This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Our Merchant Marine Is Dying”
(See pages 30-39, June 1963 Proceedings)
George Wauchope, Vice Admiral, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired) (Executive Vice President, Farrell Lines, Inc.)—Commander ^Vilhide’s article is welcome in that it gives evidence of the Navy’s continuing interest in the U. S. Merchant Marine and recognizes that important segments of the maritime •adustry are working hard and effectively to encourage public understanding and support °f this national asset.
But, in the view of some of us who spend our workaday lives in this activity, it is regrettable that the author fails to report fully the achievements of the public relations programs undertaken by the industry in recent years. Readers of the Proceedings may easily have inferred from the tone and content of Commander Wilhide’s article that precious httle is being done by industry in the public relations area.
Also regrettable is the oversight by the author, and by Admiral Arleigh Burke in his foreword, of some fundamental obstacles to the progress of all elements of the merchant marine. Two of these obstacles are the desire of foreign maritime interests to hog the business and the inability of some groups of Americans to support their merchant marine by “shipping American.”
That the aforementioned obstacles exist is not the result of any lack of an industry program “to tell its story.” Readers of Commander Wilhide’s article will be encouraged to know that many of his suggestions have been industry practice for years. On the other hand, the case he presents for certain other suggestions, even when viewed as an expression of helpful interest, fails, in the final analysis, to carry conviction.
Consider, for example, the assertion that “individual lines might have been placing too much reliance on a series of group efforts” and that “the strength of any group plan or program must come from a strong and varied program by the individual companies.”
In the area of industry information activity, individual companies work more effectively when they pool resources and co-ordinate their planning. Their own public relations activities, concentrated mainly in competitive and community areas, should supplement the essential group effort.
At Farrell Lines, for example, we emphasize both individual and group approaches to public relations. In these efforts we are rather typical of American-flag steamship companies, whose 300 active passenger and dry cargo vessels form the hard core of the U. S. Merchant Marine. These companies, which comprise the Committee of American Steamship Lines, are the American Export Lines, American Mail Line, American President Lines, Bloomfield Steamship Company, Delta Steamship Lines, Grace Line, Gulf & South American Steamship Company, Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, Moore-McCormack Lines, Pacific Far East Line, Prudential Lines, States Steamship Company, the Oceanic Steamship Company, the United States Lines Company, and the Farrell Lines.
The Navy, of course, is fully aware of the role of these 15 lines in national security planning. The soundness of our national maritime policy, as set forth in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, has been demonstrated many times—in World War II, Korea, and other crises such as Lebanon, Suez, and Cuba. During these crises, members of the CASL have responded immediately to the Navy’s emergency call for modern passenger and modern cargo ships.
This segment of our merchant marine is strong and vigorous. Of the total dry cargoes shipped in regularly scheduled liner trades to and from the United States, the CASL companies have consistently carried from 30 to 35 per cent. The 10.5 per cent share of cargoes carried by the entire U. S. Merchant Marine reflects, in the main, the decline in cargo carrying by American flag tankers, bulk carriers, and tramps.
The CASL companies are currently engaged in a $4,000,000,000 ship replacement program to be completed in five to ten years; we are competing vigorously for trade cargoes and passenger traffic; we are investing substantially in public relations activity.
Farrell Lines, for example, believes that public relations is a top management function with fundamental responsibilities that cannot be delegated to lower levels of management. We also employ the most capable and experienced public relations people we can find to assist in carrying out the policies and programs formulated by management. We conduct institutional advertising campaigns in such publications as Business Week, Wall Street Journal, Journal of Commerce, Export Trade, Foreign Affairs, and International Trade Review. We participate in about 20 trade shows and exhibits every year. We also conduct community and employee relations programs.
In the vital area of trade promotion, Farrell Lines has carried out aggressive programs. The line gave strong support to the establishment of the South African rock lobster exports to the United States. These exports now total more than $10,000,000 a year. But this figure, moreover, was almost exactly equal to the cost of 45 diesel locomotives shipped in a recent year in the opposite direction—again, as a result of Farrell Lines’ promotion activity. In September of this year, we co-ordinated a trade mission to Africa, involving United States businessmen interested in taking a greater part in the development of industry and markets in Africa.
