When Winston Churchill pressed for an attack on “the soft underbelly of Europe” in World War II, he coined one more vivid phrase to describe a complex situation. He referred, of course, to NATO’s Southern Exposure—the sprawling section of the Mediterranean world that looks for its defense today to Allied Forces Southern Europe.
Four territorial commands come under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe—Allied Forces Northern Europe, Central Europe, Mediterranean, and Southern Europe. Two are principally land-air, one principally naval —Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSouth) is the only command of the four to include large elements of land, sea, and air power in a broadly-balanced form.
The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, Admiral James S. Russell, U. S. Navy, must direct his attention over a wide arc of NATO’s south flank; stretching from the Resia Pass in Northern Italy, winding over the Alps to Italy’s eastern corner, then jumping to Greece, and following the borders of Greece and Turkey to include the ancient Biblical peak of Mount Ararat, whose 16,000-foot summit is a landmark of Turkey’s eastern boundary. This is AFSouth—the lands of Italy, Greece, and Turkey and the airspace over them; connected by the ancient sea that has served as a highway for peaceful trade and armed war since the days of the Pharaohs.
With the eye of an AFSouth planner, consider the varied kinds of terrain and the nature of the frontiers in the southern region. From west to east; first comes France, a NATO member, then three neutrals in a row —Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia, each with different characteristics. Next, one of the unique features of this region, Communist Albania, a thoroughly-committed satellite, now flirting with Red China; then Bulgaria, another member of the Soviet fold. At the far eastern end of the long sector, the rugged mountains of eastern Turkey join the Soviet frontier for 280 miles—the only member of NATO besides Norway to face the Russian homeland directly.
Fundamentally, we see here three peninsulas joined—or separated—by a water highway. The Ionian Sea separates Italy and Greece; the fabled Aegean, with its colorful islands dotting Homer’s “wine-dark sea,” divides most of Greece from Turkey, with European Turkey sharing a frontier with Greece in Thrace. To the naval eye, these water areas furnish approaches and maneuver room; to the land power expert, they are barriers restricting the free use of his forces. And, to the airman, the sea presents still another challenge in his flight calculations. The whole AFSouth area stretches 2,000 miles from northwest Italy to southeast Turkey; and the coastline twists and winds its way over more than 6,000 miles of shore.
Across the frontiers of these nations, within the Soviet bloc, lies the raison d’être of NATO -—The Threat. A projected measure of ambition, as it might be outlined by Kremlin planners and directed against our southern defense, could look like this: first, eliminate the Allied nuclear delivery capability; second, drive for the Dardanelles so the Black Sea Fleet can move into the Mediterranean unchecked, thus continuing the old Imperial pressure of the Czars; and last, occupy key areas, with the entire Southern Region as an ultimate goal.
To carry out these objectives, the Soviets could bring varying parts of their total strength to bear. Of some 150 or so ground divisions, perhaps 40 or 50 might be thrown against the southern region. (This could include a number of about 60 armored and mechanized divisions known to make up the total. And it is well to keep in mind that the peninsula of Thrace leading to the Dardanelles is good “tank country.”) Further, several thousand aircraft are in positions where they could be directed against the southern area—bombers, fighters, reconnaissance and transport. At sea, the Black Sea Fleet is estimated to include one-fourth of Russia’s total naval power, divided among cruisers, destroyers, escort vessels, and submarines. This fleet could pour into the Mediterranean if the Turkish straits were breached.
Against this grim capability—with the added satellite forces to think about—the 84 million citizens of Italy, Greece, and Turkey are now associated in a common alliance. For the first time in their histories, these three nations have joined in a common defense. Yet, within the memory of many now alive, all three of these countries have been at war with each other. But traditional enmity has been shoved aside in the face of up-to-date issues. Today these nations stand united in their determination to resist a common enemy.
To appreciate the spirit of co-operation now so evident, observe a practical demonstration—annual NATO exercises for sharpening up the battle posture of all commands. In September of 1961, Checkmate was the large-scale NATO-wide exercise. It involved NATO forces from the tip of Norway through Central Europe and around to the eastern edge of Turkey, all working in a co-ordinated effort to practice their plans under the direction of General Lyman Lemnitzer’s staff at SHAPE.
