On a black morning in February 1942, the “impregnable bastion” of Singapore fell to the Japanese invaders, and with its loss the entire British power position in the Far East crumbled into dust. The news stunned the Allies. To the embattled U. S. Navy in the Pacific, the fall of Singapore was one of the worst shocks in a series of setbacks that began with the Pearl Harbor attack.
Now, over 20 years later, though immeasurable changes have occurred in international power relationships and in the criteria that determine national power, Britain’s power position in the Far East rests once again primarily on Singapore. And in today’s clash between the Free World and the Communist nations, the alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom is stronger than it has ever been before in time of peace. Singapore, as the seat and symbol of British power in the Far East, thus figures prominently once again, albeit indirectly, in the defense posture of the United States, and it is well for us to re-examine most closely this link in the chain. In the light of the Cold War, with all its dangerous implications and potentialities, what value can we expect of Britain in the Far East today?
Recently, a U. S. government official in a key position in Washington remarked privately that British presence in Southeast Asia was worthless, possibly even a liability, in today’s world of receding colonialism and rising nationalism. Another held that Britain was finished as a world power. Meanwhile, items have appeared from time to time in the London press alleging that high policy in Whitehall plans an ultimate withdrawal of all British forces from Singapore, possibly to Australia. Then there is the “go-it-alone” school of thought in America which holds that since Britain’s Singapore naval base and its military forces deployed in that area are not only weak but also at the mercy of nuclear attack, it matters little to the United States whether these forces are there or not. Those who hold these views are either irresponsibly glib or else they are ignorant of current facts and trends in Southeast Asia.
British and Commonwealth presence in Southeast Asia—economic, political, and military—is absolutely essential to the stability and well-being of that highly critical area. Were it not for Britain, at least Malaya and Singapore would have long ago succumbed to the Communist yoke. Had this happened, it is quite possible that all of Southeast Asia would have gone down the drain to the Reds. Britain has contributed, and continues to contribute, substantially and most effectively to the economic and political progress of Malaya, Singapore, and British Borneo. In these areas, though anti-colonial sentiments can still be fanned into hatred and acts of violence, Britain’s post-World War II diplomats, administrators, and civil servants have been for the most part sympathetic and dedicated men—a far cry from the arrogant imperialists of the past. In fact, some have recently been labeled “timid imperialists.”
Militarily, it is a fact that British and Commonwealth forces based on Singapore are vulnerable to nuclear attack, and their combat capabilities are limited, but outside of U. S. forces, these forces remain by far the most effective in all of Southeast Asia. In any likely military conflict or domestic violence short of nuclear war, this writer believes that Britain can and will successfully hold Singapore. Moreover, there is much evidence to indicate that Britain firmly intends to maintain indefinitely her military presence in this area, based primarily on Singapore and Malaya, Above all, it is believed that the continued presence of British and Commonwealth forces as a stabilizing influence in Southeast Asia is vital to the interests of the United States and the whole Free World.
The areas which support or contribute to British power in the Far East today include Singapore and Hong Kong; the three Borneo dependencies of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo; and Malaya. (Except for a fuel- stop airfield at Gan in the Maldives, there is nothing else of strategic importance east of Aden.) Politically and economically, these entities run the gamut of development from near-primitive society to full-fledged nationhood. It will be worthwhile here to examine them briefly to assess how they fit into the picture of Britain’s strength and influence in the area as a whole.
In Borneo, the three dependencies of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo share with Indonesia a jungle-clad island bigger than Texas, rich in oil and other raw materials, many of whose native people live a primitive existence and have barely emerged from the type of savage barbarism caricatured by the missionary in the big black pot over the fire. None of Borneo’s peoples are yet ready for the full responsibilities of self-government, despite accelerated British efforts to prepare them for this end. Piracy plagues the surrounding seas. Red China exerts the usual Communist and chauvinist pressures among the large Chinese majority of the coastal population, particularly in Sarawak. The Philippines loudly press a tenuous, long-dormant claim to sovereignty over North Borneo. In December 1962, an abortive attempt at revolt was made in Brunei, and the survivors of it vanished into the jungles, from which they now emerge from time to time to fight again with Indonesian support. Thus far, Britain has kept these problems in hand, and, from all appearances, Britain will continue to do so.