These kinds of public relations and trade promotion activities are not particularly unusual in our industry. Many individual shipping companies are conducting aggressive, balanced, public relations programs. Farrell Lines is a relatively small company; some larger companies of CASL are engaged in relatively larger programs. The passenger lines, for example, advertise heavily in national publications such as National Geographic, New Yorker, Holiday, Time, Newsweek, McCall s, Reader’’s Digest, and others.
Commander Wilhide’s observation that the Committee of American Steamship Lines, “has done some excellent work,” will be gratefully received by its members. It is appropriate to mention briefly a few of CASL s public relations activities:
1. Institutional Advertising: CASL sponsors institutional advertising in many metropolitan newspapers and national circulation magazines.
2. Balance of Payments Information Programs: Recognizing the substantial contribution to the payments balance from shipping and traveling American, CASL a few years ago sponsored a basic research study by university scholars. Copies of the study have been mailed to 30,000 shippers and leaders in industry, education, and government. Direct mail bulletins were mailed to more than 20,000 industry traffic managers.
3. Community Visit Program: Groups of 20 to 30 presidents and traffic executives of CASL companies have visited 12 inland communities in the last few years, meeting shippers, appearing on radio and television, giving speeches to community groups, and conducting foreign trade forums.
They have carried the merchant marine story directly to 120 leading manufacturers and indirectly through the press, radio and TV to more than 11.5 million more Americans in land-locked communities.
4. Other Informational Activities: The CASL film “Lifelines, USA” has been viewed on television by an estimated 40 million Americans. A speaker’s bureau established by CASL provides experienced speakers to interested community and civic groups. An active press section encourages a regular flow
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
The maritime industry does carry out aggressive programs in the fields of public relations and trade promotion, according to the author, as it works hard and effectively to encourage public understanding and support of the U. S. Merchant Marine.
Flying Camera, Inc.
°f news releases and other material about the merchant marine to the press. In addition, CASL co-operates in many industry projects, some of which were mentioned by Commander Wilhide, such as essay contests, trade fairs, and exhibits.
The CASL firms individually and collectively have not seriously considered some of the approaches and projects proposed in the article. Nor, in our view, would it be appropriate to do so. For example, what is really implied if “only one line has a vice President in charge of public relations”? How many companies in manufacturing or other industries have vice presidents of public relations? I believe that most steamship lines recognize the importance of public relations, at least as much as industry does generally. As is well known, moreover, titles in industry do not necessarily carry the connotations that grade and rank carry in the military services. The title of a public relations officer in industry is not necessarily a measure of the importance attached to the function and bears little relationship to the soundness of the policies or the effectiveness of the programs.
Commander Wilhide’s suggestion that steamship companies should increase advertising for passenger trade in “vast areas of the land-locked midwestern states ’ must be considered against the economics of the travel business. Advertising programs for passenger trade must be based upon sound market research, including studies of population, economic factors, and travel habits.
Advertising for cargoes in local newspapers and on small radio and television stations, in our view, would promise far less return than advertising in the media that we know reach the shippers. Farrell Lines knows that there are an estimated 2,500 potential shippers engaged in trade through African ports that we serve. We direct our advertising messages to this market by effective means, such as trade magazines, sailing schedules, direct mail and, above all, personal solicitation.
The CASL companies in a recent three-year period collectively spent more than 46 million dollars on solicitation, world trade promotion, public relations, and advertising programs. More than 1,300 sales and promotion people actively represent the 15 CASL companies in sales and trade development work around the world.
General public
Employees (seamen) Shipper
Shipbuilder and ship repair and supply firms
Navy Department
Shipping firm
My comment on Commander Wilhide’s article no doubt was stimulated, in part, by the gloomy title selected for the article: “Our Merchant Marine Is Dying . . . and nobody seems to care.” I submit that the essential passenger and dry-cargo liner segment of our merchant fleet is not dying. Rather, it is robust and strong.
