If one observes a submariner behaving as a man of destiny today, it is because his future—and the future of the submarine— have never looked brighter. Submariners are confident that their weapon will continue to be efficient, effective, and necessary. There is among them a faith, backed up by sure indications, that the naval role of the submarine is an ever expanding one.
Historically, the U. S. submarine story may be analyzed in three phases from 1900 to the end of World War I; from 1919 to the end of World War II; and from 1945 to the present.
Slow but steady improvements toward making our submarines effective, reliable instruments of war marked the first period of U. S. submarine development. Because of their small size and limited underwater endurance, submarines operated most of the time on the ocean surface, where their main antagonist was always the sea. Life aboard these pioneer submarines was exacting and hazardous. Cranky gasoline engines, a constant menace and source of trouble, propelled these boats. Their batteries had a habit of blowing up from time to time. Unfortunately, some of these boats met with disaster.
The role of submarines as an element of the budding sea power of our nation was restricted and unspectacular. The submarine was, for the most part, looked upon as a defensive weapon, a means of reducing an opponent’s superiority in naval surface ships.
World War I produced a significant change in these concepts. Shortly before the war, the Germans perfected the diesel engine and introduced it into their submarines. With this innovation, the boats enjoyed a far greater degree of mobility and mechanical dependability. The way was now paved for a new strategic concept. Whereas all submarines had been restricted previously to coast defense, they could now take on oceanic defense in depth against the ships of other navies.
Moreover, the Germans, capitalizing on the new mobility of their submarines, spectacularly expanded the concept of the submarine’s role by declaring unrestricted warfare on commercial shipping. Thus, the strategic potential of the submarine presented a serious threat to the entire economy of any nation which relied upon foreign commerce for its sustenance.
While the Germans plunged into the work of proving these kinetics, still the operational employment of submarines was essentially negative in character. Submarine warfare was calculated to deny an enemy’s use of the sea. Only indirectly did submarine operations facilitate the positive control of the sea for oneself, because the submarine could not assume permanent control of sea lanes.
The U. S. Navy submarine potential lay dormant during World War I, since our antagonists, unlike our Allies, were not a coalition of maritime powers vulnerable to submarine warfare.
Indeed, so slight was the role of British and American submarines in the war that strong argument arose in our Navy and in the Royal Navy that the best way to solve the threat of a future enemy submarine potential was to outlaw all submarines. This attitude grew largely because of the tremendous success of German submarines against Allied naval and merchant ships during World War I.
Submarine employment by the U. S. against the Japanese in World War II was essentially the same as that practiced by the Germans during both World Wars, unrestricted operations against both merchant and naval vessels. Whereas the Germans failed in both cases, we succeeded in the Pacific with combined naval operations, in which, of course, our submarines contributed significantly to the success. The Japanese war economy was effectively halted by these coordinated naval tatics.
Post-World War II efforts, counter-measures in the face of much-improved ASW techniques derived from the war against U-boats in the Atlantic were designed to permit our submarines to continue in the earlier roles they had had in the past. In particular these developments were calculated to offset the high search rate of the airborne radar. We added a snorkel and streamlined hulls, which, together with batteries of higher capacity, enhanced the submerged characteristics of the new boats.
A new factor, strongly favoring the submarine in the precarious balance between its potential and improved ASW techniques, was introduced on 17 January 1955 when USS Nautilus (SSN-571) got under way on nuclear power for the first time. Here was the promise of unlimited mobility and perfect concealment from the air above. Atmospheric contaminants in these sealed submarines were a significant obstacle initially to our achieving the lengthy concealment we desired, but intensive efforts resulted in a totally submerged operation by USS Seawolf (SSN-575) for 60 days in late 1957. We were on our way.
During this same period, other efforts designed to enable our submarines to assume a new role in antisubmarine warfare began to materialize. The attack submarine emerged.
