This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets
By Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Index. 532 pages. $10.00.
The Weapons Acquisition Process:
An Economic Analysis
By Merton J. Peck, and Frederic M. Scherer. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962. Bibliography. Index. 736 pages. $10.00.
Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and Development (Bell Report)
Annotated bibliography. Available as Appendix 1 of Systems Development and Management, hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, Second Session. Committee print. (No charge while the supply lasts.)
REVIEWED BY
Henry M. Kalstad, Commander, U. S. Navy and Robert J. Massey, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy.
{Commander Kalstad has been Plans and Programs Officer in the Avionics Division of the Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Section of the Bureau of Naval Weapons.
Lieutenant Commander Massey is assigned to the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations {Development).)
These three studies treat different aspects of a single problem: resources for defenses Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets is devoted primarily to the analysis of the process by which the nation decides what portion of its national income it wishes to devote to military support of its foreign policy. The Weapons Acquisition Process deals with the uses of resources in the development of complex weapon systems. The Congressional Bell Report is concerned with measures needed to insure that defense resources are used efficiently in the national interest in the conduct of research and development.
Research for Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets was conducted at the Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia University and financed with a Carnegie Corporation grant. The Weapons Acquisition Process is the first of several volumes resulting from a three-year research project at the Harvard Business School. Support for this project was provided by a Ford Foundation grant. The Bell Report also represents the work of many people, primarily in government.
Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets presents three case studies, illustrating the process of formulation of defense policy and the development of defense budgets. Though each of the authors is responsible for but one of the studies, all three essays are integrated parts of a total presentation demonstrating defense policy evolution.
The first study, by Professor Warner R. Schilling, covers the formulation of the defense budget for Fiscal Year 1950. The FY ’50 budget was developed largely during 1948, the last year of President Truman’s first term. It was a time of changing military requirements. The balance of power in Europe had been destroyed. The development of modern
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Regular and Associate Members may save by ordering books of other publishers through the Naval Institute. A discount of 10 per cent is allowed on such books (except on foreign and government publications, and on books on which publishers do not give a discount). Allow reasonable time for orders to be cleared and books to be delivered directly to you by publishers. Address the Book Department, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland.
weapons had invalidated the traditional U. S. military policy of maintaining only the nucleus of a military establishment during peacetime. Dr. Schilling’s section of Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets is a detailed case study showing how the Nation responded to these changes in the defense environment.
In formation of the FY ’50 defense budget, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible for determining the forces required to carry out our policies, were unable to agree on a budget lower than 23.5 billion dollars. The consensus among what Dr. Schilling calls the “policy elites,” and the climate of opinion in the country, was that anything over $15 billions would play into Stalin’s hands by bankrupting the country.
Communist armies marched into South Korea four days before the end of Fiscal Year 1950. Schilling concluded:
By the time of the Korean War, the fiscal 1950 budget had been found wanting in nearly every category of major assumption: strategic, scientific, military, and diplomatic. It remained for the war itself to contradict the fundamental economic premise behind the budget: the idea that $15 billion was all the nation could stand to spend for defense . . .
In the second of the three studies, “NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament,” Professor Paul Y. Hammond offers an account of the development of NSC-68, a document prepared in the spring of 1950 for the National Security Council. In contrast to the development of the FY ’50 defense budget, the process of development of NSC-68 was a model of rationality. This document was designed as a “comprehensive and integrated general statement of the American position in the international political world, of its objectives and capabilities in that world, and of the means which were necessary to achieve those objectives.” Professor Hammond looks at the development of this long overdue policy statement as one which constitutes a major step leading to an effective political and defense posture on the international scene. There were three major developments which prompted its preparation: first, the successful atomic explosion by the U.S.S.R. in August 1949, substantially ahead of U. S. intelligence estimates; second the controversy over whether to build a fusion bomb; and third the undertaking of a comprehensive survey of American strategic policy by the National Security Council itself.
The NSC-68 study, prepared outside of the regular policy development channels, was regarded as something of a “fluke.” There is reason to believe that when it was ordered,
■■■■■■■■■■■
the President and the Secretary of Defense considered it merely a harmless “study,” by lower echelon State and Defense Department people to appease the losers in the fight over the development of the H-bomb.
NSC-68 concluded that the forces proposed in the FY ’51 defense budget were entirely inadequate to support the role the United States was attempting to play in world affairs. Though there was no price tag on its recommendations, it was variously estimated that their implementation would require defense budgets of 17 billion dollars, 35 billion dollars, or perhaps even 50 billion dollars per year.
Some of the participants in the development of NSC-68 had misgivings about its “relevancy.” They feared that since the study ignored the irrational, but powerful, forces which they saw as shaping policy, that the study would be an exercise in futility rather than a blueprint for much-needed action.
NSC-68, however, actually became the blueprint for rearmament. But one might ask would it have played that role had the invasion of Korea, shortly after its preparation, not so dramatically confirmed its validity?
The third case study of the policy process is “The ‘New Look’ of 1953” by Glenn H. Snyder. This study covers the development of the defense budget for FY ’55 during 1953, the first year of the Eisenhower Administration. The New Look called for heavy reliance on “Massive Retaliation” and use of tactical nuclear weapons as substitutes for conventional forces. Professor Snyder comments that it seems most remarkable that the doctrine of massive retaliation was adopted as a “central element in policy at the very time when this concept should have been going into eclipse— that is, just at the time when the Soviets had produced evidence that they would soon be able to punish us in kind.” “This case,” he writes, “illustrates a very tenuous relation between ‘high policy’ and force level determination and budget-making by the armed services.”
The authors picture the policy formation process as one of “bargaining” between the “policy elites” power centers within the government. In consequence, wrote Professor Schilling:
The distribution of power and responsibility necessitated the negotiation of these terms through persuasion and bargaining as often as it permitted their specification through the exercise of formal authority, and in consequence the choices that made up the content of the budget evidenced all the characteristic symptoms of a product of the foreign-policy process: no policy at all; compromised, unstable, and contradictory policy; paper policy and blind policy; slow, leaderless, and indecisive policy; gyroscopic, crisis-oriented, shortreacting, and outmoded policy.
