Although colonialism had been a political reality for more than a century, it was not until the decade between 1880-1890 that the continent of Africa was finally divided up completely among the great powers of Europe. Despite the cruelty of slavery, the oppression of the people, the exploitation of the resources, Western Imperialism did bring some benefits in the form of health, a certain amount of education and training of the Africans and some cultural aspects of European civilizations. Over the years the Africans absorbed some of the basic concepts of Western thought and some of the modern methods of doing things—factors which have by and large helped them to overcome the primitive ways of their ancestors.
Today, we see the crumbling of the colonial empires. First, two world wars taught Africa that the way to get rid of undesirable masters was to see them defeated in war. In World War I, Germany lost her colonies; in World War II, Italy lost hers. Second, there has been a national awakening among the African people and a strong pressure of world opinion on the colonial European states.
This latter factor has made itself evident in the United Nations, by the views of the neutral nations, by the propaganda of the Communists and by the constant diplomatic pressure of the United States whose heritage demands the people’s right for self-determination. At the end of 1961, 26 independent African countries have raised their voices in the United Nations and have demanded their place in the world’s family of nations.
Yet Africa cannot be regarded as an entity. Arbitrary boundaries carved in the last century create artificial nation states which ethnologically and culturally were never meant to be separated. The states that were formerly the colonies of the British differ greatly from those states formerly under French or Belgian rule. South Africa with her policies of white supremacy, separate development (Apartheid) and greater industrial development differs markedly from the other countries of the North. The ratio of European settlers to the natives differs and as a result, different value systems have been adopted. Countries such as Kenya with large European populations differ from countries such as Ghana or Nigeria where indigenous populations are the rule.
The impact of Western culture has had a disintegrating effect on tribal life. Subsistence farming with crude primitive implements has not been able to compete against the mechanized farms of the European settlers. Wage dominated economies have attracted migrant workers away from their tribal grounds. The European concept of private ownership of land based on individual initiative, risk and accomplishment has run counter to the African concept of tribal or group possession. These have caused the greatest tensions and will continue to do so.
Out of all this we have various political systems established which must function in a state of equilibrium within limits imposed by the social and economic systems inherited and the structural and institutional machinery adopted. The long term trends of development within the social and economic systems may well be incompatible with the political objectives of the government. In these cases, a system change is inevitable and political action within the current structure will be doomed to failure.
Originally, France’s interest in Africa was strategic. It was a desire to occupy a belt of territory across Africa which would give France a dominant position on both coasts to cut Britain’s commercial trade routes to India. A conscious policy of expansionism and imperialism was deliberately undertaken. Unlike the British, whose colonial endeavors usually followed individual explorers and trading groups, the French actually planned and organized expeditions in Paris for foreign policy aims. This philosophy of centralized control stemming from the traditions of Rome and the Civil Law carried on through colonial development until the colonies became free.
Since the middle of the 19th century, France has sought to square her colonizing efforts with the aim of bringing French culture to the natives—“of making artificial Frenchmen.”
Throughout, the aim was to incorporate or assimilate the native Africans into the French culture, at least to the point of giving them the French language. In actual practice, the development program was little more than a thinly rationalized exploitation of the area. The benefits to the indigenous people were more theoretical than real. A “pacification” program was maintained by a semi-military rule which had its central control back in Paris.
France’s experience during World War II of being “pacified” by the Germans created a reaction for reform. Where before, France had a colonial policy that was authoritarian, centralizing and assimilating, the policy became “democratic and federalist, while still remaining assimilationist.” A premium was placed on the minority of the natives who accepted French culture, who became the evolves, who became the political elite. These were allowed to participate in the central political organs of France.
After World War II, it became the conscious policy of the French government to be liberal, to grant local self-government, and to establish political parties which would look with favor upon continued association with France. As Premier Guy Mollet pointed out on 22 February 1957, France intended to satisfy native political aspirations before nationalism developed that was hostile to France. The greatest political reform came with the Loi cadre of 23 June 1956. This was placed in effect during the next year by a series of decrees which gave legislative powers to the local territorial assemblies while reserving certain specified powers to the central government of France.
In pursuing a policy of assimilation, France actually imbued the native Africans with the revolutionary and supranational credo of liberté, egalité, fraternité. Thus, in French Africa the emphasis was on individual freedom and well-being. Nationalist group action failed to have the same influence as it did in other parts of the continent.
