What lies beyond the horizon of the destroyer? An experienced tincan skipper envisions the global environment of the next two decades and gives his candid opinion of the role of the destroyer on tomorrow’s uncharted waters.
Because the relentless push of technology constantly changes the relative value of all weapons systems, the effectiveness of the destroyer has risen and fallen frequently during her 60-year history. Today, with the size and shape of the destroyer classes in a convulsion of technological transition, perhaps we need to take a hard look at the DD weapons system upon which our fleet relies so heavily. Is the destroyer competent to continue carrying out efficiently the heavy task thrust upon her by our world-wide sea power commitment? Will he be relatively as valuable a weapon 10 to 20 years from now as she is now, or was 10 and 20 years ago?
Today the U. S. Navy has approximately 300 destroyer type on duty with the operating fleets. The shipbuilding programs for 1963 call for the construction of eight new oil-burning destroyer escorts and 23 older destroyers are scheduled for a major face-lifting under the FRAM Program. Soon USS Bainbridge (DLGN-25), a nuclear-powered frigate, will join the fleet. An additional DLGN has been authorized and funded by the Congress. While this might seem to indicate a secure future for the destroyer, there recently has been a sharp increase in the number of dissidents who feel that the hunter-killer type submarine is a more effective weapon than the destroyer in antisubmarine warfare, and that the destroyer's future anti-air combat contribution somewhat questionable. Other critics point out that technological developments applicable to destroyers simply have not kept pace with technological developments in other seagoing weapons systems, such as the submarine. They argue that the destroyer must be assigned a shrinking role in our future fleets.
The complex new destroyers subject to praise and criticism today were conceived and planned a decade ago. Despite the exigencies of the Korean War and the daily problems concomitant with the employment of World War II weapons systems in the Korean theater, the strategic planners of that era had to wrench their mind from that busy present to visualize the horizon of the future which has now arrived. There is strong evidence that our new destroyers have considerably better relative anti-air capabilities than did the best DD's we had during the Korean War. On the other hand, there is no question that the best operating destroyer today, when pitted against the latest nuclear submarine, is relatively less effective than were its counterparts against conventionally-powered undersea craft a decade ago. It is impractical to address ourselves to the merits or deficiencies of our current vessels, however, other than to appraise them realistically, and plan accordingly. We must, instead, look to the future.
In striving to play that favorite destroyerman's game—delineating the destroyer of the future—we must look beyond this decade into the 1970's and 1980's in order to determine a design for ships not yet on the drawing boards—destroyers which the young naval officer of today will live to command. Without attempting to define a packaged strategy for that distant future, we need: first to discuss the strategic environment likely to face our nation in that time frame; second, to analyze the implications for sea power of this strategic environment; third, to deduce some of the requirements for destroyers, based on these analyses; and finally, to discuss some of the transitional problems. If tomorrow's destroyers fail in any respect to have greater relative effectiveness than their antecedents, it will be because we have not peered long and hard enough.
The Strategic Environment—1970's and 1980's
The problem is to project the present world strategic situation—two centers of superpower surrounded by vast areas of underdeveloped nations which are in varying degrees of commitment to these power centers—into the alternative courses that might reasonably be expected to develop. At one pole we have the United States and the Atlantic Community of nations, at the other, the Sino-Soviet bloc. Around the two superpower blocs are the many underdeveloped states, most of them spawned lately in the decolonization process, which has generated a great rebirth of nationalism.
Sino-Soviet Bloc. Although not yet the equal of the United States in strategic weapons systems, the Soviet Union has achieved the capability to do serious damage to the United States in a thermonuclear exchange. It seems only reasonable to conclude that in the absence of effective arms control agreements, the U.S.S.R. will arrive at that point in time at which she can wreak nearly total civil damage on her enemy by the 1970's or 1980's.