After the three-day exercise, the southern area put on its own Checkmate II—a maneuver involving Allied Forces Southern Europe and directed toward special practice for this region. Thus, you would have seen, deep in the command tunnels of the AFSouth headquarters at Naples, sprawling maps of the southern region dotted with markers representing troops, ships, and aircraft. Messages and directives flowed in and out of the bustling Operations Center, as officers, other ranks and civilians of six nations carried out their duties. Far to the north, wiry Alpini skied to their prepared positions above the snow line; in the Grecian passes, tough Evzones set up their mortars and reported, “Etimos—Ready.” A Turkish destroyer captain in the Black Sea picked up a sonar ping unaccounted for on his station list. Sleepy pilots wound through the passageways of Navy carriers to their early-morning briefings, followed by pre-dawn take-offs on their planned missions.
The flight of a U. S. Army Airborne Battle Group from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, followed by an assault parachute jump into Turkish Thrace, added a new feature to the September 1961 schedules. At the same time, the sandy beaches of Saros Bay, to the southeast, swarmed with troops making an amphibious landing under the protective cover of StrikForSouth, the U. S. Sixth Fleet in its NATO role. The first phase of Checkmate
assumed a surprise attack with nuclear weapons against all NATO. After receiving the blow, Checkmate II played the counterattack of the allies in Thrace. As the maneuver unfolded, Greek, Turkish, and U. S. forces “fought” together in the defense of the Dardanelles. At dawn on 16 September, Rear Admiral James C. Dempsey, U. S. Navy, Commander, Amphibious Task Force, supervised the establishment of the beachhead. StrikForSouth secured the beach and the assault craft swarmed onto the sand, unloading Marines, Seabees, and tons of fighting equipment.
Quickly, Dempsey’s men set up a causeway to unload troops and equipment from landing ships of the Turkish and Greek navies. The combined forces swept ashore and by noon, three major counteroffensives pounded the Aggressor army. The Turkish First Army, Greek forces, and Marines made a co-ordinated assault to link up with the paratroops of Brigadier General Joe Lawrie’s 1st Airborne Battle Group, 327th Infantry, who had seized the airhead inland.
The importance of the sea as a highway was evident to all observers at this exercise. The hundreds of tons of supplies lifted by landing craft attested to the fact that overland supply alone would never have met the logistical requirements of this force. Control of the sea is a vital ingredient in Mediterranean strategy. In fact, without control of sea and airspace, the links joining the three nations in the southern region would be tenuous indeed.
Protection of the territorial integrity of Italy, Greece, and Turkey is a CinCSouth mission; while CinCAFMed, Commander-in- Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, is responsible for sea lanes and communications in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, conduct of naval and maritime air operations, and the support of adjacent commands. Under this arrangement of responsibility, the CinCSouth concentrates on the defense of the land areas and his own attack plans. His mobile naval element can be used directly under his own command to support his mission while the Mediterranean commander takes care of the sea lanes. Close liaison is kept between the two commands and joint planning is the rule. AFMed headquarters is located at Malta, under the command of Admiral Sir Deric Holland-Martin, Royal Navy.
Testing of command control functions during the maneuver described, and during all the other exercises, is a continuous undertaking. How does SACEur, General Lemnitzer, through his southern flank, CinCSouth, Admiral Russell, control the organization?
A look at the map shows that a single land force headquarters could not participate effectively in the details of the land battle in the three separated nations. This fact became evident soon after the organization of Allied Forces Southern Europe on 21 June 1951, by Admiral Robert B. Carney, U. S. Navy. At that time, Italy alone was a member of NATO, but in 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the alliance.
With the completion of the southern tier, four principal subordinate commands were set up to handle their assigned tasks:
(ComLandSouth, commanded by General Siro Bernabo of the Italian Army at Verona.) SETAF, the U. S. Southern European Task Force under Major General Eugene F. Cardwell, U. S. Army, supports Italian armed forces in the defense of Italy from headquarters at Verona, also.
(ComLandSoutheast, commanded by Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U. S. Army, at Izmir, Turkey.) This headquarters co-ordinates the land battle plans for Greece and Turkey, and commands Greek and Turkish Army units assigned to NATO.
