was tied up in the area. International law was still observed, successes were few, and Seahorse, Starfish, and Undine were lost. Then the picture changed completely.
On 4 April, submarines were instructed to attack transports in preference to warships. By 7 April, Flag Officer, Submarines, was convinced that the German invasion of Norway was imminent, and sailed six more submarines to join the 13 already on patrol. Next day, the Polish submarine Orzel sank the transport Rio de Janeiro, and found it crammed with troops. The invasion was on.
On 9 April, the Cabinet at last decided that all German merchantmen east of 8° East should be sunk without warning. Sunfish, who had a target about to come onto the firing bearing, deciphered the signal just in time, fired, and sank SS Amasis. A few hours later, Truant torpedoed the cruiser Karlsruhe, which was abandoned and sunk by her escorts. Next day, Spearfish, after surviving six hours’ depth charging, surfaced and sighted a heavy ship turning towards her. She fired a salvo by eye, which blew the propellers off the pocket battleship Lutzow, jammed her rudder, and left her listing and out of control. (She was eventually taken in tow, and spent 12 months under repair.) Triton meanwhile had fired six torpedoes and sunk three merchant ships.
Patrols continued in the East Skaggerak until 28 April, when the German policy of moving forces only by night under heavy escort, combined with the shorter hours of darkness to force our withdrawal from these areas. In the preceding 20 days, 14 transports of over 50,000 tons total, a cruiser and a U- boat had been sunk, four transports had been mined, and the Lutzow badly damaged. Seventeen British, three French, and one Polish submarine had taken part in these operations and three had been lost. The area was untenable for surface ships, and only one short sweep by French destroyers was attempted in this period to discourage antisubmarine craft. The natural reluctance of the Cabinet to adopt the German method of submarine warfare had hampered earlier operations, confused the commanding officers, and reduced the toll of enemy shipping. In spite of this, the submarines had caused appreciable disruption of supplies during the Norwegian campaign and, in addition, several U-boats had to be recalled from their Atlantic billets to assist in the escorting of German convoys.
On 20 June, Gneisenau, accompanied by Hipper and destroyers sailed from Trondheim for a raid against our shipping. Clyde made an undetected attack in a very rough sea and obtained one hit on Gneisenau, resulting in the German Force putting back to Trondheim. This success against Gneisenau caused the postponement of the German plan to send their heavy ships to operate in the Atlantic; and to base them on the French ports as soon as they were occupied.
Submarines were employed mainly in their reconnaissance role during this period, and patrols were started in the Bay of Biscay, initially to report on the movements of possible invasion forces, but later to counter the U-boat threat. Six British submarines, the French Doris, the Dutch 0-73, and the Polish Orzel were lost.
During autumn of 1940, the risk of invasion decreased and the role of submarines in home waters shifted from anti-invasion to anti- U-boat operations.
The dearth of heavy escorts against raiders became evident with the introduction of the convoy system, and was emphasized by the Jervis Bay-Scheer action. The large submarines of the 2nd Flotilla were therefore employed for some time on escort duties to deter surface raiders. Flag Officer, Submarines, was not in favor of this use of submarines, but some boats were employed on such duties to the end of the war. It proved to be a very barren, and at times hazardous policy, completely unrewarding, and a drain on submarine resources.
In the spring of 1941, the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Hipper were out on marauding raids in the Atlantic. When intelligence reported them heading for the Bay of Biscay, every available submarine in home waters was thrown in their path. Twenty-one boats reached their positions, but the raiders reached Brest unmolested. They had passed through at least one patrol area just before the arrival of the submarine; the slow surface speed of the older submarines had proved a heavy disadvantage.
In June 1941, Russia entered the war, and the Home Flotillas were pruned to the minimum to provide boats to operate from Polyarno as well as to reinforce the Mediterranean patrols. With these two heavy commitments, there were only eight submarines normally available for operations in home waters. This condition continued into 1942.