Although U. S. submarines sank a number of enemy submarines during World War II by torpedo attack, the weapons and tactics employed were the same as those employed against surface men-of-war. None of these sinkings involved enemy submarines operating submerged when attacked.
Consequently, when an assessment of the probable future enemy submarine threat was made in the late 1940’s, we recognized that our own submarine development required reorienting. Accordingly, in 1949, Project Kayo, whose goal was to produce the attack submarine, was organized in the Pacific, and Submarine Development Group Two was established at New London, Connecticut. These two organizations were given the task of guiding this redirection of effort within the operating submarine forces of the two oceans and of effecting the necessary liaison with Research and Development activities working on the problem.
By 1956, production model sonars, designed for ASW use, were installed in all deployable submarines as quickly as possible. Weapon development was just a step or two behind. Techniques for reducing self-noise had been developed and incorporated, and operational training had been completely re-oriented toward this new primary mission. In short, the ASW submarine had emerged.
In summary, every attack submarine in our Navy today has a primary mission in ASW. This is a relatively new mission, but it is one for which all our submarines have exhibited a high degree of proficiency. Improvements in effectiveness have been so rapid as to indicate a marked proclivity for this task, and the nuclear submarines in particular have shown an exceptional aptitude for ASW.
By today’s standards, the early nuclear submarines were relatively noisy under certain conditions, but understandably so, as few noise reduction techniques had been developed and tested at the time the ships were built. Improvements were rapidly forthcoming and the results were at hand when construction of USS Thresher (SSN-593) was authorized in fiscal year 1957.
Seventeen nuclear-powered attack submarines are in the Fleet today, three of which are in the Thresher-class. Twenty-three more of this class have been authorized in the current building programs. We expect many more in the future, in recognition of the importance of the attack submarine.
What fundamental change has occurred? Seemingly, submarine employment is still limited to a strategy of denial—denial of freedom of movement to the enemy’s commercial shipping, to his surface men-of-war, and now to his submarines. Since the apparent cornerstone of Russia’s naval strategy is its submarine force, we have shifted over to the nuclear-powered submarine to help reduce and circumscribe the threat posed by that force. Having invested heavily in a large, new non-nuclear-powered submarine force (over 250 diesel-powered boats added in the last decade), Russia has made a serious strategic blunder. The submarine weapon since the early 1950’s has been and is the nuclear- powered true submersible.
While it has been shown that a strategy of denial has produced positive effects in the past, our nuclear submarines are too few in number and do not have, as yet, the capabilities to support fully a strategy of control. Our submarines support our world-wide operations by assisting in efforts to control for ourselves and to deny to the enemy those oceans and lands in which he seeks to intrude.
Prior to 1955 when many postwar submarine developments began to pay dividends, we tried to increase the amount of military power which a submarine could project onto the land by modifying several submarines for the transport of troops, cargo and oil. But their volume limitations and transportation costs per-ton- mile were not competitive with other methods. In view of proven limited utility only a few submarines were configured for these tasks.
Turning to another area of development, in January 1948, a modified version of the German V-l buzz bomb, called the Loon, was launched from the Pacific submarine USS Cask (SS-348). This experimentation with a sea-based mobile launching platform for short-range missiles led to the operational employment of the Regulus missile in 1953. Though only five submarines, all deployed in the Pacific today, are equipped for Regulus, they have been doing an outstanding job for several years.
Prior to the epoch which produced Polaris, both the air-breathing and ballistic missiles of longer range had been characterized by large size, and the latter, by considerable weight. The submarine, being a volume-limited vehicle thought to be uneconomical for transportation purposes, had not received serious consideration as a mobile platform from which to launch large numbers of such vehicles. While the military potential of such a submarine mission had been long recognized, it was not until the advent of the several technologies which made Polaris possible that it became economically feasible to employ the submarine as a large scale transportation vehicle for such missiles. Consequently, in late 1956, shortly after this breakthrough occurred, Presidential approval to build a Polaris submarine force was obtained with startling rapidity.