I was also led to comment because of the editorial selection of photographs of obsolete port facilities—apparently to illustrate the point made in the title.
In attempting to broaden the perspectives offered by Commander Wilhide on merchant marine public relations activities, I am the first to agree with him that more should be done. Observations of mine that differ sharply from his will, I hope, in no way suggest that we differ as to the goal—a strong, modern Merchant Marine for our country.
Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr. (Associate Professor, Clemson College)—This article and one in a similar vein by Captain E. B. Perry, “Our Merchant Marine is in Trouble,” May 1962 Proceedings, are both open to a serious, methodological criticism. The authors have examined American ocean shipping in the 1960s and found it wanting. Both have alluded to its pre-eminent past (circa 1820-1840) in general terms, but both have neglected to define specifically what would constitute a successful merchant marine today. It cannot be urged too strongly that such a definition is a necessary requisite for any meaningful analysis today.
The root difficulty lies in understanding, or misunderstanding the economic nature of American foreign-trade ocean shipping. Simply stated, the industry must be minimally defined as a quasi public utility, an assertion generally accepted by most maritime writers and, in point of fact, the industry itself. If for no other reasons, this is so because of large operation and construction subsidies appropriated from public monies and the public nature of national defense.
Granting the industry is public in nature, one must also grant that a general public has many economic facets or interests. The measure of success is not necessarily the same for any two.
A partial list of maritime interest groups, i.e., those directly concerned with maintaining a merchant marine, includes:
GROUP INTEREST
Return on investment; indirectly, relative and absolute tonnage carried.
Employment opportunities, wages.
Freight rates; kind and availability of service.
Purchase and supply vessels in the United States.
Amount, type and state of readiness of merchant shipping.
Minimizing cost of maintaining a merchant
marine.
It is not difficult to comprehend the possibility of different interests frequently disagreeing over what constitutes a successful merchant marine. A case in point is the recent dispute between the Navy Department and several shipping companies over the speed of new tonnage constructed under a differential subsidy. The companies argued that the higher speed characteristics desired by the Navy were not economical.
Consider some statistics relative to several of the interest groups cited above over the past 20 to 25 years. It is left to the reader to render his own interpretation. Dollar figures have not been deflated.
In June 1937, approximately 60,000 seamen were employed. In the same month, 21 years later, 51,515 seamen were employed.
The monthly wage cost for operating a C-2 cargo vessel in 1937 was $4,995. In 1958 the cost not including fringe benefits was $28,565.
In 1937, the average monthly earnings for a seaman on a dry-cargo vessel were $80. In 1957, his earnings were $585.
The cost of the operating subsidy differential program from 1937-1940 was $21,003,871. The cost from 1947 through the first six months of 1960 was $1,102,178,000.
The active, U. S. foreign-trade merchant marine in 1937—all types—totalled 1,234 vessels, of which 155 were operationally subsidized. In 1962, the active, U. S. foreign- trade merchant marine—all types—totalled 915 ships, of which 314 were operationally
subsidized by the Federal Government.
In 1937, the Federal Government owned and operated 37 vessels. As of 1 July 1959, the Msts fleet stood at 123 vessels of all types.
In 1937, American-owned “flag of convenience” shipping was negligible. In 1959, there were 378 active, American-owned, “flag of convenience” vessels.
American flag participation in U. S. foreign trade in 1937 was 22 million long tons or 26.5 per cent of the total. In 1960, the figures were 28.6 million long tons or 10.5 per cent °f the total.
In 1937, the average age of the U. S. Privately-owned merchant marine was in excess of 20 years, and average speed was little better than nine knots. In 1960, the average ship age and speed were 14.4 years and 14.7 knots, respectively.
In 1938, the net income of the subsidized lines was 2.5 million dollars. In 1957, this mcome was 70.5 million dollars.