The facade of monolithic unity within the Communist bloc began to disappear with Stalin's death. The fundamental fallacies of the Communist ideology will contribute to political fragmentation within that bloc. Differences between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. are fundamental, and the prospect is that the gulf will widen as China contemplates the morass into which the U.S.S.R.'s curtailment of aid has placed her. Similarly, the Eastern European Satellites, whose people remember days when not only their human dignity, but also their economic welfare, was in better condition, may continue to inch towards closer association with the West. If Soviet foreign policy becomes sufficiently astute to recognize the inevitability of the trend toward nationalism within her bloc under present policies, the next 20 years may witness a compromise policy in which the U.S.S.R. settles for a loose association of states of similar economic philosophy, who seek to co-ordinate their political objectives. We must concede that the Soviet state possesses a considerable economic potential. Despite her continuing difficulties with agriculture, the Soviet Union should be able to devote large amounts of industrial goods and other aid to the campaign to win the uncommitted nations. However, these programs may suffer not only from an increasing lack of co-ordination with other poles of Communist power, but also from the persistence of the aspirations of the Soviet people for improved living standards.
China represents a special enigma. Possessing the geopolitical attributes for vast potential power, politically stabilized for the first time in many years by a ruthless regime, she has, through the inefficiency and bad judgment of her leadership, compounded her problems. Whether she will ever become a serious threat by the 1970's and 1980's will, in large measure, depend on the degree of enlightened leadership of Mao's successors. We must credit China with the capability of achieving a modest nuclear weapons system during the next 20 years. More important, her future political course—whether it be a shift toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union, a reorientation toward the West, or the creation, with Japan and Southeast Asia, of a separate regional association—will have a major effect on other power alignments.
The Atlantic Community. The democratic states of Western Europe (whose political genius seems to operate best under pressure) may be expected to continue their political integration. This unique process of empirical, step-by-step integration has already proceeded, in the European Economic Community, to the point where the common man has seen the vision and experienced the economic benefits. The ships we conceive today and design tomorrow, then, will probably be coming off the ways when Europe is in the final stages of the task President Kennedy described in his Independence Day address this year: "…the first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union…"
Alternatively, we must face the fact that our present enlightened policies regarding Atlantic Community association might be unsuccessful in combining the two large halves, United Europe and North America, and that we may face in the 1970's the possibility of an integrated Europe, aloof, and serving as a third major element in world power relationships.
We must also consider, however remote, the possibility that the Soviet Union, reacting to awakening China, might seek a bona fide rapprochement with the West.
Underdeveloped nations and diffusion of power. Around the gradually fragmenting Communist bloc and the slowly integrating Atlantic Community lies the great group of underdeveloped nations. While there are exceptions, India, Brazil , Nigeria, etc., the great majority of these states have not yet begun to outpace their difficulties. The United States and other nations of the Atlantic Community have made appreciable efforts to establish the basic economic reforms and momentum necessary to bring progress and to win their orientation toward the Free World. As the Atlantic Community moves forward, both the amount and degree of co-ordination of these programs may be expected to increase.
Similarly, Communist China and the U.S.S.R. may both be expected to increase their efforts in the cold war struggle for these underdeveloped nations.
As a result of this increased economic and paramilitary competition, over the next 20 years we should expect to see some occasional temporary Communist successes, but the majority of these less privileged states should remain outside the Communist bloc—eligible for the economic aid of the Atlantic Community, slowly improving their lot. Of particular importance with regard to these states which slip temporarily under Communist influence will be the U. S. or Atlantic Community-sponsored regional groupings such as a modified Organization of American States (OAS), which will provide the internationally accepted vehicle, untainted by nationalist ambitions, to resist or overturn outside aggression or Communist-inspired subversion.
The most significant aspect of the underdeveloped areas will be the gradual tendency toward the diffusion of power and its implications. In another 20 years, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and other key nations may well have reached the stage of development to play a key role in power relationships. There will be increasing tendencies toward the more meaningful regional groupings, referred to above, around these budding powers. Atlantic Community relationships with these regional centers of power will be likely to change in the same manner that the U. S. relationship to Europe changed as Europe became stronger.
Asian rimlands. An especially critical area in any prognosis is the rimland portion of Asia whose ere cent encompasses China. We have seen that a realistic appraisal must concede that China, through ruthless control, has the capability over the next 20 years to increase her power position appreciably. Her perennial agriculture problem and her ideology are likely to make movement into the Asian rimland attractive to her leaders. As China obtains her nuclear weapon capability, we must anticipate the possibility of two directions of movement by Japan and India. They might elect to obtain an independent nuclear capability; they might choose to seek a closer rapprochement with China. The author's estimate is that there is some risk of the loss of Japan's western orientation at this time. If unable to find a place within the economic association of the Atlantic Community nations, Japan might find the economic attraction and the power threat of China an irresistible combination. It is his judgment, however, that before that time, enlightened U.S. policy will have ought to meet this threat by working with Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and perhaps Indonesia, Formoa, and the Philippines to form a Pacific enlargement of t he Atlantic Community with somewhat looser political ties. If this is to be done, the nuclear threat of China and the concomitant nuclear aspirations of India and Japan would clearly have to be met by constructing an internationalized nuclear force similar to NATO. A rimland military arrangement including India, Japan, perhaps a reoriented Indonesia, and some Southeast Asian mainland nations might well eventuate, with U. S. participation to provide the nuclear weapons system under adequate control.
