Since the termination of the Korean War, naval officers have become increasingly aware of the manning problems in newly constructed and older ships. These problems have generated many questions. Why are bunks being backfitted so often in brand new ships? When are we going to stop displacing seamen with technicians? Are allowances and complements completely realistic?
Any casual waterfront observer can see that our new ships differ greatly from their predecessors even though we still call them destroyer types. The Navy will soon have Tartar-equipped destroyer escorts—DEGs— that are larger, almost as fast, and have more effective firepower and communications capability than the 2,200-ton destroyers of World War II. Dash helicopter platforms and hangars are appearing more frequently upon destroyer fantails at the 01 level. Missile launchers are replacing conventional gun mounts. The computers and displays of the Naval Tactical Data System are speeding up human reaction time and decision making. What was once a generally simple, open, radio room area has evolved into a complex of secure and non-secure teletype spaces. The Bainbridge (DLGN-25), is the first destroyer type with a nuclear engineering plant, but other destroyer types are being equipped with pressure-fired boilers and enclosed operating stations (EOSs). The bow-mounted AN/SQS-26 sonar and its attendant consoles will provide a far greater submarine detection capability than heretofore possible. Twenty years ago our new frigates would have been designated light cruisers.
A fact that is not as evident to the waterfront observer is the change in concept of manning the Navy’s newer ships. The numerous 20-mm. and 40-mm. mounts and the 8- inch, 12-inch, and 16-inch turrets have almost disappeared in the active Fleet. Along with them have gone the large number of semiskilled seamen required to man this armament in combat. These seamen provided the abundant number of “shipkeepers” required to maintain their ships. Today, instead, the Navy has missile systems which require relatively few semi-skilled men to operate, but many highly trained ones to maintain. The maintenance requirements for new systems, be they weapons, electronics, or nuclear engineering, have become the major considerations when initially determining and establishing current manning requirements. Somewhere during this evolution, while increasing attention was being paid to technicians, the need for an adequate number of seamen “shipkeepers” was forgotten.
The Navy funding and budgetary procedures and restrictions represent a major factor. The estimated costs of proposed ships are inserted into the Navy fiscal budget long before firm or meaningful characteristics for the ships are determined. As the characteristics are developed at a later date, it too often becomes apparent that the proper balance of hardware and people will cause the end cost of the ship to exceed the budgetary ceiling. The result is that a “one of a kind” ship is dropped completely from the shipbuilding program, or a reduced number of a class is authorized.
Each crew member represents an obstacle to the Navy’s goal of building smaller, faster, and cheaper ships. The Bureau of Ships has estimated that each accommodation in a ship represents a cost of 85,000-810,000 and an increased weight of three tons. The term “accommodations” represents more than just the physical size and number of bunks. It encompasses the number and size of washrooms and heads, the area of the mess deck and galley facilities, potable water volume, the size of air conditioning equipment, the size and number of refrigerated spaces and dry storerooms required to support the shipboard personnel, etc.
The potential crew, therefore, has an impact upon the eventual size of the ship, but, as the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ships for Design, Shipbuilding, and Fleet Maintenance has stated, “the most significant contributions to greater ship size in destroyer types since 1951 have been in the areas of armament volume, electronics spaces, electric power requirements, and fuel endurance.” He further stated, “It is noted that the increase in effective fire power and range of surveillance of our newer ships constitute the most spectacular progress that has been made in the last ten years which clearly supports the increase occasioned in these areas.” Figure 1 shows the growth of destroyer types.
The Assistant Chief also made the point that “ . . . the comparisons [in Figure 1] are from a base point of manning, accommodations, and habitability which existed in 1951. This level may or may not have been an irreducible one.”
Because uninhabitable space aboard ship has grown, personnel accommodations have too often “gone under the scalpel.” As a means of keeping the ship’s end cost under a budgetary ceiling, the number of accommodations has been shaved back.