The main role of our home-based submarines in 1942 was the blockade of the German heavy ships. The paucity in boats was to some extent eased by the transfer of nine R- and S- class submarines from the U. S. Navy in 1941- 1942. The lack of submarines was further aggravated by the necessity to provide submarine close escorts to convoys. These were mainly employed on the Russian convoy routes, and some of them had alarming experiences. It was a misuse of specialist ships in an attempt to deter the German heavy units lurking in the Norwegian fjords, but our submarines could not patrol off the enemy coast during the summer months, due to the constant daylight. There was, however, a possibility of their attacking a heavy German ship attempting to maraud a North-Russian convoy, which was a more likely target for German surface forces than a transatlantic one. Trident and Tigris began operations from Polyarno in August, and in October were relieved by Sealion and Seawolf. These submarines had considerable success, and effectively stopped all German seaborne movements east of North Cape.
In February 1942, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were on passage to Trondheim when Trident, who was on the surface in bad weather, attacked and obtained one hit on Prinz Eugen, who limped into the Norwegian Leads. The Germans thereafter considered Trondheim to be too dangerous due to submarine activity, and also too far from the convoy routes; instead they based their heavy units at Narvik.
Submarines at this time had orders “to attack and report enemy cruisers and above.” The aim of this policy was to avoid compromising the patrol areas off the Norwegian coast, and thus to catch a large warship. On one patrol, Unbending sighted (but was prevented by orders from attacking) 51 supply ships, totalling an estimated 86,000 tons. A policy of restricting attacks to heavy units is of debatable value. In this instance it permitted the Germans to build up stocks of fuel and supplies for their forces.
The Home Flotillas, still weak in numbers, continued the same tasks in 1943, but in that year, Midget Submarines (X-craft) and Human Torpedoes (Chariots) were used operationally. The first attempt was made on Tirpitz, lying at Trondheim, in October 1942. Two chariots were slung beneath a Norwegian manned trawler, but after it passed scrutiny of a patrol boat, a short, steep sea was encountered, both chariots broke away and sank, and the attack failed. In September 1943, six X-craft took partin the epic attack on Tirpitz, lying at the head of Alta Fjord. Five survived the 1,000-mile submerged tow, and of these two penetrated the Tirpitz's nets, laid their two-ton side charges, and severely damaged her.
In April 1944, X-24 entered Bergen harbor and sank an 8,000-ton ship, mistaking her for the floating dock. Five months later she returned and remedied this error. All these attacks were excellent examples of the correct use of submarines. In the first instance, a great deal of damage had been done to an important ship for the loss of six X-craft (four scuttled) and 15 men. The war had been carried without warning into the enemy’s defended anchorages.
In September 1944, there were 25 operational submarines in home waters, though 14 of them were already earmarked for the Far East. Operations were confined to anti- U-boat patrols in the North Atlantic and attacks on shipping along the Norwegian coast. The sinking of U-486 by HMS Tapir off Bergen in April 1945 was the last success in these waters.
From June 1940 to late in 1943, the main objective had been the destruction of the enemy’s warships, particularly his heavy units, and not the disruption of his seaborne trade. The prime lesson to be learned is that the placing of submarines in open waters on the slender chance of their encountering a capital ship is not nearly so fruitful as the wholesale assault on shipping, which, in the long run, denies these same capital ships all their essential supplies. Long, frustrating patrols had produced little result, for the heavy units made few sorties, and the coastal trade passed by unhindered. Certainly in 1944 and 1945 so many vessels were sunk after the easing of this policy that shipping and train movements in Norway were severely restricted for want of coal.
At the start of the war the First Flotilla was based at Malta. The Mediterranean theater remained quiet, however, and the majority of submarines were transferred to the Home Flotillas in October 1939. Early in 1940, the Eighth, and part of the First Flotilla returned from the Far East to replace them. When Italy declared war, Rorqual, Grampus, Odin, and Orpheus were on patrol off the Italian coast. Only Rorqual returned to harbor; the others are now known to have been sunk by Italian forces during June 1940.
Submarine skippers again started with their hands tied, and it was not until 15 July that the Cabinet decreed that all vessels navigating within 30 miles of the Italian coast did so at their own risk. Two days later, this area was extended to include 30 miles of the Libyan coast.
