It is universally recognized that this is an age of unprecedented achievement in many fields of human endeavor. Science has given us many benefits—and also tremendous destructive power. International conflicts are unique in character and potential. So many courses of action are theoretically feasible that it frequently becomes a hard choice how best to provide for our national security. Are old concepts still fundamentally sound? If so, how do we apply them in this changing world? How do we alter their implementation to keep pace with the march of events?
The purpose of this article is to explore some of the facets of modern naval power, with the primary objective of evaluating its potential during the next decade in contributing to the security of the United States. Review of some of the fundamental characteristics of the sea has been helpful in developing this evaluation.
Locked in the bosom of the seas are many mysteries. Despite the fact that the seas are interwoven intimately with the history and development of man, his knowledge of their depths is relatively small. Perhaps the most neglected of the earth’s sciences is the study of the characteristics of the sea.
Yet it is the deduction of modern science that the first living organism moved in the waters. For eons the seas remained the nursery of all life. And even today the seas are basic to all life on our planet. They moderate climate, provide rainfall, and reserve immense natural resources.
In the advanced civilization of today, no country has within its boundaries all the materials in the quantities needed to sustain the demands of its complex societies. Other sources, from the seas and from the lands across the seas, are relied upon to an increasing degree in both peace and war.
Stored in the 330 million cubic miles of the waters of the seas are a great variety of salts, minerals, and valuable solutions. Sea water contains over 60 elements, varying greatly in concentration. The contents per cubic mile vary from 0.00000009 pound of radon to some 4 billion, 37 million tons of oxygen.
Sea water is an important commercial source of many substances in wide industrial use. As our exploration and knowledge of the seas increase, and as our land resources diminish, we can expect a greater extraction of natural resources from the sea.
Modern developments in science are giving us better means to explore the ocean depths. Improved materials and engineering techniques permit descents today to a depth of some 35,000 feet. The science of oceanography is attracting an increasing number of able men. Our marine laboratories are expanding rapidly. The United States has in progress a “Ten-Year Program in Oceanography” (TENOC) which will cost an estimated one billion dollars. This new interest in oceanography is by no means confined to the United States. All the major maritime nations are involved. Upon the results of their efforts to understand the seas better will depend their respective capacities to exploit its wealth of natural resources and its potential contribution to national security.
Factors Affecting Naval Power
Sea power is the measure of a nation’s total capability to exploit the benefits that the oceans have to offer. In its comprehensive political sense, it includes all assets that are employed for advantageous use of the oceans for commercial and military purposes.
Naval power is the major part of U. S. sea power. It comprises that portion of our nation’s military forces that utilize the surface, sub-surface, and super-surface of the oceans of the world to prepare for and conduct war at and from the sea.
The character of our sea power, and the elements of our naval power, are determined largely by the following factors: (a) world geography, (b) available technology, (c) the requisites of a national military posture. Let us analyze these in turn.
World Geography
In the millions of centuries that have passed during the evolution of the earth from a huge ball of gas and dust particles to its present form, there have been tremendous changes in its geography. Within the practical limits of time in which we can plan our national destiny, however, the chances for other than relatively minute changes in the earth’s geography are remote. New deltas will be built; new volcanic islands may appear, or small islands disappear; lowlands may be flooded; man will recapture more of the ocean floor for land cultivation.
These small changes are insignificant in the context of the subject at hand, however, for the major land and sea areas of the world will remain essentially the same. While the configuration of the boundary between land and sea changes slowly, the boundaries of individual nations are more volatile. One of the great stimulants to aggression is the desire of nations to have effective access to the sea.
From the point of view of geography the United States is one of the world’s most favored nations. Our boundaries on two oceans, the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence River, and the Gulf of Mexico, together with our many harbors, provide ready access to the sea along thousands of miles of coastline.
The breadth of the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans has been of great defensive value in wars against overseas enemies. Likewise, the oceans have been of great assistance in projecting our combat power overseas. While current and prospective weapons of war greatly overcome the defensive aspects of distance, they do not eliminate the advantages of the geographical position of the United States.
The sea that surrounds us is a friendly medium as long as we make it so. It will become an unfriendly medium only if we neglect to exploit what it has to offer.
On the other hand, the seas provide a hostile encirclement to a nation which cannot match its adversary in utilizing them as a medium for the operation of naval forces. The hostile encirclement becomes still more perilous if such a nation’s access to the seas is cramped and narrow, for modern seagoing weapons can span the distances to enemy targets, even across intervening land.
Available Technology
The degree to which we can exploit our geographical advantages depends upon the adaption of available technology to sea power. Naval power consists primarily of three elements: ships as platforms or bases for weapons; the weapons that are fired or launched from those platforms; and the strategy and tactics employed in the use of the first two elements described.
In our ships we seek versatility, endurance, speed, seakeeping ability, and concealment.