(ComStrikForSouth, commanded by Vice Admiral David L. McDonald, U. S. Navy.) This command is Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe, in its NATO role, and the U. S. Sixth Fleet as a national force. Admiral McDonald wears two hats in this assignment: he reports to Admiral Russell, CinCSouth, for NATO matters and to Admiral H. P. Smith, U. S. Navy, CinCUSNavEur in London for national matters. Admiral Smith, in turn, reports to General Lemnitzer as U. S. CincEur, so in this case, NATO and national channels merge.
On shore at NATO headquarters at Bagnoli, Naples, we find the DepCom- StrikForSouth, Rear Admiral E. A. Hannegan, U. S. Navy, who heads up the shore- based Planning Staff in the building next door to Admiral Russell’s headquarters. Here, the many NATO plans are worked out in close co-operation with land and air factors right from their start.
(ComAirSouth, commanded by Lieutenant General Ralph P. Swofford, Jr. ,U. S. Air Force.) Located within 200 yards of Admiral Russell’s office, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe staff planners work air plans and operations into the fabric of the international land-sea-air combined effort. Two subordinate commands come under ComAirSouth; the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force at Vicenza, Italy, and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force at Izmir, Turkey. Air defense is also an AirSouth responsibility.
The physical location of the air and sea headquarters in the same area as the CinCSouth’s planning and operating staff is a big help toward early and thorough planning. Staff officers can get together under the impetus of shoe-leather diplomacy and exchange information quickly. More importantly, the plans are likely to reflect the accurate dovetailing of separate forces into the over-all commander’s concept.
Turning again to the terrain, we see that the land operations logically fall in four areas —Northern Italy, Northern Greece, Eastern Turkey, and Western Turkey. Further, the geography of the zone dictates that every battle will be a land-sea-air battle, not only with respect to operations but also for logistics. Hence, LandSouth at Verona, Italy, and LandSoutheast at Izmir, Turkey, are combined headquarters, too. SETAF, the U. S. Army’s Southern European Task Force, furnishes support with its missile command and other troops to the Italian armed forces. Under U. S. Army Europe at Heidelberg, administratively, it is earmarked for ComLandSouth in war.
LandSoutheast’s large area required the establishment of a small sub-headquarters in Greece. Located at Salonika, the “branch office” can be expanded rapidly in war. Combined Greek-Turkish interests in this sector are emphasized by two principal assistants to the Commander, LandSoutheast; a Greek Army General, Major General Nikolas Papaioannou and a Turkish Army General, Brigadier General Hanza Gurguc.
This organization encourages close coordination at the top—what about the difficult intermeshing of combined operations closer to the bottom? How does a land commander north of Venice, or in the area around Thessalonica or east of Erzurum get air or amphibious support, for example?
The answer is found in the JCOC—Joint Command and Operations Center; JOC— Joint Operations Center; and ASOC—Air Support Operations Center. These co-ordinating groups parallel the chain of command down to Field Army headquarters so that the full capabilities of the southern region’s military resources can be used to the best purpose for any particular operation.
The Joint Command and Operations Centers operate on stand-by at Verona and Izmir, close to the .land and Allied Tactical Air Force headquarters. Representatives of all participating forces expand these centers whenever an exercise or alert is called. Officers from StrikForSouth, AFMed, and other commands and installations make sure that all components of the land-sea-air battle fit their battle plans into the over-all mission. Will an amphibious attack be made? If needed, when and where? Carrier-based air or land-based? Or both? And what about coordination for their attacks? Should Target X be taken on by missile or aircraft? These are the kinds of questions handled by representatives of all commands or by the commanders themselves. Through a war-room complex, information is displayed and kept current though the communications net. Commanders and their deputies allocate resources on the spot and bring land, sea, and air forces together to practice combined plans.
One echelon lower, Joint Operations Centers carry out similar tasks; they allocate supporting forces for the Field Armies of Italy and Greece. In Turkey, mobile Air Support Operations Centers are used. The Allied Tactical Air Force Commander sends this group to handle air support for each Field Army by actual designation of squadrons for various supporting missions and detailed layout of daily tasks.