While any judgment rendered may be rightly questioned, the problem posed is clear. The various interests may be ranked or one or more completely ignored, the burden of proof then being upon the author to defend his arguments. What he cannot legitimately do, however, is to assert categorically that a merchant marine is “in trouble” or “dying” without some concept or definition of an opposite state of affairs—and certainly not over a span of one hundred years.
In conclusion, while I cannot agree with Commander Wilhide, a continuing examination of the industry is in order. I have serious reservations about several of his and Captain Perry’s proposals and hence would not care to see discussion ended. I submit to these and future authors on the subject that they should precisely define what they consider to be an adequate, successful, suitable merchant marine. Then proposed solutions may be examined with respect to stated goals.
And to those who still doubt the importance of precise definition, I commend to them the tens of thousands of written and spoken words with respect to what constitutes “a substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States, ...” as set forth in Section 101(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and in the same manner to define fair and reasonable costs as also set down in Section 603(b) of the same legislation.
F. P. Karres, Lieutenant (junior grade), U. S. Coast Guard—The plight of the merchant marine is indeed a sad one, as illuminated by Commander Wilhide. While the use of a well-developed public relations program would undoubtedly improve the position of the U. S. Merchant Marine, there are other more basic factors that merit consideration.
The excessive fall in the percentage ol U. S. cargoes carried in American vessels can be attributed to one major factor: the high level of wages and cost of shipping peculiar to the United States economy. Commander Wilhide noted in his article that Japan and Great Britain carry 60 per cent of their trade in their own vessels. He seems disappointed that the same degree of public support is not present in this country. Yet if we remember that the industrial segment of our country has been built and sustained on the profit and loss system, there is little wonder that public support is lacking. There are not too many businessmen who are patriotic enough to sustain losses through excessive wages just to maintain the merchant marine.
Actually, the support of the fleet in such a manner would be far from patriotic; in fact, it could more properly be called national suicide. At this point, we must decide whether or not we can maintain our merchant marine fleet in accordance with the principles upon which this country was built. The most important of these is free enterprise.
Keeping free enterprise in mind, we can further attempt to resolve the problem by considering two solutions. The first would involve greater subsidy payments from the Federal Government to the shipping companies. These subsidies would allow lower rates to be promulgated in order to put the American lines on a more competitive basis with foreign shippers, enhancing the position of the American companies by increasing their share of the world trade. However, the concomitant effect of this increased subsidy would be a greater degree of government control. Unfortunately, history has shown that attempts by national governments to operate businesses on a competitive basis usually result in profitless failure. There is a good possibility that we would find our merchant marine degenerating into a bureaucracy that had lost all concept of a free enterprise system —its only goal being a “vessel race” with the Communist world.
We may also discover that as international interdependence becomes more of an economic reality, there will no longer be a need for a sizeable merchant marine. It is entirely possible that certain countries might find it more profitable to provide carriers, while other nations would find it to their advantage to utilize the vessels of the carrier nations.
The second solution to the merchant marine problem lies in a re-evaluation of excessive wage rates and union benefits that are entrenched in the shipping industry. Obviously, some portion of these problems have been the result of post-war inflation and cannot be readily corrected.
The one means by which the industry can improve its profit position is by the adoption of a rapid and austere program of automation. What little has been done to date has been vigorously resisted by the unions—and will be even more so in the future. Automation will simply have to be accepted, however, for unless some workers are soon eliminated, they will all be out of work.
Public relations will indeed help the merchant marine, but it will be of assistance only if it is used as a tool to bring debate such as that presented here to the attention of the general public. The maintenance of vessels available for the use of the United States in both war and peace is a vital requirement in the battle against Communism; yet, we must be careful that we do not sink to the low level of matching the Soviets on a ship for ship basis. Our efforts must be expended on a more sophisticated plane, with an ever- watchful eye towards the maintenance of our free enterprise system.
