The long history of Latin America contains many accounts of military and naval actions of interest to the professional student. The first battles between modern ironclads, the first use of the “automobile” torpedo, major amphibious operations 35 years before Gallipoli, desert, mountain and jungle warfare, are all as much a part of Latin American history as Simon Bolivar’s 200 battles and Jose de San Martin’s epic crossing of the Andes.
Seventy years ago there was a unique civil war—a navy without an army opposing an army without a navy—an elephant in conflict with a whale.
The President of Chile at the close of 1890 was a clever and favored gentleman—Jose Manuel Balmaceda—well-born, well-educated, and well-married.
There were some political troubles to begin the year of 1891, however, but President Balmaceda had no fears. He had cultivated powerful and influential friends. He had taken pains to treat the army well and felt secure in their loyalty. It was true that these necessary measures had cost considerable money, but one could always extract more taxes from the people. Of course, the Congress was proving troublesome on this point, even to officially disapproving his most recent taxations. But Balmaceda had demonstrated his power by collecting taxes without congressional approval. If the Congress did not like his methods, they would be shown that what was not Balmaceda’s right by law would be Balmaceda’s right by force.
This time the congressional leaders did not take up the matter of illegal taxation with the President or with his army. On 6 January 1891, in fear of a show of force, they fled the capital and boarded the Chilean ironclad Blanco Encalada in Valparaiso Harbor. To the commanding officer, Captain Jorge Montt, they presented their demands that the Chilean Navy uphold the elected representatives of the people and assist in deposing the autocratic President.
Captain Montt did not hesitate in his decision. The same day the congressional leaders boarded his ship, he hoisted the broad pennant of Commodore of the Congressional Fleet. Naval ships in. Chilean waters, in close touch with the home situation, almost entirely went over to the popular Congressionalist cause. The casemate vessel Cochrane, the monitor Huascar,1 the protected cruiser Esmerelda and four lighter units (corvettes and gunboats), joined Commodore Montt and his Blanco Encalada to form the rebel fleet. Opposing them in home waters, professing loyalty to Balmaceda, were only two torpedo gunboats, the Almirante Condell and the Almirante Lynch. However, the most powerful vessels in the Chilean Navy, the ironclad Arturo Prat and two fast cruisers, were in European shipyards. Their knowledge of the internal situation would be obtained principally from official cablegrams sent by President Balmaceda’s autocratic regime. It could be expected that these powerful vessels, through ignorance of the general situation, would remain faithful to Balmaceda. For the time being, however, they remained only a potential government fleet; so far as Chile was immediately concerned, the stage was set for a unique civil war. The President and the army of a nation were in conflict with the Congress and the navy of that same nation.
At first glance, the position of the Congressionalists and their fleet appeared ludicrous. The Balmacedist Army controlled the principal cities and harbors of Chile along its 2,600- mile coast. Technically insurgents, the fleet could not turn to a foreign power for bases or supplies. Powerful units of the Chilean Navy were in European ports, being fitted for the long voyage around the Horn. The insurgent ships were in need of fuel and provisions and a secure base of operations. Finally, there were no funds to finance the uprising.
A fleet and a congress, with no base, no resupply of fuel, ammunition or men! They could not even set foot upon their own homeland except as an invading force against the official government. Yet, even less could they set foot on a foreign soil and possibly implicate their country, weakened now by their own actions, in a foreign war.
These men were patriots, not fighting against the people of Chile, but against an autocrat and a military clique that were oppressing the people. Their position was a poor one, by strategic reckoning, but intangibles gave a hidden strength to their arms. Their cause was just. The common man of their country was ready to lend his sympathy and support. They had the bulk of effective naval strength in Chilean waters on their side, and Chile is geographically and economically a maritime nation.
Looking back from our own troubled times, we can appreciate the soundness of the decision displayed by this hastily organized government and force. Step by step, we can see the reasoning that brought them to their first action against the army of Balmaceda.
First, it was obvious that a Chilean base was needed immediately, as an anchorage and refueling point for the ships, and as a point of contact with the generally sympathetic populace.
Second, it was immediately necessary that funds be acquired for financing the resistance movement.
Third, it was imperative that a substantial victory or series of victories be obtained against the government forces immediately, in order to instill confidence in the Congressional cause.
Finally, decisive victory must be won before the powerful naval units in Europe could be brought to bear against the Congressional fleet.
Because of the peculiar geography and economics of Chile, most of these requirements could be fulfilled in a single action. At the time, Chile’s wealth lay principally in her nitrate deposits in the hot desert country of the north. Ships from every major country paid call at the principal ports of the north, and foreign powers would not look with disfavor on any faction so long as it permitted an uninterrupted flow of the valuable nitrates. At the same time, it could be expected that commercial companies would not be particular to whom they paid revenues, their only interest being full holds at a fair price. The combination of adequate harbor facilities and the prospect of large income from nitrate exports would give great impetus to the Congressionalist cause. In addition, difficult overland communications to the north from Balmaceda’s main forces around Valparaiso would preclude reinforcement of his northern garrisons for many days. Once ashore, the Congressionalists could expect much popular support in the form of recruits and supplies for their own army. But the emphasis must be on speed—speed and audacity.