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the budgetary and policy process, as the authors have shown it, is the tenuous, and almost casual, relationships between national policies, the strategies to support them, and defense budgets. The authors showed how in both the FY ’50 and the FY ’55 budget case, budgets and force levels were shaped primarily to conform to ideas of what the country could afford to spend, rather than on the requirements for armed strength implied by national policies and commitments. Even strategies were shaped by this ever-present “resource gap.” The key “New Look” policy decision, the policy that military plans and forces should be developed on the assumption that tactical and other nuclear weapons would be used in any future wars, was an expediency designed to help close the “resource gap.”
It is axiomatic that the extent of the resource gap is a function of the efficiency with which defense budgets can be converted into useful military power. The Weapons Acquisition Process is a synthesis of case studies illustrating the process of converting defense resources into major weapons developments.
The research group studied 12 weapons developments and seven commercial, new- product developments in depth and many other weapons projects in lesser detail. The specific cases are not identified in the discussions, and the authors have taken pains to conceal their identity. The stated purpose of the study was:
... to determine the nature of the relationships between the government and weapons contractors in the acquisition of advanced weapons and to analyze the effects of these relationships on weapons performance and the speed and cost of their acquisition.
This first volume of the projected series is almost entirely descriptive. That description of the process by which weapons are developed is not reassuring. The process could be characterized as a bleeding ulcer on the body politic, which if not healed, will surely lead to the debilitation—if not the death—of the patient.
It is one of the major theses of the study that the weapons development process is not like any other form of economic activity. The authors argue that the problems involved cannot be solved with off-the-shelf solutions from the world of business or basic research. “Ideas and concepts relevant to the weapons acquisition process are difficult to come by, for what is needed is not something borrowed, but something new.”
Even though people in the weapons industry like to characterize it as “free enterprise,” the authors point out that it is not subject to the forces which regulate commercial activities in a market. There is no “unseen hand” which naturally strikes down those organizations which choose wrong goals, or fail to control their costs in pursuit of their goals. Furthermore, they say that due to the tremendous uncertainties associated with the process, that there is no chance of developing a “market system in anything approaching the usual meaning of that term.”
The absence of the conditions essential to a “market” does not imply absence of competition. The authors found severe competition, but competition, unfortunately, not conducive toward “building a better mousetrap” or delivering it on time at a reasonable cost.
In the world of cost-plus, where penalties for overly optimistic predictions do not bear heavily on the decision-makers, “errors” in prediction are common. The authors reported that they found evidence of,
... a hierarchy of prediction errors. They are greatest for cost (the average cost factor was 3.2, with only one program costing less than predicted), less for time (the average factor was 1.36, with four programs meeting or taking less time than the original estimate), and least for performance. . . .
They reported that the propensity to
. . . ‘buy into’ attractive new programs with optimistic quality, time, and/or cost estimates is perhaps as much an industry practice in advanced weapons acquisition as list price cutting is in automobile retailing, or as the advertising of loss leaders is in department store operations.
We must agree with Peck and Scherer, that given the “unique buyer-seller relationships characteristic of weapons acquisition, the qualitative capabilities of government buying personnel are of crucial importance.” The Congressional Bell Report is concerned primarily with that problem.
The Bell Report was prepared in response to a presidential letter of 31 July 1961 directing a study of the problems of contracting for research and development.
After many months of diligent staff work, the report was issued 30 April 1962 over the signatures of the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Director, National Science Foundation; Chairman, Civil Service Commission; Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; and Director, Bureau of the Budget.
The report concluded that it “is in the national interest for the Government to continue to rely heavily on contracts ... to accomplish scientific and technical work. ...” It warned, however, that measures must be taken to “make the partnership work better in the public interest and with maximum effectiveness and economy.” The Committee additionally warned that:
There are certain functions which should under no circumstances be contracted out. The management and control of the Federal research and development effort must be firmly in the hands of full-time Government officials clearly responsible to the President and the Congress.
And the report noted that it
. . . seems to be the case that in recent years there have been instances—particularly in the Department of Defense—where we have come dangerously close to permitting contract employees to exercise functions which belong with top Government management officials . . .
Peck and Scherer substantiated this conclusion. Of this particular practice they wrote,
. . . the design philosophy was to use standard equipment instead of newly developed items only when custom-designed units afforded no operating advantages. As a result, there were frequent development excursions in pursuit of technical perfection which cost far more than it was worth. This tendency was observed to a greater or lesser extent in most of the 12 programs comprising our weapon system sample.
In some cases, it was clear that the equivalent of a S100 Swiss watch had been purchased to do a job demanding only a $5 Big Ben.
The problem of bringing into government, and holding, the technical, scientific, and managerial talent required to exercise the undelegatable management functions of government was the subject of several recommendations. The report proffered measures to strengthen government laboratories as a source of unbiased technical advice, the raising of government compensation to levels more nearly comparable with the competitive rates, and various measures to improve working conditions in the government. Among those latter measures was a specific recommendation for “eliminating . . . excess layers ... of supervisory management, and insuring that technical, administrative, and fiscal reviews be conducted ... in coordinated fashion. ...”
Though both the first two volumes reviewed here were released late in 1962, and both represent monumental amounts of research, each has been somewhat overtaken by events. Innovations of recent origin offer hope for immediate and substantial improvements. Many of these recent improvements, such as program definition contracts, PERT- Cost and program packaging, are discussed at length in the report of the hearings held by the Holifield Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee on the Bell Report. These hearings were held in late summer of 1962 and are reported in Systems Development and Management.
Peck and Scherer point out in their foreword that the program packaging system will “certainly have an indirect, and in some cases a direct, effect on specific programs and hence upon the posture of some contractors vis-a-vis the government.” Though programming will certainly affect the incentives guiding the participants in the weapons acquisition process, one of the principal objectives of the system is to improve the choice of weapon systems in their relations with the national policies and strategies they are to implement. The first-strike weapons systems of massive retaliation are being de-emphasized as those better suited to the new basic policy of “flexible response” are being strengthened. As one Administration spokesman put it recently:
. . . current defense policy emphasizes flexibility, options, and choice. One of its main objectives is to make available to the President a range of military responses appropriate for each threat to our security, so that he can apply force adequate to accomplish the objectives at hand without causing any unnecessary' damage or loss of life, and while holding to a minimum the risk of escalation to a more destructive level of conflict.