In our weapons, too, we seek versatility, range, destructive power and accuracy.
In our strategy and tactics we seek to apply the basic principles of war—surprise, concentration, economy of force, etc.
Modern technology has greatly advanced the effectiveness of these elements. Engineers and ship designers have almost doubled the speed of our capital ships. Nuclear power has resulted in a further quantum jump of some 50-fold in steaming endurance per load of fuel—and the end of improvement in this respect is not in sight.
Versatility in both ships and weapons is a desirable characteristic from the point of view of economy, flexibility and effectiveness. For example, modern science has made it possible for the aircraft carrier to operate high performance jets as well as propeller-type aircraft. Thus, one carrier’s aircraft may conduct nuclear strikes, air support of troops, antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, surface and air surveillance and destroy shipping.
Destroyers formerly carried torpedoes, for short-range attack on surface ships, and depth charges, which had to be dropped from a position almost directly over a submarine. The range of a modern destroyer’s antisubmarine weapons and torpedoes is several miles. The armament of some destroyers includes missile batteries for use against the highest performance aircraft.
The landing ship dock (LSD) is an outstanding example of ship versatility. She has evolved into a major amphibious combatant ship by carrying landing craft, helicopters, and troops for the assault waves. After completing her assault role, this versatile ship can assume the primary repair function for which she was originally designed.
Man’s ingenuity has given us nuclear power and the ballistic missile, and their marriage with the submarine; satellites for navigation and communication; torpedoes and missiles that home on their targets; and greatly improved logistic support ships that give more staying power at sea.
Although modern technology has permitted great strides forward in sea power, even greater strides will come. Our Navy is embarked upon a technological revolution that is greater than the transition from sail to steam, or from cannonball to armor-piercing projectile. The speed at which this revolution moves is breathtakingly fast. It requires the nicest of judgment, careful analysis, and— yes—some risk to strike the balance between exploiting fully the potentials of technology and avoiding the introduction of new systems into the Fleet before they are sufficiently proven and reliable.
The Requisites of a National Military Posture
Any analysis of our naval power is meaningful only if considered in relation to our total national military posture. An analysis of one service, one military requirement, one function, or one weapons system is faulty if it is considered only in isolation.
Let us look briefly at our national military forces as a whole. What should they be capable of doing, and why?
The pre-eminent position of the United States in the world today demands that we maintain a strong, broad, and versatile military power base, which will permit our civilian officials to employ boldly and with confidence, our formidable economic, political, and psychological weapons when necessary. If we accept this thesis, then one prime requisite of our military posture is obvious. It must be capable of striking back with devastating effectiveness, and inevitably so, regardless of the nature of the military attack against us.
This means that the requisite numbers and types of our forces must survive any type of a first attack against us. Weapon delivery by missile and perhaps, eventually, by craft in space, reduces the warning time of a surprise attack to only a fraction of the time heretofore.
This lack of warning puts a premium on the ability of our own weapons to five through a surprise attack. Consequently, we must build into our weapons systems those characteristics that will permit them to survive— characteristics that will perplex the enemy in the use of his own weapons systems. If we do these things, we are far less likely to receive a surprise attack, because of the doubts in the mind of any rational enemy as to the likelihood of his success.
We must also be capable of responding quickly and effectively to military aggression short of general war. We cannot predict, with assured accuracy, the area, the time, or the circumstances of such aggression. We must be ready to handle it wherever, whenever, or however it may come.
If we are to be ready to meet these two broadly defined general threats effectively, that of all-out nuclear attack and that of smaller military aggressions, it is obvious that a single weapon or a single strategy to fight a single type of war is not sufficient.
We cannot afford to present to the enemy a neat package of problems to which he can provide a single or simple solution. We must present him with such a variety of possible responses to his aggression that he cannot counter them all. We must always inject a question of serious doubt in his mind as to the probable success of his military aggression.
We can do this by having many different weapons, and the ability to deliver them from many directions and sources, from land, air, and from the surface and subsurface of the seas. The land, sea, and air each has its advantages and disadvantages as a medium of operations of weapons systems. We must exploit the advantages of each of them, because only by doing so can we complicate to the maximum an enemy’s military plans.
The Role of Sea Power in Our National Military Strategy
The primary role of sea power in our national military strategy is to contribute to our national readiness to project U. S. power overseas. Sea areas lie between us and any prospective allies. Extensive use of the seas is necessary for support of our allies and for the support of our own military forces on their soil. In times of peace, over 99 per cent of overseas tonnage moves by ship. It would not be far different in war.
These factors dictate an offensive naval strategy. Our Navy must be designed to carry the war to the enemy, both at sea and on land.
In our early history our Navy was frequently forced into a coastal defense strategy.
It was only after we shook off the shackles of these defensive concepts that we were able to exploit our full potential and perform our primary mission—control of vital sea areas.