"Maritime Resources for Security and Trade”
E. B. Perry, Captain, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The final report of the Maritime Evaluation Committee, titled “Maritime Resources for Security and Trade,” which was released early this year is interesting, informative, controversial, and somewhat difficult to accept in all of its parts. It deals with the many problems which beset our declining merchant- ship service and with hoped-for remedies. The Committee was appointed in early 1961 ? at the request of the Secretary of Commerce, to study and report on maritime policies and programs. Seven of the committee members are eminent in their trades or professions which were other than ships and shipping- The eighth member was the Navy’s retired constructor, Vice Admiral E. S. “Jerry” Land, well known for his previous services to the Government in various maritime executive and administrative positions.
The purposes of the report, as released, are to evaluate the role of the maritime industry in our national economy and defense; to consider the integration of seaborne transportation with other domestic means of transportation; to advance ideas as to how we may best regain our status as a strong maritime power; and to recommend ways and means by which the country may be assured of getting “its money’s worth” from Federal maritime funds. A prime point in the report concerns the reduction of subsidy cost per vessel.
The report recognizes our need for and current lack of a sufficient and capable merchant ship service. It realistically ascribes our decline as a maritime nation to excessive labor costs and strikes. It states that both our merchant ship fleet and the program which is supposed to provide for a capable and sufficient fleet need renewal.
The several report recommendations do not always confine themselves to one subject but, very briefly, this is the gist of the report:
• Better management-labor bargaining practices must be had even if new legislation is required. Frequent interruptions of shipping services cannot be tolerated.
• The -“flag of necessity” fleet is essential to our national security, and the ships therein must remain under U. S. control.
•While there are more seafarers than seagoing jobs in a declining service, increased Government training in certain trades is required.
• Additional Government agencies and increased regulation of the industry should be provided.
• Our various systems of transportation, land and sea, should be integrated to the best, most economical advantage.
• Full benefits must be reaped from greater
Mechanization and automation in the ships and on the docks, even to the point of considering that a great ship may safely go to sea with a crew of only 14 men.
• Nuclear-powered merchant ships should be promoted.
• More funds should be provided for increased research and development.
• Cargo preference should be continued f°r U. S.-flag ships, but, to stimulate ship replacement, foreign-built ships should be admitted to U. S. registration.
• Certain existing ships, now in the reserve fleet, should be converted for service to upgrade the tramp fleet. And a block of Liberties should be preserved for emergency services.
• While favoring larger and faster ships, simplicity of design and construction together With standardization should be encouraged.
• Passenger-liner services should be assisted in finding and developing new, economically justified services.
Management should be encouraged to be more economy minded. It is proposed that the owners share in any subsidy savings effected M the building of a ship and in her operation. Under our present program, “differential” subsidy funds go to labor to off-set the high cost of our labor versus foreign low-cost labor. It is considered a completely new idea that management should be able to pocket any Part of such funds.
In that the report appears to offer something to everybody, the various segments of the merchant marine industry will applaud varying recommendations. It is probable that the powerful labor leaders will be somewhat aghast at the proposed curtailment of their powers. While seeking to reduce the subsidy cost per vessel by new schemes and means, too little emphasis has been given to the fact that such costs could be reduced—without any expenditures, new and costly devices, or sacrifice of safety and reliability—by about 30 Per cent if dockside and seagoing labor would accept reasonable manning scales.
As the report suggests, many of the recommendations are controversial. It is to be doubted that the complete program suggested could ever become effective. It may be that a Presidential Message, as suggested in the report, will clarify the ills of our merchant service and suggest legislation for their cure.
"The Fleet Versus the Ballistic Missile”
(See pages 34-39, April 1963 Proceedings)
Charles Pollak, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy—The concept of the employment of ballistic missiles against the Fleet is of enormous importance to the Navy. Most naval officers have visualized the ballistic missile (insofar as it pertains to the Navy) only as a new means by which to extend the strategic power of the Fleet against shore targets. In his article Captain Russell Crenshaw, Jr., has examined the deep implications of the reverse role, i.e., the use of land-launched missiles against the ships at sea—or in port.