The alternative of a Japan and India moving into the Chine e camp would produce a power shift so disadvantageous to the Atlantic Community that one can assume almost any sacrifice to prevent it.
Sea Power Implications of the Strategic Environment
In the next 10 or 20 years, the medium through which the two superpowers increasingly are likely to apply their economic power will be the ocean of the world. Notwithstanding the fact that submarine and air delivery would be desirable for wartime readiness, the economic facts of life will probably lead to major reliance on surface ships in time of peace.
Extensive exploitation of the seas to strengthen the bonds of trade and of naval interdependence may provide a potent tool with which to broaden United Europe into an Atlantic association, thus avoiding the alternative of a third major bloc.
The Atlantic Community and its Pacific extension are likely to be welded together by the oceans into a great Sea Community more easily and economically tied together than the heartland of Eurasia by its highways and railroads. This burgeoning Sea Community will in turn probably be better placed to use the seas to carry trade and influence to the underdeveloped lands.
Additionally, the seas are the avenues of escape for important portions of the Communist bloc states when the time is ripe. The sea lanes to Yugoslavia, China, Albania, North Vietnam, and North Korea bring them into direct contact with the sea power of the Sea Community states. This lure is likely to increase as the decentralization of the bloc continues. Alternatively, if the U.S.S.R. makes the rapprochement to Europe and the Sea Community, the Pacific Ocean approaches will knit Soviet and U. S. power together and screen off key areas of China. Control of the seas also insures that the cold war in Africa, South America, and most of the Asian rimlands will be conducted on our terms.
This pattern of the future diffusion of power and the global nature of oceanic trade and commerce may dictate a division of naval effort into two mainstreams. To maintain our readiness for general war and the versatility necessary to retain control of the seas during limited war we must be able to deploy general purpose fast carrier striking forces simultaneously to several oceans. Their ships must be capable of sustained high speed over long distances; the majority of these ships are likely to be nuclear-powered, and we must have fast amphibious forces able to move quickly over great distances. The increasing tendency toward a balance in strategic nuclear weapons systems and the trend toward their concentration on land and in submarines, however, will make it possible to streamline our requirements for these complex surface ships. Despite the increase in ocean area responsibility, it should be possible, using increased endurance and striking power, to keep within present numbers in the complex categories of ships. But there should be another mainstream of naval development. To meet the massive requirements for escort of convoy, mining, minesweeping, hunter-killer operations, barrier patrol, and routine naval tasks over greatly enlarged sea routes, we will require an appreciable increase in the numbers of vessels so engaged. The power of the entire Atlantic Community may not be sufficient to provide the number of ships we will need if we continue the trend within all types to more complicated systems. Moreover, the insatiable demands of the developing technology of the Atlantic Community and the urgency of providing enlarged technical assistance to the underdeveloped nations, may make it necessary to limit stringently the demands of naval vessels for technical personnel and equipment. The large second mainstream of naval development then might be the construction of small, efficient, simplified, easily maintained vessels requiring minimum of personnel.
The combatant Navy will make a contribution to the closer association of the Sea Community. International military staffs, such as those of NATO, are likely to be modified and molded together as the association grows closer. Differences between member navies will probably narrow; there may be planning for Allied manning of individual ships. Since not even the Atlantic Community could build all the combatant vessels it would need for general war, there will doubtless be planning to tailor the total naval production in the most efficient manner.
Within the next five years, Atlantic Community states are likely to be exchanging their five-year forecasts of military requirements. Within ten years, they are likely to be conducting planning liaison on mutual military requirements and budgeting. Toward the end of the 20-year period, it may well be the practice to allocate to each nation the construction of those ships for which it is best suited or which most nearly support the geopolitical function of that portion of the Community.