On 16 January 1891 (ten days after the political schism), the Congressional fleet arrived off Pisaqua, in northern Chile. A naval landing force was put ashore and advanced inland to the small but strategic railroad town of Dolores, scene of one of the major battles of the War of the Pacific in 1879. Balmacedist troops were in the vicinity and a series of sharp actions were fought ashore between the opposing forces. Although the naval landing force was ashore for seven days and advanced a considerable distance inland, it is properly designated as an amphibious raid, since its mission was not to seize and hold, but to obtain recruits and military supplies for a greater effort later on. In this, it was quite successful. On 23 January, the original landing force, plus a number of local recruits, evacuated to the ships and the organization of a larger, more effective landing force began. Time was the principal enemy of the Congressionalists at this point.
Only three days after the successful raid on Pisaqua, the landing was repeated, this time with the purpose of bringing the Balmacedists to a decisive action. That the hastily organized force was hardly adequate to its task was evident in the fact that the Congressionalist landing force, after several weeks of maneuver ashore, received a sound defeat at the hands of the Balmacedist regular troops, reinforced overland from the large port of Iquique to the south.
This land defeat could well have been the end of the Congressional cause, had not a new estimate of the situation turned the defeat into a major victory. The landing force was defeated by government troops of the area, reinforced from Iquique. But during the operations ashore, the Congressional Fleet had learned that Iquique was practically stripped of Balmacedist troops. As the troops ashore maneuvered into position for the main battle, the forces afloat sped to Iquique, landed an occupation force of bluejackets on 16 February, and then made a speedy return to Pisaqua. Almost at the same time, the last battle was being fought ashore, and the navy commenced evacuation of the remaining Congres- sionalist landing force. Despite military losses, a brilliant victory had been achieved, heartening the naval forces and the Chilean people alike, and so demoralizing the Balmacedist forces in the north that no serious attempt to retake Iquique was made. There remained, however, the threat of the considerable Balmacedist army in the area. It was evident from the military defeat at Pisaqua that the hastily organized, poorly trained personnel of the Congressionalist army were no match for the Balmacedist regulars. Colonel Estanislao Del Canto, head of the new Congressionalist army, moved cautiously, holding the city and harbor of Iquique and drilling and training his spirited recruits. He was aided by the presence of a former Prussian army officer, Emil Korner, whom he named as his chief-of- staff. A month after the seizure of Iquique, a newly confident Congressionalist army moved inland from its coastal stronghold, seeking the main force of the Balmacedists. A major battle was fought in the vicinity of Pozo Almonte, resulting in the defeat of the government forces and complete control of northern Chile by the Congressionalists.
The government gave up the struggle for the north, making no attempt to move out of its strongholds in central Chile. Soon, all the country from the northern border to Coquimbo was in the hands of the rebels. Recruits poured in to the spare Congressionalist ranks. From the nitrate exports, a stream of money swelled the Congressionalist treasury. The prospect of ultimate victory appeared brighter day by day. Yet there was deep concern in the minds of Commodore Montt and Colonel Del Canto. The powerful naval units from Europe might arrive any day, placing in the hands of Balmaceda a force afloat that might well give him control of the sea, the principal advantage exploited by the Congressionalists. Before the ships arrived, a successful assault would have to be made upon the heart of Balmaceda’s strength—Valparaiso, the capital city of Chile.
Training was begun again. Through March, April, May; through June and July of 1891, the military and naval forces of the rebels labored to perfect their skills. By August, even the professional soldier, Emil Korner, was satisfied. Ten thousand troops were embarked on eight transports seized from Chilean companies. Six naval vessels completed the attack force. Boats from the transports were supplemented by others from the naval vessels for the landing.2 Each of the boats had been provided with a mitrailleuse to sweep the beach as it approached land.
On 20 August 1891, the landing force conducted a successful landing at the Bay of Quintero, a few miles north of Valparaiso. Newspaper accounts of the day describe the landings as “desperate and rash.” True, the very undertaking of amphibious assults was considered daring at the time. The landing itself, however, went smoothly, without opposition. Once ashore, the Congressionalist army organized and commenced its advance south toward Valparaiso. The rebel fleet, possibly hoping for a surprise victory similar to that at Iquique, approached Valparaiso Harbor, but were held off by fire from Fort Andes, at the harbor entrance.
Five thousand Balmacedist troops from Valparaiso, on learning of the landing, left the shelter of the city and hastened north to delay the rebel advance until reinforcements arrived.