Based upon certain assumptions, Captain Crenshaw has reached conclusions which are very thought-provoking. In essence he has concluded that:
First, “ . . . the purely ballistic missile is not a very practical weapon for use against a maneuvering ship at sea.”
Second, a ballistic missile with a terminal guidance system capable of acquiring the target as the missile plunges back into the atmosphere, and making a terminal correction of up to ten or 15 miles, would be extremely effective.
Third: “Ships in port are already vulnerable to attack by those ballistic missiles with sufficient range to reach them.”
Fourth, “ ... we must develop the capability to destroy reconnaissance satellites by antisatellite missiles.”
Fifth, “ . . . the Fleet must have an antiballistic missile capability.”
It is recognized that any article of this type must be based upon certain assumptions and simplifications. I believe it can be shown, however, that the ballistic missile is a threat to ships at sea even if the missiles do not have terminal guidance capability. If this is true, it tends to strengthen the urgency of Captain Crenshaw’s recommendations that we develop the means to destroy reconnaissance satellites and that we provide the Fleet with an antimissile capability.
Captain Crenshaw bases his first conclusion on the following premises: ideal target location and tracking by means of reconnaissance satellites, 15 minutes “dead time” to launch the missile, 15 minutes “time of flight” of the missile, and typical, non- alerted maneuvering of a 20-knot ship.
Based on these premises, he has shown that a missile on a perfect flight could be expected to miss the target by five miles. The error distance would be caused by target maneuvers during the 30-minute period from detection to re-entry body impact. One vital point has been overlooked—the “dead time” can be reduced to zero! With “dead time” eliminated, the response time (“dead time” plus time of flight) is halved, and the corresponding miss distance is halved to just 2.5 miles.
In order to understand the manner in which we can eliminate the effective “dead time,” it is necessary to know what produces this delay before a missile can be launched (it is assumed that we are referring to a solid-fuel rocket that does not require fueling preparation time). The countdown consists of two separate phases: bringing the gyro components of the missile up to speed and then aligning the missile inertial platform to the target; and inserting final fire control corrections and making final missile checks. The first phase is by far the more time-consuming, requiring perhaps 13 minutes. At the end of this phase—and this is the crux of the argument—the countdown can be stopped and the missile held in a “T minus two-minutes” condition. This condition might be maintained for several hours or even days.
Assume that a reconnaissance satellite detects a target and is able to relay tracking information for five minutes before passing over the horizon. A fire-control computer then uses this information to solve target course and speed and to generate the estimated position. The missile countdown is commenced and the missile brought to a “T-minus-two- minute” condition. A typical satellite will complete one revolution in 90 minutes (depending upon altitude). When the satellite reacquires the target, the countdown is resumed. Actual target position is compared to predicted position, and the difference is inserted as a minor correction (at IRBM or I CBM ranges, differences of even 40 or 50 miles are minor corrections insofar as the fire control solution is concerned). Target course and speed are computed and compared to the course and speed of the target made good during the 90-minute interval. A weighted average is assigned in order to obtain the most
likely course of the target during the 15- minute time of flight, and inserted as a second minor correction. These corrections can be computed and inserted automatically and continuously until one or two seconds prior to launch. Thus target information is accurate at time of launch, and effective dead time has been reduced to zero.
It is to be noted that the “original” satellite will probably not pass over the target on successive trips. With three satellites properly placed, however, we can obtain coverage at least every 90 minutes by using them alternately as the tracking source. It should be obvious, moreover, that the 90-minute period is not critical. If necessary, we could wait until the “original” satellite re-acquired (this would normally happen every third orbit) therefore once every four and a half hours). Furthermore, any reasonably accurate target information can be utilized as a basis for the initial position. The satellite, when it did acquire, would be used for the accurate information needed for launch. In this case, the tracking computations of the satellite might be given a heavier weight factor—possibly even 100 per cent—in comparison to target course and speed made good between the first information received and the satellite observations. The weight factor assigned would be used to predict target motion during the 15-minute time of flight, as before.