The mixture of land, sea, and air power in the southern region profits by this coordination from top to bottom to exploit its inherent flexibility. Amphibious Marines of the Battalion Landing Team with the Sixth Fleet, for example, furnish an ideal case of the extension of land power wherever the Sixth Fleet roams. Organized as a Task Force, this team practices amphibious landings at least once a month. Should the need arise, they can be expanded quickly by Marines from the United States.
With the criss-crossing of national and international commands, the terms “earmarked” and “assigned” become especially important. Assigned forces are constantly under the operational control of a NATO commander; naturally, the precise extent of the control is spelled out by agreement with the parent nation. Earmarked forces have been designated by the nations for assignment to a NATO operational command upon mobilization, outbreak of hostilities, or at a specified future date, additionally, for training. The Sixth Fleet is this kind of earmarked force and enters the NATO command structure from time to time on a temporary basis for practice maneuvers, combined exercises or certain alerts. Because of its mobility, the Sixth Fleet, in common with naval forces in general, can switch from national to international responsibilities as required. Even when under NATO control, the service forces of the Fleet remain under national command since logistical support remains principally a national responsibility.
The command and control system for the southern region must operate over large distances and be able to weld all forces into a flexible and powerful fist—strong enough to deter, hopefully, but well able to handle an attack if one should come.
What guidelines for the future emerge from a study of the southern region’s organization? At first glance, the relationships seem confusing: three countries to defend, six nations in the composite force, and land, sea, air, and amphibious forces to fit together into a first-class fighting team. From the analysis of the forces and the terrain, it seems clear that a land battle within each nation would be fought primarily with its own national forces, at least at the start. Air power, either for the land battle, or for wider strategic objectives, can be brought to bear from land bases and the fleet and deployed with a slight delay from other European bases or the United States.
As a ready force, Allied Forces Southern Europe can counter Soviet power with immediately available strength: some 20 divisions or equivalent in assigned and earmarked categories, about 1,250 aircraft of all kinds, and the ships of the Sixth Fleet. These potent combat forces are linked through the network of co-ordinating centers described above. An air defense net adds to the region’s military posture through a system of early warning radars that feed into Air Operations Centers, then to AirSouth’s Regional Air Operations Center at Naples.
The combination of assets in the southern region makes a strong addition to the Free World’s striking power. Through its mixture of land power, sea power and air power, a graduated response to an attack can be made in the precise terms desired. From an all- out nuclear strike down to a fleet visit, the appropriate form of national and international power can be applied.
Considered as an instrument of controlled, visible and mobile strength, StrikForSouth is easily the most versatile element of the southern command. Free of shore base and able to move rapidly, the Fleet furnishes the “cop-on-the-beat” who can make his influence felt simply by being around. As both a U. S. and a NATO commander, Vice Admiral McDonald is able to represent national and international interests as needed.
The Sixth Fleet usually includes about 50 ships, some 200 aircraft, and around 25,000 men. The fleet organization—attack carrier striking force, amphibious landing force and self-contained service force—is set up so that it can operate indefinitely at sea without shore bases. It is a ready force, a fleet in being, with all the impact of that old term in the classical sense:
The striking force from the carriers is capable of flying jet aircraft in a radius of 1,000 miles. These craft can fly reconnaissance, interceptor, fighter, and bomber missions in all weather. As a valuable tactical aid, they can furnish air support to ground units under certain conditions. In the relatively confined “open sea” of the Mediterranean, close co-ordination is essential for efficient combined operations. This is especially important because CinCSouth does not have the responsibility for conduct of naval and maritime air operations in the Mediterranean—this task, as discussed earlier, has been assigned to CinCAFMed, a co-equal command. Therefore, StrikForSouth is available to the southern region Commander in Chief as a flexible, versatile, roving powerhouse; a fighting machine able to attack with a demonstration, a feint or any sort of controlled power appropriate to the situation. Future developments in weapons systems and tactics may extend the flexibility and power of composite forces even further. Polaris submarines could be added to the fleet to expand the capability in one dimension; the possibility of flying paratroops from carriers has been discussed as a future development in yet another dimension.*
All of the southern region forces contribute to a strong “sword and shield” for NATO. Although the concept of “an attack on one is an attack on all” envisages a general war if member countries are attacked, the shield forces require an aggressor to consider the cost of an attack very carefully. General Norstad pointed this out to the NATO Parliamentarians in December 1960, “The particular purpose for which the shield forces are being created, and the general purposes which govern their deployment and use, are not only valid, but are of even greater importance in the period of nuclear plenty and missile delivery into which we are now moving. . . .Except in certain well-defined cases of direct self-defense, atomic weapons should be introduced into battle only after a particular decision to do so has resulted from the operation of an established decision-making process. This process will ensure that such a decision would, in all cases, be taken by an authority at a level higher than that of the basic combat unit, and that the level of combat would have been raised above that which could be dealt with by conventional weapons. ...”