Another factor is that the size of a surface ship’s crew, except in rare instances, never exceeds the number of bunks provided for it. The surface force does not accept the principle of “hot-bunking” and rightfully so. Consequently, when a ship or class of ships validates, through operational experience, that the size of its crew is unrealistically low, it is either forced to live with the situation or have additional berths backfitted at great expense. In 1960, the Chief, Bureau of Ships, wrote, “The loss of those funds expended in rework because of late changes in personnel figures entails the loss of other important features to ships, or in the extreme, the possible deletion of a ship from the program.”
Let us examine the results of this manning approach.
In many of the Navy’s newer ships the allowance approaches or equals the complement. An allowance is defined as the number of personnel in a fleet unit necessary to carry out normal operations and training in peacetime. Basically, it insures the ship’s tactical readiness for limited periods varying, by type of ship, from 72 hours to one week, but after which the capacity for sustained effort is markedly reduced. A complement, on the other hand, is the number of personnel a fleet unit requires to carry out wartime tasks on a sustained basis.
When initially conceived, there was a spread between allowance and complement in these ships. Then, with operational experience, it became very apparent that the ships could not operate and maintain their equipment effectively with fewer men than that provided for in their complement.
This does not mean that the present allow- ance/complement manning of these ships makes them combat ready in today’s “peacetime” situation. Navy men can, as they always have, extend themselves and work up to 20 hours a day for a period of time. They did during the Lebanon, Cuba, and other Cold War operations, and when fatigue set in, the ships were pulled off the line for a rest. A complement, by its definition, embodies staying power. A compressed crew, doubling in brass, that has no back-up or reserve source of manpower for the necessary wartime indefinite rotation on station does not qualify as a true complement or war-ready crew. Allowances that equal complements show what a “squeeze play” we are caught in.
Let us see how this squeeze play developed. The Ship Characteristics Board (Op-42) is responsible for developing a ship’s characteristics. The latter consist of the military, operational, physical, and technical qualities and features that enable the ship to perform the mission and tasks assigned. The number of accommodations is one of the characteristics. The chairman, a flag officer, is assisted by a staff of officers who are highly qualified in their specialized fields. The members of the board, preferably of flag rank, consist of one officer from each of the following offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Bureaus:
DCNO (Fleet Operations and Readiness) (Op-03), DCNO (Development) (Op-07), DCNO (Air) (Op-05), DCNO (Logistics) (Op- 43), Long Range Objectives Group (Op-93), ACNO (Communications/Director, Naval Communications) (Op-94), Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Weapons, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, who has voting privileges only when the board has under consideration matters in which the Marine Corps has an interest.
Associate members of the board, having all the rights and privileges of members except the right to vote, consist of the permanent staff plus a senior officer representative of each of the following:
Bureau of Inspection and Survey, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, and Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service.
The charge of developing the characteristics for a ship has, in the past, generally been transmitted to this board a year preceding the proposed fiscal building year. Recently, the board has been endeavoring to develop the characteristics two years in advance. The requirement given the board generally consists of the type of ship required and its missions and tasks. The Bureau of Ships then prepares single-page characteristics. In all probability, the requirement has been carried in the long range objectives for several years. As mentioned earlier, an estimate of its cost will already be included in the proposed budget. The board’s permanent staff develops a proposed set of characteristics, utilizing wherever possible, the characteristics of a similar ship. These are distributed to the members for review prior to a series of working- level meetings. The working level, composed of officers junior to the full board members, may devote all or part of their time to the Ship Characteristics Board. This working group deliberates upon, adds to, and deletes from the working or proposed set of characteristics. (The major groupings for a typical frigate are shown in Figure 2, below.)