If we can expect to land within two and one half miles of a single ship target, and if we extend the lethal range to two miles (a figure that is certainly not unrealistic for even a bomb considered “small” by today’s standards), the economics of the situation take on a far different aspect than that of a five-mile miss with- a bomb of one-mile lethal range. Using standard statistical approaches, it can be shown quite easily that the expected damage from such employment would be very high in relation to the cost of the missiles. This use of missiles at the present time probably would not be wise because of the greater damage to be expected against land targets. As Captain Crenshaw indicates, however, once a belligerent has produced sufficient missiles to obtain reasonable coverage of prime land targets, additional missiles can be allocated profitably to attack targets at sea. The need for wide dispersal of all units becomes extremely important with this the case.
It might be noted that the value of having separate military services with different Points of view is once more apparent. The solid-fuel missile, developed by the Navy over the objections of the Air Force, is superseding the liquid-fuel rocket. Meanwhile the Army, alone of the three services, has done a great deal of theoretical and experimental work on the anti-ballistic-missile concept. The work of the Army could reduce significantly the lead time necessary to develop a Fleet installation effective against the ballistic missile. Without adequate means to defend itself against land- launched rockets, the Fleet will become as vulnerable as our cities are at present.
Sea Bottom Cores
(See page 168, May 1963 Proceedings)
Jan FIahn (Editor, Oceanus)—Since about 1942, cores 15 feet long have become routine and since about 1950 longer and longer cores have been taken, some up to 80 feet. The research ship Chain on cruise 35 routinely obtained cores 30 to 50 feet long.
"Training Future Naval Officers”
(See pages 172-173, April 1963 Proceedings)
William A. Dritz, Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve—In the April Proceedings Secretary’s Notes, the career retention rates of the Naval Academy are compared to those of the Officer Candidate School and it is suggested that revision of the Naval Academy curriculum would cause a drop in the Academy retention rate.
I believe that before one can compare the career retention rates of the two schools, there has to be some rational basis for such comparison. There are several reasons why the comparison should be considered to be erroneous. Candidates for the Naval Academy are primarily high school graduates, untrained in any particular field. These young men enter the Academy with an open mind, expecting to receive career training. For the most part, OCS applicants are college graduates trained in civilian pursuits, expecting to return to those pursuits after completion of required military service.
ry *7
A 50-foot-long coring tube rests on the deck of the research vessel Chain. The tube can be taken apart in sections permitting oceanographers to examine corings taken from the ocean floor.
Jan Hahn
Secondly, recruiting methods are different. The Naval Academy is sold as a career pro-
gram. Non-career people are discouraged from applying. Officer Candidate School is deliberately sold as a non-career program in order to attract the maximum number of applicants. College graduates are encouraged to apply with the thought that they discharge their military obligation prior to commencing their career in civil life. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, in the past, has directed that lack of career motivation shall not be considered a detriment to the OCS applicant.
Officer Candidate School graduates, with few exceptions, are commissioned in the Naval Reserve—in effect labeling them from their initial commissioning as non-career officers. An OCS graduate who neither requests augmentation nor retention will automatically receive orders to inactive duty after three years of commissioned service! On the other hand, the Naval Academy graduate receives a regular commission and will be retained unless he requests release.
Concerning assignments, the Naval Academy graduate, from initial commissioning, is considered a career officer and is assigned as such. Conversely, the OCS reserve officer graduate, once again because of BuPers policy, is assigned as a non-career officer until such time as he is considered to be career material. I am sure many potential career officers are encouraged to return to civilian pursuits by this policy.
In my opinion, the above reasons are the major causes of the gross difference between the career retention rates of OCS and the Naval Academy. Using retention rate comparison as justification for a “go slow” approach to Academy curriculum revision is a perfect example of using statistics for whatever purpose intended. There are other valid arguments for a “go slow” approach to curriculum liberalization. I don’t believe unscientific, albeit spectacular, comparisons of the cold statistics are helpful in this case.