Until December 1962, no British military forces of any consequence were permanently positioned in Borneo, though naval forces were frequently deployed there for antipiracy operations, and a very small RAF service detachment was located at the Labuan Island airfield. When the Brunei revolt erupted, substantial British military forces were hurried to Borneo from Singapore, as they have been more recently, and it now appears that some security forces will be required there indefinitely.
Hong Kong, besides being a fabulous shopping mecca, is a keyhole through which one can glimpse the vastness of Red China. To the British, as well as the Communist Chinese, Hong Kong is primarily a major gateway for merchants trading between mainland China and the outside world. As a free port, it is economically useful to both Peking and London. Were it not for this fact, Hong Kong might long ago have been overrun or made untenable to the British. British military strength in the colony is now ineffectual, except for the maintenance of local order or to carry out delaying tactics in event of a Chinese assault. The former naval dockyard is now defunct, and only a few minesweepers remain homeported at Hong Kong. British ground forces comprise only token strength, and the combat capability of Royal Air Force units based there is almost negligible. Such forces are obviously inadequate to defend Hong Kong; Britain clearly does not consider the place militarily defensible in the face of any determined Red Chinese move to seize it. With its refugee-swollen population of over three million souls, Hong Kong is scarcely self-sufficient. Furthermore, its chronically inadequate water supply comes partly from the Communist mainland. Militarily, at least, Hong Kong is thus a liability rather than an asset to Britain’s power position in the Far East. And yet Britain will never voluntarily pull out. This policy is dictated in large measure by economic self- interest. But Britain knows full well, also, that to pull out would be to hand over to Mao Tse-tung another 390 square miles of free territory and surrender the population to slavery and reprisal, and this is simply not in the British tradition.
In the 1957 granting of independence to the Federation of Malaya, the British Commonwealth can be justly proud of a remarkable achievement. The odds against this achievement were staggeringly difficult. For 12 years, from 1947 to 1960, roving bands of Communist guerrillas terrorized the entire populace. At the height of their success, these terrorists numbered in excess of 10,000 men whose campaign of savage violence tied down nearly half a million Malayan, British, and Commonwealth troops, police, and home- guardsmen. Today, only mopping-up operations along the Thai border remain to be accomplished, and this threat to Malaya’s security is gone, for the present. In no part of the earth has Communist insurgency yet been dealt with so firmly or effectively.
Perhaps even more remarkable, however, have been the political and economic changes that have transpired during the same period in Malaya, despite the destructive activities of the Communists. Not only has she achieved political stability at home, but also her voice is now heard with respect in the major councils of the world, where she consistently stands firmly on the side of Western democracy. Meanwhile, her economy, based primarily on rich tin and rubber resources, both of which were severely ravaged in turn by World War II and the Communists terrorists, has regained stability, and, in fact, has become more productive than ever before. Today the people of Malaya have one of the highest per capita incomes of all the nations in Asia. Certainly these accomplishments are a tribute not only to Malaya’s native leadership, but also to Britain’s able guidance. The Federation of Malaya is an immensely valuable product of Britain’s power position and stabilizing influence in Asia; and, because of the existing Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement, Malaya will probably remain one of the firm cornerstones of this power and influence for many years to come.
Singapore, in terms of fixed defense works, is no more an impregnable fortress today than it was in 1942. And yet, it is certainly a bastion of Free World strength and influence in Asia, for it is the command post of all British Far Eastern military power and has served as the co-ordinating center of British diplomacy in the Far East. The bulk of Britain’s Far East military forces are, furthermore, actually based on this city-island. The question today, however, is not so much whether these forces can defend Singapore against external military attack, as whether Singapore will remain a tenable base for Britain’s power position in Asia in the Cold War.
Singapore was granted the status of a semi-independent state in June 1959, and her elected government has since exercised control over domestic matters. Up to the present, Britain has retained a powerful voice in matters affecting internal security. In addition, by the terms of the independence agreement, Britain reserved the right to rescind the constitution and to re-assume all the powers of government if she should consider these steps necessary to maintain order or to protect her vital national or international interests and obligations. Therefore, at least in theory, Britain has been in the driver’s seat. But the driver has looked ahead to a long and wearying trip over a road threatened by Communist roadblocks and dotted with the potholes of economic problems. These problems must be examined in some detail, as they have raised grave questions as to the future value of Singapore as a military base.
