The lessons of history are plain. The nation, powerful or puny, which sows a water-home crop of deadly mines, will reap psychological and strategic benefits all out of proportion to the time and money invested.
Mining and mine countermeasures constitute mine warfare. The Fleet Mine Forces—Atlantic and Pacific—are basically mine countermeasures organizations, comprised of divisions and squadrons of various sized minesweepers with supporting ships. Since U. S. naval offensive mining is accomplished today chiefly by aircraft and submarines, surface ship mine laying capability is maintained principally in the Reserve Fleet. Many types of ships, however, can be rapidly fitted to lay mines.
The maintenance and strategic positioning of mine stockpiles is an ordnance and logistics function. Inert loaded drill mines are utilized as training devices by mine laying vehicles and mine countermeasure forces. These devices, when properly used, give the maximum possible mine warfare realism to training and exercises. The difficulty of creating realism naturally results in some de-emphasis in mine warfare training in peacetime. This leads to a tendency by those not directly associated with mine warfare to forget the very great need for awareness of the dangers and problems of mine warfare. The old adage "out of sight—out of mind" has therefore been reflected to some degree in peacetime mine warfare training outside of the mine forces. For example, how many of today's commanding officers give serious consideration to mine field swept channel exercises? How many know the heart-in-the-throat anxiety of piloting a ship through mine suspect waters? How many exercise operation orders adequately deal with the mine threat? How many PHIBLEX operation order minesweeper listings are "constructive"?
Mine warfare is a difficult subject to discuss without the use of a classified label. An unclassified presentation must necessarily use the open book of history in an attempt to engender imaginative thoughts of the possibilities and applications of mine warfare in future wars.
Mines are relatively inexpensive weapons. They attack where they do the most good—the weak underside of the ship or the pressure hull of the submarine. They lie in wait for the transgressor; they are dormant sentinels for long periods. Under certain conditions they meet submarines on the submarine's own stealthy terms. If used properly, they can cause great losses through expenditures of men and ships. Even though never exploded, they have both strategic and tactical importance.
The mine has always been a favorite weapon of the weaker or non-naval nation in conflict with a major naval power. What better method has been devised for a weaker or relatively under-developed nation to effectively throw a rock at Goliath than to plant quantities of simple sea mines in critical areas?
A brief log of some of the highlights of the evolution of the sea mine into a modern weapon reads as follows:
1585—During the Siege of Antwerp, the Dutch effectively used several small boats containing gunpowder which was exploded by clock mechanism against the Spaniards.
1628—Charles I of England ordered the use of "divers watermines, waterpetards and boats to go underwater" during an expedition led by the Duke of Buckingham to relieve La Rochelle.
1658—The Marquess of Worcester invented a "ship destroying engine" utilizing the Dutch clockwork and a diver. Since SCUBA equipment wasn't available and hazardous duty pay for divers was yet to come, the invention was definitely not popular.
Revolutionary War—During the Revolution, David Bushnell used his submarine to carry a 150-pound explosive charge to be clandestinely attached to the underwater body of the target. He later (1777 A.D.) devised a "trigger mine" which was essentially a contact free-floating mine. Neither of these developments were outstanding successes, but they did represent progress. Several of Bushnell's floating mines, or kegs, were constructed at Bordentown on the Delaware River. On 7 January 1778, they were released with the intention that they would float down the river and destroy British shipping anchored at Philadelphia. These mines resulted in little damage, much consternation (to be known in history as "The Battle of the Kegs"), and a delightful poem by Francis Hopkinson, Esq., father of the author of "Hail, Columbia," partially quoted below:
"Those kegs I'm told the rebels hold
Packed up like pickled herring;
And they've come down to attack the town
In this new way of ferrying.
The soldiers flew, the sailors too,
And, scared almost to death, sir,
Wore out their shoes, and spread the news,
And ran till out of breath, sir.
'Arise, arise!' Sir Erskine cries,
'The rebels, more's the pity,
Without a boat, are all afloat,
And ranged before the city.
The royal band now ready stand,
All ranged in dread array, sir,
With stomach stout to see it out,
And make a bloody day, sir.
Such feats did they perform that day,
Among those wicked kegs, sir,
That years to come, when they get home,
They'll make their boast and brag, sir."