The need to use the seas for the projection of submarine-launched strategic weapons and the need to deny the use of the seas to potential enemy submarines will be even more important in the 1970's and 1980's. Diffusion of nuclear power will probably make it necessary to place additional potentially aggressive nations under the missile range umbrella of the Polaris force of the Sea Community. The greatly increased interdependence of all nations and the consequent heavy ocean commerce will make the solution of the ASW problem more imperative. Further, as the states of the Sea Community become more closely associated, penetration by potential enemy submarines into the North Atlantic becomes a penetration of an integrated political organization. It will probably be found necessary to set up permanent peacetime barriers to access of unidentified submarines.
Despite the enlarged political community with which the United States is likely to be associated, which will provide a broad spectrum of bases internal to the Sea Community, the trend in the rest of the world, with nationalism assuming more significance, may be toward a reduction in the overseas bases available outside the Community. Moreover, areas of the world in which bases have not been necessary previously will have assumed greater strategic significance. This combination of factors might force a greater reliance on mobile logistic support and a need to build greater logistics endurance into the Community's individual combatant ships.
Prognosis for Destroyers
The geopolitical lineup of the 1970's and 1980's may have been dramatically altered. However, the traditional missions of destroyers probably will remain constant. Destroyer types are likely to continue to support fast carrier task forces, amphibious operations, and offensive hunter-killer operations. They will still be escorting convoys, providing air defense, and contributing miscellaneous workhorse functions. In addition, we may expect to see destroyer types embarking on new roles of wide area barrier patrols, command communications and control ships, distant scouting and raiding function of cruisers, and politico-military missions.
The mere recital of the foregoing missions against the backdrop of the enlarged worldwide strategic environmental factors answers the question of whether the destroyer of the future will be the cruiser-size of the Coontz-class, the large size of the DDG series, whether it will resemble the small, relatively cheap but powerful and fast destroyer of the past, or whether it will be an escort size similar to the DE's of the past. Destroyers of the future will almost certainly be a mix of these four sizes. Destroyer trend of the present era tend to confirm that it is no longer feasible to construct inadequate numbers a true general purpose ship. This infeasibility is further highlighted by the fact that the combatant roles of both cruisers and destroyers are blending into a single surface ship destroyer combatant category of several types. For the future there may be a need to define missions and tasks of each destroyer type with greater clarity and with degrees of gradation. Those at the less exotic end of the spectrum should not become overloaded with equipment so costly as to restrict unduly the numbers we can afford or so complex as to create a pressure to increase their individual size.
The complex mainstream. At the top of the spectrum of complexity there will probably be the successors to the DLGN's and DLG's of the present era. These ships will probably be no larger than their forebear types. But the continued development of miniaturized and lighter equipment will make it possible to add the additional equipment required to keep these ships abreast of technological developments. Advanced tactical data systems will tie the weapons and target data systems of these ships directly in with other ships, task forces, or land-based command and control posts. Combat Information Centers will probably have become functional rather than modular in arrangement as a result of increased capabilities of consoles, a reduced need for status boards, and the need for Evaluators, Weapons Officers, and Commanding Officers to be in immediate contact. Dead Reckoning Tracers and vertical status boards are likely to give way to automatic plotting boards. The tactical data system equipment may make it possible to return to one-room CIC's. These will probably have been relocated in the lower interior decks with ship control features included for ABC defense. These CIC's will doubtless be smaller in proportion to their capabilities than the ships of today and will have fewer operators. But electronics equipment rooms may grow to the point of being as large as CIC. The need for maintenance personnel will be greatly increased. In my opinion, CO's will finally have made the transition from the bridge to CIC for all battle functions, including ASW (the result of greater detection ranges and therefore distances between ships and of electronic co-ordination of ship movements in multiple ship attacks). The residual bridge will very likely have become a small observation tower. Antiairwar systems will probably consist of radar-controlled and homing systems capable of rapid detection, acquisition, and destruction, with conventional or nuclear warheads, of enemy missiles and aircraft at ranges of hundreds of miles.
The ASW capability of these ships will doubtless provide both very long range detection and kill capability. The research and development of follow-on systems to the SQS-23 and SQS-26 sonar gear, aided by the breakthroughs that have been made during the generation of these equipments, and by application of our improved knowledge of oceanography, will have greatly increased the range of shipboard sonar gear. In addition, drone helicopters are likely to have been installed, with improved dunking sonar, to provide additionally increased ranges and search rates. Ship-based antisubmarine rockets will have increased both their airborne and water ranges.