The rebel route of advance was not an easy one. Just south of the landing beaches at Quintero, the Aconcaqua River emptied into the Pacific Ocean. The Balmacedist troops from Valparaiso were first to reach this river and hastily fortified the heights on the southern bank. When the Congressionalist army arrived at the Rio Aconcaqua, they faced the difficult task of having to cross the river at its mouth and storm the heights to the south in order to come to grips with the defending Balmacedists.
Assisted by their armed boats, a successful attempt was made to force the river. Once on the southern bank, the heights were assaulted with much vigor and great loss of life. The Balmacedists defended bravely, hoping the while that the expected reinforcements would arrive. After a bloody struggle, the Congres- sionalists seized the heights and the remaining Balmacedists were either captured or fell back toward Valparaiso. Surprisingly, losses in killed and wounded were about equal, both sides losing approximately 1,000 men. However, 1,500 men of the government forces surrendered to the rebels after the final assault on the heights, and were welcomed into the Congressionalist ranks as trained and armed recruits—altogether, a gain of some 500 men.
The action at the Aconcaqua River had delayed the rebel advance and permitted the Balmacedists to concentrate all available forces north of Valparaiso. No attempt had been made to relieve the gallant force defending the Aconcaqua. Instead, the main force of some 12,000 men were ordered to fortify the beautiful suburban town of Vina del Mar, just north of Valparaiso.
Continuing their southern advance after a brief reorganization, the Congressionalist army advanced to the outskirts of Vina del Mar, where it was halted by the formidable defenses and heavy fire of the Balmacedists. The defenses were felt out with minor attacks and it became evident that the Congressionalists had at last come against the main force of President Balmaceda.
Another major decision was necessary. Should they storm the positions as they had at the Rio Aconcaqua? Losses would be heavy, but even a defeat would not necessarily mean annihilation so long as those friendly warships and transports could be reached. The navy had been the great champion of the Congressionalist cause since the inception of hostilities in January. They had seized Iquique; they had evacuated the defeated army at Pisaqua; they had landed this victorious force at Bahia Quintero. The men, though soldiers, would be loath to leave the sight of those beloved ships for a campaign inland. Yet there were those government defenses and the 12,000 government troops holding Vina del Mar, daily improving their fortifications, daily building up supplies. No, for this final battle, the rebel army must sever its relations with the sea. It must abandon its communications with the fleet and move inland, east of Valparaiso, and advance upon the capital from the rear. Only in that way could the army of Balmaceda be tempted from its prepared positions.
The decision, was made and carried out with aggressiveness and skill. On 24 August 1891, the Congressionalist Army marched inland, swung far around, and approached the capital from the southeast. President Balmaceda was overjoyed. A jubilant cablegram was sent the Chilean minister at Washington, claiming a complete defeat of the insurgents at Vina del Mar. Since retreat to the ships was now cut off, it was already claimed that the Congressionalist forces had surrendered. The war was rapidly drawing to a close. The Congressionalist army, determined and sober, approached Valparaiso. The Balmacedists, jubilant and over-confident, were already celebrating the victory.
The end came quickly. When initial contact was made between the opposing forces, the Balmacedists quickly realized they were facing no demoralized rabble retreating to the coast, but a highly competent army intent on the seizure of the capital of Chile. Government troops were hastily withdrawn from the northern defenses and rushed to the southeast. The final battle of the war was fought on 28 August 1891, at the little town of La Placilla. The disorganized, over-confident government troops were annihilated. That same evening the Congressionalist army triumphantly entered Valparaiso. As the citizens cheered their liberators, perhaps a few remembered those hulking ships beyond Fort Andes.
The autocratic Balmaceda fled to sanctuary in the Argentine legation, a tired and broken man. His friends were fleeing; his army was a shambles on the battlefield of La Placilla. He had been the first citizen of his country. Now the people of his country were united against him in condemnation. He had reached the pinnacle of living, and now had declined to the depths. Before he died by his own hand, perhaps Jose Balmaceda also remembered those ships; they were the real instrument of his downfall.
1. Huascar, built in 1865 for the Peruvian Navy, designed by Captain Coles of the British Navy; classed as a monitor, 1,800 tons, two 10-inch guns, in service as late as 1951 as flagship of the Port Admiral at Talcahuano, Chile. In a fight with British cruisers in 1877, Huascar received 60 to 70 hits without decrease in fighting efficiency; at Punta Angamos in 1879, Huascar fought two Chilean casemate vessels, receiving 11 hits and much damage. As part of the spoils of war, she was taken over by the Chilean Navy and continued her long and useful career.
2. Of interest to amphibious experts, 16 flatboats were rigged to the sides of the ships and launched in the same manner we presently launch pontoon barges from LST’s. The flatboats carried 100-150 men each and had especially constructed overhangs at the bow in lieu of ramps. They were towed in by steam launches and warped in by lines on buoys offshore. Debarkation commenced at dawn; landings began at 0700; all troops (9,500 officers and men) were ashore by 2230.