Considering these conscious liberal efforts on the part of France after 1944, it was no surprise to French governmental circles that most of the colonies, territories, and trusts of France decided to remain within the French union when de Gaulle gave them the choice on 28 September 1958. Only Guinea decided to leave and this decision to depart from the French community can be traced to the influence of one leader, Sékou Touré.
Despite this one “defection,” the rest of the African states voted for interdependence and participation in the French Community. There are several reasons for this. First, the major political parties in French West and Equatorial Africa were on the whole pro- French in outlook. The one party R. D. A. (Rassemblement Democratique Africain), under the leadership of that remarkable man of the Ivory Coast, Felix Houphouet-Boigny controlled most of the seats in six of the eight French territories in the March 1957 elections. Houphouet-Boigny had been a member of the French cabinet and was a great defender of French culture. The second reason for such widespread support for France was attributed to the economic assistance to the territories that came from France through the “Central Fund for France Overseas” and the “Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development” (FIDES). A third reason, was the popularity of de Gaulle, who, when he made a tour of all French territories in 1958, offered complete independence but pointed out the advantages of remaining affiliated with the Union Franfaise.
It was somewhat astounding then to some people who mistakenly visualized “French Colonial Policy” in terms of guerrilla warfare, economic exploitation, brutality to the natives, and infiltration by the Communists, that all save Guinea elected to stay with France. This certainly speaks well of the wisdom of French colonial policy in the last 15 years.
One of the greatest problems inherited from the colonizing countries of Europe, is the problem of territorial boundaries. These boundaries, arbitrarily carved by treaties between European nations have cut across tribal and ethnic groups and have created cultural and power friction among the independent states of Africa today. Nowhere is this more true than in the states formerly under French colonial control. A particularly striking example is found in Togo and in the Cameroon. Both were part of German colonies which were divided between France and Britain after World War I.
Both Togo and Ghana are the homes of ethnical tribal groups such as the northern tribes of Kotokoli, Bassari, Moba, Konkomba and Chokossi. In the south, the Ewe people along the coast are also divided between Ghana and Togo. These divided ethnic groups are forced to learn different European languages, to accept different European laws and political institutions.
In the Cameroon the ethnic division is not as important as the religious differences stemming from protestant and catholic missionary efforts of the past. The pro-French Cameroon Democrats (G. D. C.) receive support from the Roman Catholic Church while the opposition party, National Action (A. N.) looks for independence and is supported by Protestant elements of the Douala, Bassa and Bulu.
These ethnic divisions account in large measure for the desire of African leaders to seek adjustment of boundaries through Pan-Africanism, regional federations and custom unions. There are already several such groupings among the states who were formerly under French domination.
Sékou Touré of Guinea has joined with Nkrumah of Ghana and later with Mali to form the nucleus of a loose confederation of the “Union of Independent States of Africa.” Senegal and Soudan have failed in their attempt to establish the Mali Federation. Under Houphouet-Boigny, the Conseil de l’Entente or the Sehel-Benim Union was formed as a loose anti-federalist union of such states as the Ivory Coast, Volta, Dahomey, and Niger. The Congo Republic, the Central African Republic and the Chad have joined in a loose federation of customs union known as the Central African Union.
Despite these efforts, sentiment to unite split ethnic groups and to seek some sort of Pan-African union is still weak. The popular will of the people for such integration has not been articulated by their leaders to the point that Pan-Africanism has become a driving force. There are too many jealousies and selfish interests among the various leaders. There is too much disparity in wealth and resources, too few lines of communications, too little education to make this potentially unifying force effective.
Take the example of the four countries which were formerly the territories of French Equatorial Africa. Gabon, the smallest of the four, the least populous and potentially the wealthiest, can see no advantage in union with her less fortunate neighbors. Under the conservative leadership of Premier Leon M’Ba, Gabon is now devoting her energies to the exploitation of iron and manganese deposits and to the further development of her lumber, gold, cocoa, and petroleum exports. The other three states, the Congo Republic, the Central African Republic and the Republic of Chad had indeed agreed to form a Central African Union. But this union was to be little more than a customs union since the three countries have insisted on separate sovereignty in the United Nations and in their dealings with France.