By forcing an aggressor to pause, the shield forces could provide time for preparation by NATO as well as some searching second thoughts on the part of the attacker. This would effectively place the responsibility and reduce the chance of a general war through accident or local rivalry. The shield force could blunt and retard the enemy attack so that our retaliatory forces—the NATO “sword”—could strike at the enemy in full measure. The cost of an assault must be kept so high that any rational enemy would not dare to attack.
Now for a look at some other aspects that make the NATO southern flank especially interesting. Many of the externals with particular attraction were shown at the huge land-sea-air tenth birthday parade at Naples on 18 June 1961. A special ceremonial group from Turkey with flashing sabers and ancient Janizary costumes; Evzones from Greece with their fierce moustaches, pleated kilts and pompomed shoes; snappy Bersaglieri from Italy with plumed hats; the Royal Hellenic Air Force “aerobats”; a U. S. Marine Corps amphibious assault made along the waterfront—all these were extremely colorful parade attractions.
Many not-so-colorful details of organization contribute to the ready posture of the southern region. Continual inspections and checks of readiness, all cleared with the nation concerned; special attention to communications through a large signal section and various operating networks, to include an ionospheric forward-scatter system; and painstaking attention to detail in the many combined plans—these produce an efficient and well-balanced team.
The great advantage of the balanced force concept is the range of choice it gives to political leaders. From a strictly military point of view, it is far better to have a complete spectrum of deterrence available than to be limited to a creampuff response on one hand or a shattering cataclysm on the other. In its capability for all kinds of action, the mobile StrikForSouth and the other elements of the command fit the need for a modern force posed by Dr. Edward Teller, the H-bomb expert—“more like the knife of a surgeon and less like the axe of an executioner.”
Of course, this ability does not detract in any way from NATO’s premise—“an attack on one is an attack on all.” But the credibility of a deterrent is much more soundly established when the deterrent force is visible, always ready and able to respond in more than one way. In the case of the Sixth Fleet, its dual status as StrikForSouth in NATO as well as representative of U. S. interests in the Mediterranean gives the Free World another added dividend.
Another aspect of flexibility in the southern region is found on the air power side. In the event of need, plans call for rapid deployment of additive squadrons from the United States to flesh out CinCSouth air. An example of effectiveness of this use of air power was shown in the Checkmate II exercise of last September, referred to earlier. The Military Air Transport Service flew 194 missions in this operation and carried some 4,000 troops and 2,250 tons of cargo. Further, the Tactical Air Command reinforced AFSouth with a composite air strike force of fighters and reconnaissance aircraft from the United States. These added elements illustrated the flexible reaction capability of the southern flank.
A pattern of combined organization emerges from an analysis of AFSouth operations. Without the crucial test of war itself, it would appear that the kind of organization and the style of operations in the southern region have added to the capability for meeting limited or ambiguous threats. By having StrikForSouth as a roving element, the southern commander in chief has, in effect, a prize package of land, sea, and air power at his immediate control. Although part of an international force, the national character of this fleet ensures easier logistical control, while NATO availability as an “earmarked” force can provide exceptionally fast reaction to any international demand.
Another factor that emerges as a pattern for combined commands is the emphasis on combined-staff planning. The physical location of air and sea commands makes it easy to bring planners together early in the game and to adjust problems before they have grown. This is not anything unique to the southern command, of course, except perhaps in relative emphasis upon complete teamwork.
While commands with different requirements and problems must develop their own solutions, the idea of a strong mobile force has certainly proven a valuable addition to the southern area capabilities.