The final draft of the characteristics, once the working level is finished with it, may bear little resemblance to the initial proposal— except that neither they nor the full board can modify, except in rare instances, the missions and tasks developed by the DGNO (Fleet Operations and Readiness) (Op-03). When all differences of opinion are ironed out at the working level or become so irreconcilable that only higher authority can decide the issue, the characteristics are submitted to the full board for its decision. The intervening time span from proposed characteristics to the full board meeting may be from several weeks to six months or longer. If approved by the full board, on a majority vote, the characteristics are forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy for approval and inclusion in the Shipbuilding and Conversion Program.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel usually gets into the act prior to the permanent staff’s approval of the proposed characteristics. In order to get a “feel” for the size of the ship involved, Op-42 will request the Bureau of Ships to make feasibility studies which often involve a series of schemes. A major problem then confronting the Bureau of Ships is the number of accommodations to figure into its studies, since this influences the size of the ship. “Accommodations” is a composite of the ship’s complement, a growth factor and, dependent upon the type ship, the flag/staff complement, embarked troop complement, air group or helicopter detachment complement, etc. The Bureau of Ships or Op-42 generally requests that the Bureau of Naval Personnel furnish tentative accommodation estimates, based upon a complement figure and growth, for utilization in the initial feasibility studies.
The amount of finite information available at this time upon which to base a manning study is not great. The main pieces of equipment or systems are known, but detailed data needed for estimating the personnel requirements are not available. Some officers maintain that the Bureau of Naval Personnel should apply an escalation factor in order to compensate for the gaps. This suggestion has considerable merit and could be implemented if the board would accept the principle. As will be seen, however, there are often gaps remaining when the final characteristics are developed. Newly developed equipment for which validated personnel requirements have not been determined may be listed. The Bureau of Naval Personnel’s representatives have had to justify, on many occasions, each billet and, hence, each accommodation. If a stipulated growth factor is reduced or abolished, what chance has an escalation figure?
Let us take the evolution of this new ship into its next phase—the formulation of the first series of characteristic drafts. The feasibility studies have delineated approximate over-all dimensions and displacement. The skeletonized single line characteristics begin to flesh out owing to the efforts of the technical bureaus and the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations who feed in finite data to the permanent staff. The electronic and weapon installation plans take form. The Bureau of Naval Personnel’s representatives can now go into a more careful manning study, since many of the gaps they worked around in preparing the initial estimate are being filled in.
In developing such a manning study, the preliminary characteristics are again carefully studied. These, combined with the following background sources of information, give a feel for the ship and her manning requirements:
• Research Studies/Technical Manuals
• Staffing Criteria
• Type and Fleet Commanders’ Recommendations
• Technical Bureaus/Sponsors
• Comparable Types/Equipment
• Commanding and Prospective Commanding Officers
• Personal Experience and Judgment
• Mission and Tasks
The Bureau of Naval Personnel’s Research Division (Pers-15) and private companies regularly make studies of new equipment. From these studies they can obtain the manning requirements that they feel are justified based upon the equipment’s complexity. In line with this, instruction manuals published by the various bureaus and civilian contractors may state personnel requirements. There are standard staffing criteria for determining the number of yeomen, cooks, bakers, barbers, disbursing clerks, mess cooks, and the like required for a ship with a given complement. Type and fleet commanders may advise the Bureau as to certain rates and ratings that they feel are desirable in a new ship. Various special sections of the Bureaus, such as the Nuclear Propulsion Section of the Bureau of Ships, will suggest manning figures for their equipment. Project sponsors, sometimes agencies outside the military, offer suggestions. The manning and maintenance requirements for equipment similar to that listed in the detailed characteristics are reviewed. The commanding officers and PCOs of similar ships are key men in helping to decide what types and quantities of men are required in specific or unique areas. The Navy must rely on the experience and judgment of its officers in deciding how many men it takes to man various stations, such as the bridge, conventional engineering spaces, etc.
Lastly, the ship’s mission and tasks must be considered. Is the vessel to remain at sea for long periods, and therefore will her crew be required to do all maintenance work? Will she operate in and out of port regularly and have constant base or tender assistance? Either situation will effect the crew’s size.
With this “feel” for the ship’s personnel needs, a Condition III Watch Bill is roughed out. This bill not only shows the stations that a ship’s complement will man at sea, but also it provides the personnel planners with a rough idea of the number of men involved. The bill also shows a rating next to each of the billet quantities, i.e., QM of the Watch; 3 QM, Data System Technicians; 3 DS.