After the collapse of France, submarines were withdrawn to Alexandria, but the distance to Italy was an obvious disadvantage, and in October 1940, the famous 10th Flotilla was formed from T- and U-boats, sent from home and operated from Malta continuously thereafter, except for a short period in 1942.
The small U-class submarines normally operated in the Sicilian Channel and off the Straits of Messina, while the T’s patrolled the Libyan and Greek coasts and the Aegean. It is well to remember that the usual targets for these submarines were three or four ships with five or six escorts making a high speed dash across the Sicilian Channel under air cover. For these operations, the older O-, P- and Minelayer-classes had been too large and slow and had paid a heavy penalty in losses. The new U’s and T’s were ideal for the job and were commanded by younger commanding officers with war experience.
The exploits of these submarines are now a part of the proudest history of the British Submarine Service. Lieutenant Commander M. D. Wanklyn made 23 successful attacks in Upholder culminating in the sinking of the 20,000-ton Italian troopships Neptunia and Oceania off Tripoli. Upholder was credited with sinking 97,000 tons of shipping, and Lieutenant Commander Wanklyn received the Victoria Cross before she sailed on her 25th war patrol from which she never returned.
Commander A. C. C. Miers in Torbay watched a convoy, evidently bound for Corfu roads, pass too far away to attack. He surfaced at dusk, and, evading the patrolling craft, entered the heavily defended harbor still on the surface, only to find no sign of the convoy. Two supply ships were sunk as a slight compensation for this disappointment, and Commander Miers received the Victoria Cross.
Turbulent, commanded by Commander J. W. Linton, once sank an entire convoy of four supply ships and their escorts. Linton was an artist in the submarine attack who favored the use of the gun almost as much as the torpedo. In the end, Turbulent, too, failed to return and Linton was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.
Urge, commanded by Lieutenant Commander E. P. Tomkinson, damaged an Italian battleship, got two hits on a cruiser, and finally sank the cruiser Bande Nere.
Submarines also landed agents and commandos, and Seraph took General Mark Clark to make contact with French sympathizers. During the blitz on Malta, submarines ferried 3,500 tons of essential supplies to and from the island. A brilliant attack on Palermo was also made by five “chariots” from the submarines Trooper and Thunderbolt on 1 March 1943. Two reached their objective; one severely damaged the 8,500-ton liner Viminale, and the other sank the brand new light cruiser Ulpio Traiano.
Rommel’s ultimate defeat in North Africa was made possible by the combined submarine and air assault on his seaborne supply routes. It was a classic case of the correct employment of submarines and of the influence of sea power on land warfare. The German High Command reported on 9 September 1941, “Now, as formerly, the most dangerous British weapon is the submarine, especially those based on Malta. ... A very severe supply crisis must occur relatively soon. This is because air transport can never be an adequate substitute for sea transport.”
In the first four months of 1942 only five per cent of enemy cargoes was lost, due to very heavy escorting and the blitz on Malta. From then on, losses mounted with submarines and aircraft sharing the credit. In the three weeks preceding the Battle of Alamein, the submarine sinkings exceeded those from air attack, and together they destroyed 44 per cent of all cargoes sailed to Libya.
On 29 October, at the time of Alamein, Rommel wrote, “Fuel and munitions are very scarce; I am decidedly pessimistic.” A week later the German General Staff noted, “The enemy has recognized sea supply communications as the weak point in our North Africa operation. . . . Our defense against submarines is barely sufficient, and against air attack is inadequate.”
In all Mediterranean operations British and Allied submarines sank four cruisers, eight destroyers, 21 submarines, nine other warships and 1,041,570 tons of merchant shipping, and damaged two battleships, five cruisers and two destroyers. (Fifty submarines had been lost.) Of the 2,000,000 tons of Axis shipping sunk in the Mediterranean, submarines are credited with 53 per cent, aircraft with 40 per cent and other forces with 7 per cent.
After the transfer of the 8th and 4th Flotillas to the Mediterranean, there were generally no submarines of the Royal Navy operating East of Suez until the collapse of Italy in September 1943. Truant and Trusty maintained occasional patrols with some success, and the former sank two ships totaling 12,000 tons in one attack.