In World War II, the greatest of all naval wars, this offensive philosophy paid great dividends. By wresting control of large ocean areas so that troops and airbases could be brought closer to the enemy homeland, we realized the true benefits of an offensive naval strategy. Technological advances since have reinforced the validity of this offensive strategical concept. No weapon is foreseen that will change that philosophy in the future. Tactics, delivery methods, and concepts of defense have changed with weapon development, but these changes fortify the concept of an offensive naval strategy.
This offensive naval philosophy is not restricted to wartime operations, but extends into the area of peacetime tensions short of a shooting war. We have found it extremely beneficial and helpful to American and Free World policy to keep naval forces capable of conducting offensive operations deployed thousands of miles from our shores in the Far Western Pacific and in the Mediterranean.
There are only a few places in which U. S. forces are deployed overseas ashore in the strength necessary to handle local military aggressions of great size. Between the points where these forces are deployed, there are gaps of thousands of miles along the eastern and southern perimeters of the Eurasian continent. To fill them by U. S. land-based forces is not feasible, even though most of the gaps are occupied by Allies or countries that are sympathetic to the Free World. Fortunately, most of these nations border upon the sea where naval forces can be brought to bear.
When force is needed, prompt action is most important, because timely action by comparatively small forces usually precludes the need for larger forces later. By exploiting the quick reaction capability of naval forces, we can either prevent hostilities or contribute greatly to keeping them confined.
A major objective of force is to control people so as to influence them to do what one wants them to do. Even in time of war the objective is to control people, not eliminate them. Who can deny the effect of our naval actions—short of battle—on the conduct of the people we sought to influence in crises such as those in Lebanon and Cuba.
This comprises one of the Navy’s foremost roles, i.e., to have available packages of U. S. power, moving islands of power, if you will, that meld naval components into integrated strike forces that can be brought quickly to within striking distance of a threatened area.
Aside from the direct effects of modern technology upon ships, weapons, and equipment, the nature of possible war has undergone fundamental changes which dictate an expanded role for the Navy in war, prewar, and postwar actions. This fact has been increasingly important since the U. S. monopoly in nuclear weapons was overcome.
The possibility of a nuclear war has emphasized the Navy’s role in the primary areas of deterrence and residual power.
Deterrence is the prevention of action by fear of consequences. As applied to initiating a nuclear war, this fear stems from an evaluation of the ability of the enemy to strike back with such effectiveness as to cause unacceptable losses. The evaluation may be right or wrong. The primary factor upon which it is based is the number and effectiveness of weapons which the strike-first nation estimates he may receive on his homeland in retaliation. His basic question is: “How many enemy weapons will survive to be delivered against me?” If his estimate of this number is sufficiently high, deterrence is likely.
For deterrence to be effective, the requisite number of our weapons to survive must be so evaluated by a nation contemplating a first strike. Therefore, a prime requisite of our delivery vehicles is survival. What major characteristics contribute to survival? Dispersal, hardness, concealment, mobility, early warning systems, and defense.
With the possible exception of concealment, none of the above characteristics is sufficient in itself. The more we can combine these characteristics in a single delivery vehicle, the greater will be its chance of survival.
The seas provide a unique medium for such a combination. In our Polaris system, for example, we combine dispersal, hardness, concealment, mobility, and inherent self- defense. Early warning of an impending enemy nuclear strike is not necessary for its survival. This delivery vehicle uses any of an infinite number of self-created subterranean passages in areas many times the size of the United States, and from many directions from possible enemy targets.
In our carrier task forces we combine dispersal, mobility, early warning, defense, and some degree of concealment. Since a target moving with the speed of a carrier task force is not a suitable target for a long range ballistic missile, the threat against it is narrowed. In the aircraft carrier we have a fast moving bomber base, with its planes, crew, housekeeping facilities, aircraft repair facilities, spare parts, and radars—in essence, the “ground environment” required for the warning, defense, and sustained operations of an air base for high performance aircraft.
In our amphibious task forces we integrate the efforts of virtually every type ship and airplane in the Navy, together with that of the redoubtable Marines, to assault hostile positions with overwhelming force projected from moving islands of power.
Thus, our sea-based systems contribute tremendously to the diversity of our national retaliatory capability. The mobility and concealment they afford to an unequalled degree become increasingly important as the accuracy of missiles against fixed targets improves.
For a fleeting moment in history, the United States had a complete monopoly in nuclear weapons. Prospective enemies were then emerging. We could have taken advantage of this monopoly and eliminated a threat in its early stages and without fear of comparable retaliation. Our self-imposed restraint was in keeping with our principles. It was one of the most noble and charitable restraints ever exercised by man.
While our nuclear weapon superiority today remains overwhelming, the number and quality of such weapons in the hands of others are undoubtedly increasing. The amount of damage that we might expect to receive in a first strike will increase with time.