Years ago the process might have ended here and, in fact, would probably have been approached from a Condition I or General Quarters manning concept initially, because our older, gun-equipped ships required the greatest number of men at Condition I in order to operate and supply the numerous small and large gun mounts and turrets. The maintenance requirements of the weapons and electronics in those ships, although sizeable, were insignificant compared to the maintenance requirements of the 1960-70 era missile ships’ systems. With maintenance considerations becoming the governing factor in the manning of today’s ships, the logical move is to review the maintenance personnel numbers in the Condition III breakdown. We may find, for instance, that maintenance of the proposed shipboard equipment requires 16 Data System Technicians. The rough rating structure provides for only 12. On the other hand, 25 Fire Control Technicians may be listed, but the operation and maintenance of the fire control radars and associate equipment may require only 20 men. Adjustments are therefore made to the rating structure in order to reflect properly these maintenance and operating requirements. This is, in essence, a “dovetailing” job of equating needed talent to billets. When necessary, the requirement for maintenance personnel in excess of operating stations is reflected.
Even with the “dovetailing,” a number of men are left over after the Condition III billets are filled. Years ago, a sizeable number of ship’s company were not expected to stand watch. They were yeomen, storekeepers, barbers, and disbursing clerks, among others, who never missed an evening movie and were assured of an “all-night-in” snooze. The composite package of watchstanders and non-watchstanders represented a large number of accommodations. In recent years, with the emphasis upon holding down ship size and saving the budgetary dollar, such a situation could not be tolerated. A satisfactory mean had to be achieved. To date, the implementing approach has been to compress the crew package to the greatest extent possible. This, then, is a facet of the “squeeze play.” We have attempted to compress the crew to the minimum size that still satisfies the ship’s watchstanding and basic housekeeping requirements. In so doing, we have unwittingly nullified the crew’s ability to maintain properly the ship’s hull structure and missile-age equipage. Further, we are diluting the effectiveness of the Navy’s trained technicians by imposing upon them menial tasks that should and could be better performed by a supporting group of unskilled personnel or strikers.
Two examples will show how the compression of a complement is effected. A conventional Combat Information Center requires numerous men who do not have to be trained radarmen or electronic technicians. They act as telephone talkers, status board plotters, communication recorders, etc. Initially, in roughing out the Condition III Watch Bill, these CIC billets may have seamen designated to fill them. But, when we start the compression or “squeeze play,” the seamen are replaced with yeomen, storekeepers, disbursing clerks, etc., who might not otherwise be standing watches. If the ship has a Terrier missile installation, unskilled men can be utilized as “wing and fin” men. Here, again, seamen may be shown. They are invariably dropped in favor of stewards, barbers, lithographers, etc. The end result is a very small group of seamen. On newer ships, they are becoming as rare as an ensign on shore duty!
The composite compressed package becomes the ship’s complement. To it is added a growth factor of 5 per cent of the enlisted complement and 10 per cent of the officer complement, plus space for staffs or special detachments. The total is the “accommodations” that the Bureau of Naval Personnel recommends to the Ship Characteristics Board.
Actually, this second set of figures for the proposed ship should complete the Bureau of Personnel’s efforts except to monitor and make minor changes, since a ship’s characteristics are never static. Historically, it too often represents only another interim stage. The figures have invariably grown since the accommodation estimate furnished in the feasibility stage. The ship’s dimensions have been roughed out based upon that early estimate. The various equipment sponsors have specified their suits of equipment. Everything about the ship has been costed out and, hopefully, falls within the approved end cost. Then BuPers drops a bombshell into the middle of the proceedings—more accommodations are required. Eyebrows lift and faces redden. The apple cart is badly tilted, if not upset.