The most dynamic proponent of union was Bartholemy Boganda, who, had he lived, might have been able to give strength and meaning to his plan for a so-called “United States of Latin Africa.” Unfortunately, his death in an aircraft accident in March 1959 left the Central African Union without strong leadership at a time when an effective union might have been established.
Since then, however, progress has been made. Together with the Council of the Entente, these three states have finally united with Gabon, Malagsy Republic, Mauritania, Senegal, and Cameroon to form the African- Malagache Organization for Economic Cooperation (OAMCE). This economic system was established under the aegis of France and the six-nation common market. The benefits of lower interest rates, the fact that the African markets are complementary rather than competitive towards the European markets are all favorable indices for the success of this venture.
There are other barriers to political stability and federation among these equatorial states. In the Chad there exists a sharp cleavage between the “Arabized” Moslem of the north and the “Christian” animists of the south. None of the three member nations have a favorable balance of trade and all must rely on heavy subsidies from France for their product. Jealousies among the recipients of this French aid tend to aggravate the relationship within the union.
In the case of the now defunct Mali Federation, the quarrel between Senegal and Soudan was based on more ideological grounds. There are sound reasons to unite Senegal and its magnificent port at Dakar, a good transportation system and several established industries with landlocked Soudan whose economy is based on peasant agriculture, cotton, hides, and cattle.
Economically, the two states are complementary. But Premier Keita of Soudan favors a more Marxist approach and a more unitary state. The break came when Keita attempted to establish in the high offices of the Federation personnel sympathetic to his radical philosophy. This was unacceptable to the French-oriented Senegalese elite who decided in August 1960 to withdraw and go it alone. Soudan denied Senegal’s right to secede and threatened to pull out of the French Union if Paris recognized Senegal as an independent state.
Naturally, Sékou Touré of Guinea has assiduously cultivated this split and in December 1960 finally persuaded Soudan, under the new name of Mali, to join Ghana and Guinea in the “Union of African States.”
Since the French African territories were first granted local autonomy, different political schools of thought arose as to what political form independence would take. These schools gravitated around the two culture centers of Dakar in Senegal and Abidjan in the Ivory Coast. Advocates of independent Pan-African federations of the Dakar school attempted to establish the Mali Federation, to include not only Senegal and Soudan, but also Dahomey and the Voltaic Republic. It was due to the efforts of Houphouet-Boigny as the leader of the Abidjan school that Dahomey and Volta were persuaded not to join, but rather to seek status as independent separatist states closely tied to France.
As a counter-force to the federalist attempts of Mali and the moves by Guinea for even more complete divorce from France and the west, Houphouet-Boigny organized the loose anti-federalist Conseil de L’Entente to satisfy the community and pan-African aspirations of his neighbor states of Volta, Dahomey, and Niger. Actually, Houphouet-Boigny convictions about the need to remain closely tied to the French Union are strong and he feels that the time is not ripe for complete independence. He has opposed any move to weaken the ties which bind the Ivory Coast and the other members of the Conseil de l’Entente with Paris.
No account of the political aspirations of the former French territories would be complete without discussing the All African Peoples Conference held in December 1958 at Accra. This was the first major confrontation of Africans with diverse colonial backgrounds.
The conference was dominated by Dr. Nkrumah and the English speaking states. Besides Guinea and Senegal, the only French speaking representation came from the minority opposition parties. Houphouet-Boigny declared that the conference was destined only to produce idle talk and demands for independence. Despite the effective boycott by French oriented governmental parties, the conference had a tremendous impact in solidifying the political sentiments of the youth groups and other dissident parties.
The Accra conference saw four stages to the African solution. First, was the attainment of freedom and independence. Second, the consolidation of this independence. Third, the creation of unity and community between the free African states. Fourth and finally, there was the economic and social reconstruction of Africa.
While it can be fairly stated that these goals represent the consensus of the African elite, there are still monumental difficulties that stand in the way of achievement. The most fundamental obstacle is the transference of colonial governmental institutions to people who in fact have been subjected to their discriminatory legal apparati. This transference would be difficult at best and may even call for complete dismantling and reconstruction of the government machinery to enable these institutions to be responsive to the nationalist aspirations of the people.
Another difficulty is that large segments of the population remain outside of the political movements and still adhere to basic tribal beliefs. These people are concerned only with local issues and take part in broader political movements in a degree proportionate to their contact with prior colonial authority and their exposure to racialism. This is more true of the less developed inland countries where transportation and means of communications are still undeveloped.
