Why is the Navy losing such a high percentage of that small group of really outstanding young officers? Twenty years from note their leadership could make a crucial difference at a time of critical need.
Because of the system of obligated service, there is at least one point in an officer’s career at which he makes a decision to remain in the active service, or resign. It is not the clear-cut decision that the enlisted man makes, since the regular officer is not forced to make a positive legal decision nor does he obligate himself for more time by choosing to remain in the service. At the time of his first opportunity to leave the service, however, four or five years after being commissioned, when he has fulfilled his national military requirement, he realizes that each extra day he remains makes it more difficult to enter a new profession. It is at this time that we logically expect, and have, the largest exodus of officers from the Navy.
Studies of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Naval Academy Alumni Association have probably come the closest to a scientific explanation of why young officers get out. These studies, of course, are limited by the data upon which they are based. For example, letters of resignation (particularly in their final form) do not necessarily reflect the resigning officer’s real feelings. Often, out of friendship for seniors in command upon whom a frank letter might reflect, or, in some cases, because of pressures from above, the officer, in order to make his exit easier, settles for the accepted reasons. In any case, the purpose of this article is not to discuss trends in resignations or the major reasons why large numbers leave. It is written from a deep concern that among those who are choosing to leave are a significant number of a special type of individual representing a real loss to the Navy at a time of critical need.
These are officers who are more than professionally competent. They have imagination and exceptional ability. Twenty years from now their leadership could make a crucial difference. For example, five promising submarine contemporaries that fit the above description have chosen law at Yale, business at Harvard, economics at Duke, mathematics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the electronics industry instead of a naval career. Three of these men are Naval Academy graduates, two are from NROTC colleges. All obligated themselves for an additional year by attendance at submarine school. Why do men of this type decide to leave the Navy?
Two commonly listed reasons are that they seek more pay and a better family life. For many, however, these are only surface reasons. They are dedicated men who were originally willing to make these sacrifices, but who have become unwilling because of other factors in service life. In the final analysis, these factors are: (1) lack of challenge in their immediate duties; (2) inability to identify with the overall purpose of the organization, (3) absence of inspiration from the personal image they see of themselves 20 or 30 years hence, and (4), despite the efforts of public information officers, failure to receive a satisfying degree of community respect for their profession.
“War is 90 per cent boredom” and many would add that peacetime is 99 per cent boredom. Junior officers getting out often complain that watches are boring and that the routine is boring. In many cases it is. It would be naïve to think that standing peacetime bridge watches night after night is not sometimes dull, or that much of the paperwork is not tedious. On the other hand, most professions require their share of grind on the lower levels. Few professions, however, demand the high degree of education, combined with eternal vigilance only occasionally tested, which is required of naval officers. If a department assignment seems equally unchallenging, the problem is compounded. It is not surprising if an officer asks himself, perhaps in the fourth hour of a cold, wet, bridge watch, what he would be doing in a comparable job in industry; whether his abilities would not be better utilized in some other type of work.
With today’s acceptance of the necessity of a deterrent for both limited and total war, there is no question that the Navy fills an extremely important role in our national purpose. The challenge to the military is a grave one as we pass into an era in which the balance of power can be changed almost overnight by technological breakthroughs. In meeting this obligation, we need officers who can think imaginatively and innovate. Yet some officers who have these qualifications do not feel that they are a necessary part of the organization as it strives to meet its challenges.
An officer making a career decision looks at the officers above him for an example of what he will be doing 15, 20 or 30 years hence. A young officer wants to see a senior who is alive, imaginative, fair, responsive to challenge, and happy with his work. He is inspired by those who have purpose and integrity. Sometimes senior officers do not realize the impact of the example they are setting on the objective career decisions of their juniors. Career appraisal and leadership programs are important, but the essential part of officer leadership is to have seniors worthy of emulation.
In the United States the military man does not enjoy great prestige. Prestige is not measured by whether Madison Avenue features a naval aviator or an airline pilot in a cigarette advertisement. It should be the kind of prestige that carries with it the esteem and respect of the community. Although the necessity of the military services has come to be realized, the people who serve in the military often are not accepted. The rejection extends from the natural pacifistic tendencies of our democracy to a more subtle intellectual snobbery—the label of the “military mind.” H. G. Wells stated in An Outline of History, “The professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual qualities would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling.” It is difficult for many to understand why a military career would be appealing, especially since the pay is not high and family life is often difficult. The tendency is to write off those who wish to stay in as security seekers. Few in our materially oriented society think that being of national service is a prime motive for a career. As John Fischer stated in reviewing The Professional Soldier by M. Janowitz, “In wartime, we are respectful to the verge of hero worship; in peacetime, we have been indifferent to the edge of contempt.”