1797—About this time, Robert Fulton invented a mine and also the submarine Nautilus as a mining vehicle. This weapon system was viewed by the French and British during the French Revolution, but both apparently found the idea distasteful. Chivalry was still in style in some parts of the world.
1843—Samuel Colt blew up a ship five miles away from his remote control position, using electric current through underwater cables.
1848—The Germans used a form of controlled mine against the Danes at Kiel during the Schleswig-Holstein War.
Crimean War—During the Crimean War, Russia used defensive contact mines at Sevastopol, Sveaborg, and Kronstadt. The fuses were constructed of acid-filled glass tubes over potassium chlorate and sugar. The inventor was Alfred Bernhard Nobel, the father of Alfred Nobel.
U. S. Civil War—Mine development resulted in the sinking of 20 ships. Also, a famous, oft-misquoted statement by Admiral David Farragut at Mobile Bay ... "Damn the torpedoes! Captain Drayton, go ahead. Mr. Jowett, full speed." Incidentally, in this item we have a record of one of the earlier effective ingenuities which mine-oriented forces are always capable of producing. Many of the 80 Confederate mines that Farragut damned that day (one of which sank the monitor Tecumseh) were made of beer kegs.
By this time the mine was well established as a weapon. Much work was done by many countries in the late 1880's to improve fuses and detonator horns, anchors and hydrostatic mooring devices, mine laying methods and defensive control systems.
April, 1904—The Japanese used a combination of mines and tactics to sink the Russian 11,000-ton flagship Petropavlovsk and damage the 13,000-ton Pobieda. Russia got her return licks in by close observation and subsequent mining of the Japanese patrol area. Score: two Japanese battleships and three cruisers. The total Russo-Japanese war loss of naval ships due to mines was 16. One fly in the ointment was the loss of 21 Japanese merchant ships in her own minefields. This loss of friendlies is, incidentally, a point of issue of the other side of the argument whenever the subject of "mine philosophy" is fully debated.
World War I—England planted approximately 128,000 mines, which sank 150 Axis warships and auxiliaries, 35 U-boats, and proportionately large merchant ship tonnage. The 43,000 German mines sank 265 assorted warships and auxiliaries. Allied merchant tonnage losses totaled about 1,000,000 tons.
Although the United States had been the world's early leading pioneer in mine warfare, her position in mining just prior to World War I was very similar to that which she held at the conclusion of the Civil War. She was, in other words, unprepared to conduct mine warfare.
World War II—The Axis countries planted over 225,000 mines and reaped a total of 1,117 ships, including several U. S. submarines. The Axis, in turn, suffered 1,588 casualties to 260,000 British-laid mines.
The U. S. Air Force carried out a mining campaign—conceived by the Navy and designated OPERATION STARVATION—against Japan. With about 12,135 aerial laid mines (by B-29's), the entire internal commerce of Japan was effectively disrupted.
The best estimate of World War II Japanese naval and merchant ship casualties due to Allied mines comes from the Naval Analysis Division of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey and the Mine Warfare Section of CNO in 1946, as follows:
No. of Ships Tonnage
Sunk 515 689,136
Damaged 560 1,600,280
1,075 2,289,416
The above figures include 32 combatant ships sunk and 78 damaged. Merchant ship losses represented nearly one quarter of the prewar strength of the Japanese merchant marine. Roughly one half of these losses occurred in one 5-month period. This score compares favorably with that (4,779,902 tons) obtained by the U. S. Submarine Forces over a period of three and a half years.
Post-World War II—During this period through 1947, an additional 251 ships were hit by drifters or unswept mines with 172 sinkings. There are still hundreds of square miles of the oceans remaining unswept. In fact, Japan's Defense Agency has recently announced a 3-year minesweeping operation to clear at least 80 per cent of the danger areas. A fleet of 35 minesweepers will be used during the clearing operation.
The River War in Indochina—In the early 1950's in Indochina, the French lost numerous river and patrol craft to the controlled river mines of the Communist guerrilla forces. Mines were undoubtedly the most dangerous weapon encountered by the French Navy in this river campaign.