Sometimes everyone goes home and attempts to come up with another ship composed of simpler equipment, or less equipment, which will permit the crew to be reduced. Too often in the past, however, the squeeze has been placed on the accommodation figures. “Why does the ship require three lookouts per watch? What purpose do the bridge messengers serve and, for that matter, why are engine room messengers provided? Do we really need a man in after steering? Look at that number of electronic and data system technicians! Eight storekeepers!” Each watchstander and watch station and every rating group has, in those instances, been scrutinized in a “cool, collected, and impersonal” manner. Cuts have been made arbitrarily in the complement or the “growth figure” has been reduced or completely eliminated. The “growth,” specified in CNO’s habitability standards, is supposed to provide accommodations for the increased personnel required during the ship’s lifetime as additional or more complex equipment, not approved or funded at the time of building, is installed. Today, unfortunately, the utilization of a portion of these spare accommodations can be foreseen at the time the characteristics are approved. “Growth” was not conceived for this purpose—it was for the future unknown equipment.
Although there are probably countless solutions to the “squeeze play,” four seem to have particular merit.
(1) The development of characteristics in two stages. If a realistic estimate of the cost and manning implications of a ship has to be known several years in advance of the building year, there should be a logical method of considering and developing a set of initial characteristics in the same time frame. When the annual Long Range Objectives Program is promulgated, characteristics could be developed for new and unique ships appearing therein. Although specific equipments and systems might change in the characteristics’ time span, the initial set would provide a more realistic and accurate base upon which to determine budgetary estimates. Then, several years later, when it is desired to build the ship two years hence, the characteristics could be brought up to date.
(2) A more equitable equation of hardware versus people. Years ago, the Navy had many men operating and maintaining relatively simple equipment. Today, we find a reduced number of men attempting to operate and maintain many complex systems. Without a more equitable equation, the Navy may soon find itself—if it is not already—supporting a fleet of sophisticated but inoperative ships.
(3) A greatly increased degree of reliability and maintainability of equipment—plus a “people- feasible” approach to hardware design. Engineers, designers, and manufacturers must become personnel oriented. These men, in too many instances, have developed equipment and systems with but one thought in mind—to have the gear achieve the operational goal for which it was developed. The successes and failures of their equipment have hinged upon factors they gave but little concern during the development and construction stages, i.e., reliability and maintainability. The Navy has, in its haste to get the equipment to sea, often given mute approval to a “non-people-feasible” design with low reliability and maintainability. The result stares us in the face whenever we visit a new fighting ship. Ships’ personnel are struggling to maintain systems by working from faulty blueprints and instruction manuals. Factory engineers, working alongside the “white hats,” are effecting a constant stream of non-documented corrective field changes. No public health agency spends more time and money fighting germs than does the Navy in “de-bugging” some of the systems and equipment it has recently placed aboard ship. Partially because of this, the faulty systems require an inordinately high number of technicians who, in turn, are displacing the shipkeepers our combatant ships so badly need. The designers, engineers, and manufacturers must raise their sights and strive for a greatly increased level of reliability and maintainability of components. This would permit a lesser number of lower skilled technicians to support the system.
(4) Utilize the Bureau of Ships’ work study methods in all new designs. The approach of the work study groups* has been one of critical appraisal of the functions to be performed by each crew member and his most efficient utilization aboard ship. Through a better arrangement of equipment, the elimination of redundant hardware, and a combining of like systems, these groups are achieving more effective ship design. Their efforts are pointing the way toward a realistic decrease in ships’ personnel and accommodations. Unlike some recent concepts that reduce the non-rated men only, their design ideas will make possible cuts “across the board.” The proper petty officer/non-rated ratio can therefore be maintained.
In centuries past, a man-of-war carried surplus personnel sufficient to man and fight a prize on her way to a friendly port. That era has passed. Yet those old ships were properly manned for their missions and tasks. Can we say the same for our combatant ships of today?
The Navy can insure that all new designs are provided with adequate accommodations for an operationally ready combat crew if:
the development of characteristics is commenced at an early date.
shipboard equipment is equated to personnel and an even balance achieved.
equipment and systems incorporate a greater level of reliability and improved maintainability;
all new designs are work-studied.
The die is cast. Accommodations are being squeezed out of our ships. No one is at fault. The trend has crept upon us almost unnoticed. Decisions based upon well thought out reasons and experience have proven wrong. A winning team profits from its losses.
* See Clifford M. Johns, “Work Study Groups— Trouble Shooters of the Fleet,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1963, page 52.