The availability of nuclear power was, unquestionably, a significant factor in the Polaris decision. Had nuclear power not been available, it is problematical whether the decision would have been a correct one. As a result of it, however, we were able to get an enormous jump on our opposition; one which we still enjoy, but one which we can retain only by unceasing efforts.
These submarines incorporate all the strengths which have been developed over the past years, and, in one monumental swing of the technological axe, earlier submarine capability for projecting only small amounts of power was transformed into one which could project the mightiest power known to man.
The magnitude of this power is growing steadily larger. At the present time, nine Polaris submarines are deployed with 144 missiles, always ready to fire upon command. Within the next several years they will be joined by 32 more ships and equipped with missiles of sufficient range to strike anywhere in the world. Their mission and task as a deterrent is of great importance to our security.
So it is that submarines have been given two more important roles in recent years. In the turbulent period between 1955 and 1960, the embryonic submarine mission in ASW became a reality, and the 32 missiles of USS George Washington (SSBN-598) and USS Patrick Henry (SSBN-599) took their place in the vanguard of the Free World.
Still, our Navy requires a broad spectrum of power for its assigned missions. Submarine capabilities for projecting power run from the lowest to the highest ends of that spectrum. And though submarines also have a fine capability, an expanding one, for supporting our naval objective aimed at control of the sea, by themselves, they are not enough; nor are they ever likely to be enough.
The “balanced force” concept has been prevalent in our Navy for many, many years. To be sure, there have been serious arguments within the Navy on many occasions as to what should constitute that balance. A prime example was the difficulty experienced by our naval air proponents in their struggle against the battleship promoters in the Navy.
History is filled with many examples of stultification in a victor’s military thought upon completion of a successful war. World War II proved to be no exception, at least until our experience in Korea gave birth to a sober reappraisal of military roles. Fortunately, this same period of military thought has been marked by its political enlightenment as to the objectives of World Communism, and by the realization that a broad spectrum of power is required to cope with the broad nature of possible conflicts.
It is against this background, where reception to innovation and change is greatest, that the above-mentioned new submarine capabilities have been achieved. While it is undeniable that they have been achieved in fact by the revolutionary changes in various technologies during this period, it is unlikely that they would have come to the fore so quickly in the type of atmosphere which marked the period following World War II and the 15-year period after World War I.
So long as today’s atmosphere exists, it is unlikely that military thought will stagnate again. It is an atmosphere which produced change; change heavily dependent upon the wisdom of our civilian leaders; and change with positive, long-term effects that determine our nation’s security.
The period in which we live today, then, is marked by its challenge to the military to excel in using imagination to develop new concepts, to discard worn ideas which may no longer be useful, and to recommend means by which to harness the technological revolution better to serve the military goals and forces entrusted to us.
The important submarine roles we have today are a product of this same revolution. There are unmistakable signs that, as this revolution proceeds, the submarine has much to gain.
During the next decade it is likely that we shall see many changes in submarines which will be products of world-wide research and development efforts. Let us assess these potential advances.
While USS Thresher is noted for her very high speed and relatively silent operation, hopefully we expect to have lighter power plants in the future which will be truly silent in their operation. Together with such a plant, we would hope to have auxiliary machinery with no moving parts, and thus no noise emission whatsoever. Much of the future equipment, atmospheric control for instance, will be highly automated. Future computer technology would facilitate many atmospheric control tasks. Speeds of 60 knots and descents to depths of 10,000 feet are not beyond the realm of possibility for our future submarines.
By the introduction of new, automated equipment it may be possible within the next ten years to provide a ship control center from which one or two men will be able to perform all necessary submarine evolutions. Available to these men would be a television picture of the ocean environment surrounding the submarine, as well as all the information required for piloting the ship. Similarly, the Commanding Officer and the Fire Control Officer might have available to them a pictorial presentation of the whole fire control problem. A complete and continuous picture of the target and fire control data could be available to the fire control team. Also by 1973, we would hope to have a much higher degree of simplicity and reliability in all of our electronic equipments, thereby reducing the requirement for highly skilled technicians by at least 50 per cent.