Korean War, 1950-53—At Wonsan, junks and sampans were used as minelayers. Russian- taught North Korean fishermen laid 3,000 moored mines which prevented 50,000 troops in 250 ships from landing for eight days. After this incident, Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman was quoted as saying, "We're plenty submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we're going to start getting mine-conscious—beginning last week."
Prior to the initial use of a magnetic influence mine by the British in 1917, naval mines had been of the contact or controlled variety. Germany turned the magnetic mine into a significant menace in September of 1939 by aerial mining of British ports and estuaries. Then followed the development of many variations and combinations of mines, both moored and bottom (or ground) using magnetic, acoustic and pressure sensing and firing mechanisms. As in all forms of warfare, the countermeasures systems have generally kept pace with mine development. In the past, any nation which has been a mining nation has generally kept pace with mine development. In the past, any nation which has been a mining nation has generally been a weak naval power, or at least exhibited a weakness in some form or another in her naval make-up. In almost every instance of either defensive or offensive mining, the objective has been to mine an area to prevent its penetration or transit by the enemy. The need of the mining nation to traverse the area which it has mined has ranged from inconsequential to, at best, secondary to preventing enemy penetration.
Mining has sometimes been a necessary admission of weakness. As a major form of warfare, it has sometimes been unpalatable to the proud. It is also unglamorous and requires hard work and solid seamanship. The United States has been competent in the art, but has not been a great mining nation; Russia, historically, has been.
During both World Wars, Great Britain, a strong naval power, was forced, mainly by the German submarine threat, to mine her own back yard—the North Sea. In other words, a strong, new, or numerically superior weapon effectively used by a weaker naval power had to be in part countered by mining campaigns. With the shortening of relative distances due to missilry, coupled with the Sino-Soviet submarine threat, is the United States not now in the same geographical situation that Britain found herself in during both World Wars? Is the U. S. mine warfare philosophy being expanded to consider the fine ASW qualities of the mine against newer, deeper, and faster submarines? Present technology plus aggressive mining theory can furnish formidable weapons for the arsenal of the Free World throughout the 1960's and 70's.
Fortunately, U. S. naval mine warfare and mine countermeasures technicians and operators have always been dedicated people. Their ships have become some of the most expensive—measured in dollars per ton—of all men-of-warsmen in the U. S. Navy. The technical knowledge and skill required to extract effectively the full mine countermeasures potential from these mine countermeasures ships is as extensive as that necessary to fly high performance aircraft or maintain and fire missile systems. This knowledge and skill is not easily acquired.
In years past, U. S. naval officers have at times viewed mine warfare as an experience to be avoided in their search for that illusive plan, the ideal career pattern; particularly in peacetime. Such is no longer true. The wise young officer is learning that the Mine Forces present one of the best opportunities to obtain valuable experience in seamanship, administration, and command early in his career. Competition is growing among young officers to avail themselves of this early command opportunity while still a lieutenant (j.g.), lieutenant or a junior lieutenant commander. During one period recently, six Flag lieutenants in the Washington area were attempting to obtain command of minesweepers, apparently on the advice of their respective admirals.
Many officers and enlisted personnel know that mine warfare is a rewarding, demanding, interesting, and necessary component of a modern military force. They also know its potential, and they hope others will recognize the past lessons, the present facts, and logical future of mine warfare. They know that the sea mine lends itself to further modernization, limited only by the ingenuity and imagination of the dedicated individuals always associated with the development and improvement of any weapons system. Mine countermeasures should never be neglected in preference to the more glamorous aspects of sea warfare.
Furthermore, the sea mine remains one of the few conventional weapons which has not been degraded by nuclear devices.
A graduate of Pennsylvania State University, Captain Hoblitzell served aboard USS Stansbury from 1941-1944 and was Chief Engineer aboard USS Abele when she was sunk north of Okinawa by the first Baka Bomb to hit a U.S. ship. During the Korean War, he was on the staff of Commander Escort Destroyer Squadron 1, and later became executive officer of USS Sproston. He graduated from the U. S. Naval Post Graduate School in 1954 and his subsequent assignments included separate tours with Fleet Weather Central in Port Lyautey, Morocco, and Miami, Florida. From 1958-1959, he was executive officer of USS Talladega APA-208 and, from 1959-1960, he commanded USS Trathen APA-530. He is presently Plans Officer, Staff, Commander Mine Force Pacific Fleet.