The combination of the new emphasis on “program definition” prior to letting major development contracts, and the new, Navy- developed, tool of PERT-Cost, will help reduce the kind of cost and schedule overruns which had become normal.
The three books covered in this review are each of unusual significance for the military officer. They are well written, but still not easy books. The complexity and magnitude of defense problems makes it impossible to reduce the accounts easily to digestible fare. The naval officer willing to invest the effort required to assimilate what these volumes have to offer, however, will find his time well rewarded.
One should remember the new emphasis on “subspecialization” by line officers aimed to induce officers to gain high technical qualifications.
The Weapons Acquisition Process should prove particularly valuable to officers who hold, or will hold, billets involving the development of weapons. This study will loom so large among the various books on the subject of R&D management, that no individual should consider writing on the subject without coming to grips with it.
The Bell Report is reproduced in Part 1 of the five-volume report of Holifield Subcommittee hearings entitled Systems Development and Management. These hearings were devoted to a review of the Bell Report and the research and development problem in general. We recommend reading not only the Bell Report, but the entire five volumes.
Strategy of Disarmament
By Henry W. Forbes, Washington, D. C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1962. Bibliography.
Index. 158 pages. $3.75.
REVIEWED BY
Robert D. McWethy, Captain, U.S.Navy
(Captain McWethy is head, Arms Control and United
Nations Branch, Politico-Military Policy Division in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations)
Dr. Forbes’s book is the result of some 20 years of reflection on disarmament including seven years of active research from his position on the faculty of George Washington University. His analysis and conclusions appear sound. Perhaps his background of Army service in World War II and subsequent military government experience have provided him with a more practical view of the national security aspects of disarmament than can be found in most works on the subject.
The Russian government initiated the first disarmament conference at The Hague in 1899 when the Czar became fearful that technological competition with Germany and Austria-Hungary was endangering Russia’s advantage in military manpower. Disarmament moved into high gear under the League of Nations between World Wars I and II. It commenced its present phase with the formation of the United Nations in 1945, a phase with a new dimension imposed by nuclear weapons. Since the beginning of this century, technical developments increasingly have convinced statesmen that arms competitions are dangerous to international peace, to national security, and, indeed, since World War II, to the survival of civilization. Yet it is clear from the detailed discussion of disarmament negotiations in this book that substantial agreement among the great powers on disarmament is impossible so long as there is no drastic change in the world order and international relations continue to rest on a balance of military power.
Strategy of Disarmament is excellent for reference. It also gives an overview of the course of disarmament negotiations that will help the reader understand why current discussions in Geneva are not likely to result in agreement. The main body of the book is divided into two parts covering the period between the two World Wars and the period following 1945. Each period is addressed with respect to quantitative disarmament measures, qualitative measures, budget restrictions, geographic measures, and, finally, control and inspection.
Among the highlights of the book is Dr. Forbes’s point that the unreality of disarmament negotiations is suggested by the tendency of great powers to change their positions when agreement seems in sight: that probably the quickest way to break up a disarmament conference has been for one side to appear to agree to the proposals of the other. When changing conditions in 1955 showed that either the United States or the U.S.S.R. could conceal a stock of nuclear weapons that would be essentially undetectable, the Soviets made a proposal which dealt specifically only with conventional weapons. Thus the Soviet Union in 1956 appeared to be taking the position the United States had held in the early years of negotiations after 1945. Meanwhile the United States was approaching the position the Soviets had occupied, namely that nuclear and conventional disarmament be dealt with together. This gambit routed the American delegation.
Today verification is undoubtedly the key disarmament issue. The United States demands verification of all remaining strength at every stage of disarmament, while the Soviet Union offers only the verification of those military elements being abolished, maintaining the U. S. demand is tantamount to espionage. Yet the United States during the League of Nations period opposed the international control and inspection measures being advocated by the U.S.S.R. In 1927, the United States maintained it could never participate in an agreement that did not leave enforcement up to the good faith of each government, precisely the opposite of the present U. S. position.
The difficulties of inspection are pointed up by problems of the Inter-Allied Control Commissions established by the Treaty of Versailles to determine German armament holdings after World War I so that excess arms could be destroyed. The Commissions were to have complete access with the co-operation and assistance of the German government. The Allies succeeded neither in controlling military manpower nor in establishing armament controls. Inspectors encountered hindrances in visits to production facilities, while arms experiments were carried out by the German Army in the Soviet Union, Switzerland, and Spain, instead of in Germany. The German government was so skillful in covering up the fact that the Commissions were misled and were never able to gather reliable data. This experience, of course, has a valuable lesson for today.
For the Soviet Union, the present bi-polar world order is a natural situation. Conflict between the two major powers is inevitable and must be constantly waged. The struggle does not necessarily involve military combat at all times, but may take place on political, economic, and propaganda levels. It will continue until opponents of Communism are eliminated. In contrast, the United States has traditionally considered war almost solely as a conflict between military forces, a departure from the normal state of affairs. This wide difference in attitude makes negotiation more difficult than during earlier periods of history, when war, either hot or cold, was not looked upon as a means of subverting the world order. There is ample evidence, however, that Soviet leaders are aware of the cataclysmic destructiveness of all-out nuclear war, and are anxious not to loose its horrors on themselves. They have a mutual interest with the West in avoiding escalation of conflict to that level.
On the basis of his analysis, Dr. Forbes concludes that weapons development should by all means continue, but that strategic nuclear weapons ought to be considered an insurance investment, not a club to be raised indiscriminately during every incident. He recognizes that changes must take place, that conflicts of interest must be resolved, and that third party arbitration cannot provide an answer. Limitation of warfare under the nuclear umbrella seems to him to be a practicable, though not ideal, substitute for disarmament as a method for making tolerable the strains of change. There might be explicit or tacit agreement in limited conflict on area, participants, objectives, or weapons. Both sides in any case must be prepared for such conflict to avoid the necessity of recourse to strategic nuclear weapons.