One DLGN will probably be assigned to each fast carrier task force. This, in my opinion, will be done to provide a nuclear-powered escort capable—like the cruisers of an earlier era—of running with the carriers under all conditions, including the final top-speed run-in to continental targets in general war, all without refueling.
Each fast carrier task force is likely to have
four to six DLG's in addition to its DLGN.
These ships will probably be sister ships to the DLGN except for the engineering plant. This greater emphasis on conventionally powered ships will have been an economic necessity, since the cost of nuclear power plants will probably have become economically competitive with fossil-fueled plants only during the late 1970's. Combination steam and diesel or steam and gas turbine plants will probably be used. But the prospect is that only nuclear-powered DLG's will be considered after the 1970's.
The equipment required to make the DLGN'S and DLG's of the future competent to operate with the fast carrier task force will likely give them the electronic capability to serve as Command and Control Communications ships in situations where speed and defensive capability are critical. A third major function of such vessels may be to serve as the cruisers of the future in reconnaissance and raiding missions. These ships will probably sacrifice the fire support capability of their more generalized DLG predecessors, although their long range surface-to-air missiles will have a surface mode which will give them a strategic shore bombardment competence. Nor will DLG's of the future be logical ships to assign to amphibious support or escort of convoy functions. Their size, expense, and paucity will probably confine them to major offensive roles. A fourth major function of these vessel will be to provide, when on station, close to shore, antimissile protection against the nearly vertical trajectories of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.
Below the DLG's in the schematic requirements pyramid will likely be the successor to the present DDG's. These ships may be expected to have only a very limited competence to operate with fast carrier task forces, as Command Communications, and Control vessel, or as cruiser. This attenuation in capability for such roles will probably be a function not only of their reduced size and range but also of the need to economize in order to have greater numbers. Their shorter range surface-to-air missile battery will likely have a limited surface ship and shore bombardment capability. They should be excellent ships for antiair war with a nearly identical ASW capability to DLG types. They will probably be used primarily for AAW and ASW support of amphibious task forces and key convoys and for hunter-killer task forces. Their technological evolution is likely to keep pace with the DLG's, but with less duplication, complexity, and expense of installed equipment.
The simplified mainstream. After the DDG of the future will come the successor to the DD and DDE. The World War II destroyers, despite their temporary rejuvenation through the FRAM program, will have been laid to rest. The post-World War II large destroyers will be passing on. Their successors will almost certainly be built to provide large numbers of escorts for filling out the ASW screens of hunter-killer task forces, amphibious task forces, and fast convoy to round out the support provided to these force by the costlier DDG's. Whereas the future DDG's are likely to provide the ASW support as well as ASW protection, the DDGs of the future will probably be limited to the provision of superior ASW support. Their ASW facilities will compare with those of the larger type—they will probably have drone or piloted helos whichever proves technically least complicated. They may have very rapid fire conventional gun capable of rendering fire support to amphibious landing forces. They should contain simple, uncomplicated, reliable equipment, capable of mass production and of duplication by our le industrialized allies. Their engineering plants may well have the combination steam and die el or steam and gas turbine plants. These ships are likely to be the primary ship for the conduction of wide area barrier patrols in cold war and wartime (quite probably integrated with airborne, ocean bottom, and shore-emplaced detection systems). They will be designed to provide greater endurance in fuel and logistics than the present era destroyers. Space for this extra endurance capability and reduced costs will probably be obtained by research and development of capsulized, light equipment, and by elimination of general purpose functions.
The destroyer escort perhaps will be of greatest significance to cold and limited war operations of the future. This ship will probably be a standardized version throughout the navies of the Atlantic Community. It will contain minimal competence in all weapons systems except for ASW in which it will be superior—using the same equipment as provided to the larger types. It will probably have a top speed of 23 knots and long range capability. It will likely be the workhorse for escort of convoys, but will also have a capability in barrier patrol, short range gunfire support with conventional guns, and escort of the slower amphibious forces. (This sacrifice of speed for economic considerations will probably be justified by the long range detection and kill capability of such ships and by the need of the faster enemy subs to come to the barrier or convoy being guarded.) Again research will emphasize lighter, stronger, less expensive hip materials, simplicity of design and construction, and economy of operation.