The Blue and Gold Caduceus
H. P. Hoffman, Midshipman Second Class, U. S. Naval Academy—Recent innovations in the academic offerings of the Naval Academy have swung open doors hitherto closed for the midshipmen. Majors in selected fields and the majority of qualifications for a master s degree are within the scope of the once overly-specialized engineering program.
Lurking unrealized by the critic from without [see page 110, April 1963 Proceedings], and seldom considered by others than those directly affected within the Academy* is the plight of the NPQ midshipman—the hapless individual who is not physically qualified to serve as a naval line officer. Almost every midshipman so designated win find himself speedily deposited in the Supply Corps. Why not open other specialized fields to capable NPQ midshipmen? The Medical and Dental Corps and Office of the Judge Advocate General would reap a golden harvest if allow'ed to tap the Academy keg. In fact, why not open these specialty fines to any Academy man? Though some strict Blue and Gold adherents might make accusations of heresy at such thought, the idea is by no means new. It is well to point out that West Point and Air Force Academy graduates may find themselves in medical or law colleges within a month to two years following graduation. Cornell Medical College sports a roster which frequently has as many as six or seven Military Academy graduates on it. There can be no doubt that these military medicine career men are valuable assets to their respective services. Not one Annapolis graduate graces the halls of such a specialized institution. Could something be amiss?
Although the Navy draws mainly from civilian institutions to fill the necessary staff corps positions, career officers in these fields are not easy to procure. With the need for well- trained military men in the field of medicine, a Congressional committee introduced a bill in the Congress which would provide for the establishment of the United States Military Academy of Medicine. But this proposal has faltered.
The prerequisites for medical and dental schools could easily be met with the refined Naval Academy curriculum. Most medical colleges now recommend a well-rounded education rather than a solely pre-medical course of study.
Should not the Naval Academy be proud to see her sons wear any of the oak leaf devices as well as the star?
★
NAVAL REVIEW
A NEW NAVAL INSTITUTE PUBLICATION
THE
NAVAL
REVIEW
The all new Naval Review for 1964. Fresh, vital essays written specially for the Review and never published before. Live photographs • Invaluable appendixes • Hard bound • 326 photographs • 8 Maps • Over 400 pages.
List Price $10.00 Member’s Price $8.00
ESSAYS
The Return of Total Sea Power
Stanton Candlin
Who Is in Control: Commander or Computer?
Cdr John A. Chastain, USN (Ret)
The Soviet Submarine Force Capitaine de Corvette Claude Huan, FN A NATO European Navy: How Practical?
RAdm G. T. S. Gray, RN Southeast Asia in Ferment William H. Hessler
The Navy as Seen from Capitol Hill
Leverett Saltonstall, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts
Sealift for Limited War
Capt Ira Dye, USN
The Vertical Assault: Its Present and Future
MGen Robert E. Cushman, USMC Developments and Problems in Coast Guard Cutter Design
Cdr R. J. Carson, USCG, & LCdr W. F. Tighe, Jr., USCG
Reading and the Future of the Fighting Man
Capt Harvey O. Webster, USN, & Cdr R. A. Komorowski, USN
The Future of the Enlisted Man
Capt John V. Noel, Jr., USN
The Naval Reserve Today
RAdm Julian Becton, USN
appendixes
Professional Backgrounds of Flag Officers
Capt O. C. Dickes, USN, & LCdr B. H. Shepherd, USN Naval Chronology, 1 January 1962—30 June 1963
W. C. C. Johnson
A New Fleet Emerges: Combat Ships
Cdr John Alden, USN
Ten Best Naval Photographs of 1962 U.S. Defense Program 1964—1968
The Secretary of Defense
BOOK ORDER DEPARTMENT, U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
Please send me the following:
.... copies, Nava/ Review 1962-63 @ $10.00 ea. $(8.00 to Members)
.... copies, Nava/ Review 1964 @ $10.00 ea. ($8.00 to Members)
Name ..........................................................................................................................................
Address ......................................................................................................................................
Enclosed is check ( ) postal note ( ) in the sum of $.............................
.",v | i • i ■ i