Dr. Forbes has put forth an excellent argument for what is essentially current U. S. strategy. He completes his argument by stating that the Western World cannot afford to neglect the search for some type of armaments control. Such a search is inexpensive and might someday be useful. He properly cautions, however, that disarmament discussions are dangerous in one respect: they cause undue optimism among the people of the Free World. The presentation in his book should help to alleviate that danger.
The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and InterAllied Strategy, 1917-1918
By David F. Trask. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961. Annotated bibliography. 244 pages. $6.00.
REVIEWED BY
L. E. Gelfand
(Dr. Gelfand is Professor of history at the State University of Iowa, and a specialist in politico-military affairs of the Wilson administration.)
Not only do the 1960’s mark the centennial of the American Civil War, but also this decade will mark the fiftieth-year observances of the Great War, 1914-1918. For almost a decade, a rising generation of American diplomatic historians, without benefit of fanfare, has been quietly working through many of the perplexing problems, re-examining fundamental premises, and, in general, reinterpreting the policies and issues of that struggle, supposed to have been the war to end wars. The renaissance in World War I studies in the United States has been abetted by the enormous volume of relatively fresh documentation placed at the disposal of scholars by the National Archives, the Library of Congress, and other institutions in this country and abroad. Moreover, there has been a growing awareness among students of twentieth century international affairs that many of the tensions and crises which beset the world-at- large during the “Long Armistice” had their origins in the difficult years of World War I and the ensuing Paris Peace Conference. Scholars of today who are busily reconsidering World War I are young men who had no firsthand knowledge; they are approaching the issues with an air of dispassion, and they are raising questions—critical, searching questions—which the previous generation of scholars rarely posed. The traditional interpretations of Wilson, House, and Lansing are no longer sacrosanct.
One of these young historians, David F. Trask, now of the University of Nebraska, has provided the first systematic treatment of American participation in the Supreme War Council. Formed in the last months of 1917, the Council was composed of representatives from the principal nations at war with the Central Powers. Its powers were never defined precisely. Practically speaking, the Council was the inter-governmental organization which directed and co-ordinated the military efforts of the co-belligerents. General Tasker Bliss was the U. S. representative.
Trask conceived of his problem in broad, sweeping terms. His is no simple chronicle of the day-by-day operations of the Council. Instead, he sees the problems which beset the Council as being both military and political. Hence, the first five chapters deal with the formation of the Council, including American participation thereon; institutional and administrative aspects of the Council’s operations; and the crucial question of how American manpower would be utilized. The last three chapters are concerned with specific actions of the Council: the intervention in Russia, the Macedonian Campaign, and the pre-Armistice negotiations.
Drawing heavily on official records of the Supreme War Council, plus a variety of relevant published and manuscript documentation, Trask shows the extent of the rift between President Wilson’s policies and those advanced by the Allied, particularly French, leaders. Trask credits Wilson with being a far more sophisticated American diplomatist, constantly striving to guard the independence of political action of the United States, than has been customary. It is clear that in 1917— 1918, Wilson became increasingly concerned lest allied military power grow to the extent that the Allied governments would not be dependent on the United States during the critical period of the peace conference. The lengthy discussion of the controversy over amalgamation of American troops found General Pershing opposing amalgamation essentially for military reasons, with the President opposed on political grounds. Bliss and Pershing were often at odds, forcing Secretary of War Baker to intervene. In this running argument over amalgamation, it is clear that the leading spirit who favored conciliation was Colonel House. In the end, Wilson bowed to what he believed was military necessity and authorized limited amalgamation of American troops into the Allied military command.
Trask has written an important book on a significant subject. And his book has provoked certain questions. If Wilson was as much interested in political strategy as is implied here, then why did the President not assert his influence more forcefully than was the case? For example, Wilson apparently did not concern himself with the Council’s plans for the Armistice until the end of the war; nor did he really comprehend that the way in which the war was fought could exercise a profound influence on the eventual peace settlement. Military questions which the Council confronted often demanded political decisions. Only to a degree did the President appreciate this delicate relationship. Since Trask’s book makes only casual references to the Allied Naval Council, one might well wonder as to the kind and degree of co-ordination that existed between the American representatives who served on these two bodies. It would also have been helpful if additional, descriptions of the Supreme War Council as an administrative entity had been included.
But what is important is that, Professor Trask has broken new ground. For a person who has an interest in and curiosity about American participation in the Great War, this is a book which is informative and suggestive.
Special Notice... 1964
GENERAL PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST
A
.Txny person, civilian or military, is eligible for this contest. A prize of not more than $1,500, a gold medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute shall be offered annually for the best essay on any subject entered in this contest which contributes toward the mission of the Naval Institute, “the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy,” subject to the following conditions. If no essay is adjudged of sufficient merit to receive the prize, an “HonorableMention” may be awarded in lieu thereof. Regardless of whether or not a prize is awarded, additional essays of merit may receive “Honorable Mention.” The author of an essay awarded “Honorable Mention” shall receive a silver or a bronze medal dependent upon the quality of the essay, similar in all other respects to the gold medal, and such compensation as may be adjudged by the Board of Control, but not including a Life Membership.
In the event that the author of a General Prize essay is adjudged a medal and already holds this medal, he shall be given a bar suitably engraved in lieu of a second award of the medal. In the event that the recipient is awarded a medal of dissimilar metal to that which he holds, he will be awarded the new medal. If an author awarded a Life Membership is already a life member, his cash award shall be increased by the commuted value of a Life Membership in his case.
In the event that no essay is adjudged of sufficient merit to receive the “Prize” or an “Honorable Mention,” the best essay submitted may receive a special award in lieu thereof.
The following rules will govern this competition:
(1)Essays should not exceed 5,000 words.
(2) Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer on or before 1 November, 1963.
(3) The name of the competitor shall not appear on the essay, and each essay must have a motto in addition to the title. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, (b) on the outside of a sealed envelope containing identification of the competitor, (c) above the name and address of the competitor inside the envelope containing this identification. This envelope will not be opened until the Board has made the selections. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a large sealed envelope marked “General Prize Essay Contest.”
(4) The selections will be made by the Board of Control, voting by ballot and without knowledge of the names of the competitors.
(5) The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors at the annual meeting on Thursday, 20 February, 1964.