We would hope to have torpedoes of extremely long range, capable of hitting any target ranging from the surface down to any depth. Detection ranges should increase to several hundred miles, and, with them, a SUBROC type missile of corresponding range for delivering nuclear attacks on submarines, surface and shore targets should be developed. We would hope that such a missile could be adapted for use in antiair warfare, against aircraft of any type, and either for air defense or denial of selected air space to the enemy. Taken collectively, such composite weapons on board submarines operating in close co-operation with each other would go far toward permitting them to control the ocean, including the air above, the surface and the depths below, in which they operate. Control of the Arctic would become a viable proposition, and would be in the exclusive domain of such a task force.
Barring unforeseen breakthroughs in detection which might render the oceans transparent from above, the ocean depths will continue to belong to the submarine, to be read like a roadmap and developed for whatever peaceful or military purposes may be required. Undersea transportation of an amphibious army, or of bulk and liquid cargo, will be entirely possible. Extensive oceanographic research—the fruit of which may help to eliminate starvation in the world— must still be accomplished and much of it must necessarily be performed by submarine.
All these advances are well within the realm of possibility. Some of them will be a part of the evolutionary growth of submarine capabilities, growth which is necessary to preserve the submarine as an effective instrument for its assigned roles. While it is conceded that breakthroughs in detection are always possible, it is likely that the effects therefrom will be transitory. Countermeasures have always been found in the past. For example, one of our best countermeasures against improved ASW capability is that of operating submarines at greater depths.
By attaining such depths and introducing weapons with appropriate characteristics, we present an effective counter to the improved ASW capability. Any enemy must make huge expenditures for new weapons to counter these new submarine characteristics and must equip all of his ASW units accordingly.
Translation of any possibility into a capability is, however, a strategic decision which is based upon many factors. Many of these capabilities would create entirely new roles for the submarine, roles which would reflect our nation’s objectives. If the submarine can perform these roles better, more efficiently and economically than other vehicles, it will be selected for these roles, and a new balance of forces will be established. If such a decision should become necessary, we should be prepared to implement it without delay. Time is the “executioner” in the Cold War.
Future submarine roles will also depend in large measure upon the growth in capabilities of potential antagonists. We must be prepared to utilize the edge we possess in submarine technology to help preserve our Navy’s ability to execute its assigned missions—by expanding the roles for which the submarine has certain inherent capabilities.
Such conjecture is an uncertain tool in attempting to predict future roles for the submarine. Only time will tell whether or not the submarine potential for these roles will be tapped. Cost alone prohibits the development, at present, of a broad-based spectrum of undersea power. Thousands of surface ships are required to project a significant amount of amphibious power, to provide fire and air support, and to put a force ashore and support it. And, in peacetime uses, the submarine transport cannot compete economically today with the surface ship. The technological trend reveals no significant change as yet in these economics.
Still, the developments in surface surveillance techniques, such as by satellite, indicate that amphibious forces will be deprived of the element of surprise. If surprise is essential to success in such operations, the submarine is the last vehicle remaining which can achieve it. But, if air supremacy must also be achieved to insure that success, it is difficult to conceive of such supremacy being provided in the near future by an undersea carrier.
The year 1973 is not so far distant, however. Experience in recent years indicates that, with the exception of the Polaris program, there is an average lead time of seven years between each new concept and its operation availability. Therefore, it is unlikely that technological change will induce any dramatic alterations in the balance of naval forces in being during the next decade. Such changes as do occur will be dictated by advancing technology as it affects the rise or decline in effectiveness of a specific weapon type for its given mission.
As stated previously, nuclear submarines have demonstrated a marked proclivity for the ASW role—so long as they are operated in a manner which capitalized on their traditional strengths of concealment, stealth and surprise Operating independently in the enemy’s backyard, they can capitalize on these ubiquitous strengths. Operating as part of a team, however, their strengths are those of a shorn Samson. Consequently, today’s submarine has yet to demonstrate the general excellence of a destroyer, for instance, in performing the multitude of ASW tasks required in the defense of convoys, surface task groups, carriers, amphibious objective areas, etc.