Except for their deterrent effect, nuclear weapons do not offer a positive defense against a massive strike. Even though the weapons survive to destroy the first-strike nation in retaliation, that action does not preclude, or reduce to acceptable proportions, the damage and casualties from a first strike. As a related point, it may be stated that the surviving strike weapons required to destroy the nation which strikes first is a finite number, beyond which it is unnecessary to go.
This kind of a nuclear balance is a strong deterrent to nuclear war. Consequently, it may raise the level of non-nuclear actions which opponents are willing to take because of the known mutual consequences of a nuclear exchange.
In this kind of a balance, sea power is a powerful instrument with which to apply pressures at sea against enemy aggressive acts overseas. It would appear that opposing actions at sea could reach a higher tempo than opposing actions on or over the sovereign territory of either antagonist, with less danger of escalating into a nuclear exchange. The nation whose sea power is superior under these conditions has a great advantage.
The time could come when overseas expansion by other nations, advancing behind a shield of nuclear terror, becomes an unacceptable threat to our security. The time when such expansion would become an unacceptable threat to our security is difficult to define. The aggressor nation’s approach to this grey area and his crossing into and beyond it would frequently be governed by the action of those nations most adversely affected.
When, in our opinion, this boundary line had been crossed, naval power could provide the United States with an instrument sufficiently strong and versatile so that any desired action could be taken at sea to block overseas aggression by force, or the threat of force. Such a use of naval power would be especially suitable where the aggressor evaluates the threat of escalation into nuclear warfare as a restraining influence to counteraction by those affected by his aggression.
The exigencies of war are uncertain. Force requirements cannot be calculated precisely. Experience, logic, and discretion dictate the need for a reserve of combat power in excess of expected requirements. In a nuclear war, the situation which might exist in the opposing homelands after a massive exchange cannot be forecast accurately.
What facilities and combat power will be left? What enemy targets will be left? Will we have the residual power to destroy them? How will we deal with other opponents that might come into the war against us after the initial exchange?
Of one thing we can be sure, that in such an exchange our homeland will be the primary target for enemy weapons. There are great expanses of the oceans that he cannot cover. The oceans are then most attractive as an area for the operation of our poststrike residual power. Relatively safe from initial and fol- low-on strikes, that portion of our power at sea that we elect not to use in immediate retaliation is available for follow-on operations, against either a primary or secondary antagonist.
While it is by no means advocated that all of our sea-based systems be withheld from the immediate retaliatory strikes, a naval power that is sufficiently strong and versatile to provide an effective residual is a potent asset.
The Future
These are some of the many factors that are influencing the changing aspects of naval power in this modern world. The challenge that lies before us is the translation of sea- utilization concepts into the hardware and tactics to meet these new requirements.
Our Navy of the future must take full advantage of, and continue to seek, new developments. The maximum imagination and application of which we are possible must be devoted to exploiting the potentials of every output of science in enhancing the nation’s sea power and, consequently, the nation’s security. Technology permits it. Military logic demands it.
Accelerating technological progress is contributing heavily to the advance of sea power. The new technology permits a great broadening of the base of the capabilities of sea power. It has permitted sea power to expand from combat at sea or against fringes of the coast, to the striking of targets far inland. The time is near when no target in the world will be beyond the range of sea-launched weapons.
This capability to project U. S. combat power in many forms from the sea to the land by no means reduces the Navy’s historic role of control of the seas by the defeat of enemy forces at sea. We must be ready to meet any challenges by enemy naval forces, whether they be surface, sub-surface, or super-surface.
Our freedom to use the seas must be absolute—not contingent upon the sanction or sufferance of any other nation. The freedom of an enemy to use the seas in time of war must be contingent upon our sanction.
Historically, the characteristics of available weapons and the nature of the enemy have heavily influenced military strategy. Some wars have been fought almost entirely on land, others predominantly on the sea, and still others in a combination of the two. In recent history, the air has become the third medium of combat, and air power has played a tremendously important role.
We are now witnessing the emergence of the missile age. In essence, we are returning to the artillery concept wherein the explosive is launched from the earth’s surface or subsurface. There is one very important difference, however, between missile exchanges and artillery duels. The prospective battleground is expanded to include the homelands of the belligerents. It would be tragic if U. S. soil were the only delivery base that we had, for then the total enemy effort could be directed against our homeland. Fortunately, naval power provides an excellent alternative. It gives us a means of using the oceans as the delivery base, while retaining the enemy’s homeland as the point of weapon impact.
These precious attributes of naval weapon systems provide advantages that accrue only to those who recognize and exploit the unique characteristics of the sea. The advantages are so great that this nation cannot afford to forfeit the lead it holds over all other nations in the availability of ships and the understanding of how to use them.