(6) All essays must be typewritten, legible, double spaced, on paper approximately 8y2" X 11", and must be submitted in duplicate, each copy complete in itself.
(7) Essays awarded the “Prize,” “Honorable Mention,” or “Special Award” are for publication in the Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS. Essays not awarded a prize may be published at the discretion of the Board of Control, and the writers of such essays shall be compensated at the rate established for articles not submitted in competition.
(8) Attention of contestants is called to the fact that an essay should be analytical or interpretive and not merely an exposition or personal narrative.
R. T. E. Bowler, Jr.
Commander, U. S. Navy.
Secretary-Treasurer
Professional Reading
By Robert M. Langdon
• In the Winter 1962-63 edition of Military Affairs, Army Historian Martin Blumenson asks—and answers—the query: “Can Official History Be Honest History?” Blumenson is the author of the massive Army History volume, Breakout and Pursuit (Government Printing Office, $10.25); the story of U. S. military might in northern France following D-Day 1944; and of The Duel for France—1944 (Houghton-Miffiin, $6.95).
• One of the most significant high-level studies ever to appear on World War II is Dartmouth historian Louis Morton’s Strategy and Command: The First Two Tears (Government Printing Office, $10.25). This massive account is the latest volume in the Army’s U. S. Army in World War II series and deals with the war in the Pacific from pre-war planning and thinking up through 1943, when the prospects for the defeat of Japan seemed much more realistic than they had some 18 months earlier.
• T. Grady Gallant’s On Valor's Side (Doubleday & Co., Inc., $4.95) is a personal account of an enlisted Marine’s adventures from Parris Island in 1941 through the Guadalcanal Campaign. It is light, vivid, and earthy.
• Admiral-Historian Samuel Eliot Morison’s Two-Ocean War (Little, Brown & Co., $15.00) is an admirable “condensation-plus” of the same author’s 15-volume U. S. Naval Operations in World War II (1947—1962). Morison has carefully selected the cream of his original accounts of the major battles and campaigns, has here and there revised his original views concerning men and events, and has at times included new material. The result is the best one-volume, popular account of the U. S. Navy’s role in World War II.
• A welcome updating and thorough revision is provided in Annapolis Today (U. S. Naval Institute, $6.00; $4.50 to members) by A. Stuart Pitt. This significant book has been the standard work on the Naval Academy since the volume first appeared a quarter century ago under the authorship of the late Kendall Banning.
• Something new in the current flood of counterinsurgency volumes is James E. Cross’s Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War (Doubleday & Co., Inc., $3.95). What distinguishes this volume is its genuine philosophical treatment of the subject rather than the usual handbook of “how to get ’em.” Cross makes the strong plea that a thorough understanding by all Americans of the nature of insurrectionary, unconventional warfare and its significance in today’s world is the basic key to dealing effectively with this problem.
• The Public Order of the Oceans (Yale University Press, $15.00) by M. S. McDougal and W. T. Burke is a massive compendium of contemporary international law of the sea and presents a heavily-documented legal approach to the process of decision by which the general world community allocates access to and authority over the oceans during times of relative peace. A most useful handbook in the same general area (minus the legal features) is Shore and Sea Boundaries (Government Printing Office $3.50) produced in the Department of Commerce under the direction of A. L. Shalowitz. Especially handy is the glossary of terms contained in the latter volume.
• The U. S. Army’s Office of Military History has recently produced an official history offering a most useful background on the coming of the Korean War in 1950. Military Advisors in Korea: KM AG in Peace and War (Government Printing Office $3.50) by Major R. K. Sawyer and edited by W. G. Hermes is a most thorough account of the role of American military advisors in Korea from shortly after V-J Day into the early phases of the Korean War.
Whether you're conning the ship from the bridge of the Enterprise or just sailing a star-class on week ends, you should have a copy of Simplified Rules of the Nautical Road handy. Prepared for use by the Midshipmen at the U. S. Naval Academy, it will he useful to any mariner. Detailed, well-illustrated chapters cover “Vessels Approaching,” “Lights and Shapes,” “Rules for Preventing Collisions,” “Restricted Visibility,” “International Rules,” “Inland Rules,” “Pilot Rules for Inland Waters,” “Helpful Hints,” and “The Motorboat Act.” * * * *
Adherence to the Rules of the Road can save your ship, your life, and the lives of those who sail with you. See that you have a copy with you when you venture out.
By LIEUTENANT O. VV. WILL, III, U.S. NAVY Y°chtin°
Simplified Rules of the Nautical Road by Lieutenant O. W. Will, III, U. S. Navy 110 pages. Illustrated. Index. Soft cover.
List Price S2.00 Members’ Price SI.60
by United States Naval Institute
Special postpaid price to members of the U. S. Naval Institute, both regular and associate, is shown in parentheses. Prices subject to change without notice. On orders for Maryland delivery, please add 3 per cent sales tax. These books may be ordered from the
U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland
NEW AND CURRENT
Annapolis Today........................................................................................................................... $6.00 ($4.50)
By Kendall Banning. Revised by A. Stuart Pitt. An authentic account of the routine, customs, studies, drills, events, landmarks, and social activities at the world’s largest naval school. This new edition is completely revised and illustrated with new photographs. 329 pages. 1963.
Baseball....................................................................................................................................... . $-1.50 ($3.38)
By Robert Spackman, Jr. Here is a book that covers the fundamentals of baseball—the duties of all members from the manager to the batboy are outlined and explained. 1 ips on batting, fielding, pitching, conditioning, and base stealing make this a great book for player, coach, or trainer. 1963. 175 pages. 130 illustrations.
Naval Logistics........................................................ .................................... .... $5.50 ($4.40)
By Vice Admiral George C. Dyer, USN (Ret.) This second edition has been revised to include the missions and roles of the Defense Supply Agency. Index. 1962. 367 pages. Illustrated.
Naval Review 1962-1963 ............................................................................................................. $10.00 ($8.00)
The most comprehensive volume on world seapower available. 1962. 14 essays. 3 appendices. 350 pages. Illustrated. Maps.
Service Etiquette........................................................................................................................... $6.00 ($4.50)
By Captain Brooks J Harral, U. S. Navy, and Oretha D. Swartz. Revised by Oretha I). Swartz. The guide to correct social usage on official and unofficial occasions tor men and women in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force. Second Edition. 1963. 4:»() pages. Illustrated.