All of the above does not imply that Allied Forces Southern Europe are free of problems. Far from it. AFSouth soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are beset by the same difficulties as all other commands, whether NATO or national. Perhaps the greatest over-all problem of the region is the requirement for developing the national economies of Greece and Turkey. Italy has been expanding its national output at one of the highest rates in the Western world in the last few years: Greece and Turkey have developed also, but from a smaller base. Although not a military problem, the stage of economic development determines the kind and quality of military effort that can be made.
Most of the logistics problems stem from this situation. It seems probable that military aid will have to be furnished for some time to come, and this aid currently comes through bilateral agreements between each nation and the United States. Perhaps in the future, some means can be developed for making mutual aid more of a NATO program under the principle of interdependence. This principle with its somewhat forbidding name was announced in an Eisenhower-Macmillan release in 1957: “The countries of the free world are interdependent, and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found.”
Promising beginnings have been made toward carrying out this aim by such acts as the development of the G-91 lightweight strike and reconnaissance aircraft as a co-operative NATO effort. Standardized weapons systems and co-operative development make for the most efficient use of resources because they reduce expensive duplication of effort, and make it unnecessary for every nation to strain to have every possible type of weapons system.
Another aspect of economic development is found in the critical shortage of specialists and technicians in the southern region, mostly in Greece and Turkey. Here again, this task is one of development and the situation should improve as the nations make an effort to upgrade their pool of skilled manpower and rate of industrial development.
Related to the same problem, too, is the need for bringing both the size and equipment for shield forces up to the desirable level. What this level should be has already been set out and there is fairly close agreement on desirable force goals, not only in the southern region, but for NATO as a whole. The old, old problem of the three M’s—men, money, and material—is surely nothing new to any NATO member nation. As new weapons systems come into inventory, harassed budgeteers groan at rising costs: yet the stern demands of defense grow no easier. Two areas that need improvement in the southern region, in particular, are modernization of equipment and adequate reserves of ammunition and other battlefield needs.
Since military strength is not an end in itself but is ever directed toward a political goal, the common NATO problem becomes: “How can a continuous posture of alertness and urgency be maintained?” Without crying “wolf” and staggering from crisis to crisis, the Western world must somehow learn to keep forces at a high level of operational readiness. Much has already been done through alert practice and surprise tests of field units. More remains to be done to keep general interest in NATO at a high level. A psychological rebirth of interest in freedom seems indicated; perhaps to be achieved through emphasis on the common ideals of the Western world.
Already much is being done toward attaining these goals. The situation is greatly improved over 1951 when Admiral Carney set up the first AFSouth headquarters aboard USS Mount Olympus in the bay of Naples. Keeping enthusiasm high for an intangible idea like NATO is no easy task; after all, everyone is a citizen of a nation and NATO is not a nation. It has no tradition or place or fables of its own; no cities, mountains or lakes to be fondly remembered; no houses or fields or winding roads leading to NATO scenes. NATO in itself may evoke a common and sensible support but hardly the fierce patriotism a man feels for his native land.
Yet, the idea of NATO is the underlying force that has made Churchill’s “soft underbelly of Europe” become lean and hard. It would take a much greater effort now to invade the southern flank and an aggressor would receive a stiff resistance indeed. In fact, the common will and determination and spirit of the southern region should in themselves deter an aggressor from even trying.
In conclusion, the lessons to be derived from the experience of ten years of successful operation on the south side of NATO are:
(1) A flexible, balanced naval striking force is a huge advantage to an international command. When equipped with all types of weapons systems, from an infantry platoon to aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, this force is able to provide a credible deterrent to many forms of aggression.
(2) International operations can be carried out with precision and success when staffs are thoroughly trained, completely indoctrinated and imbued with the joint appreciation of interservice and international problems.
(3) Complex plans for mutual support over long distances are practicable only when thoroughly understood, carefully rehearsed, and constantly up-dated by planning staffs.
The southern region is a dynamic area of NATO that looks to its future with optimism and spirit. As General Lauris Norstad told the members of the Italian Parliament in Rome on 28 November 1960, quoting appropriately from Dante, “If thou follow but thy star, thou canst not miss at last a glorious haven.”
*See “From Ocean to Drop Zone,” Military Review, February 1960.