Recognizing that these are factors in the decisions of many of the high quality officers who leave the service, we must consider if it is possible to create an atmosphere in which these factors can be lessened or eliminated.
Captain James Calvert, U. S. Navy, pioneer nuclear submarine captain, has stated that in the coming era, the emphasis will be on intellectual challenge as contrasted with previous emphasis on bravery and physical endurance during his generation. This is an age of rapid change. We must be ready to alter, if necessary, our organizational, tactical, and strategic concepts in order to keep pace. It is a time which demands great efforts. What then can we do to make this challenge an essential part of an officer’s early career?
As far as boredom is concerned, the final Responsibility for being bored rests with the individual. No matter what the job, how long or dull the cruise, an interesting individual leads an interesting life. He creates projects of his own and challenges of his own if necessary. In the same way, by accepting challenges, the atmosphere of a ship or station can be a stimulating rather than a stifling factor.
An officer who had completed several submarine patrols with responsibility for electronic countermeasures concluded that a technical article pulling together the techniques learned in establishing a sound ECM program would be a worthwhile contribution to an information bulletin so that others might benefit from his experience. The article was well received by the executive officer and the captain, but, because of tremendous administrative loads, the article never left the ship. Not only was some helpful technical information sidetracked, but a young officer's initiative was dampened, and inspection and paperwork priorities were allowed to wag the organizational dog.
The shipboard job assignments given to officers should be examined by their captain from the standpoint of what challenge they present. If we are ultraconservative in giving a young officer a position of responsibility, by tile time he begins to face real challenges he may have decided that his talents could be used or developed better elsewhere. The examination of an assignment program should include questions such as these: Does a job require innovation and initiative in its accomplishment, or is it a job in which following a preset pattern is essential (e.g. the handling of registered publications)? If the job is one of the latter types, how long has the officer been assigned to it and into what category do his collateral duties fall? Is an officer encouraged to examine established procedures with an eye to developing more effective methods? How do officers spend their spare time? (The FBM submarines have provided one useful outlet with Harvard extension courses which will be available to crews for college credits. USAFI Is available to all.) Could officer talent be more fully used? The question is not one of making longer working hours. The hours are long and hard. The question is, are these hours used purposefully? Does an officer do a job that a yeoman could do? Could a chief petty officer do some of the jobs officers are doing?
Do officers get a chance to acquire professional skills early? Are discussions held with young officers to seek their opinions? Are these opinions respected? What is the scope of the wardroom conversation?
Is it possible for junior officers to make some mistakes? For example, some captains subjected to criticism because of poor ship landings made by inexperienced officers, have had to resort to making all landings themselves. Is the wardroom a team, or a one-man show? Is there confidence up and down? Are outstanding jobs recognized?
The enlargement of the graduate school program has given tremendous boost to efforts to utilize the talents of young officers. By offering graduate programs early in an officer’s career, many men find themselves at the time of decision choosing between civilian life or a challenging graduate program. The scope of the program emphasizing science, management, and international relations as well as purely military sciences, points out the need for officers in many diverse fields. One of the greatest appeals of being a naval officer has always been that he must be an administrator, engineer, leader, diplomat, lawyer, economist, operations analyzer, etc., all in one. Now the trend seems to be to require particular ability in one area as well as proficiency in the others. It is desirable that this aspect of naval service be brought out early in a man’s career. We must ensure that deserving men do get graduate training. With the newly enlarged graduate program at Monterey, which guarantees many more officers a graduate education and opportunities to achieve advanced degrees, it is hard to believe that a qualified officer would have to leave the Navy because he was not given a chance to further his education. It is also important that officers who volunteer for specialized technical program, such as nuclear or missile training, not be sold short on their chances of obtaining graduate education when they can be spared from the programs.
The task of instilling in young officers a sense of purpose is one of relating their personal roles to the over-all role of the Navy.
The first step in achieving this goal is to disseminate information concerning the Navy’s role at all levels. The Navy Sea Power Series and the Chief of Naval Operations’ Newsletter to all officers are good examples of progress already made in this direction. After educating officers to the Navy’s purpose, the next step is to encourage them to participate in discussions concerning it. In short, we must bridge the gap between junior officers’ everyday jobs and flag rank policy decision in order that young officers will have a larger picture of what the Navy is doing and will feel important in their present and possible future.