Uniforms of the Sea Services............................................................ • . . $24.50 ($18.38)
By Colonel Robert H. Rankin, U.S.M C. A comprehensive pictorial history of the uniforms of the U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard from the Revolution to the present. 1963. 328 pages. Special Collector’s copies, signed by the author—$30.00.
HISTORY—BIOGRAPHY
63 illustrations, 8 in full color. 26
| ($4.50) |
. $3.75 | ($2.82) |
. . $4.50 | ($3.38) |
. $4.50 | ($3.38) |
. $12.50 | ($9.38) |
sets of ships’ lines | |
. f20.00 | ($15.00) |
. $3.00 | ($2.25) |
. . $6.00 | ($4.50) |
Amerika Samoa: A History of American Samoa
and Its United States Naval Administration.......................................................
By Captain J. A. C. Gray (MC) USN. 1960. 295 pages Illustrated.
David Glasgow Farragut
By Professor Charles L. Lewis, U. S. Naval Academy.
Vol. I, Admiral in the Making, 1941. 372 pages. Illustrated Vol. II, Our First Admiral. 1943. 513 pages. Illustrated .
Garde D’ Haiti 1915-1934: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine Corps • •
Compiled by J. H. McCrocklin. 1956.262 pages. 42 photographs.
Greyhounds of the Sea.............................................
By Carl C. Cutler. 1961. 592 pages and sail plans.
Special Price—Queens of the Western Ocean and
The Henrv Huddleston Rogers Collection of Ship Models.................................................
U. S. Naval Academy Museum, 2nd edition, 1958. 117 pages. Illustrated.
John Paul Jones: Fighter for Freedom and Glory............................................................
By Lincoln Lorenz, 1943,846 pages. Illustrated.
Lion Six......................................................................................................................................... $2.50 ($1.88)
By Captain D. Harry Hammer. USNR. The story of the building of the great Naval Operating Base at Guam. 1947. 109 pages. Illustrated.
A Long Line of Ships ■ t • . • f5.’00
By Lieutenant Commander Arnold S. Lott, USN. Mare Island Centennial \olume. 19:>4. 268 pages. Illustrated.
My Ufe.............................................................................................................................................. $6.00 <¥4’50>
By Grand Admiral Erich Racder, German Navy. 1960. 430 pages. Illustrated.
Queens of the Western Ocean.................................................................................................. $12.50 ($9.38)
By Carl C. Cutler. 1961. 672 pages. 69 illustrations. 10 sets of ships’ lines and sail plans. Special Price—Queens of the Western Ocean and
Greyhounds of the Sea, both volumes as a set........................................................................... $20.00 ($15.00)
Round-Shot to Rockets................................................................................................... . $3.00 ($2.25)
By Taylor Peck. A history of the Washington Navy Yard and U. S. Naval Gun Factory. 1949. 267 pages. Illustrated
Sailing and Small Craft Down the Ages .... . .... $6.50 ($4.88)
By E. L. Bloomster. 1940. 280 pages. 425 silhouette drawings. Trade edition.
(Deluxe autographed edition).................................................................................................... $12.50 ($10.00)
Ships of the United States Navy and Their Sponsors
Vol. IV—1950-1958 ......................................................................................... $10.00 ($7.50)
Compiled by Keith Frazier Somerville and Harriotte W. B. Smith. 1959. 291 pages. Illustrated.
Soldiers of the Sea . . ........................................................................................ $14.00 ($10.50)
By Colonel Robert D Heinl, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps. A definitive history of the U. S. Marine Corps, 1775-1962. 1962. 695 pages. 127 photos. 42 maps. Index.
Uniforms of the Sea Services ....... ................................... $24.50 ($18.38)
By Colonel Robert H. Rankin, U.S.M.C. A comprehensive pictorial history of the uniforms of the U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard from the Revolution to the present. 1963. 328 pages. Special Collector’s copies, signed by the author—$30.00.
The United States Coast Guard, 1790-1915 .......................................................................... $5.00 ($3.75)
By Captain Stephen H. Evans, U. S. Coast Guard. A definitive history (With a Postscript. 1915-1949). 1949. 228 pages. Illustrated.
WORLD WAR II—KOREA (U. S.)
Most Dangerous Sea................................................................................................................ $6.00 ($4.50)
By Lieutenant Commander Arnold S. Lott, USN. 1959. 322 pages. 38 photographs.
The Sea War in Korea............................................................................................................. $6.00 ($4.50)
By Commander Malcolm W. Cagle, USN, and Commander Frank A. Manson, USN, 1957. 555 pages. 176 photographs. 20 charts.
The United States Coast Guard in World War II.................................................................... $6.00 ($4.50)
By Malcolm F. Willoughby. 1957. 347 pages. 200 photographs. 27 charts.
United States Destroyer Operations in World War II.............................................................. $10.00 ($7.50)
By Theodore Roscoe. 1953.581 pages. Illustrated.
United States Submarine Operations in World War II............................................................ $10.00 ($7.50)
By Theodore Roscoe. 1949. 577 pages. Illustrated.
Special Price—2-volume set: Destroyer and
Submarine books (listed above)................................................................................................ $17.50 ($15.13)
WORLD WAR II—(OTHER NATIONS)
Der Seekrieg, The German Navy’s Story 1939-1945 ............................................................... $5.00 ($3.75)
By Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, German Navy. 1957. 440 pages. 43 photographs. 19 charts. The Divine Wind, Japan’s Kamakaze Force in World War II . . .... $4.50 ($3.38)
By Captain Rikihei Inoguchi and Commander Tatlashi Nakajima, former Imperial Japanese Navy, with Commander Roger Pineau, USNR. 1958. 240 pages. 61 photographs. 3 diagrams.
The French Navy in World War II............................................. ............................. . . $6.00 ($4.50)
By Rear Admiral Paul Auphan, French Navy (Ret.), and Jacques Modral. Translated by
Captain A. C. J. Sabalot, USN (Ret.). 1959. 413 pages. 32 photographs. 13 charts and
diagrams.