For more than a century, Singapore’s economy has rested primarily on the entrepôt trade of her great seaport, and secondarily on her role as the principal trade funnel to and from the hinterland of the Malay Peninsula. Today, due largely to competition from newly independent Indonesia and Malaya, Singapore’s trade and trans-shipment role is diminishing. New industries have not kept pace with this loss of trade, and foreign capital has not been invested in Singapore in amounts necessary to rejuvenate or diversify the economy. As a result, nearly one-fourth of the working population is today unemployed or under-employed. Meanwhile, Singapore is a prime example of the world’s postwar population explosion. The birth rate exceeds the death rate by six-to-one. Over half the present population is under 18 years of age. Consider what this means in terms of future population growth. Singapore is clearly threatened with an ever-increasing unemployment problem, with all the attendant ills and risks, both economic and political.
Of Singapore’s 1,700,000 population, about 75 per cent are Chinese. It is not surprising, therefore, that the People’s Action Party— the party in power today in the local government —is led by Chinese politicians and that these same politicians have succeeded in past elections only to the extent that they have carried the political support of the large Chinese majority of the electorate. Most of Singapore’s Chinese, except for their few English-educated leaders, know little about what Taiwan means, and they care even less. They listen to Radio Peking and believe most of what they hear.
Singapore is the seat and symbol of British power in the Far East. With such naval elements as the 30,000-ton HMS Victorious operating in the area, the author argues that the British will hold Singapore in any foreseeable military conflict short of nuclear war.
In Singapore’s first elections in May 1959, the P.A.P. was swept into power on a platform which vociferously decried the evils of capitalism and colonialism, showed heavy overtones of revolutionary socialism, and raised the spectre of a possible headlong plunge into Communism, oriented toward mainland China. The reaction among European and Chinese businessmen ranged from pessimistic retrenchment to near panic, and there were some who hastily liquidated their local assets and cleared out. The actual record of the top P.A.P. leadership in office, however, has been both surprising and encouraging. If they did not know the economic facts of life before assuming office, they soon learned that a community whose economy rests primarily on entrepôt trade cannot disavow capitalism. They learned that when an erstwhile storekeeper with inadequate capital wishes to go into big business for himself, he must convince potential investors that he will not behave like Nasser or Castro. In short, the top leaders learned that the rice bowls of their people could be kept full only through continued close economic ties with the Free World—through disavowing Communism, rather than capitalism.
While these facts appear to have been clearly perceived by Lee Kuan Yew, the P.A.P. Prime Minister, and by his close associates in high office, they have not been understood by the illiterate majority of the population. The majority has remained highly responsive to the irresponsible criticisms and revolutionary persuasions of the Communist extremists, who originally comprised an opposition group within the P.A.P. but have since split apart to form the Barisan Socialis opposition party. Thus, Lee Kuan Yew has been forced to tread a thin line. On the one hand, he has sought to provide more employment by encouraging foreign investment to broaden Singapore’s economic base; on the other, in order to stay in office, he has sought to placate the opposition as well as the electorate by continuing to pose as the champion of the leftist camp until such time as his economic policies could bear visible fruit. Thus far, he has managed this feat remarkably well. But as unemployment and popular unrest increase—as they are almost certain to do in coming years—it is not difficult to imagine the Communists inciting the discontented populace to violence and political upheaval.
Fortunately, one recent development gives rise to guarded optimism that a brighter and more stable future may lie ahead for Singapore. This prospect rests on the concept of “Greater Malaysia,” a scheme originally conceived by Britain but most arduously pushed forward today by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya. The plan originally called for political union with Malaya, by Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo, all to form one confederation of states governed from Kuala Lumpur, within the British Commonwealth. There was substantial opposition to this plan among radical left wing groups in both Singapore and Borneo, as well as the Philippines and Indonesia, particularly the latter. On 16 September 1963, however, Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo joined with Malaya and became the Federation of Malaysia. Brunei had earlier refused to sign because of a dispute over finances. The Philippines withheld recognition of the new nation and Indonesia was still dissatisfied with the results of the United Nations fact-finding team.
Greater Malaysia will have little immediate effect on Singapore’s economic problems, but joint economic planning probably will in due time stimulate a more wholesome development of industry in Singapore, benefiting Malaya as well. More important in terms of immediate salutory effects, will be the assumption by the anti-Communist Federation Government of internal security authority over Singapore, which will probably mean much more forceful action against Singapore’s radical leftists and greater political stability for Singapore. Important militarily is the provision that Britain will continue to maintain and base her military forces on Singapore Island as an extension of the existing Anglo- Malayan Defense Agreement of 1957.