A natural method of bridging the gap is the established system of having aides for flag officers. However, relatively few officers serve as aides. Therefore, senior officers need to call together from time to time young officers to discuss problems of mutual concern and those belonging to the general policy-making level—for example, the Navy’s role in space. Then Rear Admiral Burke on a midshipman cruise called together small groups of midshipmen for discussions of foreign affairs and problems of the Navy. We need this type of discussion led by captains and commanders, as well as admirals.
The CNO Newsletter has been useful in helping junior officers to understand the Navy s position on various policy matters. But too often these are briefly read and forgotten as an officer sifts through a heap of ship’s mail. A valuable follow-up would be for captains to call together their wardrooms to discuss these positions; for instance, to consider why the Navy leadership has taken various stands. It is important that Navy groups privately discuss broad policy so that junior officers can better understand and be a part of the Navy position; and, possibly, introduce new ideas.
We should insure that there is a vehicle for the expression of novice opinion. Perhaps a journal should be devoted to the viewpoint of junior officers. Or existing periodicals could serve this purpose more fully. The need is to encourage, accept, and use young opinions in these publications.
Division officers should realize the significance of their daily work in training men. There are far more lasting benefits of good training than the essential and immediate result of a more effective fighting force. For example, when men participate in shipboard activities, learn new skills, and learn to overcome prejudices, they become much stronger citizens of democracy. This is a substantial aid in our struggle with Communism, particularly after these men leave the service.
Respect is something that is not received with date of rank. Respect is something that is earned. There is no particular formula for a man who attracts it—completely diverse personalities can command great respect from the same juniors. Basically though, there are several qualities that seem to be characteristic of a respected man. In the first place, he is a man of integrity, he is a man of courage (with the courage of his convictions and the ability to recognize his shortcomings), he is intelligent, and he is fair. He is a man who knows his job completely, but has other interests apart from his job. He does not compromise himself to accomplish the short term goals, and he is impartial in judgment and in his friendships with officers. A wardroom must be 100 per cent behind the Captain, but some captains make it easier than others. Perhaps the most important image to convey is one of enthusiasm, purpose, and interest in the job. An officer wants to see these qualities in the men who reflect his own position 20 or 30 years in the future. Although many of these qualities are emphasized in leadership books, it is important that good leaders examine frequently and frankly their image.
It is difficult to foresee the day when a military man will live in an atmosphere in which his motives for choosing a military career are not questioned by his civilian counterparts. Although there has always been a great deal of honor attached to bearing arms, the dislike of war and even of those who would prevent it by being strong, is something which we, as military men, must accept. Meanwhile, the idea of a peacetime national responsibility and purpose is becoming more acceptable in American thought. The prestige of serving the government in a political, military, or civil service capacity is increasing as more people sense that their responsibility for the defense of our country is more than paying taxes, and that the consequences of a weak military could be borne by the whole population.
Prestige can be enhanced by an outward and inward effort. The outward effort has been made with great vigor. The people who man naval ships and shore establishments have become useful citizens in their communities. They have served in scouting, PTA, and many other community activities. They have been ready with speeches explaining the military role. Television programs have emphasized the importance and significance of the peacetime military. The Navy's 1959 cruise on the Great Lakes and the Naval Academy’s “Operation Information” (a program in which first classmen are sent home for a series of public speaking engagements and showings of a film on Academy life) improve prestige in an outward direction.
A greater inward effort should be directed at giving men in the Navy a positive pride in what they are doing—a feeling that they protect that for which America stands. They are men who are willing to give up some of the privileges of a democratic society in order to preserve it. It should not be said to those who complain about service life, “If you don’t like it, get out.” Rather, it should be agreed that service in the true sense requires sacrifices but that it offers much in return.
We must meet the problem of outstanding officers leaving the service by a recognition of the factors causing them to leave and a continuing effort to improve conditions which magnify those factors. We cannot afford to ignore the problem. The highest form of loyalty to an organization comes from offering suggestions for its improvement rather than dismissing it simply as a part of the system which we cannot fight. We are that system.
Lieutenant (junior grade) Howe was graduated from the Naval Academy with the class of 1957. After serving in USS Bremerton (CA130) for a year he attended the Submarine School at New London, Conn., and was then assigned to USS Tench (SS417). He is currently assigned to the U. S. Naval Nuclear Power Training Unit, West Milton Site, Schenectady, N. Y., as a staff instructor. This is Lt (jg) Howe’s second Proceedings article. His first, “The Potential of Pulhes” appeared in the November 1959 issue.