After the end of 1943, the Flotillas began to return, the 4th and 8th Flotillas started at Trincomalee. Later the 2nd Flotilla arrived, and the 8th Flotilla moved to Fremantle, Australia, early in 1944, to operate under U. S. command.
At this time operations were restricted to the zone of British responsibility to the west of Singapore, where few worthwhile targets were found due to Japan’s withdrawing into the Pacific. British and Dutch submarines were principally employed against small coastal craft in and around the hazardous 10-fathom line, where the larger U. S. patrol submarines were unsuited. The tonnages quoted in the summary are thus misleading, as no ships above 500 tons are included, although scores of small coasters and junks were sunk by gunfire or demolition charges.
Warships were encountered, however, and Tally Ho sank the cruiser Kuma off Penang. Taurus sank a Japanese submarine and Templar scored two hits on the cruiser Kitakami.
Late in 1944, patrols were extended through the Sunda and Lombok Straits and a much greater contribution could be made to the Pacific War. Commander A. R. Hezlet in Trenchant, operating inside a defensive minefield, sank the 10,000-ton cruiser Ashigara in April 1945. The ship was hit by five torpedoes at long range, and Japan’s only serviceable heavy cruiser in southern waters went down before she could impede the Borneo landings. For this superb attack Trenchant’s commanding officer received the U. S. Legion of Merit.
Two other attacks deserve mention. The midget submarines XE-3 and XE-1 made the 40-mile passage of the Johore Straits in 11 hours, laid their side charges under the cruiser Takao and withdrew successfully. Takao sank in the shallow water, and Lieutenant I. E. Fraser and his diver, Leading Seaman Magennis from XE-3 both received the Victoria Cross. Two “chariots” from Trenchant successfully attacked shipping at Puket; both of these crews were recovered and two merchant ships were sunk.
By 1945, the wheel had come full circle. In 1939, the largest Flotilla had been in the Far East and now, in the last year of war, British submarines were contributing to the combined naval assault on the enemy’s shipping which isolated Japan and ensured her ultimate defeat before the atom bomb ever fell on Hiroshima. The British and Dutch submarines are credited with the sinking of 57 merchant ships totalling 87,000 tons (not including those below 500 tons), or about 2\ per cent of the total Japanese losses. (U. S. submarines accounted for 54J per cent.)
The Royal Navy entered the war with only 57 submarines. When the war ended, it had 130 submarines whose crews numbered less than 10,000 men, or about two per cent of the uniformed Royal Navy. Wartime losses totaled 74 submarines, seven X-craft, and 3,160 men, not counting three Allied submarines under British operational control. In three thousand patrols, British submarines sank 158 enemy combatant ships and damaged 54 others, and destroyed 1,670,122 tons of enemy merchant shipping. In addition, they performed 105 minelaying operations and 250 other special operations.
Once again submarines had proved their value. As a tactical weapon, they were a failure, as they had been in World War I. But as a strategic weapon, they were immensely successful, out of all proportion to their cost.
With a remarkable economy of manpower and building resources, submarines had exerted a powerful influence on the war, especially in the Mediterranean. They had been the only forces capable of sustained operations in enemy-held waters; their endurance allowed them to undertake lengthy patrols of up to 50 days. By sinking 41 U-boats, they had given promise of the antisubmarine role they would play in the future.
Finally, they had shown that the submarine is not an escort vessel, achieves nothing when used as a cruiser, and cannot observe International Law when waging war against an enemy who disregards it. (U. S. submarines, incidentally, commenced unrestricted warfare immediately in December 1941.)
Were Great Britain not an island, and so dependent on seaborne trade for the prosecution of a war, more of the total naval effort might have been directed towards submarine warfare. Defense of trade was, however, the main naval commitment, and this explains the long blockades of surface raiders, the policy of “report not attack,” and the wrong use of submarines in escorting roles. The results achieved by British submarines under a policy which for long periods prevented their use to full advantage is thus all the more remarkable, and a great tribute to this small section of Great Britain’s Royal Navy.