What this really means is that even though Britain will surrender to Greater Malaysia her sovereignty over Singapore Island, British naval, ground, and air forces will for the foreseeable future continue to be based at, and operated from, the Singapore military base complex with essentially the same rights as in the past, provided that such forces are not employed for purposes manifestly contrary to the national interests of the Federation Government. Though Malaya is not a member of SEATO, these terms are not expected to bar British participation in any future SEATO military operations, as has been feared in some quarters. Most important of all, from a military standpoint, Greater Malaysia gives fair promise of long-term economic and political stability for Singapore, the only existing base complex from which effective British naval, ground, and air power in the Far East can be operated and supported. The prospect of continued British military presence in Greater Malaysia is more than acceptable to the Federation simply because Greater Malaysia would otherwise be virtually defenseless.
Let us now examine some of the details of British and Commonwealth military strength in Singapore and Malaya:
(1) Total ground forces normally number about 28,000 men.
(2) Aircraft in tactical units number about 160, of which roughly one-third are jet fighters, one-fourth jet tactical bombers, and the balance transports and utility aircraft.
(3) Combatant naval forces normally include 2 CVAs, 1 LPH, 1 CL, 12 DD/DE types, and 4 SS plus about 30 smaller units, mostly minesweepers.
(4) Royal Marines now include two 600- man Commando units—the 40 and 42 Commando—one normally embarked in the LPH and the other ashore at Singapore.
With the above austere forces, Britain must be constantly ready to fulfill her SEATO commitments, protect her far-flung lifelines and other national interests all the way from Suez to Hong Kong, render at least token support to the U. N. presence in Korea, conduct frequent joint training exercises with a number of Commonwealth forces, combat piracy in the Sulu and Celebes Seas, participate in SEATO exercises, stand ready to quell possible violence in Singapore, put down a revolt in Borneo, and prevent the seizure of Kuwait by Iraq—just to mention a few of the tasks. The job is a tough one, but Britain has faced up to it remarkably well and has never failed to hold the line.
With American attention focused so closely on the problems of South Vietnam and Laos, we are apt to overlook or minimize the grave potential dangers that lie further to the south, particularly widespread Communism and deeply-rooted Soviet military influence in an ultra-nationalistic Indonesia, plus the more recent ominous beginnings of insurgency in Borneo. Taken singly, each of these factors poses serious threats to Malaysia and to the stability and security of Southeast Asia as a whole. Even more menacing, however, is the clear possibility that all the above elements may eventually join forces in a campaign to subvert and seize British Borneo, and possibly Malaya and Singapore, as well. At the moment, aside from possible later U. S. involvement, only Britain stands in the way of this threat, should it materialize. It is well that Britain is there.
But taking into account the austerity of her forces, can Britain be expected to deal successfully with likely future problems in these areas without U. S. help? Probably not. It is some 8,000 miles from Suez to Hong Kong, and Britain’s forces stretch ridiculously thin over that long line. What happens, for instance, if Kuwait is threatened again at the same time that renewed violence breaks out in Borneo? What happens if Indonesia, still armed to the teeth to fight the Dutch over West New Guinea, should decide to invade British Borneo by overt military action? This may well be in the cards. Moreover, how would developments such as any of the above affect Britain’s ability to commit forces to a SEATO conflict on the mainland of Asia? Finally, what would be the situation if there were no British forces at all in Southeast Asia? These are questions worth pondering.
What the United States can or should do to bolster Britain’s depleted military power across the vast ocean area that stretches from Africa to Southeast Asia—an area which now comes close to being a seapower vacuum—is not the subject of this paper. But as our strategic planners weigh this problem, it is fervently hoped that they will not lose sight of this important fact: U. S. power and influence, strong as it may be, cannot and must not by itself seek to assume the whole burden Britain has borne and continues to bear, as best it can, in this area. Whatever we do, so long as it is to the common good, must be done in concert with Britain and it must allow Britain to continue to do certain things which she can do better than we can.
Britain’s know-how and understanding of peoples and places in South Asia have been built up over hundreds of years in which generation after generation of Britons, military and civilian, spent whole lifetimes learning the ropes, the facts of life, in these faraway places. Of course, these values do not count for everything, and they suffer somewhat from association with colonialism, but they matter far more today than most Americans realize. For instance, during the attempted revolt in Brunei in 1962, British authorities sent upriver into the dense jungles of Borneo’s interior men bearing bamboo poles with red feathers attached, the traditional rallying signal among the native tribesmen. In one day’s time, hundreds of Kenyah, Kayan, and I ban warriors emerged from the jungle ready to fight for their great white queen across the sea. They bore shotguns, parangs, blowpipes, and poison darts. They even offered to resume their ancient practice of headhunting if this would help their British friends and protectors. In such counterinsurgency situations, allies like these are invaluable, but their loyalty is not acquired in a day. It was earned through generations of British presence. No American could have rallied these forces.