In this connection, it might be pointed out that the ruling elite, particularly in the former British colonies, are having difficulties breaking down tribal traditions and values which often run counter to nationalist aspirations and the machinery and methods necessary to establish a viable state. In the former French territories, this issue, while it exists, is not as severe, due to the “pacification” carried out by the French at the turn of the century when tribal institutions were deliberately destroyed in an effort to assimilate the natives into the French culture. It is a paradox that the British, who attempted to preserve the tribal structure, have in effect left a legacy of problems to the leaders of the now independent states formerly under their control.
Despite the efforts of France to transplant the concept of democracy to her territories, there seems to be a tendency for the development of single party states and authoritarian regimes. This is only natural, since the party which first leads the people in its patriotic struggle for independence has a cause which unites all elements. This does not mean that the concept of freedom of the individual is lost. The concept of individual freedom is grounded in centuries of family and tribal life. It means, though, that any development of an opposition party must take the form of opposition to the nationalist movement or more likely it will be a struggle to see which party will lead under the independence banner.
French attempts to foster political development have by and large been aimed at maintaining the status quo. Such autonomy granted may be able to resolve internal political problems and dissensions, but the system is not geared to the solution of the major problems caused by challenges from without. Thus, federation and even membership in the French Union impose challenges hard to reconcile with the status of independence in the family of nations. The very nationalist movement opposes these international concepts and as power gravitates to the governing party, either the political system will be changed or the Western World will be repulsed.
The trouble has been and is the fact that the Westerners have never really communicated with the Africans. With a sense of superiority and detachment, the Westerners have tried to make over the Africans in their own image. Lacking a sense of history of their own, the Africans have nothing but the tribal traditions to fall back on, traditions which the educated elite see as inferior to Western ways. The African is thus faced with the dilemma of accepting Western ideas and at the same time of rejecting Western influence. The need for discovering an African “identity” runs uppermost in the thinking of the leaders of these independent states.
There is serious doubt that the states that have emerged from Afrique Occidental Française and Afrique Equatoriale Française can maintain their viability. There are external factors such as the “cold war” recently transplanted to the African scene; there are the mechanizations of certain French governmental and industrial administrators who in their attempts to maintain a favored position still drag their feet and obstruct nationalist development, there is the necessity to continue French subsidization until some more equitable system of sharing the resources can be established; and there is even the necessity to depend on French military power in some states to maintain internal stability.
All these factors challenge the inherited governmental institutions which have never been designed to be self-sufficient in maintaining autonomous regimes. Internally, there exists the conflict between the Western imported brand of nationalism and the primitive brand of nationalism which has its roots in centuries of tribal tradition. Internally, there is the ethnic and linguistic fracturization which tends to submerge national aspirations and to retard a rapid development of a nationalist fervor. This, in turn, forces the elite to exploit racialism as the one common sentiment for uniting the various elements of the nations. On the international scene, the radical change in the make-up of the United Nations, in giving a majority to the large group of Afro-Asia states, threatens to upset the entire working organization. There is little question that the African states will seize their new-found power on the international scene and exploit it to their own interests regardless of the effect of the world scene. By these actions, there appears to be little hope of further insulating the African continent from the Gold War.
The political equilibrium of these states is already unstable and with such strong forces acting, it appears that we shall see several changes in the political systems. As was pointed out before, the nature of the single party development, lacking a tradition of parliamentary democracy, will have a tendency to become more authoritarian.
In all the rapidly shifting currents of African politics, there emerge two strong characteristics that would seem to offer hope and would tend to prevent complete disintegration. One is the practical economic good sense of the leaders. They fully realize that they have to consort with the West to obtain the material benefits of the West. Nowhere is this more true than in the French Union. The second is a passion for education. Education to the Africans is more a distinguishing difference than even the color of the skin. As far as racialism is concerned, the Africans seem to be able to behave with better grace than the Europeans—or the Americans. In these two categories, the West can do much to assist the African states to form stable governments in which democracy may in time evolve. The West can do this provided they do so with understanding, which unfortunately appears at present to be lacking. For the truth is, the international orientation of these African states depends more on outside influence than on the states themselves. It is not what they have as their intentions that count; it is what they are driven to do through ignorance, poverty, and fear.