The main core of destroyer requirements of the Atlantic Community in support of it common political aims should continue to be the U. S. Navy. However, other navies will undoubtedly provide significant numbers with the percentage of their effort increasing as the degree of complexity of the destroyer type is reduced.
One must note in passing the vital role that the lower spectrum destroyer types are likely to play in peacetime. First, through similarity of design, common logistics and training problems, and possibly some Allied manning, these ships should provide a common focus and interest for the officers and men of Atlantic Community navies. The Allied manning will be feasible if it is determined to be a desirable political objective. We can assume that the dedication and imagination of the young destroyermen of the future on whose smaller ships the initial Allied manning experiments will take place, can solve the problems and perfect the methods. In either event, there will be a contribution by these ships to the common ties which lead to closer associations among their countries. Second, these ships, particularly the small escort types, commanded and manned by young men, capable of entering almost any port of commercial importance throughout the world, should make a significant, albeit intangible, contribution to Sea Community interests by their appearance in ports in times of potential trouble and during periods of tranquility. Trained in the tradition of respecting the dignity of man, friendly in approach, resolute in crisis, the officers and men of these ships will project an image of our Western civilization.
Transitional Problems
No program involving broad long term trends can be achieved by a single act or a single organization. The achievement of the navy of the 1970's and 1980's described herein will be the result of co-ordinated efforts at the seat of government and in the field. I believe that we will most efficiently accomplish this program under the following guidelines.
First, there must be conscious recognition of the need to reorient U. S. destroyer programs as the core system of the Atlantic Community requirements into the two mainstreams of development. There must be constant recognition of the need to maintain a balance between these programs. The exotic upper spectrum destroyers, which make the heart of every true destroyermen skip a beat, are going to have to be ruthlessly controlled in numbers. The simplified lower spectrum types are going to have to be cut to the bone in equipment and design to achieve the large numbers required.
Second, we must strive to intensify the research and development in both mainstreams. We must insure that such research programs are adequately funded . Past experiences with endeavoring to run surface ship programs on a shoestring in order to accelerate more exotic programs have been unfortunate in result. Luckily, the Navy has recognized this problem and recent corrective measures give promise of superior management.
Third, we must go forward in distinct steps rather in an amorphous flow of development. A proliferation of models of the same general type weapons systems adds small increases in capability at the price of greatly increased Navy-wide logistics and technical problems. We destroyermen, as a corporate group, must insist on thorough testing and perfecting of each basic new type, resisting the temptation to recommend modifications unless quantum system improvement is possible. Ideally the ships moving down each of the two mainstreams of development would not change oftener than three years or better still, five years. The author is convinced that with such development more efficient, less expensive ships—and faster progress—would result.
Fourth, to achieve both the emphasis and co-ordination necessary to accomplish these programs, in view of the increasing interrelationship between Bureau of Ships and Bureau of Naval Weapons Programs (as ships increasingly become single integrated fighter systems), there should be more centralized control and direction of these vital surface ship problems. The author believes that the best method for the accomplishment of this co-ordination and centralized control would be the creation of a DCNO (Surface), with greater authority over the details of ship planning and construction than now exists in the office of CNO, who would ride herd on surface programs in the same effective manner that DCNO (Air) has done for many years.
The young destroyerman of today is faced with a future full of the promise for adventure and accomplishment beyond compare. His efforts and his recommendations over the forthcoming years will be reflected in the wonderful ships he will steam. He will witness the finest flowering of the concept of the use of sea power for peaceful purposes. He will participate in exotic places in the application of that exact degree of national power necessary to win political objectives and to control the development of strategic alternatives. He will participate in the knitting together of the states of the Sea Community which will insure the best long term protection of the national interests of these United States. I envy him his opportunity!
Graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in the Class of 1943, in June of 1942, Captain Zumwalt served in three destroyers in the Pacific Theater during World War II. After assignments in all departments, he ended the war as Executive Officer. He was a U. S. Navy candidate for Rhodes Scholar in 1947. Since that time he has served at sea as Navigator of the battleship Wisconsin during the Korean War, and as Commanding Officer of a destroyer escort, a destroyer, and the first of the guided missile destroyer leaders, USS Dewey (DLG-14). Currently he is serving as Director of the Arms Control Directorate in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.