These types of ASW operations impose a very fundamental change in the employment of submarines, but this change is taking place slowly. Development of the necessary changes in designed capabilities by which to implement them should be expected within the next decade. When these capabilities are obtained, it is likely that more submarines will be built for these ASW tasks.
In the interim, we are building a force of nuclear-powered submarines which, by virtue of their unlimited mobility, are capable of fighting in any of the world’s oceans without the necessity of additional bases to support them. Since uncertainty is the principal characteristic of our geopolitical future, we will be fortunate in possessing a mobile undersea power whose flexibility matches that of our nation’s global interests.
A key feature of this flexibility is the virtual immunity of the nuclear submarine to nuclear warfare. If these submarines must fight a war at sea, the choice of weapons, either ours or the enemy’s, makes little difference. Naturally, the problem of killing an enemy is more easily solved with a nuclear weapon, and one certainly would not ever want to fight with toothpicks against an enemy who had a baseball bat. It is anyone’s guess whether or not a nuclear war could be fought in the undersea without escalation—for escalation is always a possibility. Our only proper concern is to insure that we can fight with or without nuclear weapons and win control of the sea by whatever means we choose.
It is this same virtual immunity, indifference if you will, of the nuclear submarine to nuclear war at sea that has made the Polaris submarine such a fine weapons system. This is the most survivable retaliatory system we have yet produced or thought about; it is capable of surviving in any wartime environment, and unlike any other, for an indefinite period of time. Survivability in time, therefore, permits an almost unlimited flexibility in response, varying from an immediate, instantaneous response of all missiles to a response which may be delayed for hours, days, weeks or months, and which may be used in any measure which the strategist may select. It is this essential quality that makes Polaris such a valuable servant of national strategy, either today or in the uncertain future.
The second essential quality of Polaris is the fine capability it has demonstrated during the past two years in patrol operations at sea. By repeated testing, we know that Polaris is a ready, reliable system in every sense of the word. Every operational commitment of SSBN patrols has been met, and no mission has been aborted. Missile and navigation performances have exceeded expectations.
These are qualities over which a potential enemy has no control, no countermeasure, no answer. Polaris gives us a system with truly incredible capabilities and with qualities that provide us in large measure with the dependable deterrent we must have.
As a counterpoint for all of these highly advanced submarine weapons systems, both SSN and SSBN, we must have the man to fit the machine. This man must be quite different from the one needed 50 years ago. On my first submarine, there was a brawny machinist’s mate who was the key man in keeping our engineering plant ready for sea. He signed his name with an “X.” An excellent submariner in that day, he would be useless on a modern submarine, and would be rejected by his shipmates. He would be unable to cope with either the technology of today or with the social order produced by it.
This example merely illustrates the nature of change—to emphasize that the pace of change is accelerating, and that the direction of change, a vector quantity of uncertain dimensions, is highly unpredictable.
Personnel requirements for the submarine of 1973 will probably be greatly reduced. Marked improvements in automation and in the reliability and simplicity of our equipment will lessen correspondingly the maintenance demands. Logically, therefore, all of these factors should combine to reduce the number of personnel in a crew. A 20 per cent reduction might result, which would ease the problem of obtaining sufficient intelligent personnel for our submarine force of that era.
One of the most important signs of our time is the increasing importance of the submarine in support of our nation’s military objectives. Whether this growth will continue in the future at the logarithmic pace of technological change, as it has in the past, is still uncertain.
Whatever the product of change may prove to be, submarines will be but one of the many systems our country requires for its security. Let no man think that a single system or a single strategic path will ever make our country secure from attack. Submarines are only a new factor in this diversified security equation, but they are an extremely important factor with a large exponential power.