The Hunters and the Hunted................................................................................ ... $3.50 ($2.63)
By Rear Admiral Aldo Cocchia, Italian Navy (Reserve). 1958. 180 pages. Photographs'and diagrams.
The Italian Navy in World War II........................................................................................... $5.75 ($4.32)
By Commander Marc’Antonio Bragadin, Italian Navy. 1957. 380 pages. 121 photographs. 17 diagrams.
Midway, The Battle That Doomed Japan, The Japanese Navy’s Story .... $4.50 ($3.38)
By Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, former Imperial Japanese Navy. Edited by Roger Pineau and Clarke Kawakami. 1955. 266 pages. Illustrated.
White Ensign, The British Navy at War, 1939-1945 .............................................................. $4250 ($3.38)
By Captain S. W. Roskill, D.S.C., R.N. (Ret.). I960. 480 pages. Illustrated.
SEA POWER
Air Operations in Naval Warfare Reading Supplement........................................................... $2.00 ($1.60)
Edited by Commander Walter C. Blattmann, USN. 1957. 185 pages. Paper bound.
Geography and National Power.................................................................................................. $2.50 ($2.00)
Edited by Professor William W. Jeffries, U. S. Naval Academy. A short, up-to-date volume covering all the strategic regions and major powers of the world. This new edition has chapters on the Polar Seas and Africa. Third Edition. 1962. 180 pages. Paperback.
Naval Logistics........................................................................................................................... $5.50 ($4.40)
By Vice Admiral George C. Dyer, USN (Ret.). Second Edition. 1962. 367 pages. Illustrated.
Naval Review 1962-1963 ................................................................................ $10.00 ($8.00)
The most comprehensive volume on world seapower available. 1962. 14 essays. 3 appendices. 350 pages. Illustrated. Maps.
Victory 4 Vi thou t War, 1958-1961 ........................................................................................... $2.00 ($1.50)
By George Fielding Eliot. 1958. 126 pages.
SEAMANSHIP
The Art of Knotting and Splicing................................................................................................. $5.00 ($3.75)
By Cyrus Day. Step-by-step pictures facing explanatory text. 2nd edition, 1955. 224 pages.
Naval Shiphandling........................................................................................................................ $5.00 ($4.00)
By Captain R. S. Crenshaw, Jr., USN. 2nd edition, 1963. 529 pages. 175 illustrations.
NAVIGATION—PILOTING
Dutton’s Navigation and Piloting................................................................................................... $8.00 ($6.40)
Prepared by Commander J. C. Hill, II, USN, Lieutenant Commander T. F. Utegaard, USN, and Gerard Riordan. (A completely rewritten text which supplants Navigation and Nautical Astronomy.) 1st edition, 1958. 771 pages. Illustrated.
Practical Manual of the Compass................................................................................................... $3.60 ($2.88)
By Captain Harris Laning, USN, and Lieutenant Commander H. D. McGuire, USN. 1921. 173 pages. Illustrated.
The Rules of the Nautical Road.................................................................................................. $5.00 ($4.00)
By Captain R. F. Farwell, USNR. Revised by Lieutenant Alfred Prunski, U. S. Coast Guard. Third Edition, 1954. 536 pages. Illustrated.
PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOKS
The Bluejackets’ Manual, U. S. Navy......................................................................................... $1.95 ($1.56)
Revised by Captain John V. Noel, Jr., USN, Commander Frederick C. Dyer, USNR, and Master Chief Journalist William J. Miller, USN. 16th edition. 1960. 641 pages. Illustrated.
The Coast Guardsman’s Manual.................................................................................................... $4.00 ($3.20)
By Captain W. C. Hogan, USCG. Revised by Lieutenant Commander M. M. Dickinson, USCGR, assisted by Loran W. Behrens, BMC, USN-FR. 3rd edition, 1958. 819 pages. Illustrated.
Division Officer’s Guide.................................................................................................................. $2.25 ($1.80)
By Captain J. V. Noel, Jr., USN. 5th edition, 1962. 282 pages.
The Marine Officer’s Guide......................................................................................................... $5.75 ($4.32)
By General G. C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.), Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, and Rear Admiral A. A. Ageton, USN (Ret.). 1956. 512 pages. 29 charts. 119 photographs.
The Naval Officer’s Guide............................................................................................................... $6.75 ($5.40)
By Rear Admiral Arthur A. Ageton, USN (Ret.), with Captain William P. Mack, USN. 5th edition, 1960. 649 pages. Illustrated.
Watch Officer’s Guide..................................................................................................................... $2.50 ($2.00)
Revised by Captain J. V. Noel, Jr., USN. 9th edition, 1961. 302 pages. Illustrated.
LEADERSHIP
Naval Leadership, 2nd edition....................................................................................................... $3.50 ($2.80)
Compiled by Commander Malcolm E. Wolfe, USN, Captain Frank J. Mulholland, USMC, Commander John M. Laudenslager, MSC, USNR, Lieutenant Horace J. Connery, MSC, USN, Rear Admiral Bruce McCandless, USN (Ret.), and Associate Professor Gregory J. Mann. 1959. 301 pages.
Naval Leadership, 1st edition......................................................................................................... $3.00 ($2.40)
Prepared at the U. S. Naval Academy for instruction of midshipmen. 1949. 324 pages.
Selected Readings in Leadership.................................................................................................... $2.50 ($2.00)
Compiled by Commander Malcolm E. Wolfe, USN, and Captain F. J. Mulholland, USMC. Revised by Leadership Committee, Command Department, U. S. Naval Academy. Revised, 1960.126 pages. Paper bound.
ENGINEERING
Descriptive Analysis of Naval Turbine Propulsion Plants ... $5 00 ($4 001
By Commander C N. Payne, USN. 1958. 187 pages. Illustrated. ' ' ' '
Fundamentals of Construction and Stability of Naval Ships......................................................... $5.50 ($4.40)
By Professor Thomas C. Gillmer, U. S. Naval Academy, 2nd edition, revised, 1959. 373 pages Illustrated. r b
Internal Combustion Engines........................................................................................................ $5.00 ($4.00)
By Commander P. W. Gill, USN, Commander J. H. Smith, Jr., USN, and Professor E. I. Ziurys. 4th edition, 1959. 570 pages. Illustrated.