Similarly, the Royal Navy’s long experience in these areas has developed certain assets with which the U. S. Navy is not yet so well endowed. For instance, when a British destroyer on the Far East Station undergoes her equivalent of our regular Operational Readiness Inspection (O.R.I.) it is commonplace for the inspecting officer to confront the ship’s captain with a problem like this: “Assume that Their Highnesses the Sultan and Sultanah of Johore will arrive on board in 20 minutes and will remain for lunch. What honors will you render? How will you address them? What can you safely serve them at lunch? What foods are taboo? What topics of conversation would be suitable, and what topics should be avoided?” Relatively junior Royal Navy officers are expected to be ready for problems like this on short notice, and by and large they can handle them alone in any port from Suez to Singapore. The main point here is that in day-to-day shipboard training and readiness, the Royal Navy places diplomatic proficiency—ability to “show the flag” —at the same level of importance as proficiency in gunnery or damage control. This pays off in the Cold War.
British military presence today with the armed forces of Malaya gives another good example of how Britain has built up deeply- rooted mutual trust and respect, with tangible results, through long-term association and support. Scores of British and Australian officers not only hold certain high ranking positions in .all three of the Malayan armed services, but also are integrated at various levels down to the most junior ranks of operational units. The duties of many of them require that they eat, sleep, and live as Malayans among Malayans. There are no PXs or commissaries reserved exclusively for British use. Most speak the language, are fully versed in local customs and traditions, and are intensely dedicated to the task of building for Malaya an effective military posture of its own.
A measure of British success towards this end is that no troops employed by the U. N. in the Congo operation have had a finer record for diligence and dependability than the Malayans. Furthermore, of all the U. N. troops transported to and from the Congo in U. S. Navy ships, the Malayans have invariably been the cleanest, the most military in their appearance and demeanor, and the best disciplined. In combat effectiveness, Malaya’s 12,000-man army probably has no equal for its size in any other Southeast Asian country. Malaya’s Navy and Air Force are still embryonic; but they, too, show good promise for the future. Britain, alone, has made possible these developments, developments of great potential value to the stability of Southeast Asia, developments which no nation but Britain could have fostered in the same time span. Nor could any nation relieve Britain of the whole burden now and complete it half as well or as soon as Britain surely will. There is no substitute for the mutual trust, understanding and loyalty which only long years of close association can build.
If there is a need for U. S. military presence in South Asian areas which are now or have been in the British sphere of influence—and the writer believes such needs clearly exist— whatever we do must be done in league with Britain for the common good. What we do must not ignore superior British grasp and understanding of key factors in local environments. Our efforts must be jointly planned and jointly executed so as to complement and support each other. Though we may possess greater pure military power and superior financial means to equip local forces, we must not forget that Britain’s local experience and influence are in many respects superior to our own. For example, due to their prolonged involvement in the Communist war in Malaya, the British probably have no equal in conducting counter-guerrilla operations in mountainous jungle terrain.
In recent years it has often been easier to criticize Britain than to praise her. Regret- ably, circumstances have made her the most obvious whipping boy for the half-truth evils of colonialism. But how many of the critics have travelled to British dependencies and seen for themselves the meaningful and enduring values of every kind that generations of Britons have so patiently and painstakingly built there? Some of our own young naval officers, after visiting British ships, come back only to deprecate the Royal Navy on grounds that reflect but a superficial understanding of what they have seen. True, their fleet is not nearly as big, or as modern, or as versatile as ours, and other weaknesses might be mentioned. But have these critics ever seen the Royal Navy fight? How much do they know of the great traditions still upheld by that Navy, or of its combat record in World War II with the same breed of men and ships we see today?
Britain still has a vital role to fulfill in defense of Free World interests and, in spite of her limited resources, she is fulfilling this role far better than most of us know. Those of us who have lived and travelled “East of Suez” are deeply grateful that Britain is still there. We must help her stay there.
The winds and the waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators.
Edward Gibbon