Introduction to Marine Engineering......................................................................................... $5.50 ($4 40)
By Professor Robert F. Latham, U. S. Naval Academy. 1958. 208 pages. Illustrated.
SCIENCES
Fundamentals of Sonar................................................................................................................. $10.00 ($8.00)
By Dr. J. Warren Horton. 2nd edition, 1959. 417 pages. 186 figures.
The Human Machine, Biological Science for the Armed Services..................................................... $5.00 ($3,751
B) Captain Charles W. Shilling (MC), USX. 1955. 292 pages. Illustrated.
Logarithmic and Trigonometric Tables.............................................. $1 65 ($1 3°)
By the Department of Mathematics, U. S. Naval Academy. 1945 89 pages. ’ ’
Marine Fouling and Its Prevention............................................................................ $10 00 ($8 00)
Prepared for Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. 19a2. 388 pages. Illustrated.
The Rule of Nine............................................................................................................................ $ .60 ($ .48)
By William Wallace, Jr. An easy, speedy way to check addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. 1959. 27 pages. Paper bound.
LAW
A Brief History of Courts-Martial............................................................................... $ 50 ($ 40)
By Brigadier General James Snedeker, USMC (Ret.). 1954. 65 pages. Paper bound.
International Law for Seagoing Officers..................................................................... $6 00 ($4 50)
By Commander Burdick H. Brittin, USN, and Dr. Liselotte B. Watson. 2nd edition, 1960. 318 pages. Illustrated.
LANGUAGES
Introduction to Brazilian Portuguese....................................................................................... $4 50 ($3 60)
By Associate Professor Guy J. Riccio, U. S. Naval Academy. 1957. 299 pages. Paper bound. Russian Conversation and Grammar, 3rd edition, I960 By Professor Claude P. Lemieux, U. S. Naval Academy
Vol. One—109 pages. Paper bound......................................................... $2 50 ($2 00)
Vol. Two—121 pages. Paper bound......................................................... $2.50 ($°00)
Russian Supplement to Naval Phraseology................................................................ $4 00 ($3 20)
By Professor Claude P. Lemieux, U. S. Naval Academy. 2nd edition, 1954. 140 pages. '
SERVICE LIFE
The Best of Taste, The Finest Food of Fifteen Nations................................................................. $4.00 ($3.00)
Edited by the SACLANT-NATO Cookbook Committee. 1957. 244 pages. Illustrated.
Naval Customs, Traditions, and Usage............................................................. $5 50 ($4 13)
By Vice Admiral Leland P. Lovette, USN (Ret.). 4th edition. 1959.' 358 pages. Illustrated.’
Prayers at Sea........................................................................................................................ $3 5Q ($9 63)
By Chaplain Joseph F. Parker, U. S. Navy. ■ \ )
The Sailor’s Wife..................................................................................................................... $1 50 ($1 13)
By Lucy Wright. 1962. 112 pages. 28 cartoons. Paper bound.
Service Etiquette .................................................................................................................... $6.00 ($4.50)
By Captain Brooks J. Harral, U. S. Navy and Oretha I). Swartz. Revised by Oretha D. Swartz. Second Edition. 1963. 450 pages. Illustrated.
Welcome Aboard ••••••••#,.. .. ^ qq ($3 00)
By Florence Ridgely Johnson. A guide for the naval officer’s bride. 5th edition, 1960. 273 pages.
How to Survive on
I .and and Sea......................... $4.00 ($3.00)
2nd revised edition, 1956. 366 pages
Intramural Programs . . . $4.00 ($3.00)
Revised, 1950. 249 pages
Soccer...................................... $4.50.............. ($3.38)
3rd edition, 1961. 172 pages
Swimming and Diving . . $4.50 ($3.38)
3rd edition, 1962. 345 pages
Championship Wrestling . . $4.50 ($3.38)
1958. 223 pages
........................................................... $4.50 ($3.38)
Illustrated.
..................................................... $1.60 ($1.28)
1958. 50 pages. Photographs and diagrams. Paper
SPORTS—ATHLETICS
Physical Education Series—V-5 Association of America
Basketball . . . Temporarily out of stock
Boxing............................................... $4.00 ($3.00)
Revised, 1950. 288 pages Conditioning Exercises . . $4.50 ($3.38)
3rd edition, 1960. 275 pages Football . . . Temporarily out of stock
Gymnastics and Tumbling . $4.50 ($3.38)
2nd revised edition, 1959. 414 pages Hand to Hand Combat . . $4.00 ($3.00)
1943. 228 pages
Baseball.......................................................................
By Robert Spackman, Jr. 1963. 175 pages.
Squash Racquets.........................................................
By Commander Arthur M. Potter, IJSNR. bound.
U. S. NAVAL ACADEMY
Annapolis Today....................................................................................................................... $6.00 ($4.50)
By Kendall Banning. Revised by A. Stuart Pitt. 329 pages. 1963. Illustrated.
The Book of Navy Songs............................................................................................................ $2.65 ($1.99)
Compiled by the Trident Society of the Naval Academy. Over 90 old and new songs. 160 pages. Illustrated. Sold only to Midshipmen and Naval Institute members.
Your Naval Academy................................................................................................................ $1.00 ($ .75)
By Midshipmen Burton and Hart. A handsome 48-page pictorial presentation of a Midshipman’s life at the Naval Academy. Brief descriptive captions. 1955. Paper bound.
Proceedings Cover Pictures....................................................................................................... $2.50 ($1.88)
Sets of all 12 cover pictures appearing on the Proceedings in each year of 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959. Printed on 13 X 13 mat. Complete set of 12 for any year.
Reef Points
The Handbook of the Brigade of Midshipmen, 1963-1964 .............................................................. $1.35, net
BOOK
ORDER
DEPT.
U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland
Title
Copies Price
$
Compiled by the Reef Points Staff of the Trident Society. The plebe’s bible, a compact book covering the Naval Academy and the history and traditions of the Naval Service.
TOTAL $
$
(For delivery in Maryland, please add 3% tax) Enclosed is check ( ) postal note ( ) in the amount of Name
Address____________________________________________________________